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Abstract 
The study is based upon an analysis of the general principles of criminal liability in 
English law and Shari 'ah. It is hoped that it may provide a valid basis for discussion of 
the future development of criminal law. 
The relationship between law and society is an organic one and this relationship in 
Shari'ah is based on revelatory text of precepts, law, and admonitions. Shari'ah is an 
essential part of faith of every Muslim; a sound knowledge of its principles not only 
gives him a sense of inner fulfilment but enables him to order his life according to the 
dictates of his religion. On the other hand, in English law, religious beliefs and private 
morality might be viewed as not a matter for law. Religion is in that context generally 
conceived as a spiritual sphere of supra-human connotation distinct from law, which is 
basically a secular concern. 
Both the systems of law under consideration are different in their sources and nature. 
English law, being a positive law, finds its source in legislation and other recognised 
sources. Shari 'ah is a divine ordinance imposed upon people without having a freedom 
of choice and it has its roots in its primary sources, the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunnah. 
However, the revelatory nature of Shari'ah does not render it entirely inflexible and 
immutable. The finality of authoritative legal texts is confined only to a limited number 
of injunctions in the primary sources. The secondary sources provide flexibility to meet 
the changing requirements of society. A legal system should strike a fair balance 
between flexibility and inflexibility of legal rules. A very flexible system of law may 
lead to inconsistencies, illogicalities and at the same time may be subject to abuse by 
judges while a rigid system, which leaves no room for judicial discretion is likely to 
lead to injustice in certain cases. It is submitted that the very flexible nature of English 
law has left it full of inconsistencies and illogicalities, despite. the appropriate use of 
judicial discretion. 
The research offers a general view of modern thinking about the theoretical foundations 
and methodology of Shari'ah. Shari 'ah recognises a variety of sources and methods 
1 
from which a rule of law might be derived. Part-I of the thesis discusses the evolving 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence from their rudimentary sources. The specific 
relationship between socio-religious reality and the production of theoretical legal 
discourse is illustrated in Part-11 and III while dealing with the problem of intoxication 
and private defence in society. It suggests that Shari'ah provides a framework in which 
the complex and sometimes competing needs of an individual and society can be fairly 
apportioned. 
The research will demonstrate that there is a well developed system of criminal law in 
Shari'ah that can be compared with the most developed and civilised criminal law of 
the contemporary world, for example, English criminal law. In order to compare the 
compatibility of both the legal systems, the approaches of both towards the problems of 
intoxication and self-defence have been taken as a parameter. Though Shari 'ah 
provisions seem to be predominantly prescriptive as compared to English criminal law, 
the comparison will show that it can provide practical solutions to problems faced by 
human society of any age. Shari 'ah being a revealed law is proactive in its nature. It 
takes action to cause changes and not only react to a change when it happens. This 
particular feature can be felt while dealing with the problem of intoxication. English 
criminal law, on the other hand, being a positive law bears the characteristics of a 
reactive law. It reacts to events or changes rather than acting first to cause change or 
prevent something. Another major difference between the two legal systems might be 
that English criminal law has passed through many evolutionary phases and reached at 
the present stage through the efforts of the political power and the state; whereas, 
Muslim states and governments throughout the centuries neither had a hand in the 
development of Islamic jurisprudence nor in the training and certification of jurists or 
jurisconsults whose task it was to formulate the law. 
History suggests that using the combined forces of religion, morality and law Shari 'ah 
has effectively eradicated social evils and created a peaceful environment for human co- 
existence, where every one can enjoy his rights without a fear of infringement by the 
others. In cases of infringement of such rights, the offender shall be liable to severe 
punishments. The principles of criminal liability are on a par with the corresponding 
principles of the English criminal law. While protecting the rights of the victim of the 
crime, Shari 'ah does not ignore the rights of the offender for fair trail, impartial justice 
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and liability for punishment proportional to the offence committed by him. At the same 
time it recognises excuse and justification defences under appropriate circumstances, as 
it will be evident while comparing the defences of intoxication and self-defence with the 
same in English criminal law. 
The study reveals that there are similarities and differences between English law and 
Shari'ah when considering the issue of crime and criminal liability. However, this may 
be considered as normal phenomenon of comparing any two different legal systems. 
The differences can be attributed to their sources, origin, history and nature of the social 
values to be protected. Similarities can be ascribed to zeal for social justice and stability. 
The study of differences and similarities will provide an opportunity to illuminate our 
understanding of law and the process of its development. As both the systems have their 
own methodology to tackle legal issues, a different approach to the similar problem will 
provide a fresh insight leading to revitalised solutions. It will also be helpful to 
understand the methodology and the legal reasoning of both the systems leading 
towards a better understanding of law in general and at the same time providing 
efficient means for improvement. 
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Introduction 
The English legal system based upon the principles of Common law is the product of 
an evolutionary process spread over centuries. ' A number of countries in the world, 
primarily from British Commonwealth, also follow the doctrines of Common law. 
2 
Though the U. S. has been independent for a long time, its laws are also influenced by 
common law and the same influence has been exported to Japan and the Philippines. 
3 
It suggests that a considerable majority of people, throughout the world, is being 
governed under the principles of Common law. 
On the other hand, Islam, being the religion of almost one quarter of the population of 
the world, practised in the private lives of Muslims is claimed to be the only other 
major legal system, beside civil law, affecting the lives of majority in one way or the 
other. 4 This majority belongs to a variety of races and cultures scattered throughout the 
world but bound by a common faith and a sense of belonging to a single community, 
distinguishable by their adherence to the teachings of Islam. 5 It means that Islam 
applies to order the lives and social conditions of many hundreds of millions of 
Muslims throughout the world. However, it is pertinent to mention that not all the 
Muslim population live under a political system which applies Islamic law to order the 
lives of its subjects. 
A comparison of both these systems, particularly in the realm of criminal law, is the 
major aim of this study. The study will help to understand the law and legal reasoning 
of English law and Shari 'ah along with development of various legal concepts. It will 
not only highlight the differences but also the similarities between the principles of the 
two legal systems. Study of similarities and contrasts is the best means to illuminate 
one's understanding of law and suggesting means of its improvement. 
Comparative studies are important because every system has its own methodology to 
tackle the legal issues. A different approach to similar problem provides fresh insights 
Atiyah, P. S., Law and Modern Society (2°d ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 5. 
2 Roebuck, D., The Background of the Common Law (2' ed., Oxford University Press, N. York, 1990) pp. 1-2. 
' Ibid. p. 2. 
4 Lippman, Matthew, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure (Praeger, London, 1988) p. 1. 
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leading to revitalised solutions. Comparative law is very useful for a better 
understanding of one's own national law and providing tools for its improvement. 6 
Comparative study may also be beneficial for the jurists; they may find the foreign 
legal thoughts more appropriate for the administration of justice in their own society. 
Comparative law is not only helpful in understanding foreign law but it also develops 
international understanding by providing an opportunity to study various legal systems 
through their culture and political system; hence leading to peaceful co-existence 
between the nations. 7 Though practically it is impossible to produce a common law for 
the entire human kind, like the principles of natural sciences, to resolve social conflicts, 
yet a comparative study can provide a much wider range of solutions than a legal 
system devoted to a single nation. ' 
Unfortunately many people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, tend to reduce Shari'ah 
and its system of jurisprudence to its sub-system of penal laws, which seems very 
strict and harsh. Thus the idea of an Islamic state is essentially associated with its 
penal laws. This over simplification ignores the fact that penal law of Islam constitutes 
only a small portion of the whole Shari'ah system. There is a need for a better 
understanding of Islam not only for the non-Muslims but also for those Muslims who 
have certain misunderstandings regarding Islam as a system of life. It is impossible to 
understand Islam without understanding its law. 9 This study is an attempt to make 
principles of Islamic law understandable to test their compatibility with the English 
law. However, it is not the totality of Islamic law which is being investigated here, but 
it is only one particular segment of it which is isolated in order to see how far it could 
provide a sufficient foundation for the understanding of the whole system of Islamic 
criminology and penology. 
The basic problem in comparing both the systems is that Islamic law does not exist in 
any official codified form; rather it is there in the scattered opinions of Muslim jurists, 
whereas English law can be found either in the authoritative judgements of the 
5 Nasir, Jamal J., The Islamic Law of Personal Status (3`d ed., Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 2. 
6 David, Rene & Brierley, John G. C., Major Legal Systems in the World Today (3`d ed., Stevens & Sons, 
London, 1985) p. 6. 
Ibid. p. 8. 
s Zweigert, Konard & Kotz, Hein, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Translated by Weir, Tony) (3`d. 
ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 15. 
9 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 1. 
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common law courts or codified in the statutory form. However, the problem can be 
solved by comparing the principles of Islamic law derived by the Muslim jurists from 
its sources and those followed by the English courts, while deciding practical issues 
before them. As far as the state practices in the modern Muslim world are concerned, 
these do not represent the true picture of Islamic law. Though a number of 
independent states have been officially declared as Islamic states and constitutionally 
Shari'ah is the principal source of their legislation, the question is of the extent to 
which they have applied the principles of Shari'ah in practice. An observation of the 
national codes of these states reveals that most of the governmental business, judicial 
system, commercial matters and all other major fields of life are being run by the 
secular laws. However, in the last quarter of the 20`h century, in certain Muslim 
countries, some half hearted attempts have been made to base the legislation on the 
principles of Shari'ah. 
For example, in Pakistan, Hudood Ordinance has been promulgated since 1979. The 
then government decided to Islamise the criminal law without meeting the 
prerequisites for such a step. A theft, in Shari'ah, will be liable for the amputation of 
hand only if committed in a society based on social justice fulfilling the needs of all its 
members. 10 An accused driven by the force of circumstances, unable to earn his 
livelihood and at the same time deprived of the social security, shall not be liable to 
Hadd because the offence was committed due to the fault of the state. 11 Hudood 
punishments are to be implemented only in an Islamic society where Shari 'ah is 
implemented in its complete form in all the spheres of life. Criminal law of Islam is 
not the whole system of Islam, rather it is a small part of the whole system. If these 
punishments are applied apart from the whole system, it will not be appropriate. 
In general, the application of criminal law of Islam must be viewed within the whole 
system and not in isolation. The obligations of the individuals are to be enforced by 
the coercive force of the state, but before enforcing the obligations, it is to be ensured 
that rights and privileges of the subjects are secured. Shari 'ah does not intend to 
amputate the hand of a hungry or needy thief, for in this case the blame of injustice is 
10 Bassiouni, M. Cherif (ed) The Islamic Criminal Justice System (Oceana Publications, 1982) p. 5. 
11 Doi, Abdur Rahman I., Shari'ah; The Islamic Law (Reprint. Taha Publishers, London, 1997) p. 224. 
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attributed to the state and society. 12 The view is proved by the fact that the second 
rightly-guided caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, suspended the application of fixed 
punishment for theft during the time of famine, when the state failed to discharge its 
functions to meet the needs of its subjects. 13 The fact that the penal law of Islam can 
be applied only after a Muslim state has discharged its obligations towards society, 
ensuring social justice, equality and civil rights will reduce the instances in which they 
may be applied. In addition, the execution of the punishment is further restricted by 
imposing strict conditions and burden of proof beyond the slightest doubt or suspicion. 
A government that does not fulfil the basic social and economic needs of its subjects 
has no right to implement only the punishments of Shari 'ah. Moreover, well trained 
judicial machinery is needed for interpretation and enforcement of Shari'ah law. 
Enforcement of Shari'ah's principles by the judges trained in English law within the 
framework of secular judicial system is nothing more than putting the cart before the 
horse. Moreover, implementation of Islamic criminal law should be the last phase of 
Islamisation of laws. Only the infliction of Shari'ah's punishments, leaving aside all 
its other aspects has portrayed a totally different picture of Shari 'ah to non-Muslims. 
The interest in preferring such a project is, basically, to unveil the relationship 
between the community created by Islam and the measures it took to protect that 
community from falling into error or disorder. Furthermore, to show that the measures 
adopted by Shari 'ah are compatible with any advanced legal system. Like Pakistan, in 
many other countries enforcement of Shari'ah is on piecemeal basis, as elements of 
traditions rather than as manifestation of a governing principle. 14 
The research, based upon the principles of Shari 'ah, as revealed in the Holy Qur'an 
and Sunnah, deduced by the Muslim jurists rather than the state practices of the 
contemporary Muslim states, will help to remove the misunderstanding. The whole 
study will be concentrated on the question whether the Shari'ah fulfils the conditions 
of positive law and can meet the requirements of modern ages. In order to remain 
within the limits of time and space, the research has been restricted to the study of the 
12 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 196. 
13 Al-Sanani, Abu-Bakar Abdul Razzaq bin Humam, Al-1fussanaf (Al-Maktab al-Islami, Beirut) 
Vol. X., p. 242. 
14 Kerr, Malcolm H., Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and 
Rashid Rida (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1966) p. 2. 
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opinions of four major Sunni schools of thought, leaving aside the Shiite school. Shiite 
law possess certain distinctive characteristics in contrast to the principles of Sunni law 
as a whole. 15 Their differences on some basic doctrines made them essentially 
different from Sunni schools. 16 The Shiite school stands on its own and like its Sunni 
counterpart it demands an independent treatment. The opinions of the Sunni schools 
will be analysed and compared with the relevant provisions of the English law on the 
same point. 
When dealing with Islamic law, we must bear in mind that the manner in which such 
law is presented in its formal sources is not necessarily conditioning the social life of 
Muslim society. There are factors of much greater importance which essentially 
overrule the principles and procedure of Islamic jurisprudence. These factors, like 
culture and traditions, are mistakenly considered to be the part and parcel of Islamic 
law and hence portraying a totally different picture of Islam. The research is an 
endeavour to show that such factors have nothing to do with Shari'ah and the 
principles of Islamic legal system as presented in the 7th and 8th century are compatible 
with the English law of the contemporary world, though the English law has passed 
through so many evolutionary stages to reach its present stage in the 2 1St century. 
It should be kept in mind that the thesis is a comparison of a religious legal system, in 
some ways akin to a system of natural law, with a positive legal system, which is 
secular in its nature. The provisions of any other religious law, such as Biblical law, 
are for a variety of reasons, of a different nature from Shari 'ah. Such laws are not 
dealt with in this thesis. We might note for example that the prophet of Islam 
successfully set up an Islamic state where the Shari 'ah was practically implemented in 
its true spirit and later on his followers, the rightly guided caliphs, carried the tradition. 
However, in the case of Christianity, the head figure of the religion did not do this. 
Furthermore, Shari 'ah, being a complete code of life, covers both spiritual and 
temporal aspects of human existence. It provides guidance in religious and secular, 
private and public, moral and legal, administrative and constitutional, social and 
commercial matters, leaving no aspect of human life unguided, whereas other religions 
focus principally on spiritual development. 
15 Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law (The University Press, Edinburgh, 1971) p. 105. 
16 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 16. 
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A descriptive and comparative approach has been adopted to compare the established 
principles of English criminal law and the authentic opinions of the Muslim jurists. 
The study has been divided into three major parts. Part one deals with the nature, 
sources, characteristics of law, and the principles of criminal liability under both the 
systems. It seeks to provide a broader insight into the similarities and differences of 
both the systems. For a better understanding of the principles of criminal liability a 
brief account of defences available to an accused to a criminal charge has also been 
given. As we know there are a number of defences available to an accused under 
various legal systems. It is practically impossible to explore all the area of these 
defences. For the purpose of simplicity and comprehension only one defence has been 
selected both from excusatory defences and from justificatory ones. 
Part two examines a very complex and controversial defence of intoxication in English 
criminal law. This part generally discusses the relevance of intoxication to mental 
disorder and the attitude of law towards defendants who seek to use the condition as a 
defence to a criminal charge. Consumption of alcohol, being an integral part of 
contemporary Western life style, has been discussed in its historical perspective. 
Taking into account the failure of various efforts to control the consumption of 
intoxicants in society, strategy of Shari'ah to totally control and prohibit intoxicants 
has been discussed in detail exploring its implications in the modem times. Part three 
of the study examines the right of private defence where the English criminal law is 
still in the state of flux; especially in the cases where the accused used more force than 
was necessary for the defence. As a matter of principle, both the systems recognise the 
right of every individual to defend his legally protected interests. The mechanism and 
limitation of the right, in both the systems, are pivotal point of this part. Key 
advantages for adopting an intermediate approach i. e. substitution of murder 
conviction with manslaughter in the cases of use of excessive force are identified. The 
proposals for the reformation of law have also been discussed at the end of the 
respective parts. 
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Part-I 
Chapter-1 The Nature and Sources of English law 
1.1 Introduction 
The present English legal system comprehends the role of legislature and executive, 
judges and juries, barristers and solicitors; ' the situation was not the same in the 
beginning and at its various developmental stages. What the law is now can only be 
discovered by examining the process of its development and the materials which 
comprises it. The basic issues to be deal with in chapter are sources and various stages 
of development of English law. The peculiar characteristics which distinguish English 
legal system from other systems of the contemporary world will also be considered. In 
order to deal with these issues a brief account of historical development shall also be 
taken into account, for the knowledge of history is indispensable for understanding 
English Law. 2 The chapter will suggest that English law being a positive law in its 
nature reflects the aims and needs of the society it serves, without explicit reference to 
religious and moral values. 
1.2 Sources of English Law 
A source is an origin from which a rule of law derives its force. 3 It may be termed as 
any fact which in accordance with the basic legal rules within a specific legal system 
determines the acceptance of any new rule within the system. 4 The English legal system 
is a product of evolution over many centuries. 5 The traditional unwritten law of 
England, common law, based on customs and judicial decisions began to develop over a 
thousand years ago. 6 However, today the bulk of it has been enacted into statutes with 
modern variations. 7 In its formative stages and development, it has been influenced by 
the Islamic law, 8 Roman law, Canon law enforced by the church courts, charters and 
similar documents, official practices, assizes, and books of authority. The writings of 
1 Adam, J. N. & Brownsword, R., Understanding Law (3`d cd., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) p. 1. 
2 Atiyah, P. S., Law and Modern Society (2"d ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 5. 
David, Rene, Major Legal System in the World Today (3`d ed. Stevens &Sons, London, 1985) p. 309. 
3 Cross, R. & Harris, J. W., Precedent in English Law (4`" ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) p. 167. 
4 Fitzgerald, P. J., Salmond on Jurisprudence (12`" ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1966) p. 110. 
5 Walker, R. J. & Ward, R., Walker & Walker's English Legal System (7`" ed., Butterworths, 1994) p. 3. 
G Hudson, John, The Formation of the English Common Law (Longman, London, 1996)p. 17 
7 Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (3`d ed., Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 5. 
Makdisi, G., The Rise of Colleges (Edinburgh university Press, Edinburgh, 1981) p. 286. 
Glenn, If. Patrick, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) p. 236. 
Khadduri, M. & Liebesny, H. J., Law in the Middle East(Middle East Institute, Washington, 1955)Vol. I, p. 215. 
For the influence of Islam on other institutions in Europe see, Watt, W. Montgomery, The Influence of 
Islam on Medieval Europe (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1972). 
9 Jenks, Edward, A short History of English Law (6`" ed., Methuen & Co., London, 1949) pp. 17-25. 
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the great English legal historians like Bracton, Glanvill, Littleton, Coke, Hale, and 
Blackstone can be considered as the historical sources of English law. 10 
Sources of law differ from system to system and even in one system in different periods 
of its development. In the modern age sources of English law are statutes, common law, 
books of authority, EC laws, European Convention on Human Rights, and international 
treaties. 11 However, it stemmed mainly from three major historical sources i. e. common 
law, equity and legislation. 12 As mentioned earlier, English law in its present form 
emerged from the principles of common law hence it is appropriate to have a look upon 
the origin and development of this most important source. 
1.2.1 What is Meant by Common Law and What is it Composed of? 
The common law prevailed in UK and countries colonised by it at some time. The name 
is derived from the medieval theory that the law administered by the royal courts 
represented the common custom of the realm, as opposed to the local customs applied 
by the manorial courts. 13 It is designated common because it was the law common to all 
of England and Wales, 14 administered by a central court, available to the majority of 
population, 15 as distinguished from the customary law that varied from county to 
county, lordship to lordship, or manor to manor. 16 
The emergence of common law was the result of an attempt to bring uniformity in the 
law. '7 Local customs were gradually replaced either by consolidation of local customary 
rules into rules of general application throughout the realm, or by their erosion, '8 giving 
way to general customs nationally applied by the courts. 19 It suggests that common law 
is the body of rules, enforced by the royal judges, 20 deriving their authority solely from 
usages and customs of immemorial antiquity. These rules were not dependent for their 
authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. In this 
10 Cross, R. & Harris, J. W., 1991, op. cit. p. 166. 
Zander, Michael, The Law-Making Process (Butterworths, London, 1999) p. 387. 
11 Darbyshire, P., Eddey & Darbyshire on the English Legal System (7`h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) p. 19. 
12 Walker, R J. & Ward, R., 1994, op. cit. p. 5. 
13 Baker, J. H., An Introduction to English Legal History (3`d ed., Butterworths, 1990) p. 15. 
S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, Modern English Legal System (41h ed., Sweet &Maxwell, 2002) p. 2. 
14 Kiralfy, A. K. R., The English Legal System (81hed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990) p. 1. 
Is Hudson, John, 1996, op. cit. p. 16. 
16 Walker, RJ& Ward, R., 1994, op. cit. p. 5 
17 Stychin, Carl F., Legal Method: Text and Material (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) p. 94. 
18 Walker, R. J& Ward, R., 1994, op. cit. p. 5. 
19 Denham, Paul, A Modern Introduction to Law (Edward Arnold, London, 1983) p. 6. 
20 Hogue, A. R., Origins of the Common Law (Indiana University Press, London, 1966) p. 11. 
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sense it represents the unwritten law whether legal or equitable in its origin21 as opposed 
to the statutory law. 22 Let's have a brief introduction to custom and precedent, the two 
important elements that played a vital role in its formation. 
1.2.1.1 Custom 
A custom may be termed as a common practice among the people, varying with the 
country, culture, time and religion. A local custom may develop from a folkway or the 
traditional behaviour of a certain group of people. 23 It originates either from the 
repetition of certain acts till they become habitual or from the decision of an authority in 
a case brought before it. 24 If the majority of people in an area behave in a specific 
manner for a reasonable time, the established behaviour may be termed as a custom. 25 In 
its broad sense a custom includes all the social rules that are approved and observed by 
the majority of the members of society. 26 These rules acquire the binding power and 
force of law by a long use and admissibility by the masses. 27 It is the existence of 
society that gives rise to a custom, binding on all its members; 28 however its process of 
growth is slow and gradual. 29 Beside locality, a custom may be restricted to a specific 
class of persons within a particular locality. 30 
Ancient customs, embodied in the judicial decisions, are the basic element of the 
common law. 31 In order that a custom should be considered as a source of law it must 
not be repugnant to any fundamental principle of justice or law, because no custom can 
take away the force of any law. 32 It must have a reasonable commencement, must be 
certain and regarded by the persons concerned as binding, not as a matter of individual 
choice. Its practice must be continuous not disputed, must not be against the law of 
God33 and must be reasonable. 34 To determine whether it is reasonable is the sole 
21 Jowitt, Earl, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (2"a ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1977) Vol. 1, p. 391. 
22 Pollock, Frederick, Sir, & Maitland, Frederic William, The History of English Law (2"a ed. The 
University Press, Cambridge, 1898) Vol. 1, p. 177. 
23 Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 6. 
24 Sadler, Gilbert T., The Relation of Custom to Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1919) p. 27. 
25 Denham, Paul, Law: A Modern Introduction (4'h ed., Hodder & Stoughton, 1999) p. 43. 
26 Ibid. p. 2. 
27 Hale, Matthew, Sir, The History of the Common Law of England (ed. Gray, Charles M) (The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1971) p. 17. 
Thorne, Samuel, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (Seldon Society, 1968) Vol. 11, p. 22. 
28 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, Law in the Making (7'h ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 67. 
29 Dias, R. W. M., Jurisprudence (5'hed., Butterworths, London, 1985) p. 187. 
30 Walker, R. J. & Ward, R., 1994, op. cit. p. 9. 
31 Luke, H. K., "The Common Law: Judicial Impartiality & Judge Made Law"98 (1982) LQR 29 at p. 33. 
32 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1966, op. cit. p. 200. 
33 Sadler, Gilbert T., 1919, op. cit. p. 61. 
Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 6. 
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discretion of the court that may disregard a custom if it does not fulfil any of the 
conditions mentioned. 5A custom is void if it is unreasonable such as to make a person 
judge of his own cause. 36 Similarly, it must be consistent with the other customs of the 
area. 37 Another condition might be that it must have been enjoyed peaceably without the 
opposition of the other members of the community. 38 Customs continued to be the chief 
regulator of private rights of the people even long after the birth of law. 39 However, 
their importance diminished with the development of the legal system. 40 
1.2.1.2 Precedent 
The common law is not a product of merely customary rules; judicial decisions have 
also played a vital role in its growth 41 and a great deal of its development is attributed to 
the decided cases. 42 It may rightly be designated as judge-made law in the sense that it 
is a by-product of litigation in the courts. 43 In the 12th and 13th centuries, the king's 
judges succeeded in weaving a single garment of common law, which served to clothe 
the entire nation. 44 Up to the Norman period there is no trace of reported cases. By the 
end of 13`h century the very words of judges and pleaders were being reduced into 
writing, 45 and before the end of the century the year books were available for citing 
earlier cases. 46 A decided case forms a precedent that might be used in the cases of 
similar nature in future. Judicial record of the court's decision is very important because 
a court is not bound to follow the previous decisions unless its attention is drawn to it. 
Judicial precedents derive their force from the doctrine of stare decisis i. e. the previous 
decisions of the higher court in a jurisdiction are binding on all the lower courts in that 
jurisdiction. 47 A judge must always look how the previous judges have dealt with the 
34 Brown, W. J., The Austinian Theory of Law (John Murray, London, 1906, Reprint, 1931) p. 315. 
Cross, R. & Harris, J. W., 1991, op. cit. p. 168. 35 Paton, G. W., A Textbook of Jurisprudence (0 ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972) p. 195. 36 Sadler, Gilbert T., 1919, op. cit. p. 67. 
37 Dias, R. W. M., 1985, op. cit. p. 189. 
38 Zander, Michael, 1999, op. cit. p. 393. 
39 Geer, F. A., "Custom in the Common Law" 9 (1893) LQR 153 at 163. 
40 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1966, op. cit. p. 188. 
41 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 71. 
42 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1966, op. cit. p. 141. 
43 Luke, H. K., 1982, op. cit. p. 33 
Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 9. 
44 Jenks, Edward, The Book of English Law (6t1i ed., John Murray, London, 1967) p. 24. 45 Lewis, Ellis T., "The History of Judicial Precedent" 46 (1930) LQR 207 at 207. 46 Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 225. 
Jenks, Edward, 1949, op. cit. p. 79. 
47 S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, 2002, op. cit. p. 486. 
Cassell and Co. Ltd v. Broome [ 1972] AC 1027 at 1054. 
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similar cases. 48 Technically it is not the court's judgement or decision that is important 
rather it is the ratio decidendi of the case which forms a precedent. 49 Where a ratio 
decidendi is considered relevant to a subsequent case and is applied by the court to 
decide it, the court is said to follow the precedent. 
Precedent may serve another very important purpose of guiding judges. 50 It prevents 
new judges from unwittingly leaving the right course settled by their wise 
predecessors. 51 In this way the doctrine of stare decisis not only affects the parties but 
everyone else by leaving its impact on the future decisions of courts. 52 The doctrine 
implies the stability of the legal system along the stream of time and suggests that the 
contents of the legal system are more or less settled and that the social, economic and 
political changes have not affected the society and its need for a changed rule of law. 53 
This implies that a legal system based on precedents is inclined to rigidity or continuity 
because it is confined only to declaring law instead of making it. 54 However, it has 
never been claimed, even in the most rigidly codified systems, that a judge should shut 
his mind to the reasoning of others in like circumstances. 55 Even today the decisions of 
Court of Appeal and House of Lords can be very important in law making because they 
56 may adjudicate the issues which have never arisen in quite the same way before. 
By following a precedent, a judge is seeking authoritative basis for his decision. 57 A 
departure from the precedent may cause injustice to those who have shaped their 
conduct in the light of the decision of the court. 58 The primary requisites of law are that 
it should be certain and applicable to all so that they may know it and feel its 
impartiality. 59 The public interest requires that the principle according to which the law 
Manchester, C., & Salter, D., Exploring the Law (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) p. 13. 
48 Darbyshire, P., 2001, op. cit. p. 36. 
49 Manchester, C., & Salter, D., 2000, op. cit. p. 4. 
S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, 2002, op. cit. p. 480. 
50 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 162. 
5' Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 225. 
52 Zander, Michael, 1999, op. cit. p. 195. 
53 Stone, Julius, "The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi" 22 (1959) MLR 597 at 598. 
54 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 27. 
55 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 161. 
56 Atiyah, P. S., 1995, op. cit. p. 19. 
57 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 162. 
58 Paton, G. W., 1972, op. cit. p. 224. 
Ingman, Terence, The English Legal Process (9th ed. Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 43 1. 
59 Fifoot, C. H. S., English Law and its Background (C. Bell & Sons Ltd, London, 1932) p. 5. 
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was administered should be made known to the people. 60 Precedents are a means to 
make the law known to them, unless a judge does as his predecessor has done no one 
would know with certainty what the law was. 61 However, a too rigid adherence to 
precedent may lead to injustice in certain cases and also unduly restrict the proper 
development of law. 62 This may be the reason that the doctrine is not recognised within 
most civil law jurisdictions, for it restricts the right of judges to interpret law. 63 
Nonetheless, in order to maintain uniformity the concept of jurisprudence conslante is 
applied to ensure that the judges shall adjudicate in a predictable manner. 
The quality of judge-made law and the authority of a precedent depend upon judicial 
impartiality, capacity of the judge, power of his imagination and his commitment to the 
ideals of justice. 64 However, its value can be undermined on the ground that throughout 
the common law world there are judges who will, consciously or not, decide the cases, 
the way political authority wants them to, rather than according to law. 65 A court could 
be bound by a precedent only if it was unimpeachable and its authority was 
established. 66 Since judges, as human beings, sometimes make mistakes, the precedent 
may be wrong and it could be corrected by the court of appeal. If a judge believes a 
previous decision to be wrong, he is not bound to follow it because a strict adherence to 
precedent can increase uncertainty, for it encourages over-subtle distinctions between 
cases essentially similar. 67 The convenience of following precedents should not be 
allowed to degenerate into a mere mechanical exercise performed without thought. 68 
1.2.2 Origin and Development of Common Law 
Primitive man knew nothing of laws except customs, the body of unwritten rules, 
evolved with the evolution of society. 69 The primitive laws obtained their force from 
custom of a certain territory which was declared as its law by those who were familiar 
with it. 70 Customs were not deliberately designed; they originated inadvertently having 
their roots far off in the history. Though the needs of society were diverse yet 
60 Manchester, A. H., A Modern Legal History of England and Wales 1750-1950 (Butterworths, 1980) p. 24. 
61 Lewis, Ellis T., 1930, op. cit. p. 221. 
62 Scarman, Leslie, Law Report: The New Pattern (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968) p. 23. 
63 Stare decisis(http: //www. fict-index. com/c/co/common Iaw. html) p. I. 
6' Luke, H. K., 1982, op. cit. p. 29. 
6s Roebuck, Derek, The Background of the Common Law (2"d ed., Oxford University Press, N. York, 1990) p. 3. 
"" Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 229. 
67 Ibid. p. 228. 
6R Ingman, Terence, 2002, op. cit. p. 430. 
69 Sadler, Gilbert T., 1919, op. cit. p. 1 
70 Hogue, A. R., 1966, op. cit. p. 9. 
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unchanging, hence met by the customary obligations. 71 The customary law, approved by 
use, carried the greatest authority72 and provided foundation for the origin of common 
law. Different phases of common law's development can be summarised as under. 
1.2.2.1 Law and Administration of Justice before Norman Conquest 
In the Anglo Saxon times, there was no uniform law for the whole of England. 73 The 
laws were mostly oral varying with the variation of local custom. 74 The diversity of 
customs can be highlighted by the fact that even for centuries after the accomplishment 
of common law there was no common language or common dress in the kingdom. 75 
Most important men of the society had judicial powers and were responsible for law and 
administration. 76 Administration of justice was a profitable business77 and a privilege 
shared by the powerful; the king laid down the rules of his peace, so did the lord and the 
bishop. 78 Breach of peace had two-fold penalty, one to the victim and the other to the 
king, lord or bishop. 79 Everyone who had some authority had his own court and hence 
could do justice. RO There were no police and no justice separate from administration 
until the end of the middle ages in England. 81 In early 13`x' century a preliminary form of 
police system was introduced in each county to keep peace. 82 
A number of judicial tribunals were* exercising parallel jurisdiction in the disputes 
amongst the subjects, like the courts of shires, hundreds and boroughs, the courts of 
lords, and the king. 831t was a network of competing courts of conflicting jurisdictions, 84 
yet it played its role in the growth of common law and by the end of 13th century the 
common law absorbed much of it. 85 By the end of 15`h century common law courts 
established their superiority over all local courts, and the new courts such as council 
71 Milsom, S. F. C., Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2"a ed., Butterworths, 1981) p. 13. 
72 Hogue, A. R., 1966, op. cit. p. 10. 
73 Slapper, G. & Kelly, D., The English Legal System (5`h ed., Cavendish Publishing, London, 2001) p. 3. 
74 Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 5. 
75 Warmington, L. Crispin (Editor-in-chief) Stephen's Commentaries on the Law of England (Butterworth's 
& Co., London, 1950) Vol. 1, p. 12. 
76 Kiralfy, A. K. R., 1990, op. cit. p. 2. 
77 Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 17. 
78 Roebuck, Derek, 1990, op. cit. p. 30. 
79 Ibid. p. 13. 
80 Caenegem, R. C. Van, The Birth of English Common Law (The University Press, Cambridge, 1973) p. 14. 
R1 Roebuck, Derek, 1990, op. cit. p. 1 1. 
82 Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 29. 
R3 Ibid. p. 15. 
84 Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law (6`h ed., Methuen & Co., London, 1938) Vol. 1, p. 4. 
85 Hogue, A. R., 1966, op. cit. p. 5. 
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court, Star Chamber and court of chancery were all centralised. 86 Traces of the borough 
and city courts could be found until 1971, when the Courts Act 1971 abolished them. 87 
The royal administration depended upon the lord's administration. If a man had no lord 
he could be proclaimed an outlaw; being outside the law's protection against anyone 
doing him harm. 88 The lord was responsible to produce him in the court if required. 89 
Dependence on a lord was a check on the individual freedom of a freeborn man. 90 The 
administration of justice was discriminatory taking into account the rank or the status of 
the person. There was nothing called law, rather groups of people were enforcing local 
customs in an arbitrary manner. The distinction between civil and criminal liability was 
not recognised. `' However, it began to rise in the late 12`h century under the influence of 
Roman and canon. law. 92 There was no difference between public and private law, 
substantive law and procedure; and even the most obvious distinction between 
ecclesiastical and secular affairs was absent. 93 
There was no central state authority, the essential element of contemporary civilised 
life. 94 It was a typical localised society that remained divided into classes of noble, 
knights, esquires, gentleman, plebeians, clergy, and many others up to the first quarter 
of 17th century. 95 The state of legal affairs was hap-hazard. 96 Pre-conquest legal process 
of England was used by the powerful to their own advantages. 97 The Norman Conquest 
brought uniformity and eliminated the hap-hazard state of affairs. 
1.2.2.2 Norman Conquest and After 
The Norman Conquest is an event of great importance in English legal history. 98 At the 
time of the conquest, in 1066, there was very little that could be called common law. 99 
There was no central court administering justice to neither the whole country nor any 
86 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 187. 
87 The Courts Act 1971(c. 23) ss. 42-43. 
8 Roebuck, Derek, 1990, op. cit. p. 13. 
9 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 23. 
90 Pollock, & Maitland, 1898, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 31. 
91 Ibid. (Reissue, 1968) Vol. II., p. 499. 
92 Hudson, John, 1996, op. cit. p. 56. 
93 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 13. 
94 Jenks, Edward, 1949, op. cit. p. 7. 
95 0' Sullivan, Richard, The Inheritance of the Common Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1950) p. 26. 
Pollock, & Maitland, 1898, op. cit. Vol. I., pp. 32-34. 
96 Jenks, Edward, 1949, op. cit. p. 17. 
97 Harding, Alan, The Law Courts of Medieval England (George Allen &Unwin, London, 1973) p. 30. 
98 David, Rene, 1985, op. cit. p. 31 1. 
99 Roebuck, Derek, 1990, op. cit. pp. 17-18. 
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developed form of judicature or legislative100 and there existed no concept of separation 
of powers. 101 The conquest resulted in the introduction of precise and orderly methods 
into government and law. 102 The Norman kings and their successors made a great effort 
and assumed the responsibility of administration of justice themselves. 103 
The conquest brought a strong ruler with the power and will to make his influence felt 
throughout the country by establishing a central royal court and centralised 
administrative organisation. 104 Soon after the conquest the royal justices travelled all 
over the country to hear civil and criminal pleas of the crown and brought justice to the 
doors of their subjects. 105 Normans rapidly set up an elaborate system of courts not only 
to enforce pleas of the Crown but also common pleas. 106 The court of common pleas 
contributed to the development of common law more than any other court. 107 The 
Normans were successful in putting together the basic ingredients of common law; 
nonetheless it took two centuries to establish a centralised judicial system. 108 
The centralised judicial system gradually rendered the local courts insignificant and 
substituted one common law for the confused mess of local customs-109 In the 13th 
century, litigation was allowed only through the limited number of standard forms of 
writs available from chancery on the payment of prescribed fee. 110 Originally there were 
only three writs, writ of right to land, writ of debt and detinue, and the writ of 
trespass. 111 New forms of writs were introduced from time to time to meet the 
requirements of changing circumstances. 112 The rapid growth of common law during 
this period is mainly attributed to the writ system. 113 A writ issued once becomes a 
precedent for the future. 114 However, in the 19th century, in order to bring uniformity in 
100 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 3. 
101 Milsom, S. F. C., 1981, op. cit. p. 13. 
102 Plucknett, Theodore F. T., A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed., Butterworth, 1956) p. 11. 
103 Roebuck, Derek, 1990, op. cit. p. 20. 
104 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 4. 
David, Rene, 1985, op. cit. p. 311. 
105 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 49. 
1°'Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 14. 
107 Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 46. 
108 Warmington, L. Crispin, 1950, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 12. 
109 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 5. 
110 Brand, Paul, The Making of the Comma: Law (The Hambledon Press, London, 1992) p. 96. 
111 Geer, F. A., 1893, op. cit. p. 158. 
112 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 31. 
113 Jenks, Edward, 1949, op. cit. p. 45. 
114 Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 65. 
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the system most of the forms of actions were abolished and thereafter any litigation 
could commence by the same form of writ and also different causes of action could be 
joined in it. 115 
1.2.3 Equity 
Early common law was somewhat inflexible; it would not adjudicate a case that did not 
fall precisely under the purview of a particular writ and had an unwieldy set of 
procedural rules. 16 It means that an aggrieved party was not entitled to relief if no 
remedy was provided under the law. Except for a few types of lawsuits in which the 
object was to recover real or personal property, the only remedy provided was damages; 
the body of legal principles known as equity evolved partly to overcome these 
deficiencies. 117 Equity served as an appendix to the common law by filling up its 
defects, preventing abuse of its process, and hence setting up itself as a rival to the 
common law courts. 118 
The common law courts, bound by precedent, were unable to administer justice in 
certain cases, and the plaintiffs started petitioning the sovereign seeking justice, hence 
the origin of the court of equity. ' 19 Equity dates from the 15`h century in the form of the 
Court of Chancery. ' 20 Rules of equity, unlike the rules of common law, were altered, 
improved, and refined from time to time for securing the better administration of 
justice. 121 Court of equity exercised exclusive, concurrent, and auxiliary jurisdiction in 
the cases where common law provided no relief or was insufficient or to remove 
procedural deficiencies respectively. 122 Unlike common law, equity established the rule 
that where there is a wrong there is a remedy. 123 
Until recent times there was a sharp division between common law and equity. 
Obviously, the exercise of common law and equity jurisdiction by different courts 
raised the risk of rivalry between the two and their amalgamation was considered 
115 Glenn, H. Patrick, 2000, op. cit. p. 223. 
Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 80. 
116 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 401. 
S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, 2002, op. cit. p. 4. 
117 Glenn, H. Patrick, 2000, op. cit. p. 237. 
118 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 33. 
S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, 2002, op. cit. p. 5. 
19 Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 11. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1966, op. cit. p. 145. 
122 Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 11. 
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appropriate. 124 In the 19t1i century the rivalry between both the courts had become 
intense125 and ultimately both the courts were amalgamated by an Act of parliament. 126 
Thenceforth, actions at law and suits in equity are to be administered in the same courts 
and under the same procedure. 127 
1.2.4 Legislation 
A legal system based on the-judge-made law could keep pace with the needs of society 
if the conditions remained fairly static. 128 In the modem age dramatic changes are taking 
place in the social, economic, and political structure of society. Judge-made law cannot 
cope with such changes. Legislation is the rapid and efficient means to meet the needs 
of society. Though the legislation as a regular practice started in the 13th century by the 
establishment of the parliament, 129 however the changing political and socio-economic 
conditions led to the dominance of legislation over common law from the late 19th 
century. 130 Rules of law developed by the courts can be modified or reversed by the 
legislature and it can legislate on any subject. 131 Nonetheless, it is desired that 
legislation should be avoided in the areas where the basic principles are still in the 
process of evolution and a legal dispute is likely to arise unexpectedly. 132 
A law is ought to be simple, straightforward, readily accessible and its provisions to be 
easily and immediately ascertainable. 133 An enacted law, indeed, have all these 
characteristics and is easily intelligible. 134 Moreover, Legislation removes the 
uncertainties, illogicalities, and inconsistencies of law. 135 Though the bulk of English 
criminal law is now found in the statutes yet some offences, like murder, manslaughter, 
assault and conspiracy to defraud, are governed under the principles of common law; 
likewise some basic principles of criminal liability, like intention and recklessness and 
defences like duress, intoxication, and insanity are still firmly embedded in the common 
123 Denham, Paul, 1999, op. cit. p. 65. 
124 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op, cit. p. 36. 
123 Denham, Paul, 1983, op. cit. p. 12. 
126 The Judicature Act 1873, s. 24. 
127 Walker, R. J. & Ward, R., 1994, op. cit. p. 7. 
128 Kiralfy, A. K. R., 1990, op. cit. p. 98. 
129 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 37. 
130 Denham, Paul, 1999, op. cit. p. 43. 
131 Kiralfy, A. K. R., 1990, op. cit. p. 98. 
132 Ibid. p. 101. 
133 Samuels, Alec, "Is it in force or Isn't it? " 35 (1979) The Magistrate 173 at 174. 
134 Luke, H. K., 1982, op. cit p. 31. 
135 Hahlo, H. R., "Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace" 30 (1967) MLR 241 at 246. 
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law. 136 In addition, the law relating to movable property, prerogative of crown and 
constitutional law can only be understood by the study of common law. 137 
1.2.5 Other Sources of English Law 
Although common law, legislation and equity are the major sources of English law, ' 38 
however, after joining the European Community and signing the Treaty of European 
Union, the legislation and judicial decisions of European Court of Justice have become 
its important and additional source. 139 The international conventions are meant to 
harmonise the laws of all the contracting states on the particular subject and this cannot 
be achieved unless their interpretation is same to the possible extent in all the 
contracting states. 140 Normally an international treaty does not impinge on the 
sovereignty of the parliaments of the member states, rather a failure to comply with its 
provisions results in the breach of international law. 141 However, the EC treaty has its 
own legal system which the courts of the member states are bound to apply. 142 
The treaty demanded that the courts of the member states should set aside any national 
law which prevent them from granting any relief which, otherwise, is available under 
the Community laws. 143 UK's parliament gave effect to the community law under 
statutory provisions. Section 2, of the European Communities Act 1972, states that both 
past and future Acts of the parliament should be effective subject to the Community 
law. 144 In the light of this rule UK courts are now Community law courts, bound to give 
effect to that law where it is operative. 145 They are not allowed to set entirely different 
rules to undermine the convention. 146 It suggests that English courts cannot disregard 
any provision of the convention. 147 The decisions of the European Court of Justice are 
binding on all the courts of member countries including English courts. ' 48 It is an 
interesting phenomenon that English courts are bound to follow the decisions of 
136 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 5. 
Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 76. 
138 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 29. 
138 Zander, Michael, 1999, op. cit. p. 374. 
139 Manchester, C., & Salter, D., 2000, op. cit. p. 3. 
140 Dicey, AN., Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (12'h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) Vol. 1, p. 9. 
141 Atiyah, P. S., 1995, op. cit. p. 93. 
142 Zander, Michael, 1999, op. cit. p. 382. 
143 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, Exp. Factortame Ltd. [1990] 3 WLR 818 at 852. 
144 Wade, H. W. R., "What Has Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament? " 107 [1991] LQR 1. 
S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, 2002, op. cit. p. 354. 
146 Slapper, G. & Kelly, D., 2001, op. cit. p. 569. 
146 Sidhu and Others v. British Airways [1997] A. C. 430 at 454. 
147 Darbyshire, P., 2001, op. cit. p. 45. 
148 Ibid. p. 37. 
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European Court of Justice but the European Court itself is not bound by its own 
decisions. 149 Nevertheless, for the purpose of legal certainty and uniformity the ECJ 
generally follows its own previous decisions. 150 
It implies that the interpretation of the national laws by the European Court will take 
precedence over all the laws prevailing in the country including statutes if they appear 
contrary to such interpretation. ) 51 In the context of the Community law, the parliament 
is no longer sovereign152 rather subordinate to the European Community law. 153 The 
membership of the Community requires every member to undertake that its domestic 
law shall give way to the Community law in case of a conflict. It means that in case of a 
conflict the Community law will prevail over the UK's laws and hence the parliament 
will be bound to annul, amend, or change the national law contrary to the Community 
laws. The House of Lords confirmed the supremacy of the Community law and declared 
that an Act of parliament contrary to the Community law is unenforceable. ' 54 However, 
the supremacy of Community law has been tempered by the fact that the EC legislation 
must be in accordance with the principles of international laws. 155 
Similarly, the parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, within their 
jurisdiction, are required to protect the rights safeguarded in the convention and to 
provide a remedy for their breach. 156 Initially, the UK government did not enact to 
incorporate the convention into its domestic laws for the assumption that the rights and 
freedoms set out in the convention are already protected under the domestic laws., 57 
However, later on the convention was incorporated into UK laws as Human Rights Act 
1998.158 Under the provisions of the Act all the primary and subordinate legislation 
shall be given effect in a way which is compatible with the convention rights. 159 The 
149 Baker, 1. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 230. 
150 Manchester, C., & Salter, D., 2000, op. cit. p. 7. 
151 Zander, Michael, 1999, op. cit. p. 381. 
Slapper, G. & Kelly, D., 2001, op. cit. p. 567. 
152 Wade, H. W. R., 1991, op. cit. p. 2. 
153 Atiyah, P. S., 1995, op. cit. p. 93. 
154 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parse Factortame Ltd and Others (No. 1) [ 1990] 2 AC 85 & 
(No. 2) [1991 ]1 AC 603 at 659. 
155 Weatherill, Stephen & Beaumont, Paul, EU Law (3`d ed., Penguin Books, London, 1999) p. 437. 156 Manchester, C., & Salter, D., 2000, op. cit. p. 131. 157 Ibid. p. 132. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Zander, Michael, 1999, op. cit. p. 167. 
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fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 5 and 6 have become the parameters for the 
statutes and casc law of the English courts. 160 
1.3 Distinctive Features of English Law 
One of the distinctive features of English law is that it is based upon judicial decisions, 
leaving a scope for a discretionary, ad hoc, and pragmatic approach to the particular 
problem before the court. The grounds for deciding cases are found in precedents; 
whereas civil law system based upon codified laws controls the exercise of judicial 
discretion. 16 1 Though the idea of codification is finding its place in English legal system 
but still certain important areas are being governed by the principles of unwritten 
common law. The different roles of case law in civil and common law traditions creates 
differences in the way the courts render their decisions. Common law courts generally 
explain in detail the rationale behind their decisions with numerous citations to previous 
decisions and other authority. By constrast, decisions in the courts of most civil law 
jurisdictions are generally very short, referring only to the statute applied. 162 
The jury trial is a common law process by which the jury are responsible for hearing the 
dispute, evaluating the evidence presented and deciding on the facts; 163 in accordance 
with the rule of law as directed by the judge. Trial by jury is considered to be the heart 
of the Anglo-Saxon process of criminal trial. 164 The jury is the final arbiter of the 
question of fact; however it has no part to play in fixing the punishment. 165 A jury is a 
body of responsible persons of neighbourhood helping the judge to resolve a conflict. 166 
The jury trial has its peculiar feature of division of responsibility between the judge and 
the jury, the judge explains the law and directs the jury on the rule of law and the actual 
judgement is made by the jury. Though to some extent the trial by jury is better than the 
ordeals and battle yet its simplicity and rationality are doubtful. 
The jury trial has attracted more praise and less theoretical analysis 167 because the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 made it an offence to publish or solicit for publication any 
° Darbyshire, P., 2001, op. cit. p. 174. 
161 Slapper, G. & Kelly, D., 2001, op. cit. p. 3. 
162 Common Law (http: //www. fact-index. com/c/co/coinmon law. html) p. 3 
'' Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 298. 
164 Findlay, Mark, & Duff, Peter, (ed) The Jury Under Attack (Butterworths, London, 1988) p. 140. 
165 Darbyshire, P., 2001, op. cit. p. 313. 
166 Jenks, Edward, 1949, op. cit. p. 48. 
167 Darbyshire, P., "The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives-Is it Worth the Candle? "[1991] Crim. LR. 740 
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detail of what happens in the jury room. 168 However, this mode of trial is not free from 
defects. A jury is comprised of a group which eliminates the concept of individual 
responsibility. It gives no reason for its verdict nor the verdict is subject to any appeal, 
experience shows that the verdict can be influenced by intimidation, 169 as it has been 
apprehended in Tony Marlin's case. 170 Corruption and misconduct by jurors was an 
undeniable obstacle to justice. 171 A jury may be composed of persons having no desire 
or capacity to grasp complex question, whether of fact or law, to weigh evidence or to 
reach a conclusion upon facts in issue. 172 
In the middle ages juries were ignorant and not very intelligent to perform their 
functions properly, the questions in dispute were to be much narrowed down so that 
they could be answered simply by guilty or non guilty. 173 Until 1930, there was an 
extensive use of jury in civil actions174 but now most civil and criminal cases are not 
tried before a jury. 175 At the moment, only 3% criminal cases are tried in the Crown 
Court and most of the offenders plead guilty and merely appear before the judge for 
sentence. 176 The courts themselves admit that in certain cases the trial by a judge should 
be the usual mode. 177 It is also alleged that the chances of acquittal of the accused in a 
jury trial are very high. 178 It can be claimed without any fear of contradiction that judges 
are more competent in deciding question of fact relying upon their experience of 
weighing evidence, so a trial by a judge is more rationale and preferable. 
Statutes codifying English common law are understood to always be interpreted in the 
light of the common law tradition, and so may leave a number of things unexplained 
because they are already understood from pre-existing precedents and customs. 
Codification restate the common law position in a single document rather than creating 
new offences, so the common law remains relevant to their interpretation. '79 By contrast 
168 The Contempt of Court Act 1981, Section 8. 
169 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 347. 
170 The Times, April 20,2000. 
171 Baker, J. H., 1990, op. cit. p. 156. 
172 Holdsworth, W. S., 1938, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 347. 
173 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 34. 
174 Atiyah, P. S., 1995, op. cit. p. 30 
175 Home Oflice, Juries in Serious Fraud Trials: A Consultation Document 
(http: //www. homeoffice. Rov. tik). 2003, Chapter-2. 
176 Darbyshire, P., 2001, op. cit. p. 3 13. 
177 Ward v. James [ 1966] 1 QB 273 at p. 303. 
178 Atiyah, P. S., 1995, op. cit. p. 33. 
179 Common Law (http: //www. fact-index. com/c/co/commonIaw. html) p. 3. 
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to the codifications of common law, in other jurisdictions some laws are purely 
statutory, and may create new causes of action and offences beyond the common law. 
The English law has sufficient flexibility to take account of the changing needs of a 
continually changing society. 180 Being secular in its nature it has absorbed all types of 
changes that occurred in society. English law is mainly based upon the local customs as 
recognised and embodied in legal framework by the courts. 181 If a case is raised to a 
common law court and no statute or a precedent appears to deal with the question in 
issue, the judge may decide the case on the principle of analogy 182 because no 
intelligent legal system would refute the indispensable instrument of analogy and parity 
of reasoning. '83 In this sense the judge undoubtedly makes and declares law in a limited 
sense and this practice gives the law flexibility which is one of its features but it does 
not allow a departure from recognised principles184 because too much flexibility will 
lead to intolerable uncertainty. Flexibility of English law may be attributed to the 
principles of equity which abated the rigours of the fixed common law. 185 
Conclusion 
Common law, being a human effort, is the product of time and places, economic and 
class interests, struggle for power between political factions, and the trial of cases by the 
judges and lawyers of great skill. 186 Customs, precedents, legal writings, legislation, 
human reason and international treaties played their part to take it to the stage where it 
stands today. It is the basic characteristic of human effort that there is always room for 
improvement. Though the English law has passed through many stages of its 
development yet it is not free from defects. Statutory reform of common law is an 
inevitable fact of the 20th century. 187 The Law Commission admitted that a great deal is 
to be done before it can be justifiably said that the English legal system is harmonious 
with the social and economic requirements of the modem society. 188 According to them 
the English law is not certain, nor readily accessible or easily understandable. In 1968, 
expressing their dissatisfaction over the criminal law the commissioners stated that it is 
1R0 Per Lord Justice Donadlson in Parker v. British Airways Board [ 1982] 2 WLR 503 at p. 513. 
181 Keeton, G., English Law: The Judicial Contribution (David & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1974) p. 10. 182 Waldron, Jeremy, The Law (Routledge, London, N. York, 1990) p. 6. 183 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, 1964, op. cit. p. 67. 
184 Jenks, Edward, 1967, op. cit. p. 28. 
185 Lobban, M., The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) p. 1. 186 Roebuck, Derek, 1990, op. cit. p. 2. 
18' Luke, H. K., 1982, op. cit. p. 29. 
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complex, obscure, its terminology confusing, and its provisions often out of accord with 
the modern conditions. 189 Simply, the common law has been declared defective and 
unattractive. The law making process in the UK has also been declared unsatisfactory 
and obscure as compared to many other jurisdictions. 190 
In the next chapter we'll deal with the nature and sources of Islamic law and it will be 
made clear how the two systems are alike or differ from each other. 
188 The Law Commission, First Programme of the Law Commission, Note by the Commissioners (Law 
Com. No. 1,1965). 
lß9 The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law (Law Com. No. 14,1968) Item No. XVIII. 
190 Dale, William, Sir, Legislative Drafting: A New Approach (Butterworths, London, 1977) pp. 331-33. 
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Chapter-2 Islamic Law its Nature and Sources 
2.1 Introduction 
The Islamic legal system is one of the major non-western legal systems of the world, and 
Islam itself is the second largest religion in Europe. 2 The word `Islam' literally means 
peace, commitment, submission, and obedience. 3 In its religious sense it denotes 
submission to the will of God and in its secular sense the establishment of peace. 4 As a 
religion it stands for a belief in Allah and all His prophets and demands an unconditional 
submission to the Divine will revealed to mankind through Prophets. 5 
The study of law and theology cannot be differentiated; no distinction can be made 
between rules of law and that of religion. 6 This joint body of learning is termed as Fiqh, 
or understanding of the word of God and man's duties under it. 7 The life of a Muslim 
has always been dominated by the two; theology, prescribing the beliefs, and the law, 
declaring the permissible and prohibited. 8 The discipline of law rather than theology 
played the primary part in the development of this understanding, for the law became 
the central discipline of Islam. Islamic law is essentially religious as opposed to 
English concept of law and hence enormously wider in its scope than any secular law. '° 
The term Fiqh thus came to have exclusively legal undertone. Later the word Shari 'ah 
or the path' 1 became the accepted expression for describing this discipline. Islamic law, 
having its expression in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, is technically known as Shari'ah. '2 
It is the expression of divine limits over the freedom of human in his individual and 
collective life. Shari'ah is the divine path along with it is incumbent on mankind to 
walk. 13 It enunciates the rules and regulations, derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah, 
1 Edge, Ian, Islamic Law and Legal theory (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996) p. xiii 
2 Ahmad, Khurshid, Islam: Its Meaning and Message (Islamic Council of Europe, London, 1976) Foreword. 
s Ibn Manzur, Lisaan Al-Arab (Dar Sader, Beirut, 1955) Vol. XII, p. 293. 
Mulla, D. F. Sir, Principles of Mohammadan Law (18`h ed. Mansoor Book House, Lahore, 1988) p. xiv. 
Gibb, H. A. R., Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (Oxford University Press, 1949) p. 1. 
4 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xv. 
5 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 28. 
G Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit, p. 30. 7 Ibid. 
8 Anderson, J. N. D., Islamic law in the Modern World (Stevens & Sons, London, 1959) p. 19. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. p. 4. 
" Ibn Manzur, 1955, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 176. 
12 Hassan, Ahmad, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1u ed. I. R. I., Islamabad, Pakistan, 1993) p. l. 13 Doi, Abdur Rehman I., Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (Ta'ha Publishers, London, 1997) p. 2. 
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governing rights and liabilities of Muslims. 14 Both the sources are textual in character 
and technically called Nasus (sing. Nass) in Arabic. Shari'ah covers both, law, in the 
English sense, and also moral rules not enforceable by the law courts. 15 It reaches much 
deeper into the thought, life and conduct of human beings than a secular law. '6 
This chapter will deal with the sources and nature of Shari'ah and its distinction from 
the English law. It will demonstrate that the revelatory nature of Shari'ah restrict the 
scope of law making by man. The restrictions are based on divine commandments, 
however these restrictions do not render it inflexible and the secondary sources of 
Shari'ah are capable of developing legal rules to cope with the requirements of modern 
times. A brief description of four major Sunni schools of thought has also been included 
to facilitate the understanding of development of Shari'ah. The similarities and 
dissimilarities of both the systems will be highlighted elaborating the characteristics 
which distinguish Islamic legal system from the English one. 
2.2 Sources of Islamic Law 
Sources of Islamic law fall into two main categories; the primary and the secondary or 
dependent sources, 17 some time these sources are designated as agreed upon and 
disputed sources as well. '8 In the classical view of Islamic jurisprudence the Holy 
Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijnia together with Qiyas comprise the primary sources. 19 These 
sources are more authoritative than any man-made statute having unchanged authority 
in all the times and the circumstances. 20 It is unanimously accepted that the Holy 
Qur'an and the Sunnah are the primary sources of Shari'ah and the custodian of Islamic 
thought and knowledge. Qiyas and Ijma are, in fact, instruments for legislation on new 
problems for whose solution a direct guidance from the Qur'an or the Sunnah is not 
available. 21 An enormous proportion of Shari'ah, indeed, rests on these two sources. 
Bosworth, C. E. & Donzel, E. Van, Encyclopaedia of Islam (New ed. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1997)Vol. IX, p. 321. 
IS Gerber, Haim, Islamic Law and Culture 1600-1840 (Brill, Leiden, 1999) p. 128. 
16 Weeramantry, C. G., Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Macmillan, 1988) p. 1. 
17 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 31. 
18 Hassan, H. Hamid, An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Law (Shari'ah Academy, 1997) p. 124. 
19 Hassan, Ahmad, "The Sources of Islamic Law" Islamic Studies 7 (1968) 165 at 170. 
Anderson, J. N. D., 1959, op. cit. p. 13. 
All, Shaheen Sardar, Gender and Human Rights in Islam (Kluwer Law International, 2000) p. 19. 
20 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 42. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, (ed) The Islamic Criminal Justice System (Oceana Publications, 1982) p. 9 
21 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 42. 
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The - secondary or the subsidiary sources are, Istihsan (public interest), Masalih 
Mursalah or public good, Istishab (presumption of continuity), religious laws before 
Islam, Madhab al-sahabi, acts ofAhl-e-Madina, Fatwa of a companion (legal opinion), 
Sadd al-Darah'i (blocking the means) and customs. 22 These sources mainly serve as 
means to discover law and in themselves are not independent. 23 
The primary sources shall be taken in the order mentioned above because it is not 
permissible to refer to the subsequent source except when no rule is found in the 
preceding one on the point under consideration. 24 However, it is necessary to keep in 
mind that the Sunnah is to be consulted concurrently for the explanation and exposition 
of the meaning of the Qur'an to resolve any ambiguity. The secondary sources need not 
any specific order for their application in deducing a rule of law. 25 
2.2.1 The Qur'an 
The Qur'an, the Holy book of Islam, is the bed rock of Islamic jurisprudence. 26 It is the 
primary source of Shari'ah and all other sources are subordinate to it. 27 It is a part of 
every Muslim's belief that it has been authentically revealed to the Prophet and has been 
preserved down the ages without any alteration having been effected in its text. 28 The 
Qur'an was not revealed all at once, 29 the revelation came in fragments from time to 
time and the Holy Prophet used to communicate it to his followers and asked them not 
only to learn it by heart but to write it down as wel1.30 He also indicated the precise 
place of the new revelation in the text. 31 
The Qur'an was revealed according to happenings, incidents and in response to the 
questions raised by the companions, which are called the causes of revelation. 32 This 
piecemeal revelation served several purposes; it facilitated the preservation of revelation 
by reducing into writing and memorising, it led to the gradual legislation, as it will be 
22 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 124. 
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (I. T. S., Cambridge, 1991)pp. 168-310. 
23 Weiss, Bernard, "Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad' 26 (1978) Am. JCL. 199 at 202. 
24 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 132. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 34. 
27 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 143. 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar, 2000, op. cit. p. 19. 
28 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 82 
29 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 144. 
30 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., An Introduction to Islam (I. 1. F. S. 0., 1970) p. 20. 
31 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. pp. 146-47 
32 Ibid p. 144. 
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seen in the case of prohibition of alcohol drinking (see 9.7), it made the implementation 
of Shari 'ah easy over those who had recently left tribal system. The knowledge of 
incidents and questions helped the commentators to explain the meaning of the verses 
revealed on a particular time. 33 The revelation continued during the whole missionary 
life of the Holy Prophet for a period of 22 years 2 months and 22 days. 34 
The laws given by the Qur'an are eternal, immutable and binding on Muslims of all the 
countries and ages. 35 Since the Qur'an has no earthly source, it is obvious that nothing 
of it can be altered by any human agency or institution. 36 As a matter of fact, leaving 
certain specific offences, the Holy Qur'an describes the objectives of law and general 
principles of legislation in civil and criminal, political and economic, constitutional and 
international affairs leaving the rest for the scholars of every age to legislate in the light 
of these principles according to their social needs and interests of the people. 37 In the 
realm of criminal law, society is allowed to legislate in the light of a broad principle that 
the punishment of an evil should be an evil like it. 38 
The scholars throughout the centuries attempted to derive a fresh message, a new 
thought from the Qur'an that was more suitable to the realities of their times and the 
requirement of the community. 39 It contains directions for the conduct of the ruler and 
the ruled, the rich and the poor, for peace as well for war, for spiritual as well as 
material well-being of man. 40 A careful study of the Book would show beyond any 
doubt that there is not a single word in it which could ever become time-barred. 
The Qur'an calls itself a book of guidance41 and not a code of law. Out of 6235 verses42 
at the most only 500 deal with the legal matters, both secular and ecclesiastical, 
including family, civil and criminal matters. 43 According to a more careful opinion there 
are about 228 such versus out of which 70 deal with the family law, 70 with civil law, 
33 Doi, Abdur Rehman 1., 1997, op. cit. p. 22. 
34 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 21. 
35 Walliullah, Mir, Muslim Jurisprudence and the Qur'anic Law of Crimes (I. B. S. Lahore, 1982) p. 5. 
36 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xvi. 
Rahman, Fazlur, Islam (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1966) p. 32. 
37 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 30. 
38 Al-Qur'an 42: 40. 
39 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 32. 
40 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 26. 
41 Al-Qur'an 2: 3. 
42 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 14. 
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30 with criminal law, 13 with procedure and jurisdiction, 10 with constitutional law, 25 
with international relationships, and 10 with economic and financial matters. 4 Such an 
enumeration, however, can only be approximate. The legal bearing of some injunctions 
is disputable, whereas some others simultaneously apply to more than one sphere of 
law. 45 If we leave out of account those verses which concern the state as such, there are 
about 80 verses more or less, which deal with the law of personal status. 46 In addition, 
these verses are scattered around and not in any particular order. 
Apart from the controversy over the number of legal verses, it is clear that the Qur'an is 
an amalgam of law, ethics, and moral guidance; the legal verses were revealed in the 
form of moral exhortations, exhorting people to the obedience of God and occasionally 
installing a keen sense of fear of God in their minds. 47 The divine law joins ethical and 
legal matters together, thereby encouraging the harmonisation of conscience and the 
law. 48 Its primary purpose is to regulate the relationship of man with man and with his 
Creator. 49 The law of inheritance, principles of marriage and divorce, rules for 
commercial transactions, prohibition of usury, provisions for war and peace, directives 
for international relations, punishments for crimes, are all meant for regulating human 
relationships in society. 50 It can, therefore, be said that Coulson is not justified in saying 
that the primary purpose of the Qur'an is to regulate the relationship of man with his 
Creator and not with his fellows. 51 
2.2.2 The Sunnah 
The Sunnah is the second major source of Shari'ah after the Qur'an. 52 It explains and 
elaborates the Qur'an and at the same time constitutes an independent source as well. 53 
It explains the precise rules of the Qur'an or qualifies its absolute injunctions or 
43 Al-Qardavi, Yousaf, Madkhal-Li-Dirasat Al-Shari'ah Al-Islamia (Maktaba Al-Wahba, Cairo, 1997) p. 10 44 Khallaf, Abdul Wahab, Ilm Usul al-Filth (8'h ed., Dar AI-llm, Kuwait) p. 22-23. 
Lippman, Matthew, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure (Praeger, London, New York, 1988)p. 29 
Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. pp. 245-46. 
45 Ramadan Said, Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity (2"d ed. Dr. Said Ramadan, 1970) p. 43. 
46 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xv. 
Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law (Reprint) (Edinburgh University Press, 1971) p. 12. 
47 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 44. 
48 Waines, David, An Introduction to Islam (Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 76. 
49 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 43. 
50 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 31. 
51 Coulson, N. J., 1971, op. cit. p. 12. 
52 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 30. 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar, 2000, op. cit. p. 20. 
53 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 42. 
Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 62. 
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specifies its general statements. 54 The Prophet was, in fact, sent primarily to exemplify 
the teaching of the Qur'an hence its understanding is dependent upon Sunnah. 55 If on a 
given matter the Qur'an is silent, the guidance is sought from the teaching and example 
of the Holy Prophet. Detailed accounts of the life of the Prophet and his teachings are 
available in their original and pure form. 56 
The word Sunnah literally means manner of acting, a rule of conduct, or a mode of 
life. 57 It will, therefore, include any rule deduced from the saying or the conduct of the 
Holy prophet. 58 Such conduct may be in the form of a specific utterance of the Holy 
Prophet, an action or practice, or the approval by him of the action of someone else. 59 
The approval implies the permissibility of the conduct in question. It shows that the 
Sunnah may be divided into three kind i. e. verbal, practical and tacit constituting the 
model behaviour of the Holy Prophet for Muslims. 60 
To follow the command and the example of the Holy Prophet is obligatory upon every 
Muslim. It has been ordained in the Holy Qur'an, "Whatsoever the Messenger gives 
you take it and whatsoever he forbids, abstain from it. "61 It was the Qur'anic command 
to obey the Prophet that sanctioned the second source of authority for Shari'ah. 62 The 
Prophet neither errs nor does he commit mistakes in what emanates from him because 
of infallibility and divine guidance. He speaks nothing of his own but that what has 
been revealed to him. 63 Thus whatever the Holy Prophet commanded is considered to be 
the will of Allah64 hence the authority of the traditions of the Holy Prophet collectively 
known as the Sunnah in Shari 'ah. 
The importance of Sunnah is increased due to the fact that the Holy Prophet not only 
taught, but took the opportunity of putting his teachings into practice in all the important 
affairs of life. He lived for 23 years after Prophet-hood and endowed his community 
54 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 149. 
55 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 60. 
56 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 43. 
37 Ibn Manzur, 1955, op. cit. Vol. Xlll, p. 225. 
58 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 34. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 50. 
Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 151. 
Al-Qur'an 59: 7 
62 Calverley, E. E., Islam: An Introduction (The American University at Cairo, Cairo, 1958) p. 69. 
63 Al-Qur'an 53: 3-4. 
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with a practical religion, founded a state which he administered, maintained internal 
peace and order, led the armies for external defence, judged and settled the disputes of 
his subjects, punished the criminals, and legislated in all other walks of life. 65 
2.2.3 Ijma (consensus) 
Ijma or consensus of opinion is the third source of Shari 'ah. Whether Ijma means the 
Jima of the whole community, the companions, the jurists as a class, or just those of a 
particular locality is a debatable question, 66 yet in classical theory it is the agreement of 
the qualified jurists. 67 The successors of the Holy Prophet retained both spiritual and 
secular authority over the community; while deciding any case they had to consult the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah to seek a divine ruling about a certain issue. In case of failure, 
they had to seek the advice of the pious and learned members of the community and 
apply their unanimous opinion. It suggests that recourse to Ijma will be allowed only in 
the cases where the point of law, under consideration, is not covered by the first two 
basic sources. 68 Though Ijma has been defined differently by various jurists yet the most 
appropriate definition is the unanimous agreement of the Muslim jurists in a certain 
69 period of time, after the death of the Prophet, on a rule of Shari'ah. 
Ijma serves as a source of authority to unite the Muslim community under a common 
body of doctrine and law. 70 Doctrine of Ijma derives its authority both from the Holy 
Qur'an 71 and the saying of the Holy Prophet that his community shall never unite on 
error. 72 In a sense the doctrine represents a secular proposition that the voice of the 
people is the voice of God. 73 It serves as a means to acclimatise the provisions of 
Shari'ah to the ever changing needs of society at different places and times. 74 The Holy 
6' 
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66 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 82. 
Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 40. 
67 Coulson, N. J., 1971, op. cit. p. 77. 
68 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 30. 
6') Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 37. 
Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 32. 
Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 166 
70 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 82. 
71A1-Qur'an 4: 115 (Shaft, Mufti Muhammad, Muarifal-Qur'an (Idara al-Muarif, Karachi, 1986) Vol. If, p. 547. 
72 lbn Majah, Sunan ibn Majah, (2"d ed., Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1413 A. H. ) Vol. II, p. 1303. 
73 Kerr, Malcolm H., Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid 
Rida (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1966) p. 79. 74 Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., Medieval Islam (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953) p. 149. 
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Prophet is reported to have said that whatever is agreed upon by the Muslims attains the 
status of binding rule unless it declares an unlawful as permissible and vice versa. 75 
Doctrine of Ijma is agreed upon by all the four Sunni schools of thought. 76 Though the 
rules deduced on the basis of Ijma vary in degree of sanctity in different schools, 
however, there is unanimity of opinion that Ijma once established cannot be 
abrogated. 77 The Muslim jurists unanimously admit the principle that all that the 
Muslims consider good, is good in the eyes of Allah, 78 hence doctrine of Ijma implies 
that the rules deduced by lima entail divine approval. 79 It will be binding on the 
Muslims to act on a principle that has been established by Ijma of qualified legal 
scholars of any generation. 80 
Unlike the Qur'an and the Sunnah, Ijma is not a divine source. Its importance as a 
source of Shari 'ah demands that only an absolute and universal consensus, though 
difficult to obtain, should qualify. 81 The concept will lead to the political unity of the 
Muslim community, combined with the democratic notion of political consensus it is 
the most authoritative basis for the legislative development of Shari'ah. 82 However, this 
particular feature renders it too slow a process for legislation to keep pace with the 
changing needs of community in modern times. Moreover, geopolitical differences and 
the diversity of culture and traditions throughout the Muslim world render the 
occurrence of classical Jima more difficult. The only plausible solution to overcome the 
difficulty is that the courts should not be barred from giving ad hoc judgements pending 
the occurrence of Ijma. 83 
2.2.4 Qiyas (Analogical Reasoning) 
Literally Qiyas stands for measuring the length, weight or quality of something or its 
comparison with a similar one. 84 It suggests an equality or close similarity between the 
75 Al-Tirmidhi, AI-Jameh al-Sahih (2"d ed., Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1413 A. H. )Vol. 111, p. 626. 'G All, Shaheen Sardar, The Conceptual Foundation of Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective 3 (1997) 
European Public Law 261 at 268. 
"Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xix. 
78 AI-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Hamid, AI-Mustasfa min Uloom udDin (Al-Moassat al-Rissala, 
Beirut, 1997) Vol. I, p. 41 1. 
Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din, AI-Ashbah Wa A1-Nazair (Mo, assasa al-Halbi, Cairo, 1968) p. 93. '' Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 131. 
80 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xviii. 
8i Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 168. 
82 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. xvi. 
83 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 1 1. 
84 Ibn Manzu, r, 1955, op. cit. Vol. VI, pp. 187-88. 
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two things, where one serves as criterion to evaluate the other. 85 In Shari 'ah Qiyas 
means the deduction of legal prescriptions from the Qur'an and the Sunnah by 
reasoning and analogy. 86 When a judge exercised his discretion to extend the principle 
in one case to another by virtue of a common cause (111ah) shared by the two, the 
process was termed as analogical deduction or Qiyas. 87 The deduction may be regarded 
as reasoning from the general to the particular or from the particular to the particular. 
Qiyas may be described as the method of interpretation in which legal reasoning on the 
basis of Qur'an and Sunnah is generally accepted as fully legitimate. 88 
The whole concept of Qiyas is based upon the effort to find out an essential common 
cause between the similar cases and to apply the rule of one to the other. 89 The main 
role of human reason is the identification of the common cause. 90 Once it is identified it 
becomes necessary to apply the rule without any change or interference. 91 The extension 
of an existing rule of Shari 'ah to a similar case is invalid without identification of the 
common cause. 92 Hence, reasoning and example both are essential elements of Qiyas. 
Qiyas is merely the extension of the existing law to the new cases, hence it does not 
amount to an independent source of law rather it is a tool to develop the existing one. 93 
Doctrine of Qiyas is a means to restrict and discipline the discretion of the judges. 94 it 
involves the investigation of the motive of law or ratio legis and application of the 
reasoning in one case to the other on the basis of analogy. 95 It is permissible for the 
jurists to exercise Ijtihad to determine the common cause, the essential requirement of 
analogy, in the cases where it was not evident. 
85 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 197. 
86 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 32. 
87 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 65. 
88 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 66. 
ß9 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 197. 
Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 43. 
90 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 173 
91 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 198. 
92 Ibid. p. 37. 
93 Ibid. p. 198. 
9d Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 1953, op. cit. p. 148. 
95 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 251. 
Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. pp. 40-41. 
Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 32. 
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For the application of doctrine of Qiyas it is a prerequisite condition that the original 
ruling was based upon either of the two material sources of Shari 'ah and the solution of 
the current case cannot be found in them or in a definite Iima. 96 It means that a rule of 
law already exists in the primary sources leading to a particular conclusion given all the 
circumstances of the case in hand. 97 Hence doctrine of Qiyas ensures consistency of 
revealed law and reason in the development of Shari'ah. 98 Though there is disagreement 
among the Muslim jurists on the application of Qiyas in criminal cases, however the 
most appropriate view is not to apply the doctrine in cases of penalties because in the 
realm of criminal law each case has its peculiar facts distinguishing it from the other. 99 
Generally in the civil cases the doctrine can be applied. 
English law also recognises the principle of analogy as a tool to deal with the new 
issues of law. If a new case comes before a court and it is analogous with some other 
already dealt with, it should be decided on the same principle because if like matters 
arise let them be decided by the like one, 100 since the occasion is good one for 
proceeding Similibus ad similia. 101 The common cause (111ah) required by Shari 'ah is 
analogous to the ratio decidendi to be followed in the cases of binding precedents. 
Majority of the Muslim jurists hold the view that the four sources i. e. the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, Ijma and Qiyas are valid and provide adequate means for the decisions of all 
new problems forming the basis for the fundamental structure of Islamic 
jurisprudence. 102 
2.3 Secondary Sources of Islamic Law 
Divine origin of Shari'ah does not render it rigid. The secondary sources give it the 
flexibility required to absorb the changing conditions of human society. The political 
power of the time enjoys a degree of legislative competence derived from the divine 
law. Justice, doing of good and wisdom are the fundamental guiding principles for such 
legislation. A study of Shari'ah makes it clear that there are certain subjects whose rules 
have been specified in a definite way, while there are others left to the discretion of the 
community to determine appropriate rules for them, provided that they do not contradict 
96 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 197. 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar, 2000, op. cit. p. 23. 
97 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 173 
98 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 198. 
99 /bid p. 223. 
loo S. H. Bailey & D. C. Ormerod, Modern English Legal System (4th ed., Sweet &Maxwell, 2002) p. 477. 
101 Thorne, Samuel, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (Seldon Society, 1968) Vol. II, p. 21. 
102 Calverley, E. E., 1958, op. cit. p. 73. 
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the principles laid down in the primary sources. Some of the secondary sources are 
unanimously acknowledged by all the Sunni schools, whereas some others are 
acknowledged by some and refuted by the others. Some of the important secondary 
sources have been precisely discussed below. 
2.3.1 /stihsan 
Isstihsan is an important method of Ijtihad that plays a significant role in the adaptation 
of Shari'ah to the changing needs of a society. The word is derived from Hasan, which 
means being good or beautiful. 103 It literally means to approve, or to deem some thing 
preferable. 104 In juristic sense, it stands for exercising personal opinion in order to avoid 
any rigidity and unfairness that might result from the literal enforcement of the existing 
rules. ' 05 Istihsan does not mean to derive a rule by an arbitrary opinion or desire. 106 It 
means to set aside the requirement of a proof as an exception, and to make concession 
for a stronger proof, in case of the conflict of proofs. 107 It is another way to interpret the 
sources by preferring one of the two analogies. 
Istihsan authorises departure from the set principle of analogy, when its strict 
enforcement leads to unfair results, 108 for what would be more convenient for the people 
in a particular case. 109 If the analogy is general, and conflicts with consensus, public 
interest, custom, or the principle of eliminating harm, the analogy will be set aside. 110 
This suggests that a decision arrived at by the use of reasoning by analogy may be 
rejected in favour of one based on equity. " Istihsan does not seek to constitute an 
authority beyond the Shari 'ah. It is an integral part of the Shari 'ah and does not 
recognise superiority of any other law to the divine law. 112 
Doctrine of Istihsan helps admitting new rules into Corpus Juris of Shari 'ah; it restricts 
or extends the interpretation of pre-existing rules on the basis of social needs. 113 It 
103 Ibn Manzur, 1955, op. cit. Vol. XIII, p. 114. 
104 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 246. 
1°5 Ibid. 
106 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 180. 
1 07 Ibid. 
108 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 66. 
109 Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 1953, op. cit. p. 149. 
11° Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 180. 
111 Makdisi, John, "Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law" 33 (1985) Am. JCL. 63 at 67. 112 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. pp. 245-46. 
113 Makdisi, John, 1985, op. cit. p. 68. 
34 
i; ný_liih L: m ; uul Shuri'rrtr: Nanirt:, Sources and Principle- of Criºninal l, iabilitti 
equips Shari'ah with the necessary means encouraging flexibility and growth. 114 This 
essential flexibility of the doctrine led the Shafite to apprehend that it may escort to the 
suspension of Shari'ah's injunctions and may be used as a means to circumvent its 
general principles and hence they rejected the doctrine. 115 However, this opinion is 
questionable because it is neither an independent source of law nor it is the arbitrary 
exercise of personal opinion, rather a form of Qiyas having firm roots in Shari 'ah. 
Use of the doctrine by Malkite and Hanfite is widely known, the only disagreement 
between them is on its nomenclature. 116 Malkite named it as Istislah. 117 An example of 
Istihsan is imposition of liability on artisans for destruction or damage of. an article 
handed over to them for certain work, on payment of charges. The general rule requires 
that there should be no responsibility because they are trustees and a trustee is not liable 
for the damage or loss of deposit, unless attributed to his personal fault or negligence. 
However, the imposition of liability under the doctrine is for the public interest. ' 18 This 
will ensure the protection of the property of the people because craftsman will be more 
cautious to safeguard it. The doctrine of Istihsan states that the overall welfare of the 
community overshadows any particular legal consideration and a general right or duty is 
more important than the particular one. 119 It consists of determining man's best interests 
and promoting them in accordance with the spirit of Shari 'ah. 
Istihsan is an equivalent of equity in secular law. 120 Both are inspired by the principle of 
fairness and conscience, authorising a departure from the rule of law when its 
enforcement leads to injustice. 12 1 Despite their similarity they are not exactly identical, 
equity relies on the concept of natural law whereas Istihsan on the underlying values 
and principles of Shari'ah. 122 Natural law shares a lot of features of divine law but it 
differs in its assumption that right and wrong are inherent in nature. 123 Shari'ah admits 
that these values are determined by the divine will. Equity is the law of nature, above all 
114 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 246. 
115 AI-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Hamid, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 409. 116 Hassan, 1-1. Ilamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 179. 
117 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 61. 
Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 1953, op. cit. p. 149. 
Its Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 257. 
119 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 22. 
120 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 36. 
121 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 245. 122 Ibid. 
123 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 57. 
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the legal rules written or otherwise but Istihsan does not recognise superiority of any 
law over Shari'ah. 124 Equity in itself is considered as a superior law but Istihsan is not 
an independent authority beyond Shari'ah. 125 Istihsan can be called Islamic equity since 
justice is the most basic value emphasised in Shari'ah. 126 
2.3.2 Religious Laws Revealed before Islam 
Another source of Islamic law is the divine revelation received by the former 
Prophets. 127 Islam is preceded by other revealed religions that have been mentioned in 
the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, like the laws of Abraham, Moses and Jesus., 28 All 
revealed laws emanate from one and the same source and convey the same message. 129 
The revealed religions may be considered as different manifestations of unity. Since 
these laws were addressed to different nations at different times so each of them has its 
distinguishing features in the fields of permissible, prohibited and religious rituals. 130 
The essential unity of revealed laws in belief, moral values, and essence of guidance to 
regulate human conduct has been affirmed a number of times in the Qur'an. 131 Islam 
has retained many of these laws and at the same time abrogated or amended many 
others. These laws are binding on Muslims if they are not amended or repealed. 132 
However, now the basis of their being binding is not the old revelation but the text of 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah commanding the Muslims to adhere to them. For example, 
the law of Qisas was actually revealed for the Jews in the Torah but as it has been 
maintained in the holy Qur'an so now it is an Islamic law. 133 Similar is the case with the 
punishment of stoning to death for adultery. 134 
2.3.3 Custom (Urf) 
A custom may be defined as a conduct that is common among the people and to which 
they have become habituated. 135 Shari'ah did not impose such laws on the people as 
124 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 245. 
125 Makdisi, John, 1985, op. cit. p. 90. 
126 Gerber, Haim, 1999, op. cit. p. 93. 
127 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 134. 
128 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 234. 
129 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 229. 
130 Ibid. p. 230. 
131 For example, Al-Qur'an 42: 13; 5: 44; and 6: 92. 
132 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 37. 
133 Al-Qur'an 5: 45. 
134 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, Saih al-Bukhari (2°d ed., Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1413 A. H. ) Vol. 
VIII, p. 30. 
Muslim bin I-Iijjaj, Saih Muslim (2"d ed., Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1413 A. H. )Vol. 11, p. 1326. 
Also see The New Testament, St. John, Chapter VIII, Verses 3-11 (Stoning to death was Jewish Law). 
135 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 224. 
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were absolutely unknown to them. Old customs and law of Arabia were examined, and 
after necessary and appropriate changes, if needed, they were retained. 136 The guiding 
principle in this regard is that all that which is not repugnant to the provisions of the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah constitutes good law. 137 A considerable number of technical 
terms of pre-Islamic customary laws have been adopted either with modified or 
narrower definitions, or even attributing totally different meaning to them. 138 The Holy 
Qur'an itself enunciates the validity of custom in determining the maintenance of wife 
and children. 139 
The acceptance of custom as a source can be found on the injunction of the Holy 
Qur'an which states that no hardship has been laid upon the believers. 140 The 
disapproval of a prevailing custom would have caused hardship in the cases where there 
was no explicit conflict with the principles of Shari'ah. Custom could be incorporated 
and assimilated through interpretations based on the exercise of Ijtihad, in cases 
determined by preference, public interest, and even consensus. 141 An example of 
adoption of prevailing custom by Shari 'ah is the liability of the kinsmen of an offender 
to share payment of Diyat in case of manslaughter. 142 Similarly, sale of a non existing 
object at the time of conclusion of contract is validated on the grounds of custom. 143 
A custom is binding upon the parties as a lawful agreement between them, for a custom 
is no more than an agreement between a large number of people. 144 A legal maxim 
states that a valid custom is like a stipulated condition, the parties are bound by the 
custom as they are by the condition. 145 Like English law, Muslim jurists have imposed 
certain conditions, at par with that of English law, for the validity of a custom, among 
these are; that it should be general and not peculiar to a class of people, 146 it must be 
136 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 133. 
137 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 224. 
138 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 285. 
Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 8. 
133 Al-Qur'an 65: 7 and 2: 233. 
40 Al-Qur'an 22: 78. 
141 Bosworth, C. E. & Donzel, E. Van, 1997, op. cit. Vol. X, p. 887. 
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sound and reasonable, 147 it should be in existence at the time of revelation, and it should 
not contravene a provision of Qur'an or Sunnah. 148 
Whether a custom can be taken as a source of law in the modern age is a complex 
question. Disintegration of traditional patterns of societies, change in the socio- 
economic status of people, and unprecedented urbanisation has caused instability in 
social behaviour which resulted into discontinuation and instability of customs 
qualifying to be converted into a legal rule. Moreover, modern legislation has 
diminished the need to rely on custom as a basis of decision making. 149 At the most an 
authoritative custom may serve as a supplementary source in certain civil matters. 
2.4 ljtihad in Shari'ah 
Practical utilisation of all the sources of Shari'ah needs ljtihad i. e. the exertion of effort 
in deriving rules from the sources. 150 ljtihad is the ability, occasioned by knowledge, to 
derive legal rule that requires learned effort. 151 The conditions of knowledge and ability 
suggest that ljtihad is open only to the men of great scholarship who deserve the title of 
Mujtahid and are juristically qualified. 152 Another basic condition is the proficiency in 
language of the primary sources of Shari'ah along with methodological skills to resolve 
instances of conflict in its conclusions. 153 A Mujtahid must have the knowledge of the 
legal contents of the Qur'an and full grasp of occasions of revelation and doctrine of 
abrogation. 1 54 The importance of knowledge of abrogation is reflected by the maxim, 
lex posterior derogat priori that the later rule prevails over the earlier one. 155 The 
conditions render Ijtihad a scientific practice to derive a rule from legal sources. 
The scope of Ijtihad is limited to the issues about which no clear and defined rule occur 
and no Jima has been held yet. ' 56 The Qur'an and the Sunnah are the roots of Shari 'ah 
while the opinions of the jurists can be brought in by way of supplementation where the 
147 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 283. 
148 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. pp. 228-29. 
149 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 293. 
150 Ibid. p. 367. 
151 Weiss, Bernard, 1978, op. cit. p. 200. 
All, Shaheen Sardar, 2000, op. cit. p. 23. 
152 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xix. 
Ali, Shaheen Sardar, 1997, op. cit. p. 269. 
153 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 86. 
154Ibid p. 375. 
Coulson, N. J., 1971, op. cit. p. 76. 
155 Fitzgerald, P. J., Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1966) p. 200. 
156 Gibb, H. A. R., 1949, op. cit. p. 97. 
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main sources are silent. 157 In majority of the cases the Qur'an and the Sunnah do not 
state law in a strict legal sense, like the statutes, they however contain it, and the duty of 
a Mujtahid is to extract and derive law from these sources. 158 Ijtihad enables a Mujtahid 
to apply fundamental unchangeable principles of Shari 'ah to new situations, in order to 
solve new problems of human society. In this sense Muslim jurists-do not invent new 
legal rules by unrestricted discretion; they derive these concealed rules by the 
disciplined interpretation of divine texts. 159 This text oriented approach may be regarded 
as the true means for the historical development of Shari'ah. 
The importance of Ijtihad has been such a great that the Holy Prophet said that a 
Mujtahid will receive a reward in the hereafter even though he, inadvertently, reaches a 
wrong conclusion after the exercise of such an effort. 160 An erroneous opinion, formed 
honestly and not identified as such, is binding as long as the jurist has been sincere and 
diligent in his scrutiny of the primary source. 161 However, a fallible Ijtihad of an 
individual would always be corrected under the doctrine of Ijmci. 162 Shari 'ah not only 
permits rather encourages Ijtihad because any restriction will curtail the liberty of the 
individual to research and express an opinion. 163 The fact can be proved by a tradition of 
the Holy Prophet, when he appointed one of his companions Muadh as governor of 
Yemen and encouraged him to use reasoning and forming personal opinion to settle a 
dispute, if there was no textual authority. 164 
Ijtihad plays a vital role in deducing legal principles regarding the new issues arising in 
human society. 165 It makes Shari'ah capable of embracing human evolution in various 
fields like politics, economics, social relations and others. Though admitted that the 
general principle is to follow the injunctions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, yet the 
All, Shaheen Sardar, 2000, op. cit. p. 23. 
157 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 31. 
15s Weiss, Bernard, 1978, op. cit. p. 199. 
159 Gerber, Haim, 1999, op. cit. p. 143. 
160 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1413 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 157. 
Muslim, bin Hijjaj, 1413 A. H., op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1342. 
Al-Khatib al-Tabrizi, Mishkat al-Masabih (Translated in English by James Robson) (Shaikh 
Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, Pakistan, 1963) Vol. II, p. 793. 
161 Weiss, Bernard, 1978, op. cit. p. 205. 
162 Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 1953, op. cit. p. 151. 
16' Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 23. 
1`4 Ahmad bin Hanbal, Masnad Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal (Cagri Yayinlari, Istanbul, Turkey, 
1981) Vol. V, p. 236 & 242. 
165 Gerber, Haim, 1999, op. cit. p. 82. 
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development of Shari'ah can be attributed to the doctrine of Ijtihad because both these 
fundamental sources, in most of the cases, do not disclose the precise line to be 
followed. Where a principle was laid down but it was silent as to an individual case an 
independent effort is required to apply the principle keeping in view the text of the 
sources, public interest and equity. 
Jurists interpret the provisions of basic sources in the light of their knowledge and 
experience, and in this way doctrine of Ijtihad serves as a bridge between the immutable 
provisions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and the contemporary needs. Personal 
judgement supported by Qiyas or Istihsan gives a rational pragmatic character to the 
legal thinking of the jurists and the differences of opinion are removed by the 
application of doctrine of Ijma to bring uniformity. It is because of Ijtihad that the 
Shari'ah exists as a body of positive rules. Ijtihad is an ongoing process of deriving 
rules from the divine sources and Ijma transforms these rules into eternal principles 
which provide material out of which tomorrow's rules may be derived. '66 
The opinion, that has almost attained the status of consensus among orientalists, ' 67 and 
some Muslim scholars168 as well that the door of Ijtihad was closed in the I Oth century, 
is based upon misconception. Beside others, Professor Coulson and Joseph Schacht are 
among the supporters of this opinion. 169 Contrary to this opinion, the doctrine of Ijtihad 
never ceased in medieval Islam, rather it continued to the present day. Ftawa Imam Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 1328) is the best example to support this view. 170 It is interesting to 
mention that Joseph Schacht himself admits that Ibn Taymiyya interpreted the 
provisions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah afresh and arrived at novel conclusions. 171 
This exertion of effort to derive new meaning from the immutable texts and their 
application on unprecedented conditions is called Ijtihad. This process is still operative 
and can add a lot to the body of Shari 'ah. 172 
166 Weiss, Bernard, 1978, op. cit. p. 209. 
167 Jackson, Sherman A., Islamic Law and the State (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1996) p. 74. 16' Ali, Shaheen Sardar, 2000, op. cit. p. 23. 
169 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 69. 
Coulson, N. J., 1971, op. cit. p. 80. 
170 Gleave, R. & Kermeli, E., Islamic Law: Theory and Practice (I. B. Tauris, London, 2001) p. 119. 171 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 72. 
172 Hassan, Ahmad, "ljma in the Early Schools" 6 (1967) Islamic Studies 121 at 125. 
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2.5 Major Schools of Thoughts 
During the life time of the Holy Prophet and thereafter in the time of companions' 
jurisprudence was not a special subject. 173 The companions acted as judges seeking 
guidance from the holy Qur'an and the Sunnah or by exercising their independent 
opinion and discretion, if necessary, to deal with the issues before them. During the time 
of second generation, by the expansion of Muslim state to a vast geographical area, 
independent legal activities started in the various parts of the realm. ' 74 The second and 
third centuries A. H. witnessed the establishment and growth of four great schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 175 They comprise the Sunni understanding of the Shari'ah. 176 
Shari'ah did not develop through legislation or judicial decisions like English law, but 
is attributed to the thought and discourse of the great Muslim jurists. ' 77 The jurists 
devoted their lives deducing the general discursive rules from the text of the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah following certain fixed principles specific to their schools. 178 
There are differences of minor nature on various points of law among these schools but 
no disagreements on the basic principles and doctrines. 179 These differences can be 
attributed to the way each school accepts, employs, and interpret the sources in a 
particular issue 180 and may be regarded as simply different manifestations of the same 
divine will. The interpretations of the four schools enjoyed equal status because they 
differed in the extent and freedom of individual interpretation which they allowed. 181 
They all uphold an ideal of Shari'ah that unites them and their adherents in a common 
Sunni orthodoxy. 182 Difference of opinion in interpretation is not the unique feature of 
Shari'ah, all the major legal systems have different schools of thought and even in the 
contemporary legal systems different judges do differently interpret the laws. 
173 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 12. 
174 Ibid. p. 19. 
175 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 49. 
176 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 65. 
17 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 25. 
178 Nasir, Jamal J., The Islamic law of Personal Status (3"' ed., Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 9. 179 Donohue, John J. & Esposito, John L., (editors) Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982) p. 183. 
David, Rene, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Stevens & Sons, London, 1985) p. 459. 
Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 26. 
1S0 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 78. 
181 Endress, Gerhard, Islam: A Historical Introduction (2"a ed., Edinburgh University Press, 2002) p. 64. 182 Denny, Frederick Mathewson, An Introduction to Islam (Maxwell Macmillan, New York, 1994) p. 204. 
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2.5.1 Han fite School 
The school is named after its founder Abu Hanifa, Al-Numan bin Thabit (699-767). 183 
Abu Hanifa is the greatest jurist throughout the history of the Muslim law, having an 
immense power of legal reasoning. 184 Abu Yousaf, Muhammad al-Shaybani, and Zufar 
are his well known disciples responsible for the present shape of Hanfi Jurisprudence, 185 
though they disagreed with Abu Hanifa on many legal propositions. 186 Hanfite school is 
the most famous of the four schools of Islamic law. 187 The validity of free and 
independent opinion is the main characteristic of the school. Hanfite regarded the local 
customs and general practices of a particular place as basis of legal rules, unless these 
go against the express or implied provisions of the Qur'an or the Sunnah. Abu Hanifa's 
legal thought is much superior to that of his contemporaries, technically more highly 
developed, more circumspect and more refined. 188 Hanfite did not confine themselves to 
the real problems. They went beyond; assuming problems hypothetically that might 
arise in future and suggested their solutions. 189 
The major characteristic of the school is the interpretation of laws in favour of the 
subjects. The school emphasised the importance of public interest in consideration of 
legal questions. 19° Hanfite would never agree to any proposition of law based on an 
interpretation which causes undue hardship to anyone. 191 The Fiqh of the school is more 
sensible, judicious, moderate, and much easier to follow as compared to any other 
school. 192 This seems to be one of the main reasons why an overwhelming majority of 
the Sunni Muslims of the world follow this school. 193 
A major base for the legal propositions in the school is Qiyas. Though the other schools 
of law do recognise Qiyas as a source of law yet they do not use it so frequently. 194 
Hanfite would place Qiyas above a solitary Hadith (based on single testimony) in the 
183 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xi. 
184 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 48. 
185 Gibb, H. R. A., The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Luzac & Co. London, 1960) p. 124. 
186 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 46. 
187 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xi. 
188 Gibb, H. R. A., 1960, op. cit. p. 123. 
189 Nasir, Jamal J., 2002, op. cit. p. 11. 
Badr, Gamal Moursi, "Islamic Law: Its Relation to other Legal Systems" 26 (1978) Am. JCL. 187 at 189. 
190 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 50. 
191 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 50. 
192 Ibid p. 51. 
193 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 254. 
194 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 48. 
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order of preference. 195 Abu Hanifa has been reported to set the order of preference of 
legal sources for the discovery of a legal rule as the Qur'an, the Sunnah, saying of the 
companions with a liberty to choose anyone of them in case of difference of opinion 
among them and in the event of absence of any provision thereby forming his 
independent opinion. 196 The school was adopted as official law by the Ottoman Empire 
in Turkcy and Moghuls in India. 197 At present the Hanfrte predominates in Western 
Asia, Syria, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Turkish central Asia, lower Egypt and Indo- 
Pakistan. 198 
2.5.2 Malkite School 
The school was founded by Malik bin Ans (710-795). 199 The greatest work of his life is 
A1-Muwatta, the earliest book of collection of Traditions and Figh, 200 which also 
contains the general practice of the Muslims of Madina that provides a base for the legal 
propositions in the school. 201 He preferred the actual practice in Madina over the 
contradictory traditions, because in his view the general practice of the Muslims of the 
city represented the living Sunnah and was, therefore, more reliable than verbal 
traditions. 202 The Traditions in the Al-Mutivatta are arranged subject wise, like text 
books of codified laws. 203 
Like the doctrine of Istihsan in Hanfite school, Malik had the principle of Istislah to set 
the legal rules in conformity with the requirements of everyday life and equity. He also 
used free opinion in the cases where practice of Madina did not exist. Most of the 
followers of Malik were practical lawyers thus the teachings of the school were 
essentially practical rather than speculative. 204 The teachings of Malik spread from 
Madina to Egypt, north, central and West Africa, Spain, and eastern Arabian coast. 205 At 
present the school is followed in parts of north and West Africa and Upper Egypt. 206 
195 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xxiii. 
196 Muhawizz, A. Muhammad, Tarikh al-Tashreeh al-Islami (15` ed., Dar al-Ktub al-Ilmia, Beirut, 2000) p. 80. 
AI-Saa'is, Muhammad All, Tarikh al-Fiqh al-Islami (Maktaba Muhammad Ali, Egypt) pp. 93-94. 
197 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 50. 
198 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xi. 
Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 74. 
199 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 51. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 57. 
202 Ibid. p. 58. 
203 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 67. 
204 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 51. 
205 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xiii. 
206 Gibb, H. A. R., 1949, op. cit. p. 103. 
Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 60. 
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2.5.3 Shafite School 
The third in chronological order is the Shafite school founded by Abu Abdullah 
Muhammad hin Idrees al-Shafi (767-820). 207 He is the first jurist who wrote on Islamic 
jurisprudence and methodology of law. 208 His accomplishments in the religious science 
were unmatched by anyone of his time. 209 One of the prominent features of Shafi's 
jurisprudence is the fact that he selected such doctrines from other schools as pleased 
him and borrowed freely from various sources . 
210 The school is particularly strong in 
logic and reason. 211 As he learnt from Malik and some of the disciples of Abu Hanifa, 212 
his jurisprudence was actually a compromise between the two schools. 213 
He accepted the doctrine of Qiyas but ruled that an analogy may be based on the 
Qur'an, Sunnah or Ijma. 214 It means that the points on which there exists an express 
ruling in the Qur'an, the Sunnah or Ijma, no disagreement is allowed. 215 The principle 
restricts the use of discretionary opinion by the jurists. 216 Though he acknowledged 
Ijma as a source of law 217 yet he was not a blind follower of the doctrine, according to 
him the Ijma of jurists must be thoroughly scrutinised before its acceptance. 218 At 
present the school is followed in Egypt, southern Arabia, Bahrain, some parts of India 
and Sri Lanka, some parts of central Asia and east Africa, 219 Indonesia and Malaysia. 22° 
2.5.4 Hanbalite School 
The school was founded by Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal in Baghdad (780-855). 221 He was 
a student of Al-Shafi. 222 He spent much more time in collecting Ahadith than in the 
Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 74. 
207 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xiii. 
208 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 62. 
Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xiii. 
209 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 67. 
210 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 63. 
. 211 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 52. 
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213 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 63. 
211 Mulla, D. F. Sir, 1988, op. cit. p. xiii. 
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220 Gibb, H. A. R., 1949, op. cit. p. 103. 
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derivation of rules of law. 223 He collected thousands of Ahadith compiled into the book 
known as Musnad of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal. 224 The collection is arranged according 
to the transmitters. 225 Unlike Shafi he wrote no treatise on ethico-juristic methodology, 
226 however, certain of his decisions bear witness to a judicial subtlety without parallel. 
Ahmad bin Hanbal was very indulgent to the traditions of the Holy Prophet and the 
most prominent characteristic of the school is that some times they admit very weak 
traditions as the basis of legal propositions. 227 Though he does not fully appreciate the 
value of Qiyas as an instrument of juridical systemisation and discovery yet he does not 
reject it completely. 228 He regarded the legal opinions of the leading companions as the 
third source of Islamic law because they were the best to understand and practise the 
Prophet's Sunnah. 229 The school is considered as the strictest of the schools, for its 
rejection of any proposition not based on the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 230 He extensively 
used Istishab, a method of reasoning which consists in maintaining a given judicial 
status so long as a new condition arises to authorise its modification. 231 Hanbalite had 
its strong following in Iraq and Syria until the Ottoman conquest; however, it was 
revived in the 18th century in central Arabia, and now is the dominant school in most of 
the central and northern Arabia, Syria and Palestine. 232 The school enjoys an official 
recognition in Saudi Arabia. 233 
2.6 Role of These Schools in Development of Shari'ah 
The Muslim jurists never had the authority to make law in their own right. 234 Their 
function is to discover and expound it from its sources. They are more rigidly bound to 
the text of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and not the formulators of new laws like the 
common law judges. 235 Development of Shari 'ah is attributed to these great jurists 
223 Walliullah, Mir, 1982, op. cit. p. 66. 
224 Gibb, H. R. A., 1960, op. cit. p. 273. 
225 Hassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 54. 
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228 Gibb, H. R. A., 1960, op. cit. p. 276. 
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231 Gibb, H. R. A., 1960, op. cit. p. 276. 
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independent of government and its legislative organs. 236 The absence of interference 
from the government in the freedom of opinion of the Muslim jurists proved greatly 
favourable for the rapid development of law. 237 These schools were not official law- 
making bodies, rather independent jurists each following certain methodology of his 
own based on the primary sources of Shari'ah; a process of development of law 
unprecedented in other legal systems. 238 The adoption of peculiar methodology for 
deducing the principles has led to the disagreement and differences among the schools 
on certain matters of detail. 
It was natural that the legal school favoured by the political power of the time should 
prevail in the realm. 239 But to say that a school survived because it was favoured is not 
correct; a political power supports only for its own good and where it found strength 
already in existence. 240 These schools assimilated the culture and traditions of various 
parts of the world. Abu Hanifa was of Persian origin, whereas the other three were from 
Arabia. 241 In the subsequent generations there emerged Muslim jurists from different 
races; the development of Shari'ah was, therefore, an international enterprise. 242 
Despite their formal differences and divergences in detail, all the schools are in 
substantial agreement on the more important matters. 243 All of them in practice 
recognised the same sources: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, Iinza and some form of analogical 
reasoning; and all recognised each other's systems as equally orthodox. 244 They are not 
to be distinguished as different sects of Sunnis but merely as distinct schools. 
It may be pointed out that these scholars are all human beings; if they differ among 
themselves; the people are allowed to follow the one who appears to be more 
authoritative to them. 245 It will be similar to the cases of precedent that a court is 
allowed to follow one which it consider more authoritative and appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
236 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. xv. 
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2.7 Kinds of command and prohibition in Shari'ah 
The communication of God, relating to the acts of those who are the subjects of 
Shari'ah, by way of demand to do or abstain from doing an act, or giving them an 
option for its performance, or declaring a thing to be a cause or condition of such 
communication or impediment to it, is called a command. 246 On the basis of this 
definition the command may be divided into two major kinds i. e. the command, which 
demands to do or refrain from doing or gives an option, is called Hukm taklifi (the law 
which defines rights and obligations) and the command which declares a thing to be the 
cause or condition of a rule or an impediment, is termed Hukm wadi (declaratory 
law). 247 
The majority of the Muslim jurists have divided Hukm taklifi into five categories: 
248 
when an act is declared as obligatory it is IVajib, like command to fulfil the 
covenants; 249 when absolutely forbidden it is Haram, like prohibition of adultery and 
fornication. 250 The remaining three find their place between these two extremes. These 
are, reprehensible or disapproved i. e. Ifakruh, which fall short of outright prohibited 
ones, their omission, however, is preferable over their commission; recommended or 
Mandub, which are regarded as pious conduct worthy of spiritual merit, but their 
omission does not entail penalty; and finally the permissible or Mubah, towards which 
Shari'ah is totally indifferent. The examples of Makruh, Mandub, and Mubah are 
prohibition from business transactions after call for Friday prayer, 
251 reducing the 
contract of debt into writing, 252 and dispersal to seek the bounty of Allah after Friday 
prayer253 respectively. 
246 A1-Amidi, Al-lhkam fr Usul al-Ahkain (Matba'at al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1914) Vol. 1, p. 137. 
Sadr al-Shari'ah, Ubaid ullah bin Masud, Al-Tanqih ala Al-Tawdih (Dar al-Ahd al-Jadid Lil-Tibaah, 
Cairo, 1957) Vol. 1, pp. 13-14. 
Aamer, Abdul Aziz, Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (1s` ed. Dar al-Salant al-Ghouria, 1997) Vol. 1, p. 40. 
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However, Hanfite added two other kinds; Makruh has been divided by them into two 
kinds i. e. Tahrimi and Tanzihi. Makruh Tahrimi are the matters which are frankly 
discouraged but the evidence required to declare them Haram is uncertain254or we may 
say that it is an absolute demand to refrain from an act on the basis of probable 
evidence. 255 An indecisive demand to refrain from an act is called Makruh Tanzihi. 256 
They also add another category of obligatory acts, the Fard i. e. the absolute demand to 
do an act on the basis of decisive evidence; whereas, according to them the Wajib is an 
absolute demand to do an act on the basis of probable evidence. 257 
Instances of declaratory law have been described in the Qur'an. For example, decline of 
the sun has been declared to be the cause of noon prayer, 258 purification (ablution) has 
been declared as a condition for the validity of prayer, 259 and polytheism has been 
declared to be an impediment to marry an unbeliever. 260 
Shari'ah differs from secular laws in that its laws are not confined to merely command 
and prohibition rather often coupled with an appeal to the conscience of man. The 
classification, contrary to the positive law of valid and invalid, signifies the importance 
of moral aspect of Shari 'ah; obligatory, recommended and indifferent acts form the part 
of valid whereas forbidden are termed as invalid . 
261 This moral appeal may be in the 
form of a persuasion or warning, an illusion to the possible harm or benefit attached to 
its obedience or otherwise, a promise for reward or threat of punishment in the 
hereafter, whereas secular laws are devoid of such an appeal and are confined to an 
exposition of imperative rules and their tangible results. 262 It is a characteristic of 
Shari 'ah that the commands and prohibitions are expressed in a variety of forms often 
open to interpretation and Ijtihad. 263 
2.8 Legal Maxims in Shari'ah 
Muslim jurists. developed certain uniform rules of universal application. These rules 
known as Al-gawa'id al-fighiyya, based upon either a verse of the Qur'an or the Hadith, 
254 Waines, David, 1995, op. cit. p. 79. 
255 Hassan, Ahmad, 1993, op. cit. p. 35. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 AI-Qur'an 17: 78 
259 AI-Qur'an 5: 6 
260 AI-Quran 2: 221. 
261 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 9. 
262 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 139. 
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are compatible with the maxims of equity in English law. These maxims have been 
discussed in the book of Al-Ishbah Wa Al-Nazair in Hanfite as well as Shafite school of 
thought. 264 The maxims deal with the important questions of intention, proof, flexibility, 
necessity, custom, mischief, and many others providing basis to deduct legal rules. 
For example, a maxim related to the intention says that "all matters shall be determined 
according to the intention. "265 The maxim is based upon the well known saying of the 
1-loly Prophet that deeds are to be adjudged by the intention. 266 Another maxim related 
to the proof enunciates that "certainty cannot be displaced by doubt. "267 Freedom from 
any civil obligation or criminal liability falls under this maxim unless contrary proved 
because every one is originally presumed to be innocent. The maxim is based upon the 
saying of the Holy Prophet which states that the burden of proof is on the proponent; an 
oath is incumbent on him who denies. 268 Similarly the maxim that necessity renders 
prohibited things permissible269 finds its roots in the verse of the Holy Qur'an. 270 
These maxims provide an authoritative statement of Shari 'ah in civil and criminal 
litigation. Distinguished from the general theories, the maxims serve as a parameter for 
the deduction of particular precepts within the theories. 271 The maxims are very 
important because their knowledge makes the detailed study of Shari 'ah easy, helps to 
govern the new situations not discussed by the jurists, enlightens the objects of 
Shari 'ah, and provides the easiest way, for the lawyers and the students of Shari 'ah, to 
explore the enriched scholarship of Muslim jurists. 272 
26' Ibid. p. 33. 
2(4 lbn Nujaym, Zain ud din, 1968, op. cit. pp. 21-163. 
Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Na: air (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmia, Beirut, 1979). 
265 lbn Nujaym, Zain ud din, 1968, op. cit. p. 27. 
266 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1413 A. H., op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 2. 
Ibn Majah, 1413 A. H., op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1413. 
267 lbn Nujaym, Zain ud din, 1968, op. cit. p. 56. 
268 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1413 A. H., op. cit. Vol. III, p. 159. 
Muslim bin Hiijaj, 1413 A. H., op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1336. 
269 Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din, 1968, op. cit. p. 85. 
270 Al-Qur'an 2: 173. 
271 Nasir, Jamal J., 2002, op. cit. p. 30. 
272 Taqi ud din Al-Husni, Abu Bakr bin Muhammad, Kitab al-Qawa'id (15' ed., Maktaba al-Rushed, Al- 
Riyadh, 1997) Vol. 1, pp. 37-38. 
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2.9 English law and Shari'ah Distinguished 
2.9.1 Sovereignty 
Both English law and Shari'ah share the common feature that their application extended 
far beyond the boundaries of their original birth places. 273 However, the field of 
differences is very vast. The pivotal point of difference is the concept of sovereignty 
between the two. The belief in the unity and sovereignty of God is the foundation of the 
legal, political, social, and moral system propounded by all the Prophets. 274 The basic 
principle of Islamic way of life is that human beings must, individually and collectively, 
surrender all rights of over-lordship, legislation, and exercising of authority over others 
and submit to the will of God. No one is allowed to make laws on his own authority and 
no one is obliged to abide by them. 275 
In Shari'ah, no person, group or even the majority can lay claim to sovereignty. Allah 
alone is the real sovereign; all others are merely His subjects. They have neither an 
authority to a totally independent legislation nor for modification of the revealed law. 276 
It is because "the authority rests with none but Allah. He commands you not to 
surrender to anyone save Him. "277 At another instance it has been revealed "They ask: 
Have we also got some authority? Say: all authority belongs to Allah alone. "278 The 
believers are bound to adjudicate according to the revelation. "Whoso does not decide 
by that which Allah has revealed, such are disbeliever. "279 Having created every thing 
He deserves the command, "His is all creation and command. 11280 
According to this theory, ultimate sovereignty, above the legal and political system 
belongs to Allah . 
281 He alone is the law giver. Since the development of Shari 'ah is 
totally independent of the secular authority, there could be no question of interference 
by the governments with its rules and decisions. 282 All administrative matters and 
questions about which no explicit injunction is to be found in Shari 'ah are settled by the 
273 Badr, G. Moursi, 1978, op. cit. p. 187. 
274 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 158. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ihid. p. 159. 
! lassan, Ahmad, 1982, op. cit. p. 56. 
277 Al-Qur'an 12: 40 
278 Al-Qur'an 3: 154 
279 Al-Qur'an 5: 44 
280 Al-Qur'an 7.54 
281 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 4. 
282 Gibb, H. A. R., 1949, op. cit. p. 104. 
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consensus of opinion following the process of Ijtihad. 283 The qualified persons 
(Mt jtahid) can interpret the revealed law by exercising their free opinion. 284 
The concept is distinguishable from the modern democracy, which places sovereignty in 
people 285 and the law is shaped by public opinion. 286 People have a complete right to 
determine the values and norms of behaviour to be observed by them and they posses an 
absolute power of legislation accordingly. Law making is their prerogative and the 
legislation must correspond to their needs and temper of their opinion. 287 Law develops 
within society and is promulgated by a sovereign among human beings who keeps in 
view the demands of society, and his own political interests while legislating. 
2.9.2 Immutability 
The Qur'an and the Sunnah are the fountainheads of Shari 'ah that cannot be 
encroached on by any temporal authority. Their provisions, immutable in character, 
control the society and are not controlled by it and at the same time immune from any 
type of social or political change. 288 Political authority is allowed to exercise delegated 
legislative powers in conformity with the revealed principles. It is to be noted that 
Shari'ah prohibits only the violation of what Allah has revealed. It does not forbid 
Muslims from following any law that has not been revealed provided that it should be in 
conformity with the principles of Divine law. 289 Thus it is open for a Muslim society to 
frame new laws-to meet the demands of new situations but it is not permitted to adopt 
any law repugnant to the revealed principles. 
It is the feature of Shari 'ah that permanence and change co-exist in it. It is neither so 
rigid that it cannot admit any change even in the matter of details nor it is so flexible 
and fluid that its distinctive traits have no permanent character of their own. Both the 
qualities are embodied in such a way that they do not affect its natural distinction. 290 It 
is the law of nature that the element of permanence and change must co-exist in a 
283 Ibid. p. 161. 
284 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 4. 285 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 1 1. 
286 Denham, Paul, A Modern Introduction to Law (Edward Arnold, London, 1983) p. 2. 287 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 176. 288 Coulson, N. J., 1971, op. cit. p. 1. 
289 Ansari, Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman, The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim 
Society (ls` ed. Indus Educational Foundation, Karachi, Pakistan, 1973) Vol. 11, p. 347. 
290 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 42. (Like the process of physiological changes in human body, 
tissues of the body change throughout the life but the person remains the same; leaves, flowers, and the 
fruits of a tree change every year but the character of the tree remains unchanged. ) 
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harmonious equation. The basic problems of human society remain the same in all ages 
but the means to solve them may change with the passage of time. 
English law, like all other man-made laws is controlled by the society. These. laws can 
be changed, annulled or modified as the society deems it fit taking into account its own 
specific requirements. These laws uphold the principles believed by the society and are 
meant to support the system it wishes to establish. The changes in these laws are closely 
linked with change of policy, government and the passage of time. 
2.9.2.1 Is the Concept of Immutability an Innovation in Shari'ah? 
The concept of immutability of legal principles is not an innovation for the secular laws. 
Natural law theory admits that some sort of regulation of human behaviour proceeds 
from nature or the will of God which cannot be changed. 291 Principles of natural law are 
for all the times and no change can be made in these principles. 292 These principles 
determine the condition of perfect human co-existence, progress and development. 
According to Austin's point of view divine law may be divided into revealed and un- 
revealed, the un-revealed divine law is termed as natural law which can be discovered 
by reason or thought of man. 293 This concept is based upon the belief that God provided 
human reason with the necessary basis for determining the principles of social morality 
while only the spiritual issues are to be addressed by the revelation. But according to 
Islamic belief these un-revealed laws could have been discovered prior to the revelation, 
once the revelation has arrived these laws may only be discovered in the light of 
revelation. 294 It is because whatever is in the nature of man certainly does not indicate 
the intention or will of God with respect to man. This does not mean that Shari 'ah 
prohibits the use of reason; rather it has been ordained a number of times in the Holy 
Qur'an to use reason. Human reason in some cases could perceive what is good and 
what is bad; in such cases revelation do no more than confirming this judgement, 
whereas in certain other cases it is revelation alone that could evaluate the nature of an 
act which human reason could not otherwise evaluate. 295 In this way reason being 
subordinate to revelation form an integrated combination for the welfare of human 
beings. Blackstone admitted that the free will of human beings is regulated by the 
291 Kelsen, Flans, General Theory of Law and State (Russell & Russell, New York, 1961) p. 8. 
292 Finnis, John, Natural law and Natural Rights (reprint) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) p. 24. 
291 Austin, John, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5`h ed. John Murray, London, 1885) p. 104 
294 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Theories of Islamic Law (I. R. I. & I. I. I. T., Islamabad, 1994) p. 45. 
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eternal and immutable divine laws, good and evil has been determined by God and men 
are not bound to obey any human law in breach of such principles. 296 
2.9.3 Moral Aspect of Law 
Shari'ah regards moral virtues as the principal basis of a society, declaring all those acts 
punishable which are inimical to the moral standards of an Islamic society. It takes 
meticulous care of moral values because their springs lie in religion which enjoins 
inculcation of moral virtues and induces man to do good. Morality, whether public or 
private is the concern of Shari 'ah, crime and sin cannot he bifurcated, because without 
religion there can be no morality and without morality there can be no law. That is why 
law and morality are integrated into a single substance. 297 
English law completely ignores principles of private morality unless their violation 
directly affects the public order, peace and tranquillity in society. For example, sexual 
intercourse out of lawful wedlock is punishable only if done without the consent of the 
parties, but in Shari 'ah it is an offence regardless of the consent because it is considered 
to be detrimental to Islamic morality. The same is the case with intoxication, in English 
law intoxication itself is not an offence; it amounts to an offence only under the 
circumstances where it would be a nuisance to others. Shari 'ah, on the contrary, 
punishes use of alcohol, regardless of the fact whether or not it produces intoxication, 
and intoxication caused by any other substance, in order to keep intact its moral 
standards and the health of the community. 
The difference is based upon the fact that in Shari 'ah law and morality are derived from 
the same origin, whereas in English law legal rules derive their force from the will of 
the legislature but the morality finds its roots in religion, and culture. The approach of 
English law may be criticised on the ground that if the law was concerned only with the 
public order and morality, it should not have punished incest and bigamy which may be 
committed without corrupting public morals. 
2.9.4 Law as a Part of Religious Belief 
The principles of Shari 'ah enjoy a high level of respect, both in the hearts of the rulers 
and the subjects because they believe that these laws are revealed by the Almighty Allah 
and hence sacred. This belief motivates them to follow these principles. Adjudication 
205 Edge, Ian, 1996, op. cit. p. 488. 
296 Blackstone, Commentaries (15th Ed. A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. 1, pp. 40-43. 
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under the principles of Shari'ah and submission to its rule has been declared as the basis 
for true belief. 299 In Islamic history there are a number of instances where the person 
himself appeared before the Holy Prophet and confessed the offence punishable with 
capital punishment, where it was not known to anyone whether he had committed such 
an offence. As per belief, implementation of Shari'ah and adjudication according to its 
provisions is a religious duty of the Muslim rulers and judges respectively. 299 
It is the natural weakness of humans that personal urges, selfish desires and interests 
have serious influences on law making. The ruling class legislates to protect its own 
interests at the cost of the interests of general public. The fundamental difference 
between Shari 'ah and the man-made laws is that, Shari'ah's laws are not passed by men 
who desire to legislate in their own interests; these laws are firmly based upon the 
principle of protection of the interests of whole mankind. In Shari 'ah all the legislation 
is subject to the will of God and no one is empowered to go against that. 
2.9.5 Implementation of Punishment in the Realm of Criminal Law 
The implementation of Shari 'ah s punishments is a legal as well as a spiritual duty of 
the state. 300 The subjects are bound to get their disputes decided according to the 
revealed law and not to show any sign of aversion, otherwise they are not true 
believers. 301 The implementation of Hadd punishment serves as expiation for the wrong 
done by the offender and re-establishes his relation with God and the society as well. 302 
It means that if the offender has been punished for his offence in this world, he shall not 
be liable for the torment of God in the Hereafter. In the implementation of Hudood, the 
position of ruler is like a father who punishes his children to reform and discipline them 
or a doctor who administers a bitter medicine or a surgeon who operates on his patient 
to cure the disease. 303 Apparently the operation of a surgeon causes harm to the patient, 
but actually it is unavoidable to cure him of the disease and to improve quality of his 
life, same is the case with punishments in Shari 'ah. On the other hand in secular laws 
execution of punishments is merely a legal duty having no ties with religious beliefs. 
297 Kerr, Malcolm H., 1966, op. cit. p. 7. 
298 A1-Qur'an 4: 65 
299 Al-Qur'an 5: 44,45 & 47. 
30" Ansari, Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman, 1973, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 292. 
301 Al-Qur'an 4: 65. 
302 Al-Khatib, Wali ud din Muhammad bin Abdullah, Mishkat Al-Masabih (Al-Maktab al Islami 
Damascus, Syria, 1961) Vol. II, p. 309. 
Al-Baihaqi, Abu Baker Ahmed bin Hassan, Al-Sunan al-Kubra (Dar al-Fiker, Beirut, 1996) Vol. XIII, p. 150. 303 Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ud din, AI-Sayasat al-Shariah (Dar al Kutb al Arabi, Egypt, 1969) p. 75 
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These punishments serve as retribution and outweigh the benefits derived by the 
offender from his offence and clear the account of the offender with the society. 304 
2.9.6 Perfection 
All secular laws are creation of man, whereas Shari 'ah is divine revelation. This is the 
basic difference which reflects the qualities of their respective makers. Man-made law is 
imperfect, inadequate and liable to changes and modifications. It is obvious that it aims 
at the collection of rules which are in harmony with the social needs of a particular 
society at a particular time, and no sooner does the society undergo a change, its laws 
are inevitably changed. Shari 'ah, on the other hand, is the creation of the perfect God 
which is for all times and there shall be no modification of His law as He said, "There is 
no change in the words of Allah. "30' The phenomenon of change in secular laws can be 
understood by taking into account the history of English law that it has undergone 
countless changes to cope with the requirements of the society, whereas Shari'ah's 
principles since the 7th century are unchanged and these are capable of absorbing and 
accommodating all the evolutionary changes that take place in human society. 
2.9.7 Concept of Rights and Duties 
All man-made laws emphasise the rights of man, showing much less concern with his 
obligations. 306 These laws govern only the relationships of man with his fellow men, 
whereas in Shari 'ah everyone bears certain obligations towards God, other humans, and 
even to himself. Shari'ah may be termed as a doctrine of duties and a code of 
obligations, individual's rights have secondary place in it. 307 The relationships between 
the individual and the community are defined in terms of duties not in terms of rights. 
For example, everyone is under an obligation to respect the right of life of others; if he 
does not, he shall be liable to the punishment of Qisas. Suicide is an offence because it 
is transgression of the right of God. Man is not allowed to take his own life because he 
did not create it. 
Everyone is bound to fulfil his obligations and no earthly authority can relieve him of 
these obligations, those who do not fulfil their obligations have no legitimate right. If 
everyone discharges his duty, the rights of others shall be safeguarded and by this way 
everyone shall be enjoying his freedom, and rights in peace and security. The emphasis 
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on obligations creates harmony in an Islamic society, because, if everyone performs his 
duty, the complaints for infringements of rights will naturally vanish, whereas emphasis 
on rights creates a trouble because everyone having concerns about his rights would 
hardly have the mind to think of his obligations towards others. 308 
2.9.8 Setting Standards of Conduct 
Unlike secular laws, Shari 'ah sets the desired standards of conduct and enjoins its 
subjects to attain these standards and not to transgress. It has been ordained in the Holy 
Qur'an, "And come not near to adultery. Lo! It is an abomination and an evil way. "309 
In the same Surah it has been ordained not to kill any person without any just cause and 
not to come near the wealth of orphans, to fulfil the covenants and to measure and 
weigh accurately. 310 Shari'ah ordains Muslims to avoid all kinds of evils and to follow 
the role model of the Holy Prophet. 311 It teaches man how to act, what to do and what to 
avoid in order to attain pleasure of Almighty Allah and to be successful on the day of 
judgement. 312 A violation of such injunctions will result into criminal liability. 
Secular laws, on the other hand, are not concerned with setting the standards of conduct, 
these laws only describe that if the subjects commit a particular act they will be liable 
for a specific punishment. Shari 'ah has adopted a more effective method. It seems to be 
more logical and realistic that the people are guided about their conduct, the prohibited 
has been distinguished from the permissible. After this, if some one violates the law, he 
should be liable for a severe punishment. 
2.9.9 Procedural Matters 
For the administration of justice, Shari 'ah from the very beginning not only required the 
proof by direct evidence but also established the institution of purification of witnesses, 
to ascertain whether a witness is trustworthy. 313 A testimony without corroboration 
bears no value. 314 Strict rules of evidence and conditions for witnesses are intended to 
ensure a fair trial and slim the probability of error. The rules of evidence, qualifications 
of witnesses and judges, elaborated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, fortify the rights of 
the accused and Shari 'ah has long led the rest of the world in recognising and applying 
308 Ansari, Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman, 1973, op. cit. Vol. II, p. v. 309 A1-Qur'an 27: 32. 
310 Al-Qur'an 27: 33-35. 
311 A1-Qur'an 33: "1. 
312 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 11. 
313 Hamidullah, Muhammad Dr., 1970, op. cit. p. 132. 314 Heer, Nicholas, 1990, op. cit. p. 7. 
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these rules. 31$ The proof of offences requires the satisfaction of strict evidentiary 
principles to establish a certainty of guilt which legitimise the infliction of relatively 
harsh punishments and eliminate the temptation to crimes. 316 It was only in the 16`h 
century when English law began to admit some rules of evidence. 317 It suggests that the 
Islamic society was based on the rule of law from its very beginning, long before the 
concept became a cornerstone of English society. 318 
The commandments of Shari 'ah are categorised into four kinds i. e. pertaining to rituals 
or worship, civil laws, personal laws, and penal laws. 319 From the very beginning, there 
were courts exercising separate jurisdictions in civil and criminal matters. 320 The golden 
thread of modern English law that an accused is presumed innocent unless proved guilty 
and the wisdom that it is better to acquit one hundred guilty persons than to wrongly 
convict an innocent were expressly recognised by Shari 'ah centuries ago. 321 There is no 
doubt that the principle of social justice laid down in Islamic jurisprudence were well 
suited to the then existing social conditions, these are equally appropriate for good 
governance and regulation of society of the present day. 
Conclusion 
Shari'ah knows no distinction between the religious and the secular, but views in one 
sweep the entire life of man. In the Holy Qur'an the two aspects are found interwoven 
one with the other. 322 The philosophy of ethics, law and morals, manners and mores, 
forms of social, political and economic organisation, side by side with the problems of 
worship and theology, have their legitimate place in the all inclusive system of 
Shari'ah. 323 That is why the ten years of the Prophet's rule in Madina, and thereafter 
thirty years of the rightly guided caliphs constituted the age in which human society had 
come as near perfection as could be hoped for. 324 The religious aspect of Shari 'ah 
becomes more prominent because it covers the religious duties of its subjects along with 
secular ones, whereas English law, in particular, and other legal systems in general are 
not concerned with the religious life of their subjects. 
315 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. xi. 
316 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
317 1 loldsworth, W. S., A History of English Law (6'h ed., Methuen & Co., London, 1938) Vol. 1, p. 334. 
318 Badr, Gamal Moursi, 1978, op. cit. p. 191. 
319Ibid. p. 26. 
320 Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 1953, op. cit. p. 165. 
321 Weeramantry, C. G., 1988, op. cit. p. 78. 
322 Gibb, H. A. R., 1949, op. cit. p. 89. 
323 Ahmad, Khurshid, 1976, op. cit. p. 200. 
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Unlike English law that has been developed by judges to meet the changing needs of 
society; Shari 'ah is mainly based upon the commandments of God independent of 
society. 325 English law, developed through the judicial decisions, is well described as 
judge-made law; Shari 'ah developed through the endeavours of authoritative jurists, 
having their opinions well-supported by arguments may be called jurist's law. 326 
Shari'ah'c development may be ascribed to private experts, independent of state's 
intervention but still awaiting formal codification. 327 In its sources, its scope, and its 
sanctions Shari 'ah is the antithesis of English law; despite some religious influence in 
the beginning, English law remained a temporal affair, the legislature for its enactment 
and the courts for its enforcement. 
After having the knowledge of the sources and the nature of both the legal systems it is 
appropriate to know that on what grounds the criminal liability in both the systems 
rests? The succeeding chapter will deal with the principles of criminal liability in 
English law. 
321 Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 1953, op. cit. p. 143. 
325 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 2. 
326 Badr, G. Moursi, 1978, op. cit. p. 189. 
Weiss, Bernard, 1978, op. cit. p. 201. 
3'7 Gerber, Haim, 1999, op. cit. p. 24. 
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Chapter-3 Principles of Criminal Liability in English Law 
3.1 Introduction 
Criminal liability is based on the grounds that the offender has contravened certain 
normative system, done something prohibited, which, therefore, prompts the reaction to 
hold him legally responsible. ' Once it is established that he is responsible for the 
unlawful conduct; the next step is to ascertain whether he fulfils the necessary 
conditions of criminal liability. What are these conditions that give rise to criminal 
liability? The answer to this question is based upon the principles of a specific legal 
system. 2 Generally, if the conditions of capacity and volition are fulfilled, the accused is 
found guilty and is sentenced to the punishment provided within the legal system to 
which he is subject. It shows that criminal law basically deals with four major 
questions; 3 Is the accused responsible for the conduct under question? How to assess the 
gravity of the offences and classify them? What are the criteria to select an appropriate 
punishment for the offence? What are the conditions that justify punishments? 
Although the conditions of criminal liability, criteria for classification of crimes and 
principles of selecting punishment conceptually vary in various legal systems yet there 
are some points of intersection and interrelation between them. Most criminal laws 
forbid certain types of behaviour, therefore, before a person can be convicted, it must be 
proved that he acted contrary to the law. 4 Similarly, all the legal systems share the 
common feature that offences are arranged hierarchically according to their comparative 
seriousness on the basis of the right infringed, harm produced, or the intention of the 
offender. 
Generally, criminal law does not set the standards of behaviour ought to be followed; it 
only threatens the consequences of violation of its provisions. 5 This threat of 
punishment helps in bringing about the desired social conduct. 6 Criminal conduct is a 
behaviour that does not follow normal patterns of behaviour, written or un-written, 
understood and accepted by the majority. The aim of law is not only to secure peace in 
Ross, Alf, On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment (Stevens & Sons, London, 1975) p. 13 2 Ibid p. 29. 3 Ibid. 
Sistare, C. T., Responsibility and Criminal Liability (Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989) p. 8. 
Devlin, Patrick, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1965) pp. 6-7. s Devlin, Patrick, 1965, op. cit. p. 20. G Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State (Russell & Russell, New York, 1961) p. 19. 
Denham, Paul, Law: A Modern Introduction (4`h ed., Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1999) p. 150. 
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the society but also to regulate all forms of behaviour. A key object of criminal law is to 
protect the rights of citizens against intentional violation by others and to protect the 
weak against the strong. 
This chapter will focus in a general way on criminal liability, searching the answers to 
the questions like: What is meant by criminal liability and how is it determined? What 
criteria has English law adopted for its determination? Is there any relationship between 
law and morality? What are the aims and objects of punishment? Do the punishments in 
English law achieve their objects effectively? 
3.2 Infringement of Rights: Basis of Criminal Liability 
In many legal and constitutional systems, it is possible to distinguish between two kinds 
of rights i. e. ordinary and fundamental rights. Ordinary rights are those rights that are 
believed, in a particular society at a particular time, to symbolize an appropriate 
normative balance between the citizens and the state. These rights are considered to be 
properly subject to the political process and change or extinction at any time by the state. 
Fundamental rights are considered to be particularly important, for instrumental or 
symbolic reasons, and are, therefore, properly given some measure of protection against 
the operation of the political process. 8 
The executive authority of the state is liable to uphold the fundamental rights of citizens 
to life, property, dignity and many others. In order to protect these rights, society has 
developed a formal legal system of rules binding on all its members, and enforced by an 
authority that guarantees peace, stability and protection of the interests of the society. 
Any conduct in breach of these rules endangering the safety and stability of a society is 
rightly regarded as an offence to be repressed with the corresponding severity. 9 
Besides criminal law, religion, customs, and morality are also considered to be the basic 
forces governing human conduct in a society. 1° All these are similar in their functions 
but by its coercive nature law can be distinguished from the others. Law exercises 
compulsion and enforces punishments on the transgressors, whereas others create a 
8 Feldman, David, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1993) pp. 50-51. 
9 Turner, J. W. Cecil, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (191h ed., The University Press, Cambridge, 1966) p. 2. 
Asworth, A. J. & Wasik, Martin, (Editors) Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in the Honour of 
Andrew Von Hirsch (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 18. 
10 MacDonald, H. Malcolm, The Rule of Law (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1961)p. 50 
Denham, Paul, A Modern Introduction to Law (Edward Arnold, London, 1983) p. 467. 
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conviction in favour of what man ought to do. Law deals with the exterior behaviour of 
a man, whereas others are mainly concerned with his inclinations, feelings, intentions 
and motives constituting his interior. Further, generally the law operates after an act or 
omission has taken place but the religion and morality operate to reform the conduct of 
a man before he acts. Here it may be noted that religion is not entirely internal, religious 
norms are some times more effective than all other norms including legal ones provided 
that the subjects believe firmly in the existence and power of a superhuman authority. " 
One reason for the obedience of law may be the legal sanctions behind it yet other 
influences are equally important. Social pressure, displeasure of fellowmen, public 
opinion and ethical considerations may also be taken into account while considering the 
behaviour of the people. It may be said that law makes the pressure of other forces more 
effective. However, existence of all these is essential for maximum happiness, pleasure 
and well being of a society. 12 
3.3 Criminal Liability and Human Rights 
In this Era of modern and civilized world, beside state or domestic laws there are certain 
regional and international organizations endeavouring to safeguard the basic human 
rights throughout the world. 13 All the conventions and charters of human rights declare, 
accept and protect the right to life, property, liberty, freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention, equality in dignity, non discrimination, protection against torture and 
inhuman treatment. The states are bound not only to avoid the violation of such rights 
themselves but also to take positive steps to prevent the infringement of such rights by 
the individuals. 14 
Human rights do not lose their significance in the realm of criminal law. It is desired 
that it should protect the rights of the community as well as the wrong-doer. In order to 
achieve this end the criminal law must strike a balance between the rights of individuals 
and society so as to protect life, liberty, and property of the individual, on the one hand, 
11 Kelsen, Hans, 1961, op. cit. p. 20 
12 MacDonald, H. Malcolm, 1961, op. cit. p. 32. 
13 In this regard we can take examples of The European Convention on Human Rights 1950, The 
American Convention on Human Rights 1969, The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples 
Rights 1981, and above all The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
14 Rehman, Javaid, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Longman, 2003) p. 9. 
In A v. UK, VI RJD 2669, ECHR held that governments are under a duty to protect the rights of 
children and other vulnerable all other vulnerable citizens from being infringed by private individuals 
and held UK government responsible for breach of its duty. 
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and social stability and security of society on the other. 15 The right of an accused to a 
fair trial, a right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment by the court, 
safeguard against illegitimate treatment by law enforcing agencies, protection against 
illegal police actions or abuse of process and many other rights are the concern of 
human rights. 
Human rights ensure that the authorities should treat all human beings, whether 
suspected, accused, or convicted, in a humane manner and their conduct should not fall 
below standard of behaviour dictated by civilization and respect for human dignity. 16 
These restrictions imposed on the scope of criminal law are meant to prevent its use as 
an instrument of tyranny and to ensure that zeal for law enforcement does not lead the 
law enforcing agencies to fall below the standard of treatment demanded by respect for 
the individual as a human being. '? 
3.4 Basic Characteristics of Criminal Law 
The governing power in a society is empowered to make rules of law regulating the 
conduct of individuals. Though this power may make any law that it likes yet it must be 
reasonable, just, certain, and safeguarding the interests of all the groups in a society and 
logically acceptable. 18 In order that power should not be the basis of a society, Lord 
Denning describing the features of criminal law says that it must be certain so that the 
people may act safely upon it and approve its enforcement. It must be readily 
ascertainable, so that they may know their rights and duties under it and its enforcement 
must be by independent and upright judges in whom people have confidence. '9 
Pre existence of the criminal law is required so that the prospective offender should 
weigh the advantage of his crime against the evil of the punishment provided for that 
offence. 20 No conduct may be held criminal unless it is precisely described in the 
criminal law. 21 It is unfair to punish someone unless he has an opportunity to know the 
law and conform to it. 22 In the view of Professor Jerome Hall, four types of penal 
legislation shall be considered the violation of the general principle: retrospective 
15 Morris, Norval & Howard, Colin, Studies in Criminal law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 153. 
Fitzgerald, P. J., Criminal Law and Punishment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) p. 146. 
17 Ibid. p. 164. 
18 Lanham, David, "Larsonneur Revisited" [1976] Crim. L. R. 276 at 277. 19 Denning, Sir, Alfred, The changing law (Steven & Sons Ltd., London, 1953) pp. 3-4. 20 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1962, op. cit. p. 170. 
21 Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law (2"`1 ed., The Bobbs-Mirrill, Indianapolis, 1960) p. 28. 22 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1962, op. cit. p. 170. 
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enforcement of criminal law, aggravation of an offence from past date, enhancement of 
punishment subsequently, and change in the existing rules or standard of evidence 
detrimental to the rights of the offender. 23 
All these conditions have been imposed because criminal liability is the strongest 
condemnation, inflicted by the society upon a person who has, voluntarily, violated any 
provision of the criminal law. 24 It may amount to death, infliction of pain, deprivation of 
the civil rights, or imposition of fine. It is justified only if it produces greater pleasure 
than the pain it causes or prevents a greater pain, protects freedom of individuals and 
save them from the threat of crimes. 25 
3.5 Criminal Liability and Moral Values 
One of the legitimate functions of criminal law is to protect the moral standards of a 
society because it is at its heart an instrument of morality. 26 If it protects an individual 
from injury and exploitation but fails to protect the institution and community of ideas 
whether political or moral, it has not discharged its functions. 27 When we refer to 
criminal liability, what sort of conduct are we talking about? The answer may differ not 
only from society to society, but also from one era to another in the same society. 28 For 
example, the offences of suicide and homosexuality have been decriminalized in UK. 29 
Prior to the decriminalization, such acts'were considered to be contrary to the moral 
standards of the society and punishment was justified. 30 On the other hand, some forms 
of insider trading on the stock market and the possession of indecent photographs are 
crimes now, although they were not so until a few years ago. 31 Similarly, what are 
crimes today may not be crimes tomorrow. 
In the West, post World War II period has observed a strong campaign to bifurcate 
morality and religion in the development of law. 32 It is believed that there is no 
justification for the suppression by the state or proscription by the criminal law of the 
23 Hall, Jerome, 1960, op. cit. p. 60. 
24 Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (3`d ed. Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 1. 
25 Duff, Antony & Garland, David, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 3 
26 McCord, David, "The English and American History of Voluntary Intoxication to Negate mens rea" 
11(1990) JHL. 372 at 380. 
27 Devlin, Patrick, 1965, op. cit. p. 22 
28 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 2. 
29 Suicide was a crime in UK until 1961 when by the Suicide Act 1961 it became perfectly lawful to kill 
oneself; homosexual acts committed in private by male persons who have attained the age of 21 years 
were offence until 1967 when by Sexual Offences Act 1967 such acts became permissible. 
ao Fitzgerald, P. J., 1962, op. cit. p. 205. 
31 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 2. 
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private immorality causing no harm to others. 33 Wolfenden Committee Report34 
declared that it is not the function of criminal law to intervene in the private lives of 
citizen and to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour35 rather it ought to give an 
individual freedom of choice and action in private morality. 36 The Committee drew a 
distinction between private and public morality by allowing prostitution and prohibiting 
it in the streets. 37 It is claimed that the function of criminal law is to preserve public 
order and decency, protection of citizens from what is injurious or offensive, and to 
provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation or corruption. 38 The legislation based 
on the committee's report, allowing homosexuality, is full of inconsistencies, 
discrimination and can be termed beyond logic. 39 The inconsistency becomes more 
prominent by another example, the lease of a house for immoral purposes is invalid and 
cannot be enforced by law, now if what goes on inside a house is a matter to be dealt 
under private morality and it is not the law's concern then law need not inquire into the 
object of the lease. 40 There is no justification for allowing such acts on ground of 
distinction between public and private morality. The only justification might be the 
principle of liberty of the individual. 
Whether the law is concerned with private morality or not may be a debatable question 
but there can be no second opinion that law should not allow any kind of discrimination. 
If the plea of the committee is admissible then number of other acts like, incest, suicide 
pacts, duelling, abortion, euthanasia should also be excluded from the realm of criminal 
law. 4' Another point that suggests relationship between law and morality is that it is 
wrong to punish the un-blameworthy or one who cannot be held morally responsible for 
32 Up to the end of the 19`h century even slaughtering a sheep in view of other sheep was an offence as 
decided in Collman v. Mills [1897] 1 QB 396. 
37 Feinberg, Joel, Harmless Immoralities and Offensive Nuisance in Care, Norman (ed) Issues in Law and 
Morality (The Press of Case Western University, 1973) p. 83. 
34 Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Cmnd. 247 (1957). 
35 Ibid. Ch. 2, Para-14. 
36Ibid. Ch. 5, Para-61. 
371bid. Ch. 9, Para-285. 
38 Ibid. Ch. 2, Para-13. 
39 Homosexual acts of the members of Armed forces and Merchant Navy are offences under section 1(5) 
and 2 (1) respectively, of the Act. Similarly, homosexual acts done in private by more than two person 
are logically to be treated in the like way whereas under section 1(2) (a) of the Act if three persons are 
indulged in homosexual acts the fact that the act was being done in private does not provide any 
defence. 
40 Devlin, Patrick, 1965, op. cit. p. 7. 
41 Ibid. 
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his actions. 42 A law that punishes an un-blameworthy conduct would be too severe for 
that society to bear. 43 The distinction between murder and manslaughter and the 
defences, especially infancy and insanity, are based on the concept of moral 
blameworthiness. 
Morality helps to attain the highest standards of goodness in a society because law 
regulates the conduct of an individual while morality emphasises the perfection of his 
character. 44 Despite the difference of opinion about the role of morality in English law, 
it can be concluded that "Society cannot ignore the morality of the individual any more 
than it can his loyalty; it flourishes on both and without either dies. "45 
3.6 Intention and Its Importance in Criminal Liability 
In all the modern legal systems criminal liability depends on two elements; the outward 
act forbidden by the law and a certain condition of mind, called intention, 
accompanying the act. 46 An intention may be termed as the purpose or the design with 
which an act is done. 47 The offender shall be liable only if he intended the harm caused 
or foresaw the consequences of his conduct and nevertheless continued recklessly. 48 An 
act is intentional as to a consequence if it is done with the wish, desire, purpose or aim 
of producing the result in question. 49 Hence intention is made up of foresight of specific 
consequences or knowledge of unlawfulness of the conduct irrespective of 
consequences. 50 In the words of Lord Asquith, intention means a state of affairs, which 
the offender decides to bring about and for which he has a reasonable foresight of being 
able to do so by his own act of volition. 51 Intention according to J. F. Stephen is "the 
result of deliberation upon motives and is the object aimed at by the action caused or 
accompanied by the act of volition. "52 It suggests that English criminal law recognizes 
two kinds of intentions; direct intention i. e. where the consequences were aimed at and 
42 Robertson. G., Freedom: The Individual and the Law (7`h ed. Penguin Books, London, 1993) p. 433. 
Beck, Stanley M. & Parker, Graham E., "The Intoxicated Offender: A Problem of Responsibility" 44 
[ 1966] Can. Bar Rev. 563 at 564. 
43 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Laiv (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963) p. 42. 
44 Husik, Issac, The Theory ofJustice (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1925) p. 40. 
45 Devlin, Patrick, 1965, op. cit. p. 22. 
46 Hart, H L. A., The Morality of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, London, 1965) p. 6 
47 Kent, Edward Allen, Law and Philosophy: Reading in Legal Philosophy (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
Englewood Cliff, New Jersey, 1970) p. 172. 
48 R. v. Cunningham [ 1957] 2 Qß. 396. 
49 Williams, Glanville, "Oblique Intention" 46 [1987] CLJ. 417 at 418. 
50 The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: General Principles (Working Paper No. 31, 
1970) p. 30 
Williams, Glanville, Criminal Law: The General Part (2"d ed., Stevens & Sons, 1961) p. 34. 
51 Cunliffe v. Goodman [ 1950] 2 KB. 237 at 253. 
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there is a direct relation between the cause and the consequence, and oblique intention 
i. e. though the consequences may not be directly linked with the cause, however, these 
are foreseen, collateral or virtually certain. 53 
A person does not incur criminal liability unless he intended to bring about, or 
recklessly brought, those elements, which constitute the crime. The concept has been 
traditionally expressed in the maxim "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit red" i. e. an act 
does not make a man guilty of a crime unless his mind is also guilty. An inquiry into the 
state of mind of accused is made simply to make sure that the exception of the accused 
from punishment will not weaken the authority of criminal law. 54 
The Latin phrase inens rea is generally used as a comprehensive term to denote this 
mental condition. Formally, mens rea can be stated as the mental state of the defendant 
as required by the definition of an offence with respect to the actus reus. 55 For example, 
murder is the intentional killing of a human being, so the defendant is not guilty of 
murder unless he intentionally killed someone. 56 Though mens rea may differ in 
different crimes yet there is one common essential element in all the crimes that it is the 
voluntary doing of a morally wrongful act, 57 forbidden and made punishable by the 
criminal law. 58 In its broad sense mens rea may be defined as a general immorality of 
motive, vicious will or evil mind. 
59 
There are a number of words indicative of the requirement of mens rea, like, knowingly, 
maliciously, wilfully, dishonestly, malice, intention, recklessness. Similarly, awareness, 
belief, consciousness, desire, deliberateness, foresight, heedlessness, wickedness, all 
implies states of mind some of which are synonyms in the eye of the law while some 
60 others are not. It would be nice to be able to say that mens rea or the internal element 
52 Stephen, J. F., A History of Criminal Law of England (Macmillan, London, 1883) Vol. II, p. 110. 
53 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by: Willford 
Harrison (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1948) p. 202. 
Williams, Glanville, "Oblique Intention" 46 [1987] CLJ 417 at 421. 
R. v. Mathew & Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim. 192 in 67 (2003) Journal of Criminal Law 292 at 293. sa Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) p. 42. 
ss Lacey, N., & Wells, C., Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and Materials (Butterworths, 1998) p. 39. 
Kadish, Sanford, "The Decline of Innocence" 37 [1978] CLJ. 274. 
56 Dressler, Joshua, 1995, op. cit. F. N. 56. pp. 102-103. 
57 Hall, Jerome, 1960, op. cit. p. 103 
58 Allard v. Selfridges (1925) 1 KB 129 at 137. 
59 Dressler, Joshua, 1995, op. cit. F. N. 56. p. 102 
60 Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (15`h ed., Butterworths, 2001) p. 62. 
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of an offence is simply an evil and wicked mind that invariably must be proved to 
obtain a conviction. 61 , Liens rea not only plays an important role in the conviction of an 
offender, it is also important at the subsequent stage of determining punishment for the 
act done. 62 The essence of principle of mens rea is that criminal liability should be 
imposed only on persons who are sufficiently aware of what they are doing, and of the 
consequences it might have. This approach is based on the principle of autonomy. 
Individuals are regarded as autonomous with a general capacity to choose among 
alternative courses of behaviour, and respect for their autonomy means holding them 
liable only on the basis of their choices. 63 
3.6.1 How to prove intention? 
Merely an intention to commit a crime without any manifestation of actus reus is not 
culpable; no criminal liability will ensue while the unlawful intention remains 
concealed, 64 for it is the deviant conduct not the thoughts that the law is primarily 
designed to control. 65 Intention is the core element of all the offences; the intangible 
condition of mind that cannot be proved directly. It is not possible to look into the mind 
of an accused to ascertain his intention at a particular time. In the words of Blackstone, 
"No temporal tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the intention of the mind, 
otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward actions. It, therefore, cannot punish 
for that it cannot know. , 66 
Now, the question does arise, how to ascertain the intention of an accused? The answer 
is very simple that it is a question of fact depending on the experience and observation 
of a common man taking into account the conduct of the accused at the time of 
commission of the offence and other circumstances. 67 Circumstantial evidence, like 
what he did or said at a particular time under question will also be very helpful. 68 The 
jury can infer his intention from his acts and all the circumstances proved before them. 69 
Wilson, William, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory (2nd ed., Longman, 2003) p. 119. 
Simester, AP. & Sullivan, GR., Criminal Law. - Theory and Doctrine (Portland Oregon, Oxford, 2002)p. 1 14. 
Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (6`n ed., Blackstone Press, 2001) p. 49. 
61 Scanlan, Gary, An Introduction to Criminal Law (Financial Training Publications, London, 1985) p. 34. 
62 Hart, H. L. A., 1970, op. cit. F. N. 54. p. 162. 
63 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. pp. 151-52. 
64 L. Crispin. Warmington, Stephen's Commentaries on the Law of England (2151 ed., Butterworth, 
London, 1950) Vol. IV, p. 38. 
GS Colvin, Eric, "A Theory of the Intoxication Defence" 59 (1981) Can. Bar. Rev. 750 at 752. 
66 Blackstone, Commentaries on the law of England (15"i ed. A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. IV, p. 20. 
`'' Per Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A. C. 644 at p. 663. 
68 Per Lord Bridge of Horwich in R. v. Moloney [1985] AC 905 at p. 918. 
69 Per Barry J. in R. v. Charlson [ 1955] 1 WLR 317. 
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As already mentioned that the intention of the offender is related to his foresight of the 
consequences, English courts used the criterion to determine his intention. In R. v. 
Ilancock 70 the court held that foresight of consequences is directly related to the 
probabilities, the higher the probability, the more certain it is to find that the defendant 
foresaw and therefore intended it. However, if a consequence cannot be foreseen it 
cannot be avoided. 71 
In D. P. P. v. Smith, 72 the court adopted the doctrine of objective liability to determine 
the intention. The case suggested that in certain circumstances there is a conclusive 
presumption that the accused intended the natural consequences of his acts and this 
presumption applies until contrary is proved. 73 This doctrine imputes to an accused the 
knowledge or intention which he may not, but an average man would have had. The 
only test to determine the liability of the accused is whether the harm caused by an 
unlawful voluntary act of the accused was the natural and probable consequence of his 
act. For this test, foresight of an ordinary prudent man shall be used instead of that of 
the accused. 74 The doctrine leads to the conclusion that acts should be adjudged by their 
tendency under the known circumstances, not by the actual intent accompanying them. 75 
In fact, the law does not consider, and need not consider, in determining criminal 
liability, of an offender, what he actually intended, it imputes to him the intention that 
an ordinary man equipped with ordinary knowledge, would be taken to have had in 
acting as the accused did. 
However, the principle of objective liability has been overruled by section 8 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967. It states expressly that a court or jury is not bound in law to 
draw inferences of intention even in the absence of any rebutting evidence. 76 It requires 
the fact finder to examine all the evidence before deciding whether the accused did 
foresee the result brought about by his conduct. 77 The irrefutable presumption of law 
70 R. v. Hancock [ 1986] AC. 455 at 473 
" Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1963, op. cit. p. 47. 
72 DPP. v. Smith [ 1961 ] AC. 290. 
73 Tapper, Collin, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (8'h ed., Butterworths, London, 1995) p. 128. 
74 Holmes, Oliver, Wendell, 1968, op. cit. p. 327 
75 Holems, Oliver Wendell, 1963, op. cit. p. 40. 
76 Dennis, I. H., The Law of Evidence (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2002) p. 420. 
77 Keane, Adrian, The Modern Law of Evidence (5'h ed., Butterworth, London, 2000) p. 637. 
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has been converted into presumption of fact and the prosecution is under a duty to prove 
that the accused actually foresaw the specified result. 78 
English courts have taken aU turn towards the relation of foresight with intention of the 
offender. In a number of cases it has been decided that to equate foresight of 
consequences of wrongful act with the intention of murder is wrong in a direction on the 
mens rea of the offence. In R. v. Woollin, 79 the House of Lords held that in a case of 
murder the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the intention unless 
they feel sure that the death was a virtual certainty and the accused appreciated that such 
was the case. This case suggests that foresight of certainty must not be a condition of 
intention because intention is a state of mind and a person may well believe a result to 
be certain when in fact it is not. For example, pulling the trigger of a gun on a person 
with an intention to kill where the gun has been unloaded without the knowledge of the 
offender or the victim was wearing a bullet proof vast. RO The result in this case is not 
certain though undoubtedly intended by the offender. 
The Criminal Justice Act and the decisions of the courts have unduly changed the 
balance in favour of the offender. As a matter of law an intention to kill is sufficient for 
the conviction of murder, whether it was known or not to the accused that the death was 
virtually certain, highly probable or merely possible; he will be liable even though the 
possibility of result was remote. 81 Had it not been the principle it would have been 
impossible to convict any offender of murder on the grounds that he was a very poor at 
shot or that it was unlikely to cause death from such a distance. 
It can be summed up that the actual state of a person's mind is not an easy thing to 
prove unless the accused himself confesses. 82 In the absence of any such confession 
intention can be inferred only by the use of common sense taking into account all the 
available circumstantial evidence. The absence of any direct evidence to prove intention 
has led the English courts to adopt different attitudes at different times and no 
satisfactory and uniform principles have been laid down in this regard. Taking into 
78 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (10"' ed., Butterworths, Lexis Nexis, 2002) p. 359. 
79 R. v. Wool/in [ 1999] 1 AC. 82. 
80 Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. p. 71. 
RI Ibid p. 330. 
82 Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (4°i cd., Pitman Printing Press, London, 1997) p. 53. 
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account the prevailing unsatisfactory condition, the Law Commission and the House of 
Lords suggested that a statutory definition of intention should be provided to make it 
clear that to foresee a result of one's act as virtually certain is to intend it. 83 The 
proposed solution may lead to many complications, intention is the internal condition of 
mind of a person which cannot be perceived by the senses; a statutory definition will 
deprive the courts from using their common sense to infer it from the conduct of the 
offender that is the most reliable method to determine it. 
3.7 Offences of Strict Liability 
The presumption that mens rea is an essential and basic element in every offence is 
liable to be displaced either by words of statute creating the offence or by the subject 
matter with which it deals. 84 In certain crimes, nearly all of which are created by statute, 
a person may incur criminal liability even though he has acted without intention or 
recklessness in relation to one or more of the elements of that crime. 85 Such crimes 
where prosecution need not prove mens rea are known as crimes of strict liability, the 
only requirement is to prove the existence of an act or omission causing the delinquent 
behaviour. 86 The object of strict liability is to ensure a high standard of care87 and this 
view has been approved in a number of English cases. 88 The doctrine is generally 
viewed with great abhorrence and admitted as an exception to the general principles of 
criminal liability; the principles have been sacrificed to secure a higher measure of 
conformity and conviction of offenders. 89 The doctrine denotes the preference of public 
interest over individual responsibility 90 and its application is justified so far as it furthers 
deterrence and promotes the enforcement of the regulatory requirements. 91 
3.8 Concurrence of Actus reus and Mens rea 
According to the criminal law doctrine, it is the coincidence of actus rears and mens rea 
that constitutes offences and justifies punishment. 92 The requirement implies the 
temporal existence of actus reus and mens rea, an actus reus at one moment and mens 
83 Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England & Wales (Law Com. No. 177) (Commentary on Draft 
Criminal Code Bill) Vol. 11. Clause 14, p. 184. 
Report of Select Committee of House of Lords on Murder & Life Imprisonment, 1988-89, Vol. XIII, 
Para 195, p. 50. 
ßa Sherras v. De Rutzen [ 1895] 1 QB. 918. 
85 Chisholm v. Doulton (1889) 22 QB. 736. 
96 R. v. Lemon and Other [ 1979] Crim. LR. 311 
8' Howard, Colin, "Strict Liability in the High Court of Australia" 76 (1960) LQR 547. 
88 Lim Chin Aik v. R[ 1963] AC. 160; Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commission r (1968) 52 Cr. App. R. 
373; Gibson [1991] 1 All ER 439. 
89 Hart, H. L. A., 1970, op. cit. F. N. 54. p. 20 
90 Jackson, B. S, "Storkwain: A Case Study in Strict Liability and Self-regulation" [1991] Crim. LR 892. 
91 Richardson, G. "Strict Liability for Regulatory Crime: An Empirical Research" [1987] Crim. LR. 295 at 296. 
92 Denham, Paul, 1999, op. cit. p. 182. 
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rea at another do not give rise to criminal liability. There must be a combination of 
physical and mental element with respect to each aspect of the offence. 93 The 
prosecution must prove that the accused perpetrated the actus reus and at that time 
possessed, necessary mental state. 94 Suppose that the accused drives to the victim's 
house, intending to kill him. On his way, a person is run over by his car, giving him no 
chance to avoid, and is killed. If the deceased turns out to be the victim, clearly it will 
not be a murder. 95 However, if the accused has already done an act with intent to cause 
the actus rea, it is immaterial that he has repented before the occurrence of actus reus. 96 
Similarly, in cases where the actus reus is continuing act, it is sufficient that the accused 
has mens rea at any moment during the continuance of the actus reus. 97 Where the actus 
reus is a part of a larger transaction, it may be sufficient that he had mens rea during 
that transaction, though not at the moment the actus reus is accomplished. 98 It can be 
concluded that presence of mens rea whether at the time of inception or completion or 
during continuance of a criminal act is sufficient for concurrence and to give rise to the 
criminal liability. 
3.9 Intention and Motive 
A motive is the driving force, which induces a man to do or omit to do a certain act or it 
may be termed as the reason to seek certain objectives. 99 Some times it may be taken as 
an emotion such as jealously or greed and some times a species of intention. 100 The 
reason, why it is considered merely a motive, is that it is a consequence ulterior to the 
mens rea and actus reus; it is no part of a crime. 101 It is the motive, which gives birth to 
intention and a person's motive is his reason for doing as he did. 10' Motive is thus used 
to mean an emotion prompting an act and hence must always precede intention in 
93 Lacey, N. & Wells, C., 1998, o?. cit. p. 47. 
94 Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (4" ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) p. 82. 
95 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8Ih ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) p. 79. 
96 R. v. Jakeman [1983] Crim. LR. 104.; (1983) 76 Cr. App. R. 223. 
97 Fagan v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1969] 1 QB. 439; [1968] 3 All. ER. 442. 
98 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 95. p. 79. 
Thabo Meli & Others v. R [1954] 1 All ER. 373. 
99 Robinson, Paul H., Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing Co., USA, 1984)Vol. II, p. 17. 
loo Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. F. N. 78. p. 96. 
101 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 95. p. 82. 
102 Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (14t1i cd., Butterworths, London, 1998) p. 79. 
Hall, Jerome, 1960, op. cit. p. 84. 
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time. 103 It means that one cannot have an intention for a motive but can have a motive 
for an intention. 104 
As a general principle motive is irrelevant to the substantive criminal law. 105 The 
irrelevancy can be supported by a number of decided cases as well. ' 06 In criminal 
proceeding the prosecution will have to prove that the offender has committed the crime. 
It does not need to prove why he committed. A murder committed out of motive of 
compassion is as heinous as out of enmity or for any other bad motive. 107 Proof of 
motive although not necessary for conviction can often strengthen the prosecution's 
case 108 and generally it may be crucial in determining punishment. 109 
However, motive will be pertinent to criminal liability if it provides the defendant with 
a discrete defence as in duress 110 and self-defence fear and self-preservation are of 
fundamental importance. "' It is also relevant in racially aggravated offence under 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, if motivated by hostility towards members of a racial 
group. ' 12 Similarly, motive is always relevant as evidence. In a case R. v Williams, 113 
the Court of Appeal held that, "evidence of motive was admissible to show that it was 
more than probable that an accused has committed the offence charged. " It suggests that 
both intention and motive, being the part of a single transaction, may be taken into 
account to understand the conduct of the offender. 114 Though as a matter of principle 
English criminal law denies relevancy of motive to criminal liability, however, the 
principle has been violated by English courts' 15 in R. v. Steane116 and Arthur Gray. 117 
103 Wasik, Martin, "Mens Rea, Motive, and the Problem of Dishonesty in the Law of Theft" [ 1979] Crim. 
LR. 543 at 544. 
1°4 Kenny, A., Action, Emotion and Will (Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1963) p. 87. 105 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 17. 
106 The Queen v. Senior [1899] I QB 283; Chandler v. D. P. P. [1964] AC 763. 
107 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 95. p. 81. 
108 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 375. 
Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 95. p. 83. 
109 lbid. at 545. 
110 Wilson, William, 2003, op. cit. p. 131. 
"' Wasik, Martin, 1979, op. cit. p. 550 
112 Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. F. N. 78. p. 96. 
113 R. v. Williams (1987) 84 Cr. App. R. 299. 
11a Wasik, Martin, 1979, op. cit. p. 545. 
115 Jefferson, Michael, Criminal Law (3rd ed., Pitman Publishing, London, 1997) p. 124. 
116 R. v. Steane [1947] KB. 997. 
117 Reported in "The Times " Thursday, October 7,1965 at p. 6 
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3.9.1 Good Motive and Criminal Liability 
Apart from such defences as are recognized by criminal law, criminal nature of an act is 
not eliminated by good motive. Because, to allow a man to substitute for law his own 
notion of right would be in effect to destabilize the law. l 18 If a man commits an offence, 
law is not concerned why he commits.. ' 19 However, now it is proposed to abolish the 
principle of irrelevancy of motive, and to take into account a good motive in the cases 
of homicide by way of partial excuse under the diminished responsibility rules., 20 The 
C. L. R. C. in its 12`h Report 12' recommended that there are certain cases of murder to 
which special consideration apply, like the case of causing death deliberately from 
motive of compassion. They thought that where a mother killed her deformed child or a 
husband terminated the agonies of his dying wife, the mandatory imposition of life 
imprisonment is intolerable and indeed no sentence of imprisonment is appropriate. The 
same recommendation was re-affirmed in 1976 in a working paper of the Committee. 122 
The committee tentatively suggested that there should be a new offence, which would 
apply to a person who, from compassion, unlawfully kills another person who is or is 
believed by him to be: permanently subject to great bodily pain or suffering, or 
prominently helpless from bodily or mental incapacity, or subject to rapid and incurable 
bodily or mental degeneration. Maximum punishment suggested for the new offence is 
an imprisonment of two years. This suggestion, if accepted will give a license for the 
killing of handicapped and mentally retarded persons particularly, and generally for all 
those who are believed by the killer subject to great bodily pain, helpless due to bodily 
or mental incapacity or suffering from an incurable disease. 
A sick person may be a cause of considerable unhappiness for his friends and family. 
They may cut short this unhappiness and disturbance by causing his death in the name 
of mercy killing. 123 Allowing Euthanasia would put many dying people at risk of losing 
their lives unjustly. 124 How illogical is it that the committee itself admits that the killing 
was for a good cause and on the other hand suggested that a new offence should be 
118 Williams, Glanville, Criminal Law: The General Part (2"a ed., Stevens & Sons, 1961) p. 748. 119 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 102. p. 603. 
Kennedy, 1. & Grubb, A., Principles of Medical Law (Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 846. 120 Wasik, Martin, 1979, op. cit. p. 550 
121 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Penalty for Murder (12`h Report, Cmnd. 5184,1973) Para 42. 
122 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on the Offences Against the Person (Home Office, 
1976) Paras 79-87, pp. 31-34. 
123 Devine, Philip E., The Ethics of Homicide (Cornell University Press, London, 1978) p. 155. 124 Deigh, John, "Physician Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Some Relevant Differences" 88 
(1988)JCL. 1155 at 1157. 
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created to deal with such situations of murder. While dealing with the cases of 
Euthanasia we must also keep in our mind that it is not just relief of distress or pain. It is 
the relief of pain achieved through the destruction of life of the victim. 125 To allow it in 
the name of relieving distress and pain of the victim is analogous to the situation where 
a person was shot dead, just above his eye, on forehead. One of his stupid friends seeing 
the corpse said, "Thank God that the bullet has spared the eye. " The person was dead 
but the stupid friend was happy that the deceased's eye was saved from damage. 
However, it should be kept in mind that in a positive legal system any law can be 
changed with a change in the attitude, cultural approach, ideals and moral values of a 
society. A change in the law may make mercy killing completely lawful. The European 
Convention on Human Rights guarantees that no one will be guilty of an offence for a 
conduct if it did not constitute an offence under national or international law at the time 
under consideration. 126 
Life of a human being is the most precious thing on earth; it either ought never be 
directly attacked, or else that it should be done only when it is unavoidable to save, 
equally valuable, other's life. Anything short of this would require a very heavy burden 
of justification, which mercy killing does not provide. 127 Allowing Euthanasia is not 
merely a question of sympathy of a doctor with a patient in acute distress but it also 
involves changes in the legal framework. An offence of murder is to be redefined and a 
proviso be added to cover the cases of Euthanasia. Human rights, emphasizing 
protection of life rather than ending it, are to be reconsidered. There is no justification 
for supporting euthanasia; the hospices should be supported for better pain relief where 
it is needed. Not all terminally ill people want to die they need help instead of 
supporting a quick fix of just pushing them out of this world. It would be very wrong 
for the law to say that in certain circumstances people can die or be assisted to death. 
3.10 Punishment: Its Justification 
When a crime is committed it shocks the public by its atrocity. There are demands made 
for fierce retribution on the culprit, partly on the plea that he ought to be made to suffer, 
and partly for the purpose of deterring others from offending. 128 Criminal law is the 
machinery that allows organized pressure of society to be brought to bear on the 
125 Devine, Philip E., 1978, op. cit. p. 169. 
126 Article 7, European Convention on Human Rights. 
127 Devine, Philip E., 1978, op. cit. p. 178. 
128 Devon, James, The Criminal and the Community (2°a Impression, John Lane, London, 1912) p. 164. 
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offender. 129 It allows the victim to get legitimate revenge and assists in promotion and 
maintenance of public order. Hence imposition of punishment can be justified either on 
utilitarian or retributive grounds. 130 
Taking into account the past conduct of the offender, retributists justify punishment 
because the offender deserves it. 131 The magnitude of the punishment should correspond 
to the wrong done because punishing people without regard to the gravity of their 
offences is no punishing at all. 132 It should be the primary concern of criminal law that 
the magnitude of the punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the crime or 
it should adequately express the moral condemnation of society. 133 It is quite natural to 
say that criminals should be punished as severely as they deserve and as much as it 
contributes towards crime control. 134 
A wrong-doer certainly provokes and excites the feelings of anger and hatred of all right 
thinking members of society. 135 Traditionally English jurisprudence admitted that all the 
hatred and contempt that are behind the word felon are enlisted against the offender, for 
he has done wrong to society. 136 Punishment is the legal, civilized and efficient way in 
which such feelings may be directed towards their proper object. In general, we may say 
that punishments institutionalize feeling of resentment and hatred of society that are 
directed towards the wrong doer. 137 
According to utilitarian theory punishment is justified by its good future consequences 
rather than the past conduct of the offender. 139 According to Bentham, the basic purpose 
of criminal law should be to create an environment, suitable to promote happiness and 
well being of society, to provide an opportunity to all its subjects to lead a peaceful and 
trouble free life, to ensure security of their lives, property and other values. 139 He says, 
punishments in themselves are evils and, therefore, cannot be justified except in so far 
129 Thompson, D., Criminal Law Reform: An Inaugural Lecture (University of Keele, 1965) p. 3. 
30 Primoratz, Igor, Justifying Legal Punishment (Humanities Press International, London, 1989) p. 9. 
131 Ashworth, Andrew, Sentencing & Penal Policy (Weidenfeld &Nicolson, London, 1983) p. 18. 
132 Primoratz, Igor, 1989, op. cit. p. 6. 
133 Hart, H. L. A., 1970, op. cit. F. N. 54. p. 236. 
134 Ashworth, Andrew, 1983, op. cit. p. 18. 
135 Stephen, J. F., 1883, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 81. 
136 Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law (3r1 ed., Methuen, London, 1923) Vol. II, p. 358. 
137 Stephen, J. F., 1883, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 81 
138 Primoratz, Igor, 1989, op. cit. p. 12 
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as they result in a greater sum of good. 140 This greater sum of good is the deterrence of 
the criminals in order to eliminate crimes from the society. 141 This will lead to secure 
the rights of majority and to maximize the protection of rights. 142 State is justified in 
criminalising any conduct that causes harm, and to inflict punishment by its power, to 
secure the society from harm. J. S. Mill states this principle as, "the only purpose for 
which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. " 143 It means that punishments are not an 
end themselves but they are means to an end; means of responding to undesired and 
prohibited behaviour. 144 
Retributists and utilitarians have attempted to deal with the justification of punishment 
from different view points. However, in doing so they looked at only their own side of 
view and failed to take into account the other side. Both the theories are not mutually 
exclusive rather interdependent. A punishment, in its real sense, will be justified and 
effective only if it combines both, the retributive as well as the utilitarian elements. 
Punishment can, in fact, never be justified merely as means for promoting a future good, 
ignoring the magnitude of the crime. Criminal justice is done only when offenders are 
duly convicted and punished. 145 We may say that in order to justify punishment, a court 
should look at the past conduct of the offender as well as its future consequences. 146 
3.11 Aims and Objectives of Punishment 
Among the normative aims that have been suggested for punishment, deterrence, 
retribution, reformation or rehabilitation and denunciation are the most important. 
Another possible aim, to educate people about social values, is clearly related to 
denunciation, for education is often achieved by condemning conduct contrary to the 
values. 147 When a punishment is to be imposed, the first decision to be made should be 
as to the object to be achieved by it. Is the aim simply to mete out a justified punishment 
139 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1879) p. 2 
140 Ibid. & Atkinson, Charles Milner, Bentham's Theory of Legislation (Milford Oxford University Press 
London, 1914)Vol. 11, p. 148. 
141 Primoratz, Igor, 1989, op. cit. p. 10 
142 Murphy, Jeffrie G., Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence (Rev. ed. Westview Press, 
1990) p. 118. 
143 Mill, J. S., On Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 15. 
144 Harding, C. & Ireland, R. W., Punishment: Rhetoric, Rule and Practice (Routledge, London, 1989) p. 13. 
145 Waldron, Jeremy, The Law (Routledge, London, N. York, 1990) p. 178. 
146 Rawls, John, Punishment in Feinberg, Joel & Gross, Hyman, Philosophy of law (41h ed., Wadsworth 
Publishing, 1991) p. 652. 
147 Bayles, Michael D., Principles of Law: A Normative Analysis (D. Reidel Publishing, 1987) pp. 281-82. 
76 
f; r: lýlis{: l. ati : uul J'irari'nlt: °ialurc. "N*trurces and Nrincif>Icc of 'Criminal Liability 
to the wrong doer; special or general deterrence, to reform the offender or a 
combination of all these? When this decision is made, a second decision what measure 
is most appropriate to achieve the desired object must follow. Here is a brief description 
of these aims. 
3.11.1 Deterrence 
Punishment occupies a distinct functional and symbolic position with a high profile in 
general social consciousness. 148 Deterrence is the deliberate threat of harm with the 
purpose of discouraging criminal conduct. 149 Infliction of punishment may deter 
offenders and serve to reduce the number of crimes in a society. 150 Punishment can be 
justified on the ground that it would be effective in preventing offences and there is no 
other means that could be equally effective at no greater cost to other values. 151 
In the absence of any punishment, a much larger number of persons, who now refrain, 
might have committed crimes. 152 Seeing others punished for delinquent behaviour can 
create in people a sense that such behaviour is wrong and unacceptable for the society. 
Punishments, thus, help them to harmonize their behaviour with the norms of the 
society. In R v. Kingston, 153 the Court of Appeal held that, "the purpose of criminal law 
is to inhibit, by proscription and by penal sanction, antisocial acts which the individual 
may otherwise commit. " 154 Punishment, proportional to the magnitude of wrong, 
inflicted on one offender would indicate to others who might be tempted to commit a 
crime that if they commit, they were likely to be punished. 155 
3.11.1.2 How to Achieve Objects of Deterrence? 
To deter an offender from reoffending, a punishment should be severe enough to 
outweigh in his mind the benefits of the crime. 156 Objects of deterrence can be achieved 
effectively only if the magnitude of the punishment is proportional to the seriousness of 
harm caused by the offender. 157 Neither should it exceed the appropriate limits nor 
148 Harding, Christopher, Punishment: Rhetoric, Rule and Practice (Routledge, London, 1989) p. 13. 
149 Walker, Nigel, "The Efficacy and Morality of Deterrents" [1979] Crim. LR. 129 at 129. 
150 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1962, op. cit. p. 203. 
Dressler, Joshua, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (West Publishing Co., U. S. A., 1994) p. 24. 
Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 282. 
151 Feinberg, Joel, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 1984) p. 26. 
152 Von Hirsch, Andrew, Doing Justice, The choice of Punishments (Hill & Wang, N. York, 1976) p. 39 
153 R. v. Kingston [1994] QB 81. 
154 Ibid. at p. 89 
155 R. v. Fairman [1983] Crim. LR. 197. 
156 Dressler, Joshua, 1994, op. cit. F. N. 149. p. 25. 
157 Primoratz, Igor, 1989, op. cit. p. 20 
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should it be less than what the offender actually deserves. 158 Wrong is the negation of 
right, punishment is the negation of that negation, or retribution, so it must be 
proportionate to the wrong because its purpose is to destroy the wrong. 159 Severity of 
the punishment can be determined by taking into account seriousness of the harm 
caused, circumstances of the offence and character of the offender. 160 
However, it should be remembered that in English society, in particular, and in Western 
societies in general the principle of proportionality of the punishment has been violated 
by abolishing death sentence for the offence of murder. 161 Nothing could be 
proportional to the life of the victim except the capital punishment for the convicted. 
The equilibrium disturbed by the offender cannot be restored unless death of the 
offender has been caused by the law. 
3.11.2 Reformation 
If people are disposed to commit crimes, the law should intervene to reform them. 162 
Conviction and imposition of a punishment might contribute to reform if they help an 
offender become aware that he has acted wrongly. 163 However, reform is usually 
conceived as involving more positive steps to alter basic character in order to make an 
offender less antisocial. 164 
Reforming methods include making the offender realise his moral guilt and inducement 
of state of repentance from crimes, awareness of the demands of society, provision of 
education and vocational training. 165 The states are to achieve this end by the most 
appropriate means available within their resources. Education and training programmes 
can render legitimate employment, a more attractive alternative to criminal behaviour. 
These may indirectly help enhance self-respect, but their primary purpose is to alter the 
option that the released convict will face. '66 
158 Ashworth, Andrew, 1983, op. cit. p. 18. 
159 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1963, op. cit. p. 36. 
160 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Business of the Criminal Courts, Cmnd. 1289 (1961) 
Para. 257 p. 76. 
Ashworth, Andrew, 1983, op. cit. p. 21. 
161 Death penalty was abolished in UK by Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965. 
162 Cavadino, M. & Dignan, J, The Penal System: An Introduction (2nd ed., Sage Publications, 1997) p. 36. 
163 Robinson, Paul, H., Fundamentals of Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. Boston, 1988) p. 27 
Primoratz, Igor, 1989, op. cit. p. 20. 
Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 289. 
164 Dressler, Joshua, 1994, op. cit. F. N. 149. p. 25. 
165 Hart H. L. A., 1970, op. cit. F. N. 54. p. 26. 
166 Dressler, Joshua, 1994, op. cit. F. N. 149. p. 25. 
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The idea is very attractive and impressive but the question does arise that how many 
states of the world can run such a programme? Developing and underdeveloped 
countries are not in a position to provide basic necessities of life, like education, health, 
and shelter to their subjects. How is it possible for them to allocate sufficient budget for 
the reformation of offenders? Of course, only a few countries of the international 
community can afford this luxury, hence the scope of this particular object is very 
limited. Scope of reformation can also be observed by taking into account the 
conditions of jails; originally meant for the reformation of the offenders. Nowadays, 
jails can be considered training camps for the criminals. A person who has committed 
an offence for the first time and was imprisoned for that, on his release he may have 
been converted into a hardened and seasoned criminal due to the company of other 
criminals in the jail. 167 
Reformation can never be the sole aim of punishment because if it were so, every 
prisoner should have been released as soon as it is proved that he has changed his 
character and now he will not repeat the offence. Moreover, the principle of reformation 
does not reconcile with the capital punishment. 168 Reformation, though, more difficult 
to achieve yet is also more worthy of effort, for the offender will not reoffend even 
when he knows that his crime cannot be detected. 
The difference between reformation and deterrence lies in motive for not committing 
crimes. Deterrence involves a desire to avoid future punishment, while reformation 
removes the desire to commit crimes. Consequently, reform provides more security than 
deterrence. 169 
3.11.3 Retribution 
If some one violates a rule of criminal law, he has an unjust advantage over the others; 
justice requires that this wrong be rewarded or expiated by punishment. 170 While 
punishing the offender it is to be taken into consideration that the punishment should 
adequately reflect the revulsion felt by society for that particular crime. The retribution 
means that the potential benefits of the offender are outweighed by the potential harms 
167 Cavadino, M& Dignan, J, 1997, op. cit. p. 36. 
168 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1936, op. cit. p. 36 
169 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 290. 
170 Ashworth, Andrew, 1983, op. cit. p. 18. 
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of the punishment. 171 The principle requires that the punishment must always be equal 
to the wrong done. 172 It suggests that the punishment is not just a means of crime 
prevention but a merited response to the offender's deed restoring the equilibrium and 
expressing moral reprobation of the defender for the wrong. 
The severity of punishment reflects the moral gravity of the crime. The degree of 
suffering of the offender should be equal to the evil of his conduct. 173 If retribution is 
not exact, the public conscience will be outraged as to take law into their own hands. 174 
The infliction of desert punishment will make the individuals believe that they are being 
protected against the wrongful conduct of the offender. The concept of retribution 
differs from deterrence; in the theory of deterrence punishment is justified to the extent 
that it deters occurrence of future crime either by the offender or by others, whereas 
retribution justifies punishment on that which has already occurred. The deterrence 
looks to the future whereas retribution takes notice of past conduct of the offender. 175 
3.11.4 Denunciation 
A court's judgement that a person is guilty of a crime constitutes denunciation. 176 The 
object of denouncing wrongdoing is attaching a stigma to the convicted person for the 
act he has done. The stigma of conviction and sentence makes the offender to conform 
to the law. 177 The real punishment lies in the stigma which the society brands upon 
him. 178 Certainly those who simply fear society's condemnation should be deterred by 
the mere stigma of public condemnation. This aim cannot be achieved unless the 
offender is publicly convicted and known to suffer the penalty. 
It is generally accepted that a punishment should have the characteristic properties of 
deterrence, prevention, reformation and retribution. As a deterrent, punishment may be 
considered to be a social protective of the values of the society, no more and no less. As 
reformative, punishment may aim to make the criminal to conform to the conventions of 
his society. As retributive, it may be considered as means of rationalizing revenge and 
thus to put an end to further disorder in the society. 
171 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1936, op. cit. p. 285. 
172 Cavadino, M. & Dignan, J., 1997, op. cit. p. 33. 
173 Hart, H. L. A., 1970, op. cit. F. N. 54. p. 233. 
174 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1962, op. cit. p. 204. 
175 Jackson, Kathryn N., "Punishment as Therapy: A reply to Halleck" 49 (1986) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 147 at p. 147. 
176 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 290. 
177 Fitzgerald, P. J., 1962, op. cit. p. 204. 
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3.12 Do the Punishments in English Law Achieve the Objects? 
Generally speaking, infliction of punishment may be justified on the ground of crime 
control. 179 Do the punishments in English criminal law serve the purpose? Let us have a 
look at the facts. Official reports reveal that the punishments in English legal system 
failed to achieve any of the objects mentioned. A study reveals that 54% of prisoners 
were re-convicted within two. years, while over five years the figure rose to 60%. 180 The 
situation becomes graver if we differentiate reconviction from re-offending. A crime 
survey suggests that out of every 100 offences committed only two result in a 
conviction. Only 50% of the crimes committed are reported to the police; only 30% are 
recorded by police as a crime; 7% of crimes are cleared up; 3% result in caution or 
conviction. 181 
The research reports of Home Office show that the punishment of imprisonment is an 
expensive way of making bad people worse. 182 There are 138 prisons in England and 
Wales having a capacity to accommodate 709827 offenders and to take care of these 
offenders a staff amounting to 44000 has been employed. 183 The prisons are unable to 
meet the increasing number of criminals and hence more committals of the convicted to 
the prisons. 184 It shows that criminal justice system annually spends millions of pounds 
and yet leaves the society with little more than a sense of futility. 
At a time when the common man all over the world is in economical fix and finds it 
difficult to earn livelihood for himself and his family, there is a logical reasoning 
involved in the consideration that he can procure such subsistence and a good many 
facilities and services by simply committing a crime. The ever increasing burden of 
building and maintaining prisons, payments of staff, care, proper food, medical, and 
other facilities for persons of proved anti-social character is undoubtedly an expensive 
way of converting a bad offender into worse one. 
178 Allen, Carleton Kemp, Sir, Law in the Making (7t1i ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 68. 
179 Ibid. p. 19. 
180 Llyod, Charles & Mair, George, Explaining Reconviclion Rates: A Critical Analysis (Home Office 
Research No. 136, HSMO, London, 1994) p. 20. 
181 Ibid. p. 5. 
82 Cavadino, M. & Dignan, J., 1997, op. cit. p. 36. 
183 HM Prison service (http: //www. hiiiprisonservice.. Qov. uk 2002. 
184 On 12 July 2002 the prison service announced that prisons are over-crowded and there are 71,480 
prisoners in the British prisons, the over crowding has forced the service to house some inmates in 
police cells. (http: //news. bbc. co. uk). 
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The reconviction rates show that the aims of sentencing are forgotten or relegated to a 
minor role. The nominal punishments, in any case, are not sufficient to deter the 
criminal-minded people from commission of crimes. Imprisonment for two or three 
years does not serve the aims of punishment as discussed, rather it provides an 
opportunity to the new offenders to become habitual in the company of criminal-minded 
in the prisons and all that is done at the cost of taxpayers. 185 Objects of punishment can 
only be achieved by its proportionality to the severity of the crime. If the criminals do 
not refrain out of fear of punishment, they are not deterred and infliction of punishment 
with the intention of deterring would not be justified if the evidence clearly shows that it 
did not achieve the object. 186 
Conclusion 
The state's liability is either to support the existing social values without guiding its 
subjects towards a desirable and ideal way of life or to pursue and introduce particular 
views of a good society, leading its subjects to a desirable direction. 187 All the spheres 
of social life are guided in terms of social policy of the state. To resolve the conflicts of 
the subjects is not only the object of law, it has also a preventive function to guard 
against and try to prevent conflicts. 188 In order to achieve this end it provides standards 
and punishments so that the individual may forecast the result of their behaviour. 1S9 If 
this role of law is admitted then there must be some moral standards of behaviour to be 
announced and protected by the government. Unfortunately this particular aspect of law 
has been totally ignored in English legal system. Deviation from moral principles of 
legislation has led to inconsistencies and discriminations. Violation of the principle of 
proportionality between the offence and punishment has affected the efficacy of 
criminal justice and the basic objects of punishments are no more achievable. 
The next chapter shall focus on the principles of criminal liability in Shari'ah and a 
comparison of its principles with that of English law. 
185 Tunick, Mark, Punishment: Theory and Practice (University of California Press, 1992) p. 2. 
86 Walker, Nigel, "The Efficacy and Morality of Deterrents" [ 19791 Crim. LR. 129 at p. 129. 
187 Damaska, Mirjan, The Faces of Justice and State (Yale University Press, 1980) pp. 72-82. 
188 Roebuck, Derek, The Background of the Common Law (2n 1 ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 
1990) p. 3. 
189 Ibid. 
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Chapter-4 Criminal Liability in Shari'ah 
4.1 Introduction 
Like most developed legal systems of the contemporary world, Shari 'ah has its own 
criminal justice system. The system is characterized by direct reliance, in its foundation 
and general principles, upon Divine revelation. ' Some of its injunctions have historical 
roots in pre-Islamic Arab traditions and practices and at the same time it recognises 
certain Judeo-Christian traditions. Shari'ah provides a unique way to tackle the 
incidence of crimes in society, which other secular systems do not. Islamic criminal law 
has a dominant religious flavour that incites an individual to follow its provisions. This 
chapter shall deal with both the preventive and punitive measures adopted by Shari 'ah, 
to control crimes. It will be obvious that Shari 'ah is predominantly proactive and 
emphasis to prevent the commission of crimes rather than punishing the offenders after 
commission. Offences, punishments and their objectives will be discussed. Major 
concepts, principles and practices will be highlighted and, of course, a comparison with 
the English criminal law shall find its appropriate place. During the course of 
comparison, an attempt shall be made to establish that though the basis of criminal 
liability are similar in both, English and Islamic law, yet the system of sanctions is 
altogether different. 
4.2 Prevention of Crimes and Islamic Criminal Law 
In order to eliminate crimes from society, Shari 'ah imposes checks to wipe out their 
very possibility. Belief in the Hereafter is the backbone of these checks. It reminds 
everyone that every action, major or minor, of every human being is being recorded 
very accurately and this record will be placed before each individual on the Day of 
Judgment. 2 This belief gives rise to the concept of self-accountability in those people 
who are good by nature and guided by instinct. 
Shari'ah leaves no stone unturned to block all the channels leading to commission of 
crime. To combat crimes it does not prescribe only the punitive measures but also 
preventive means so as to arrest the growth of crime before it takes place. 3 The best 
example in this regard can be taken of the fact that Shari 'ah condemns promiscuity and 
seclusion between the members of opposite sexes because that constitutes a means 
which may lead to sexual immorality. 4 Unnecessary, irresponsible and free union of a 
I Bassiouni, M. Cherif(ed. ), The Islamic Criminal Justice System (Oceana Publications, 1982) p. 128. 
2 A1-Qur'an 18: 49. 
3 Abu Zohra, Muhammad, Usul Al Fiqh (Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, Beirut) p. 288. 
4 Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, op. cit. F. N. 4. p. 271. 
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man and a woman is not tolerated as an innocent amusement or harmless flirtation. To 
extinguish adultery and control the sexual desire, public appearance of painted and 
pampered women is forbidden completely. 5 Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyah has given ninety 
nine instances to mark administration of Shari'ah by such preventive measures. 6 In 
addition, certain external elements that encourage the commission of crime, like use of 
liquor and other intoxicants, are strictly prohibited. The religious and spiritual duties 
contain material advantages to extinguish evils from the society. Prayer, obligatory 
upon every adult and sane Muslim, five times a day, has been described as a means to 
prevent indecency and evil in the society. 7 Similarly, fasting during the month of 
Ramadan has been declared serving the same purpose. 8 
It is not enough that a person avoids evil and does good deeds in his personal life; he is 
also bound to safeguard his family from all types of sins and evils so as to save them 
from the torment of God. 9 The Holy Prophet extended the applicability of this principle 
beyond family to all those falling under his authority, in any capacity, to enjoin good 
and forbid evil. ]() If every one discharges his duty, in his capacity, to build the moral 
character of his dependants and subordinates, the chances for corruption and evil deeds 
in the society shall be reduced to the minimum. 
Publicity of crimes may create a temptation to commit crime. Shari 'ah prohibits their 
publicity by the threat of a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter. 11 The 
Holy Prophet said if a sin is committed secretly it will not harm but the offender; 
however, if disclosed and publicised it would invoke Allah's displeasure. 12 Commission 
of an offence is a matter between man and his creator and it is disliked to publicise it 
among his fellows. 
Shari'ah enjoins upon Muslims to propagate goodness and to prevent social evils. 13 It is 
the duty of every Muslim not only to follow the divine law in his daily life, but also to 
S Ibid. p. 269 
6 Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, I'lam A1-Mawaqquain (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut, 1977)Vol. 111, pp. 149-171 
Al-Qur'an 29: 45 
8 Al-Qur'an 2: 183 
9 A1-Qur'an 66: 6 
10 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, Saih al-Bukhari (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. 1, p. 215. 11 A1-Qur'an 24: 19. 
12 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 89. 
Muslim bin Hijjaj, Saih Muslim (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. III, p. 2291. 
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contribute, according to his capacities, to the propagation of good and prevention of evil 
in the society. This duty is said to characterise Muslims as the best of all the 
communities in the world. 14 It is also prescribed that the manners adopted for the 
propagation of goodness and prevention of evil should be based upon wisdom and fair 
exhortation. 15 Co-operation in noble acts and righteousness has been described as a 
religious duty of Muslims as it is to avoid sin and transgression. 16 A Muslim's duty to 
act in defence and propagation of what is right is as much part of his faith as is his duty 
to prevent wrong. 
It is the characteristic of the believers that they are protecting friends of one another; 
they enjoin right and forbid wrong. 17 Beside propagation of goodness, they are also 
enjoined to suppress evil within their power. '8 The preservation of social order depends 
on each and every member of society, freely adhering to the same moral principles and 
practices. Choice is given according to the capacity and ability of the person and the 
circumstance in which he found himself. Thus in an Islamic state the functionaries of 
the government, public institutions and the individual, all are to combat evil in all its 
forms. This combined effort will lead to a situation where goodness takes its roots in the 
society and evil is eradicated. 
It shows that the strategy of Shari 'ah to control crime is mainly based upon the 
corrective, preventive and reformative measures and less often it is punitive. Law can 
punish the offenders, punishments can deter the people from committing crimes, but it 
cannot reform them and cannot root out crimes from society. It is required that a change 
must occur in the soul of man. Development of both body and soul is the object of all 
the teachings of Shari 'ah creating a harmonious equilibrium in man as a whole. It 
addresses the conscience and intellect of man and induces him to voluntarily obey its 
commands. The preventive measures, definitely, play much more important role in 
eradicating crimes from society than the punishments. 
13 AI-Qur'an 3: 104 
14 AI-Qur'an 3 : 110 
'5 AI-Qur'an 16 : 125 
16 AI-Qur'an 5: 2 
17 AI-Qur'an 9: 71. 
18 The Holy Prophet said, "Anyone of you who sees an evil and has power to suppress it, must weed it out 
with his hands. If he cannot, he must verbally forbid it. If he is not in a position to prohibit it verbally, 
he ought to abhor it in his heart. This is the lowest degree of faith. "{(Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 
Al-Jameh al-Saih (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 470) 
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As a society is composed of good and bad, such types of exhortations are sufficient only 
for the good and noble but the bad people cannot be prevented unless a fear of worldly 
punishment is created in their hearts. Shari 'ah, like an expert surgeon, does its best to 
treat the patient (criminal minded) by the suitable medicine (exhortations) and at the 
same time if the medicine proved ineffective, is ready to use surgical instruments 
(punishments) to eradicate the roots of crime from society. 19 Punishments are 
considered to be one amongst several means to oblige the subjects to follow the law. 
Criminal law cannot be isolated from the social and moral doctrines of Shari'ah which 
require spiritual as well as material welfare of man and tend to reduce or eliminate the 
temptation to crime20by his moral development. 21 Shari 'ah has adopted a policy to repel 
crime by its teachings before its commission and deter by infliction of punishments after 
its commission. It suggests that Shari'ah possesses proactive and reactive characteristics 
simultaneously. 
4.3 Penal Policy in Islamic Law 
Shari'ah has, as we will see later, a well developed concept of crime and punishment 
capable of meeting the needs of modern society. A crime has been defined as violation 
of a legal prohibition imposed by Allah, which entails punishment prescribed by Him. 22 
Here legal prohibition includes commission of a forbidden act and omission of an act 
enjoined by the lawgiver. 23 The commandments of God are communicated to the people 
through His Prophets; the torment of God has been linked with the knowledge of these 
commandments and subsequent violations thereof. 24 The Muslim jurists, from the 
provisions above, have derived a principle that there is no crime and no punishment 
without legal provisions. 25 It is a general principle of Shari 'ah that penal provisions are 
not effective unless they have been declared and made known to the people. 26 It is 
desired that the law should give a fair and adequate notice of prohibited conduct 
entailing punishment if the punishment for that conduct is to be justified. 
19 Ministry of Interior Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Effect of Islamic Legislation on Crime prevention in 
Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Interior Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Nation Social Defence 
Research Institute, 1980) p. 153. 
20 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 132. 
21 Lippman, Matthew, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure (Praeger, London, 1988) p. 37. 22 Al-Mawardi, Muhammad bin Habib Al-Ahkam al-Sultania (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmia, Beirut) p. 92. 23 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, Al-Tashrih a! -Jinai al-Islami (Al-Risalah Publishing, Beirut, 1997) Vol. I, p. 66 24 AI-Qur'an 17: 15-16 and 28: 59. 
25 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 118. 
26Ibid. p. 261 
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Another condition for the imposition of punishment is that such commandments and 
prohibitions should be declared prior to the commission of an offence. Describing the 
prohibited degrees of marriage in Shari'ah, it has been stated in the Holy Qur'an, "And 
marry not those women whom your fathers married, except what has already happened 
(of that nature) in the past. "27 The same principle was enunciated while prohibiting 
marriage with two real sisters at a time28 and addressing the disbelievers to stop 
persecution of believers. 29 The verses show that any act done prior to the promulgation 
of any specific law does not give rise to criminal liability. A person can only be 
punished for an act which was declared unlawful prior to its commission, made known 
to him, defined with sufficient clarity and was not extended by analogy. 
Hudood and Qisas cannot be inflicted in cases of doubt. 30 The principle is based upon 
the saying of the Holy Prophet "Doubt nullifies Hudood. "31 The doubt mentioned above 
is in the mind of the accused at the time of commission of an act as to its permission or 
vice versa on the basis of conflicting opinions of the Muslim jurists on the point. 32 So it 
must be distinguished from the benefit of doubt that goes to the accused and which is a 
doubt in the mind of the judge as to proof of the crime. 33 The ambiguities, if any, are to 
be resolved in favour of the accused. If the guilt of the offender has not been established 
beyond doubt, it is better for the judge to err in his acquittal than in punishing him. 34 
These principles are analogous to the principles of English law that no penal provision 
shall take effect retrospectively to the disadvantage of the accused. It is compulsory that 
the law be known and expressly promulgated. Its meaning be clearly defined and its 
statement and intent both must be general. Shari'ah has the superiority that it 
promulgated the principles of criminal liability in the 7`h century which most civilized 
nations of the world incorporated in their legal systems in the 19`h and the 20th century. 
27 A1-Qur'an 4: 22 
28 Al-Qur'an 4: 23 
29 Al-Qur'an 8: 38 
30 Al-Sarakhasi, Shamas ud din, Al-hfabsut (3r1 ed., Dar Al-Marfah, Beirut) Vol. XVI, p. 37. 31 Al-Shoukani, Muhammad bin Ali, Neil Al-Aoutar (Mataba Mustafa Al-Babi, Egypt) Vol. VII, p. 118. 32 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, General Principles of Criminal Law (Advanced Legal Studies Institute, 
Islamabad, 1998) p. 62. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, Al-Jameh a! Sahih (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 33. 
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4.4 Human Rights of Accused in Shari'ah 
Shari'ah acknowledges most of the universally recognised human rights. 35 Its teachings 
have always stressed the dual protection of society and the rights of the accused. 
Protection of society has been ensured by the severe punishments for the violation of its 
rights, whereas the rights of an accused have been protected by strict rules of evidence, 
qualifications and conduct of witnesses and judges. 36 Shari 'ah demands the satisfaction 
of very strict evidentiary requirements to establish certainty of guilt of the offender, 
which justifies the infliction of relatively harsh punishments. 37 The judges are under a 
duty to do justice to every possible extent. The duty of a judge is so important, delicate 
and difficult that the Holy Prophet said that one appointed as a judge has been 
slaughtered without a knife. 38 
The conditions of existence of the law and non-retroactivity provide the accused a right 
to rely on the law at the time of commission of the act under question. The society is 
under an obligation to its individuals to prevent the misuse of criminal law by fairly 
defining the prohibited acts and omissions, fixing punishments reasonably proportional 
to the conduct and character of the accused following a just, rational, transparent, and 
fair procedure of conviction. Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is ensured. 
Personal liberty cannot be encroached upon without any reasonable ground. The Holy 
Qur'an says, "0 ye who believe! If an evil-liver bring you tidings, verify it, lest ye 
smite some folk in ignorance and afterward repent of what ye did. "39 The verse makes it 
clear that no one should be arrested or detained unless credible information has been 
received and confirmed by a just and fair inquiry. 40 The provisions govern the rights of 
an accused at pre-trial procedure as well as trial stage of a criminal proceeding. 
4.5 Criminal Liability in Shari'ah 
As mentioned earlier, criminal liability in Shari'ah is based upon the violation of divine 
commandment and prohibition. When man was sent down to earth, God Almighty 
promised to send guidance for his success in this world and in the Hereafter, through 
His prophets. 41 This revealed guidance kept on coming till the Prophet-hood of 
35 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. xvii. 
36 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. xi. 
Ibid pp. 2-3. 
38 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, Sunan Ibn Majah (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. II, p. 774. 
Abu Daoud, Salman bin Ash'ath, Sunan Abu Daoud (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, pp. 4-5. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 111, p. 614. 
39 AI-Qur'an 49: 6 
40 Malik, bin Ans, AI-Muwatia (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. 11, p. 720. 
41 A1-Qur'an 2: 38 
88 
c; n Iiar Lays : uid SIiurr'rrlr: Nature. Sources and Priuciplcs of Criminal Liability 
Muhammad (Peace be upon him). People are bound to obey this guidance to protect 
their individual and collective interests. Punishments are prescribed as a means through 
which society can protect its political, economic and social interests. 42 Though, like 
positive law, Shari'ah's objectives are the protection of public and private interests, yet 
it differs in determination of these interests. In Shari 'ah these interests have been 
determined by the lawgiver Himself, whereas in the positive law the society itself 
determines them. In order to protect these interests Shari 'ah emphasizes safeguarding 
certain rights. 
4.6 Classification of Rights in Shari'ah 
Before dealing with the punishments under Shari'ah, it seems appropriate to consider 
rights and their classification, because criminal liability depends upon transgression of 
these rights. The rights have been divided into four kinds43 and these are; 
4.6.1 Rights of Allah 
These rights are termed as rights of Allah because they comprehend public benefit of a 
great significance and general nature. 44 They are either specific to Allah or aim to 
safeguard public interest and social order and not the private right of an individual. 45 
These rights include right of worship, Hudood and expiation in cases of homicide by 
mistake or for intentionally breaking fast during the Holy month of Ramdhan. 46 The 
enforcement of these rights is the duty of the state47and parties are not allowed to 
compromise. 48 The violation of this right and the resulted offence is equal to public 
wrong in positive law. However, these rights may be differentiated from the rights of 
state which fall under the authority of political power and are known as Siyasa 
Sharhia. 49 
4.6.2 Mixed Right with the Predominance of Allah's Right 
The rights deal with the situations where right of Allah and that of man exist side by 
side with predominance of Allah's right; like Hadd for Qadhf50 According to Muslim 
42 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 128. 
41 A1-Sarakhasi, Muhammad bin Ahmad, Usul al-Sarakhsi (Lajna Ehya Al-Muaraf al-Noamania, 
Hyderabad, India). Vol. 11, pp. 289-300. 
Bukhari, Abdul Aziz, Kashaf al-Asrar (Al-Sadaf Publishers, Karachi, Pakistan). Vol. IV, p. 134. 
Al-Taftazani, Saad al-din Masud bin Umar, Al-Tawih ala al-Tawdih (Dar al-Ahd al-Jadid Lil Tabah, 
Cairo, 1957). Vol. II, p. 151. 
Khallaf, Abdul Wahab, IN Usul al-Filth (8'h ed., Dar Al-Ilm, Kuwait) p. 211 45 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. I., p. 205. 
46 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Theories of Islamic Law (I. I. I. T &I. R. I. Islamabad, 1994) pp. 60-61. 47 Hassan, Ahmad, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (I51 ed., I. R. I., Islamabad, 1993) p. 279. 48 lbn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, 1977, op. cit. F. N. 6, Vol. 1, p. 108. 49 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, 1994, op. cit. F. N. 46. p. 58. 
50 Hassan, Ahmad, 1993, op. cit. p. 284. (Shafrte hold that in Qadhf right of man is predominant admitting 
forgiveness from the victim by contrast to the Hanfite who declare it a right of Allah and consequently 
the victim has no right to forgive (Ibid. 286) 
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jurists, though the victim has been defamed and it is his interests that have been directly 
injured but he has no right to pardon the offender or compromise with him. 51In majority 
of the cases of Qadhf the victim is a woman, stigmatized by such an accusation and the 
honour of the entire family is called into question. The offence, therefore, is likely to 
cause infamy, injure the reputation of the victim and lead to hatred and animosity 
among the members of society. 52 That is the reason to include the Hadd in the rights of 
Allah. The punishment for the offence is deterrent causing public benefit. 53 
4.6.3 Mixed Right with the Predominance of Man's Right 
Third kind of rights is once again a mixed right but here the right of man is predominant 
over the right of Allah like Qisas for murder and other bodily injuries. 54 The right of 
individual arises from the fact that the offence causes loss and sorrow to the heirs of the 
victim in case of homicide, or pain and anguish to the victim himself in case of bodily 
injuries. The loss suffered by the victim is more than the loss suffered by the society. 55 
As in this kind of rights man's right is dominating, so in its nature it can be linked with 
the rights which can be called as exclusive rights of man. The victim or his heirs have a 
right to compound by taking compensation or to pardon the offender without any 
compensation to promote good relationships between the two families in future. 56 
4.6.4 Right of Man 
This kind includes all the rights that have not been included in the preceding three 
categories and man is at liberty to exercise them within the prescribed limits. 57 The 
rights of man correspond to private rights in positive law, like right to enforce a contract, 
protection of property, compensation for damages etc. These rights are designed to 
protect the individual interests; they admit compromise, waiver, and compensation. 58 
The enforcement of these rights depends upon the discretion of the man whose right has 
been infringed; he may demand or forgo them. 59 
4.6.5 Importance of this Classification 
This classification is important because it is directly linked with the procedure to be 
followed and the punishment to be implemented in case of transgression of a particular 
51 Bukhari, Abdul Aziz, op. cit. F. N. 43. Vol. IV, p. 159. 
Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, 1977, op. cit. F. N. 6, Vol. 1, p. 108. 
52 A1-Zokhali, Wahba, Usul al-Filth al-Islami (lu ed,. Dar al-Fiker, Damascus, 1986) Vol. 1, p. 156. 
Badran, Abu Al-Ainain, Usul al-Filth al-Islami (Moassasa Shabab al-Jamah, Alexendria, 1984) p. 31 1. 53 Hassan, Ahmad, 1993, op. cit. p. 286. 
54 Ibid. 
5s Ibid. 
56 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 205. 
57 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, 1994, op. cit. F. N. 46. p. 61. 58 Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, 1977, op. cit. F. N. 6, Vol. I, p. 108. 
59 Hassan, Ahmad, 1993, op. cit. p. 280. 
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right. Shari'ah divides offences into two major kinds i. e. offences against rights of 
Allah and against rights of man. 60 If a right of Allah, or the right in which right of Allah 
is predominant, has been violated the punishment shall be a Hadd. In these cases the 
magnitude of the offences is not to be taken into account rather the disgrace caused to 
the injunctions which preserve Islamic virtues is important. For example, in the offence 
of theft, fulfilling all other conditions, if the value of the stolen property equals the 
prescribed standard i. e. Nisab, the offence shall be liable to amputation of hand and the 
punishment would remain unaffected in the case this standard stands exceeded to any 
extent. 61 Similarly, the punishment for use of liquor is the same, regardless of its 
quantity. But the offences which are related to rights of man or in which right of man is 
predominant, it is required that the punishment must be proportional to the crime. 62 In 
these cases the punishment shall be from the realm of Qisas or Tazir. 63 
4.7 Punishments in Shari'ah 
Srari'ah has a different system of punishments as compared to English law. 
Punishments with respect to the time of implementation have been divided into two 
major kinds i. e. punishments to be inflicted in the Hereafter and worldly punishments. 64 
4.7.1 Punishments to be Inflicted in the Hereafter 
Certain wrongs that cannot be proved by evidence, like back-biting, hypocrisy, personal 
grudge, jealousy, malice, sneaking whisper though disapproved by the Lawgiver yet not 
punishable in this world but in the Hereafter. Likewise, if an offence committed secretly 
or where the accused has managed to escape his liability due to lack of evidence, his 
personal influence or by any other means. He shall be punished on the Day of Judgment 
and these punishments are much more severe than the worldly punishments. At a 
number of places in the Holy Qur'an this fact has been prescribed that "Know that 
Allah is severe in punishment"65 and that "He is swift in prosecution. "66 Every believer 
is bound to avoid the displeasure of his Lord by following His commandments and 
avoiding all kinds of evil. As these punishments are not related to this study, we need 
not discuss them. 
6° Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 2. 
61 Abu Zohra, Muhammad, Al-Aqooba (Dar-Al-Fiker al Arabi, Cairo) pp 9-10 62 Ibid. p. 10. 
63 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence (I. 1. I. T. &I. R. I., Islamabad, 2000) p. 98. 64 Abu Zohra, Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. p. 62. 65 Al-Qur'an 5: 98 
66 AI-Qur'an 7: 166 
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4.7.2 Worldly Punishments 
The other kind of punishments, worldly punishments, is prescribed for the acts which 
have been declared unlawful by Shari 'ah and are considered to be sufficiently injurious 
to the interests of society. Islam, like all other revealed religions, has certain basic 
objects to be achieved. These objects have been enumerated as; protection and 
preservation of religion, life, family life, intellect, and property. 67 
The words `protection' and `preservation' emphasize a dual aspect, that these interests 
are not only affirmed by the eternal law but also safeguarded. 68 These objects are of 
such importance that it is just impossible to imagine a peaceful life without their 
preservation and protection. Almost all the criminal codes of civilized nations 
emphasize the protection of the same interests and any act detrimental to them is an 
offence, like offences against, person, property, state, public tranquillity, etc. These are, 
therefore, indispensable for peace and security in a society and their absence would 
disrupt life and lead to disorder and anarchy. In order to protect these five important 
indispensable interests, Shari 'ah provides a system of worldly punishments, in addition 
to that in the Hereafter. In fact, by doing so, it has adopted two parallel courses to 
preserve them by cultivating religious consciousness through moral education; and by 
inflicting deterrent punishments upon one who violates the legal norms. 
Shari'ah has its distinguishing feature dividing punishments with reference to their 
nature into fixed and discretionary. There are fixed punishments for major crimes, like, 
murder, highway robbery, theft, adultery and fornication, false accusation of adultery 
and drinking Khamr. Shari 'ah places the protection of religion, safety of life and 
property, preservation of chastity and reputation and safeguarding intellect at the highest 
priority. Therefore, crimes involving violation of these most precious values are subject 
to fixed punishments. The fixed punishments can further be subdivided into two kinds 
i. e. Hudood and Qisas; whereas discretionary punishments are termed as Tazir. 
Offences in Shari 'ah are classified on the basis of punishments, whereas in English 
criminal law classification is based upon the harm arising out of the crime, like crime. 
against the person or property. 69 
G' Al-Shatibi, Ibrahim bin Moosa, Al-Muwafagat fi Usul al-Shari'ah (2' ed., Dar al Marafa, Beirut, 1975) 
Vol. II, pp. 8-12. 
GS Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 32. p. 25. 
69 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 38. 
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4.7.2.1 Hudood 
Hudood is plural of Hadd, which literally means limit, prevention, hindrance, restraint 
or prohibition. 70 These punishments are designated as Hudood because they prohibit the 
commission of crimes, restrain its instances in an Islamic society and draw a line of 
demarcation between permissible and prohibited . 
71 A Hadd may be defined as "Fixed 
punishment to be implemented as the right of God. "72 
Since God is perfect and eternal, so are His laws perfect and comprehensive. Hence the 
punishments ordained by God are immutable and invariable. No human tribunal is 
empowered to change Hudood punishments in either way i. e. no increase or decrease 
can be made on any ground. 73 The immutability of Hudood is supported by the verse of 
the Holy Qur'an which states, "These are the limits of Allah. Transgress them not. For 
whoso transgresseth Allah's limits, such are wrongdoers. "74 As mentioned above the 
major crimes in the eyes of Shari 'ah are, murder, it is punished with capital punishment 
(Qisas), 75 Zina by a married adulterer is punished with stoning to death76 and by an 
unmarried fornicator by one hundred lashes, 77 highway robbery by amputation of right 
hand and left foot, 78 whereas theft has been provided with the punishment of amputation 
of right hand of the thief, 79 drinking wine or the use of any other kind of intoxicant is 
punished with eighty lashes, 80 similar number of lashes have been prescribed for 
70 Ibn Manzur, Lisaan Al-Arab (Dar Sader, Beirut) Vol. III, p. 140. 
71 Aamer, Abdul Aziz, Al-Tazir (5'h ed., Dar Al-Fiker al-Arabi, 1976) p. 13. 
72 Al-Kasani, Ala-ud-din, Badai al-Sanai (H. M. Saced Co., Karachi, Pakistan, 1979) Vol. VII, p. 33. 
AI-Sarakhasi, AI-Mabsut (Idara Al-Qur'an Wal Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi, Pakistan) Vol. IX, p. 36. 73 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 686-87. 
74 Al-Qur'an 2: 229 
75 AI-Qur'an 2: 178. 
AI-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 38. 
Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. Il, p. 1302. 
Al-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, Sunan Al-Nissai (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. VII, p. 90. 
lbn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 847. 
Abu Daoud, Salman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 522. 
76 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 120. 
Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II. p. 1325. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 852. 
Abu Daoud, Salman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 593. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 39. 
Malik bin Ans, 1981, op. cit. F. N. 40. Vol. II, p. 820. 
77 A1-Qur'an 24: 2 
78 A1-Qur'an 5: 33 
79 AL-Qur'an 5: 38 
80 Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1336. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 858. 
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Qadhf. 81 Similarly, death punishment for high treason82 and apostasy83 has been fixed 
by the Sunnah of the Holy prophet. 
All these are fixed punishments and except the punishment of murder all other are 
designated as Hudood. It should be kept in mind that the fixed punishments provided for 
the offences are maximum when all the conditions of the offence are fulfilled. In all 
other cases society is authorized to make laws suitable to its own requirements within 
the maximum and minimum limits. 
4.7.2.1.1 Number of Hudood 
As far as the Hudood punishments are concerned, there is no difference of opinion 
among the Muslim jurists that these are fixed and immutable. However, they differ on 
the number of Hudood offences. According to the majority of the Muslim jurists there 
are seven kinds of Hudood and these are; (Zina) unlawful sexual intercourse, (Qadhf) 
false accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse, (Saraqa) theft, (Haraba) highway 
robbery, (Khamr) drinking wine, (Ridda) apostasy, and (Baghi) high treason. 84 This 
view has been accepted by a number of contemporary Muslim scholars as well. 85 The 
opinion is based upon the fact that the punishment for these offences has been fixed 
either in the Holy Qur'an or Sunnah and all these are considered to be the violation of 
right of Allah or the society at large. 
However, Hanf lie jurists do not agree with the opinion; they exclude apostasy and high 
treason from Hudood offences. The reason might be that in case of high treason the 
ruler has a right to forgive the offenders, if he believes it in the best interest of society, 
and similarly in the cases of apostasy the court is bound to give the offender at least 
R' Al-Qur'an 24: 4-5. 
82 Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1373 &1480. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1303. 
AI-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 153. 
Ahmad bin Hanbal, Masnad Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. It, p. 161. 
83 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 162. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 848. 
Al-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 104. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 59. 
Abu Daoud, Salman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 521. 
84 lbn Qadama, Al-Mughni (Maktaba Al-Mustafa Al-babi al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. VII, p. 104. 
Al-Dasooqi, Hashiat Al Dasooqi (Dar al-Ahya Al-Kutab al-Arabia, Egypt) Vol. IV, p. 298 
Al-Khatib, Al-Iqnah (Dar Al-Marfa Litabbah wa Al-Nasher, Beirut, 1979) Vol. II, p. 177. 
lbn Hazm, Ali bin Ahmad bin Saeed, AI-Mohallah (Dar AI-Afaq al-Jadeeda, Beirut) Vol. XI, p. 118. 
Al-Fatoohi, Taqi-ud-din Muhammad, Muntahi Al-Iradat (Alam al-Kütab, Beirut) Vol. II, p. 456. 
Al-Bahooti, Kasshaf al-Qannah (Maktaba Al Nasar al-Hadisa, Riyadh) Vol. VI, p. 77. 
85 Sabiq, Al-Sayyed, Fiqh AI-Sunnah (3`d ed., Dar Al-Kitab al Arabi, Beirut, 1977) Vol. II, p. 355. 
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three days to rethink and renounce apostasy while such relaxation is not allowed in the 
cases of other Hudood offences. 86 
There is a difference of opinion on the number of Hudood among the Hanfite jurists 
themselves. In one opinion there are six kinds of Hudood, excluding apostasy and high 
treason, and they add Hadd for intoxication in addition to drinking wine. 87 A second 
opinion excludes the highway robbery from the realm of Hudood, lowering their 
number to five. 88 The reason for excluding highway robbery might be that this offence 
seldom occurred in the early history of Islam. The third opinion treats the Hadd for 
intoxication and drinking liquor as one reducing the number of Hudood to four, 89 
because the object of its implementation and magnitude are the same, though the reason 
for its becoming due may be different. 
4.7.2.2 Qisas 
Murder is amongst the most heinous crimes known to mankind. The Right to life is the 
most important right in the view of Shari'ah, any transgression on this right is very 
strongly condemned. An unjustified killing of one human being is declared as murder of 
the whole humanity. 90 Shari 'ah provides punishment of Qisas for the offences against 
human body in the cases of intentionally causing death or loss of any of organs or limbs. 
The word Qisas means equality91 and the Muslim jurists have defined it as the infliction 
of the same harm upon the offender as he caused to the victim. 92 Qisas is the best 
example of retribution and the principle of proportionality emphasised by Shari 'ah. 
Punishment of Qisas was the part of Jewish law. The Holy Qur'an continues the 
tradition of the Judeo-Christian teachings, "The life for the life, and the eye for the eye, 
and the nose for the nose, and the ear for the ear, and the tooth for the tooth, and for 
wounds retaliation. "93 The basic feature of Qisas is that the victim of the offence has a 
right to compound for compensation or pardon the offender, thus having an important 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, pp. 612 & 634. 
86 Ibn Abdeen, Muhammad Ameen, Hashia Ibn Abdeen (Maktaba Majdia, Quetta, Pakistan)Vol. Ill, p. 312 
87 Ibid. p. 153. 
88 Al-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 33. 
Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din, op. cit. F. N. 89. Vol. V, p. 2. 
90 Al-Qur'an 5: 32 
71 Ghurbal, M. Shafiq, A1-Mawsu'ah al-Arabia al-Muyassarah (Dar al-Jeel, Beirut, 1995) Vol. Il, p. 1382. 
92 Ibn Qadama, Ahmed bin Muhammad, Al-Mughni (Dar al-Hadith, Cairo, 1996) Vol. XI, p. 417. 
Ibn Manzur, Lisaan Al-Arab (Dar Sader, Beirut) Vol. VII, p. 76. 
93 Al-Qur'an 5: 45 
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role in the prosecution of the accused. 94 The Holy Qur'an clearly prefers payment of 
Diyat or compensation over the execution of Qisas. 95 The preference indicates the bond 
of continuity between the law and religion since the act of forgiveness will be rewarded 
in the Hereafter. 96 
Punishment of Qisas has been prescribed as it saves life, though apparently it causes 
death of the offender and takes life of another member of society. The Holy Qur'an says, 
"And there is life for you in Qisass, 0 men of understanding, that you may ward off 
(evil). "97 It is worth mentioning here that in this verse the addressees are not the 
Muslims only, rather generally the men of intellect and understanding. If a person who 
intended to kill someone is sure that if he kills he will be killed in Qisas, definitely he 
will think hundred times before commission of such a heinous crime and will refrain 
from committing it. In this way two lives have been saved, life of the person whose 
death was intended and life of the would be murderer. The fact can be proved by the 
crime statistics report of Interpol. In Saudi Arabia, where punishment of Qi. sas is 
implemented, 147 murders were committed in 2000, whereas in the same year 766 
murders were committed in England and Wales. 98 The frequency of murders in UK is 
gradually increasing after the abolition of death punishment, in 2002,1048 murders 
were reported to police, 99 where as prior to abolition of death punishment during 50 
years(1900-1949) a total number of 7,454 murders were known to the police in England 
and Wales. 100 It is important to mention that though only 632 convicts were executed 
during the period mentioned above 101 yet it was the fear of death punishment which 
kept the offence of murder under control. Certainly there could be a number of other 
factors involved for such a low prevalence rate of homicide, however application of 
Shari'ah punishments is the most important of all. 
94 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 204. 
Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 41. 
95 AI-Qur'an 3: 159. 
96 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 205. 
97 AI-Qur'an 2: 17 
98 (http: //www. interpol. int/Public/Statistics/1CS) 2003. (The same source estimated Saudi Arabia's 
population in the year to 20,846,884 and UK's to 52,427,906) 
99Ibid. 
00 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953) Cmd. 8932 (HMSO, London) p. 19. 
101 Ibid. 
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It should be remembered that Shari'ah recognises various degrees of homicides, like 
intentional or negligent homicide. 102 Qisas is the punishment provided only for 
intentional homicide or murder. It is important to mention here that after 39 years of 
abolition of capital punishment the Tory shadow home secretary Mr. David Davis 
suggested bringing back death penalty for some premeditated and cold blooded 
murders. 103 
4.7.2.3 Tazir 
Tazir punishments are applied to the offences which fall out of the domain of Hudood 
and Qisas. 104 These are the discretionary punishments to be inflicted for transgression 
against the rights of individual, or right of Allah for which there is neither a fixed 
punishment nor a penance or expiation. 105 Tazir punishment may also be inflicted in the 
cases of Hudood and Qisas if the required standard of proof is not available or an 
essential element of offence is missing, hence preventing the execution of Hadd or 
Qisas. 106 Similarly, all other acts damaging interests of an individual or society are to be 
punished by sole discretion of the judge. 107 Basically, Tazir offences are less serious 
than the Hudood and Qisas; they include any conduct that violates Islamic norms like 
obscenity, usury, breach of trust, false testimony and contempt of court. 108 
Though the criminalisation of conduct and fixing of Tazir punishment has been left to 
the discretion of the court, yet at the time of awarding the sentence the court is bound to 
take into account certain factors like gravity of the offence, its frequency in 
society, 109 circumstances of the case and the character of the offender. 110 Hence 
102 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 84. Vol. VII, p. 637. 
AI-Khatib, Mughni Al-Mohtaj (Dar-lhya al-Taras Al-Arabi Beirut, 1933)Vol. IV, p. 3 
Ibn Al-Hamam, Sharah Feth Al-Qadeer (Dar Ahya al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. IX, p. 137. 
Malik Bin Ans, Al-Mudawana Al-Kubra (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 432. 
Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 50. 
103 (htlp-//news. bbc. co. uk) 16 Nov. 2003. 
104 Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, op. cit. F. N. 4. p. 145. 
105 Al-Sarakhsi, op. cit. F. N. 72. Vol. IX, p. 36. 
lbn Al-Hamam, Sharah Al-Feth Al-Qadeer (Dar Ahya al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. VII, p. 119. 
AI-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 84. Vol. IV, p. 72. 
Al-Mawardi, Muhammad bin Habib, op. cit. F. N. 22. p. 224. 
AI-Rammali, Nihayat al-Mohtaj (Al-Maktaba al-Islamia) Vol. VII, p. 77. 
106 Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 84. Vol. VI, p. 121. 
Abu Zohra, Muhammad, Al-Jarima Wa al-Agooba (Maktab al-Anglo al-Misria, Cairo) p. 126. 
Shansi, Ahmad Fathi, Al-Agooba Fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (5`h ed. Dar Al-Sharooq, Beirut, 1983) p. 134. 
107 Gerber, Haim, Islamic Law and Culture 1600-1840 (Brill, Leiden, 1999) p. 39. 
108 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 53. 
109 Ibn Tamiyya, Taqi ud din, Al-Siyassa al-Shariah (Dar al-Ktub al-Arabi Egypt, 1969) p. 53. 
I10 Aamer, Abdul Aziz, 1976, op. cit. p. 69. 
Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, 1977, op. cit. F. N. 6, Vol. 11, p. 29. 
Ibn Tamiyya, Taqi ud din, 1969, op. cit. p. 97. 
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punishment of Tazir may differ from society to society, time to time and person to 
person, but Hudood and Qi. sas are not subject to such changes. ' 11 Gravity of an offence 
can be determined by taking into account three things i. e. the anguish suffered by the 
victim, the magnitude of alarm and fright caused to the society by the offence and the 
quantum of disgrace caused to the Islamic virtues. 112 The principle that the severity of 
punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong is admitted in 
secular systems of criminal laws, and the seriousness of the offence is determined by 
taking into account the harm caused by the act and the past conduct of the offender. 113 
Tazir punishment provides the court with a further jurisdiction and freedom to inflict a 
more appropriate penalty on the offender taking into account the circumstances of the 
crime and the criminal. In English law, a court may be confronted with a case where 
there is a little evidence against the offender but under the rigid and inadequate legal 
rules it is bound to acquit the accused. The best example in this case can be the use of 
force in the exercise of the right of private defence. 
This classification of punishments is the characteristic of an ideal penal system to 
provide criminal justice to the society. Basic values of human life have been positively 
protected and the punishments for transgression of such values have been fixed by the 
Lawgiver Himself. Out of hundreds of criminal offences only a few have been dealt 
with in the Holy Book and the traditions of the Holy Prophet. The rest have been left to 
the discretion of man, with an authority and freedom to legislate taking into account the 
needs of society in any age and in a way which suits the conditions of that age. 114 
4.8 Hudood, Qisas and Tazir Distinguished 
It is important to know the differences among these three kinds of punishments because 
the jurisdiction of the court and its powers vary with the punishment to be imposed on 
the offender. Beside their fixed and variable character there are many other grounds on 
which these three kinds of punishments can be differentiated. Some of the differences 
are as follow; 
lbn Farhoon, Tabsarat al-Hukkam (Maktba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt) Vol. 1, p. 366. 
Al-Qarafi, Shahab ud din Ahmad bin Idrees, Al-Frooq (Alam al-Kutab, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 181. 
112 Abu Zohra, Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. p. 8 
13 Von Hirsch, Andrew, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (Hill &Wang, N. York, 1976) p. 68. 
114 Kamel, Taymour, The Principle of Legality, in Bassiouni, M. Cherif (ed) The Islamic Criminal Justice 
System (Oceana Publications, 1982) p. 167. 
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1. Qisas offences fall into the category of civil wrongs, for it is the victim or his 
heirs who have right to initiate prosecution, demand retaliation, accept Diyat or 
pardon the offender altogether. 115 In the cases of amicable settlement the court 
can impose only an appropriate Tazir, if deemed necessary. 116 Hudood offences 
are public wrongs, no amicable settlement, either by the victim, by the court or 
even by the head of state, is allowed. In Tazir offences the court can waive the 
punishment, 117 provided it does not prejudice the rights of aggrieved party. ' 18 
Similarly, the victim may forgive the offender to the extent of his own rights 
without prejudicing the rights of society. 119 
2. Standard of evidence to prove Hudood offences is higher than that for Qisas and 
Tazir. According to majority opinion of Muslim jurists, evidence of woman is 
not admissible in Hudood and Qisas offences, 120 unlike Tazir. 121 Similarly, in 
Qisas, as opposed to Hudood, evidence in writing or by the signs of a dumb 
witness is admissible. ' 22 In the offence of Zina four male eye witnesses of the 
act of penetration are required. The minimum number of witnesses to prove 
other Hudood and Qisas offences is two, whereas in Tazir offences a single 
witness would suffice to prove it. ' 23 The judge, if himself an eye witness, is 
allowed to decide a case of Qisas relying upon his own knowledge, whereas in 
Hudood knowledge of the judge is of no value and he is bound to decide the 
case in the light of evidence produced before him. 124 The reason being that his 
personal knowledge does not inspire confidence in the public, but instead breeds 
doubt sufficient to avoid Hadd. 125 
3. An unreasonable delay in prosecution of the offender by the victim affects 
admissibility of evidence in Hudood except Hadd for Qadhf, whereas such delay 
does not affect evidence in cases of Qisas and all other cases for recovery of 
115 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 41. 
116 Aamer, Abdul Aziz, 1976, op. cit. p. 68. 
117 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 687. 
118 Ibid. p. 81. 
19 Ministry of Interior, KSA, 1980, op. cit. p. 46. 
120 Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ud din, 1969, op. cit. p. 78. 
Abi Shaiba, Mussanif(Idara al-Qur'an & Uloom al-Islamia, Karachi, 1986) Vol. X, p. 59. 121 Aamer, Abdul Aziz, 1976, op. cit. p. 70. 
lbn Al-Humam, Sharh Fateh Al-Qadeer (Dar Ahya Al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. VI, p. 450. 122 lbn Nujaym, AI-Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair (Idara Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi)Vol. 1, p. 1 18 123 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1., p. 83. 
lbn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, op. cit. F. N. 4. p. 93. 
Aamer, Abdul Aziz, 1976, op. cit. p. 44. 
124 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 122. Vol. I, p. 118. 
125 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 1 12. 
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personal rights. 126 There are short periods of limitations, generally one month, 
except in drinking wine where it is the time during which smell of wine 
persists. 127 
4. Intercession for the offender is allowed in Qisas prior to or after prosecution, but 
in- cases of Hudood, except in theft prior to prosecution, generally it is not 
permissible. 128 Once the case has been reported for prosecution, no intercession 
or waiver can be affected, rather it has been disliked. 129 Similarly, arbitration 
and mediation is allowed only in the cases of Qisas. 
5. Minors and insane, being incapable of committing crimes, are not subject to the 
punishment of Hudood or Qisas. 130 However, Tazir may be inflicted on them 
taking into account their standard of maturity or understanding, because Tazir is 
a disciplinary punishment having an element of education and its lesser degree 
may start merely with reprimand. 13 1 This can be equivalent to the trial of minors 
by juvenile courts, under the rules of positive law, and to keep them in young 
offender's institutions for some time. 
6. Repentance of the offender has no effect on the Hudood and Qisas except in 
apostasy if he repents within three days, 132 highway robbery if he repents before 
his arrest 133 and in theft where after active repentance he returns the stolen 
property before an application for prosecution. 134 However, on the effect of 
repentance on Tazir, there are two opinions, According to Shafite, if announced 
sincerely, repentance may provide a defence to the punishment of Tazir, 135 
126 Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din op. cit. F. N. 122. Vol. I, p. 1 18. 
Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 177. 127 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 176. 
128 Doi, Abdur Rahman I., Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (Taha Publishers, London, 1997) p. 224. 
The view is based upon the saying of the Holy Prophet, where the cloak of Abu Sufyan was stolen; he 
caught the thief and took him before the Holy Prophet. After the proof of the offence the offender was 
sentenced to amputation of hand. Abu Sufyan said I never intended this and I endow this property to 
him, the Holy Prophet denied the settlement and said this was better to be done before you raised the 
case. {lbn Nujaym, Zain ud din, op. cit. F. N. 89. Vol. V, p. 2); Hazrat Zubair has also been reported to 
have said that once the case of Hadd has been reported for prosecution the curse of Allah be upon the 
intercessor and interceded. ((Malik bin Ans, Al-Muwatta (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. 11, 
p. 835). 
129 Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din, op. cit. F. N. 89. Vol. V, p. 2 
130 Aamer, Abdul Aziz, 1976, op. cit. p. 71. 
11 Ibn Abdeen, Muhammad Ameen, Hashia ! bn Abdeen (Dar Al Fiker, Beirut) Vol. Ill, p. 183. 132 Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din, Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair (Moassasa AI-Halbi, Cairo, 1968) p. 189 
Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin Ali, Al-Mohazzib (Dar Al-Qalm, Damascos, 1996) Vol. V., p. 209. 33 Al-Qur'an 5: 34 
134 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 176. 
135 AI-Mawardi, Muhammad bin Habib, op. cit. F. N. 22. p. 239. 
Al-Qarafi, Shab ud din Ahmad bin Idrees, Al-Frooq (Alam al-Kutab, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 181. 
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whereas Hanfrie opined that it does not affect the liability. 136 Both the opinions 
can be combined by saying that if the offence of Tazir was related to the right of 
Allah and the offender repented, he may be discharged of liability, however in 
the cases of right of man his repentance will be of no effect. 
It is a practice in positive law that if a serious offence has been committed and 
the offender is anonymous, an accomplice joining the prosecution to bring the 
offenders to accountability shall be exempted from liability. Shari 'ah has taken a 
realistic account of this aspect, specifically in the cases of highway robbery 
where in most of the cases, the offenders manage to escape without any clue, if 
someone sincerely repented before his arrest and appeared before the authorities 
and gave information regarding the offence, he shall not be liable for Hadd. 
7. Hudood and Qisas punishments have been prescribed just to combat the crime 
under question, without any reference to the rank or the social status of the 
offender; whereas in the cases of Tazir, a court is entitled to take into account 
such factors. The Holy Prophet is reported to have said, "Ignore the minor 
mistakes, other than Hudood, of your respectable. " 137 It enjoins upon the court 
that the personality of the offender, his moral character and other circumstances 
should necessarily be taken into account while passing a sentence upon him in a 
Tazir offence. 138 
It should be kept in mind that in Shari 'ah respectable does not mean the men of 
wealth or power in society rather the term denotes the scholars and the noble 
men. 139 Basically, punishments are designed to deter people from commission of 
crimes. But people are temperamentally different; for some people rebuke or 
scold will be enough, like the scholars of a society, there are others who may 
need intimidation or even a slap to set them right, and still there are others who 
cannot be corrected except by the execution of a severe punishment. 140 So while 
passing Tazir sentence a court may take into account all these factors and may 
reduce the severity of the punishment. 
136 Ihn Nujaym, Zain ud din, 1968, op. cit. F. N. 132. p. 188. 
137 Al-Baihaqi, A! -Sunan al-Kubra (Dar al-Fiker, Beirut, 1996) Vol. XIII, p. 161 138 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. I., p. 612. 
139 Ibn Farhoon, Tabsarat al-Hukkam (Matba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt) Vol. II, p. 208. 
140 Ibn Al-l-lumam, op. cit. F. N. 121. Vol. V, p. 112. 
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8. According to majority opinion of Muslim jurists if the offence of Hadd, 
pertaining to right of Allah is proved by the confession of the offender, he is 
allowed to retract his confession at any stage of the proceeding and thereby he 
shall not be liable. 141 The reason for the opinion is that there is uncertainty of his 
truthfulness either in his confession or retraction, casting a doubt sufficient to 
prevent the implementation of Hadd. 142 The Muslim jurists, relying upon the 
tradition of the Holy Prophet, also enjoin the court to bring it to the notice of the 
offender that he has a right to retract. 143 On the other hand, if his confession is 
pertaining to the right of man like Qisas or where the right of man is 
predominant like a Hadd for Qadhf, he is not allowed to retract. 
4.9 Are the Punishments in Shari'ah very Harsh? 
Shari'ah's punishments, specifically Hudood, seem to be harsh and severe. Are they 
really so? The following study will provide an answer to the question. Punishments in 
Shari'ah have two-fold objects, spiritual benefits and social welfare of the community, 
whereas secular laws lack the element of spiritual benefits of their subjects. Shari 'ah 
lays emphasis on maintenance of order and peace at all costs by prescribing severe 
punishments for crimes which are a menace to society and deteriorate the moral values. 
A punishment is not a revenge or cruelty inflicted on the offender. Muslim jurists admit 
that punishment itself is misery and evil but it prevents more misery than it inflicts. 144 it 
protects a greater interest i. e. secures the rights of individuals, maintains law and order 
in the society and preserves the purity of its morals. 14' The same principle has been 
incorporated in the theory of utility by Bentham to justify the implementation of 
punishments. 
It is not only in Shari 'ah that severe punishments are provided. If we take into account 
the English criminal law, up to the 19`h century capital punishment was provided for 
141 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 177. 
142 AI-Sarkhasi, Shamas ud din, op. cit. F. N. 30. Vol. IX, p. 182. 
Al-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 232. 
Al-Khatib, 1933, op. cit. F. N. 102. Vol. IV, p. 150. 
AI-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin Ali, Al-Mohazzib (Maktbah Isa AI-Babi Al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. II, p. 345. 
Ibn Qadama, Al-Mughni (Maktaba Al-Riaz al-Hadisa, Riyadh) Vol. VII, p. 197. 
Malik Bin Ans, A1-Mudawana Al-Kobra (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 383. 
143 Malik bin Ans, 1981, op. cit. F. N. 40. Vol. 11, p. 820. 
Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 22. 
Muslim, Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1321. 
1" Abu Zohra, Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. p. 6. 
145 Ibid. p. 7 
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very minor offences. 146 There were approximately two hundred offences punishable 
with death. 147 It was admitted that there is no other country in the world where so many 
offences were punishable with death. 148 Initially English criminal law was not 
concerned with intention of the offender; criminal liability was imposed only by taking 
into account the outward conduct. 149 There was little discrimination on ground of age; 
children and teenagers were not only sentenced to death but executed as well. ' 50 It is 
irrefutable evidence that English criminal law was cruel and arbitrarily administered 
without affording adequate guarantee to the essential rights of the subjects. The harsh 
and brutish punishments were justified on the ground that as under the English criminal 
law the rights of accused are well safeguarded, so the punishments of those found guilty 
should be exemplary. 151 
It is worth mentioning here that in Shari 'ah there are only three offences, murder, 
adultery by a married adulterer and apostasy, for which death sentence has been 
provided by the Lawgiver. 152 Except these three cases it is not permissible to take the 
life of anyone. Great sanctity is attached to the protection of human life, chastity and 
unity of the community; he who violates this sanctity voluntarily shall have to suffer not 
only the capital punishment in this world but also the torment of Hell in the Hereafter. 
Those who contend that such punishments are harsh, ignore the harmful effects of such 
crimes on individual and society. '53 
By prescribing severe punishments, Shari 'ah attempts to strike a fair balance between 
the interests of the accused and the society. Though the Shari 'ah punishments are 
undoubtedly severe, yet admittedly their severity has been reduced by provision of a 
tough criminal procedure and high standard of proof requiring certainty of guilt, to 
lac Radzinowicz, L. & Turner, J. W. C., The Modern Approach to the Criminal law (Collected Essays) 
(Macmillan & Co. London, 1948) p. 39. 
147 Radzinowicz, L, Sir, A History of English Criminal law and its Administration from 1750 (Stevens & 
Sons, London, 1948) Vol., 1, p. 4. 
Radzinowicz, L., & Turner, J. W. C., 1948, op. cit. p. 44. 
148 Radzinowicz, L. Sir, 1948, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 3. 
149 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law (2na ed., University Press, Cambridge, 1968) Vol. II., p. 470. 
Iso Radzinowicz, L, Sir, 1948, op. cit. Vol., 1, pp. 12-13. 
151 Ibid. p. 27 
152 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 38. 
Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1302. 
Abu Daoud, Salman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 522 
Al-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VII., p. 90. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 847. 
153 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 197. 
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avoid error and prevent abuse of judicial discretion. 154 Western scholars admit that 
severity is one of the characteristics of punishments which render them most 
effective. 155 A person burnt on a hot stove will very unlikely touch it again. 156 Crime is 
called the cancer of human society that disrupts the whole social life; this cancer must 
be treated by the most appropriate and effective medicine. The criticism on the 
harshness of Shari'ah's punishments may also be tempered by the recognition of the 
fact that their deterrent nature has effectively reduced the incidence of serious crimes in 
Islamic societies. 157 Taking into account the impact of punishments in English criminal 
law it may also be argued that infliction of effective and severe punishments in rare 
instances is more reasonable as compared to the nominal and ineffective punishments 
on a large number of offenders. 
Although the punishments in Shari'ah are severe yet these are to be inflicted as a last 
resort. 158 Criminal law is not the whole system of Shari'ah rather it is a small part of it. 
These punishments are to be implemented only in an Islamic society where Shari 'ah is 
implemented in its complete form in all the spheres of life. Application of Hudood has 
been restricted, beside other defences, by their narrow definitions, peculiar conditions, 
and strict standard of proof, active repentance and dominance of role of doubt. 159 These 
factors altogether temper the severity of punishments and restrict their application to 
very limited cases. The application of the most severe punishment of Zina is restricted 
by the fact that accusation of the offence is discouraged by threat of punishment of 
Qadhf, if the accuser failed to prove the accusation by four eye witnesses., 60 Further, so 
many evidentiary requirements have been imposed as to make the conviction impossible 
unless the perpetrator confesses. 161 However, if these punishments are applied, apart 
from the whole system, it will not be appropriate. 
4.10 Retributive and Deterrent Functions of these Punishments 
In Shari 'ah punishments serve two major objects: Firstly, preservation of virtues, moral 
excellence enunciated by Shari'ah and condemnation of vice prevailing in society. 
Secondly, protection of public interests, safeguarding collective security and furtherance 
i51 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 121. 
155 McGuire, James (ed), What Works: Reducing Reoffending (J. Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1995)p. 13 
156 Felson, Marcus, Crime and Everyday Life (Pine Forge, London, 1994) p. 10. 
157 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 196. 
58 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 85. 
'S9 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 176. 
60 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 46. 
161 
. 
Forte, David F., Studies in Islamic Law (Austin & Winfield Publishers, 1999) p. 81. 
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of social welfare. ' 62 In order to achieve these objects punishments must be based upon 
the principles of deterrence and retribution. 163 It is unfair that an offender should gain an 
advantage over law abiding people through contravening a prohibition and get away 
with that advantage. It is, therefore, justifiable that he should be subjected to such a 
disadvantage so as to outweigh the benefits. This object cannot be achieved unless the 
offender receives what he actually deserves. ' 64 Execution of a merited punishment upon 
the offender creates a satisfaction for the victim and his family, which in turn plays an 
important role in the process of social control. 
Social justice and respect for law cannot be maintained without punishing the offender 
as he deserved. The retributive function of Hudood punishments has been specifically 
mentioned in the Holy Qur'an for the offences of highway robbery' 65 and theft. 166 In 
both the cases the punishment has been described as reward for the evil deeds of the 
offenders. At another place it has been provided that, "And those who earn ill deeds, 
(for them) requital of each ill deed by the like thereof; " 167 
Recognition of deterrent aspect of punishments in Shari 'ah is stronger than any other 
legal system. 168 Deterrence has been considered as predominant justification for 
punishments. Especially Hudood punishments have been defined as "deterrent 
punishments ordained by Allah to prevent man from committing crimes. "' 69 In order to 
achieve the object of general deterrence execution of Hadd punishment has been 
ordained to be executed in public. 170 The Holy Qur'an commands that the punishment 
for Zina be carried out in public. 171 When the people will witness the execution of 
punishment on the offender they will be deterred from the commission of crime. 
Nudood punishments are severe and immutable; these two characteristics give them as 
full a retributive effect as possible and combat the inclination of man to break law. 
162 Abu Zohra, Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. p. 28. 
163 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 84. 
164 Al-Qur'an 42: 40 
165 A1-Qur'an 5: 33 
66 A1-Qur'an 5: 38 
167 Al-Qur'an 10: 27 
168 El-Awa, M. Salim., Punishment in Islamic Law (American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, 1981) p. 30. 169 AI-Mawardi, Muhammad bin Habib, op. cit. F. N. 22. p. 191. 
170 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 84 171 Al-Qur'an 24: 2 
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The most common evidence of deterrent effects of Hudood punishment is the 
significant decrease in crime-rate in Saudi Arabia, where the criminal law is based upon 
the principles of Shari 'ah. The total crime-rate per 1000 habitants was 32 in 1966 that 
reduced to 18 per 1000 inhabitants in 1975.172 In 2000, there were only 147 murders and 
30 rapes against 766 murders and 8409 rapes in England and Wales in the same year. 173 
An official figure shows that Hadd punishment for theft has never been carried out in 
Saudi Arabia more than twice a year. 174 There is only one reported case of amputation 
of hand for five years i. e. from 1972 to 1976.175 It is admitted that respect for Shari'ah 
is a major reason for the relative stability enjoyed by Saudi Arabia in the turbulent 
Middle East. ' 76 
Punishments provided in Shari'ah contain all the major objects individually and 
collectively. The punishment provided for the offence of fornication is reformative in its 
nature and implies the spiritual purification of the offender, whereas, punishments 
provided for the offence of theft and highway robbery are deterrent in their character 
while the punishment for murder is based upon the concept of retribution. 177 
4.11 Role of Intention in Determining Criminal Liability 
In Shari 'ah, violation of command and prohibition based upon rational understanding 
and volition of the offender gives rise to criminal liability. 178 A person shall be 
criminally liable only when he rationally understands what he is doing and at the same 
time has an option to do otherwise. If a person is capable of forming intention but has 
no option to do otherwise, he shall not be liable, like acts done under coercion. 179 A 
minor and an insane are exempted from criminal liability because they are incapable of 
forming intention and knowing the nature and consequences of their acts. There is a 
tradition of the Holy Prophet narrating that all the acts and omissions of a man are to be 
judged in the light of intention with which these are done. 180 The tradition not only 
reveals the importance of intention, rather another important principle of criminal law as 
well that there should be concurrence between the act and the intention. It is the 
172 Ministry of Interior, KSA, 1980, op. cit. p. 500. 
173 International Crime Statistics (littp: /hvww. interpol. int/Public/Statistics/ICS) 2003. 
174 El-Awa, M. Salim., 1981, op. cit. p. 30. 
175 Ministry of Interior, KSA, 1980, op. cit. p. 560. 
176 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 107. 
177 Ansari, The Qur. 'anic Foundations (Ist ed., Indus Educational Foundation, Karachi, 1973)Vol. II, p. xxiv. 178 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 393. 179 ibid. 
180 AI-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 2 
106 
I: nýIi%h Lint and Shuri'r1i : Nature. Sources and Principles of C: riininal Liability 
intention which renders an act lawful or unlawful, valid or void, obedience or 
disobedience. '8' 
It is the importance of intention that led the Hanfite jurists to classify homicide into five 
kinds, homicide with deliberate intention, quasi deliberate intention, by mistake, quasi 
mistake and indirect homicide. 182 This classification results in the variation of degree in 
the liability of the offender. In the cases of murder liability is Qisas, whereas in all other 
kinds of homicide the liability is to pay blood money (Diyat) with certain variation in its 
amount. The classification indicates that Hanfite jurists had a general idea of the modem 
concept of mens rea, representing various states of minds of an offender. 
As it is known that the intention of a man is the internal condition of his heart and mind 
and normally it is impossible to prove it by any direct evidence. Comparatively it is 
more difficult to know what is in the mind of a man than to know what he has done. So 
some external circumstantial evidence is required to prove his intention. Muslim jurists 
adopted an objective method to prove it in the cases of homicide. They have taken use 
of a weapon as a parameter to determine the intention of the offender. 183 Homicide with 
deliberate intention or murder means killing of a human being with a weapon which is 
sharp and specifically designed for killing. 184 So all the weapons primarily designed for 
killing like swords, daggers and arrows, used in the past and following the analogy all 
the lethal weapons of the present day, if used in a homicide prove that the offender not 
only intended the act but also the result i. e. death of the victim. Similarly, all the 
weapons, which in the ordinary course of nature are likely to cause death, may lead to 
the same conclusion. 
This particular circumstantial evidence to determine the intention of the offender was 
considered by English judges also. In R. v. Meakin 185 while directing the jury Baron 
Alderson said that use of a deadly weapon by the accused, even in state of intoxication, 
leads to the conclusion that the accused intended death of the victim. It shows that at a 
time English judges were stricter to infer intention from the weapon of the offence, 
181 Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyah, 1977, op. cit. F. N. 6, Vol. 111, p. 108 
182 Ibn Al-Hamam, Sharah Feth AI-Qadeer (Dar Ahya al-Taras al Arabi, Beirut) Vol. IX, p. 137. 
Ibn Nujaym, Zain ud din, op. cit. F. N. 89. Vol. VII. p. 287. 
1B3 Ibn Al Hamam, Sharah Feih AI-Qadeer (Dar Ahya al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. IX, p. 138. 184 Ibid. 
185 R. v. Meakin (1836) 7C&P 297; 173 ER 131. 
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notwithstanding the mental capacity of the accused. The same view was affirmed by 
Coleridge J. in R. v. Monkhouse 186 by saying that when a man put a pistol on the head 
of another and shot him dead, he intended nothing except to cause his death. In another 
case R. v. Doherty 187 Stephen J. addressing the jury said that it is difficult to see how a 
man can fire a loaded pistol at another without an intention to cause his death or 
grievous bodily harm. 188 The cases prove that in English law up to the l9`h century 
weapon of the offence was used to determine the intention of the accused. The principle 
has not lost its validity; in the absence of any evidence to the contrary use of a deadly 
weapon is the best circumstantial evidence to prove that the defendant intended death or 
grievous bodily harm. 
It is clear that intention is very important in determining the liability of the offender. 
However, in Shari'ah, motive, good or bad, has no impact on the offence or its 
punishment. It cannot be taken into account neither determining liability nor at the 
sentencing stage. Powers of the courts have been curtailed in the offences for which 
fixed punishment has been provided. However, as already mentioned, in the offences of 
Tazir the punishment depends upon discretion of the court, so practically it is possible 
for the court to take into account motive of the offender for commission of the crime 
and mitigate the punishment if deems appropriate. 189 This view is in line with practice 
in English criminal law, as discussed in 3.9.1, particularly in the instances of good 
motive. 
4.12 Morality and Law in Shari'ah 
In Shari 'ah, morality, being the sense of good and bad in a society, derives its existence 
and force from the divine law. It has been established by experience that man is 
incapable of perceiving his own true interests. It is the natural weakness of man that in 
most of the affairs he takes into account only one aspect of reality, swayed by emotions 
and desires, and loses sight of other aspects, hence rendering his judgements usually one 
sided. 190 
186 R. v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 Cox. CC 55. 
187 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox. CC 306. 
188 Ibid. at 308. 
189 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 41 1. 
190 Ahmed, Khurshid, Islam: Its Meaning and Message (Ambika Publications, N. Delhi, 1977) p. 162. (An 
example of this phenomenon is the enactment of prohibition law in 1920 in America. The people of 
America thought that prohibition of alcoholic beverages is in the best interest of their nation but just after 
thirteen years of experience the same people demanded the repeal of law. ) 
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The incapacity of man to determine ultimate good and evil has been stated in the Holy 
Qur'an, "lt may happen that you hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen 
that you love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knows, you know not. "191 What is 
absolutely good or evil is an important question to be determined in the light of 
revelation, if no answer has been provided the believers are allowed to follow the 
dictates of reason in accordance with certain definite principles. 192 
The sense of goodness and evil springs from the consciousness of a man and his 
conscience makes him incline to obey righteousness. Yet morality should not be 
accepted as self-imposed, because self can also dispense with it even as it can impose. 
Consequently it should be imposed by some authority and such an authority in an 
Islamic society is God. The revealed law has been referred to as criterion to distinguish 
between right and wrong, vice and virtue. 193 The Holy Qur'an communicates, "0 you 
who believe! If you fear God, He will grant you a criterion (to judge between right and 
wrong), remove from you all evil (that may afflict you) and bestow upon you 
forgiveness. "' 94 Even in the secular societies it is admitted that a super intelligence, 
knowing fully all the passions of mankind and its nature but having no contact with 
these passions, independent of mankind is required, to determine goodness, and there is 
no such super intelligent but the God almighty. 195 
The revealed religion is a force in the moral development of man. Religion, law, and 
morality are knitted with each other; little distinction is made between moral and legal. 
All the ideals of honesty, virtue, piety, truth, loyalty, sympathy, mercy, forgiveness, 
tolerance, charitableness, moderation, generosity, tenderness, respect for elders and 
number of other moral and ethical ideals are established, promoted and safeguarded by 
the religion. They bear the transcendental dimensions of a Muslim's personality by 
strengthening the moral fibre which results into nourishing his faith. The private life of 
an individual is regulated by the teachings of Shari 'ah so morality is essentially 
governed by its teaching. 
191 Al-Qur'an 2: 216 
192 Fyzee, Asaf A. A., Outlines of Muhammadan Law (Oxford University Press, 1949) pp. 15-16. 
193 Gibb, H. A. R., Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (Oxford University Press, 1949) p. 91. 
194 Al-Qur'an 8: 29 
195 Rousseau, J. J., Social Contract (Greenwood Publishers, Westport-Connecticut, 1980) p. 205. 
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There has been a significant polarisation among Western scholars on the extent to which 
the criminal law should intervene in protecting moral values but such a division never 
existed in Shari'ah because of integral relationship between law and morality. 196 
Shari'ah is the law of morality which culminates in the hearts of its followers the purity 
of motives, sympathy for the poor and weak, fear of God and the Day of Judgement and 
hatred for cruelty and injustice. The Holy Prophet is reported to have said, "I have been 
sent to perfect the moral goodness". 197 Thus, there is no dichotomy in Shari 'ah between 
criminal law and moral principles. It is almost impossible to deny that the notion of 
crime is inextricably linked with the moral blameworthiness. The traditional view of 
Common law as well as Shari 'ah has been that crimes are essentially immoral acts 
deserving punishments. 
Beside a number of opinions of important English jurists 198 the best exposition of 
relation between crime and moral guilt is enshrined in the maxim "actus non faci reum 
nisi mens rea. "199 There are certain occasions where mens rea is used to refer to moral 
wrong doing200 and criminal liability has been linked to the moral blameworthiness. 201 it 
can further be argued that had there been any distinction between them there had been 
no difference between the wilful and accidental or un-intentional conduct. In Shari 'ah 
all crimes are immoral acts but not vice versa, for in the realm of Tazir the court may 
punish any act on the grounds of social expediency and not because of its immoral 
nature. It is no wonder that Shari'ah prescribes two types of punishments for every 
wrongful act. The first one imposed by the authorities in this world for the wrongs 
declared as crimes and the second one imposed by God in the Hereafter for moral sins. 
The standards of Islamic morality are universal. It is admitted that in a number of 
Muslim states these standards are not being observed but it is a fact that even those who 
do not observe these principles do not deny them. 
4.13 Characteristics of Islamic Criminal Law 
All the principles of Shari 'ah are based upon equity and equality of human beings. It 
emphasises the fact that all humans are creature of the same Lord and it is piety, which 
196 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 132. 
197 Malik bin Ans, Al-Muwatta (2"d ed., Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1992) Vol. 11, p. 904. 198 Hale, Matthew, Sir, Pleas of the Crown (Catherine Lintot, London, 1759) Vol. 1, p. 31. 
Hawkins, Williams, Pleas off the Crown Law (E &R Nutt, London, 1728) pp. 1-2. 
Blackstone, Commentaries (A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. IV, p. 21. 
199 Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal law (Bobbs-Merril, Indianapolis, 1960) p. 8 1. 200 Williams, Glanville, Criminal law: The General Part (Stevens & Sons, London, 1961) p. 27. 201 Per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson [ 1932] AC 562 at 580. 
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is the only criterion of grandeur of an individual. 202 There is no discrimination on 
account of race, colour, caste, wealth, power or anything else among humans. God has 
created all human beings as equals, the nations and tribes are only for identification and 
not for discrimination. Muslims have been enjoined to respect the rights of their fellow- 
beings, irrespective of their faith and belief. 203 
Islamic justice is some thing higher than the formal justice in man-made laws. 
Administration of justice is related to the innermost motives because the judge is to act 
as in the presence of Allah, to whom all things, acts and motives are known. To act 
justly is a religious duty and a devotional act. No one, even the head of a state, is 
exempted from law and all are to be treated equally. The Holy Prophet warned against 
discrimination, between common people and nobility in applying punishments, stating 
204 that if his own daughter had committed theft, he would have amputated her hand. 
This fact was acknowledged by the first Caliph Abu Bakr, who declared in his very first 
address to the Muslims after being elected as their leader "Co-operate with me when I 
am right, and correct me when I commit error. Obey me so long as I follow the 
commandments of Allah and his Prophet but turn away from me when I deviate. "205 It 
suggests that the head of state is bound to follow the divine law and individuals are 
subject to his authority only when this authority is being exercised in conformity with 
the commandments of Shari 'ah. The concept of accountability of the highest authority 
is contrary to the English legal maxim that king can do no wrong. 206 
Administration of justice being a religious duty has been commanded to be discharged 
free from personal liking and disliking. 207 A judge is bound to stand firm and discharge 
his duty in all sincerity. Love of God has been linked with Justice. 208 It has been 
202 Al-Qur'an 49: 13 
203 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 19. 
204 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 17. 
Muslim, Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1315. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV. p. 37. 
Al-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 69. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II. p. 851. 
205 Ibn Al-Athir, Al-Kamal Fi A1-Tarikh (Dar al-Sader, Beirut, 1965) Vol. If., p. 332. 
Al-Tibri, Abu Jafar, Tarikh al-Umum wa al-Malook (Al-Matba al-Hussania al-Misria, Egypt)Vol. Ill., p. 203. 
Ibn Hisham, Abu Muhammad Abdul Malik, Al-Seerah al-Nabvia (Dar Al-Jeel, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 228. 
206 Blackstone, Commentaries on the law of England (15`h Ed. A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. 1, p. 68. 
207 Al-Quran 5: 8 
208 Al-Qur'an 49: 9 
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ordained, "If you judge between man kind, that you judge justly. "209 Shari 'ah seeks to 
inculcate within every Muslim the need to search for justice and to apply it to himself as 
well as to others. Justice in Shari'ah is totally impartial. Every Muslim has been 
commanded to stand firm for justice though it may be detrimental to his own interests or 
to the interests of those who are near and dear to him. 210 
Shari'ah guarantees justice, protection and promotion of human rights in such a way 
that peasant and prince, rich and poor, weak and strong, ruler and subject are treated 
equally before law. No one is allowed to transgress the rights of others. In his last 
sermon, termed to be the first charter of human rights, the Holy Prophet emphasised that 
all human beings are equal no one has precedence over the other except through his 
degree of piety. Life, honour, property and all other legal rights of every one are 
inviolable for others. All the weak are to be protected against oppression of the 
strong. 211 This is a comprehensive quotation proving equal and non-discriminatory 
attitude of Shari 'ah towards human beings. No individual or group of individuals will 
suffer any disability on account of birth, social status, gender, or profession that may in 
any way impede the growth of his faculties or hamper the development of his 
personality. Pride of colour, race, and language is wholly condemned. It makes only one 
decisive test about the grandeur, the loftiness, and greatness of human character which 
consists in his capacity to control himself so as to be able to practise righteousness. 212 
An objection may be raised that the norms dealing with the human rights are basically 
moral and religious in their nature. There is no sanction or judicial enforcement behind 
them and these moral and religious recommendations have not been incorporated into 
Islamic legal system. We have already mentioned that under Shari 'ah religion, morality 
and law are inter knitted and it is not possible to separate them. The Holy Qur'an is not 
a code of law rather it is a scripture covering the eternal guidance. It is more particularly 
an appeal to faith and the human soul rather than a classification of legal prescriptions. 
Legal provisions have been promulgated only in a few cases and the rest of the things, 
209 AI-Qur'an 4: 58 
210 Al- Qur'an 4: 135 
211 AI-Shaibani, Ibn Dabih, Hadiq Al-Anivar (Maktbah bani Hashim al Katbi, Syria) Vol. It, p. 718. 
Shibly, Noamani, Seerat al-Nabi (4t1' ed. National Book Foundation, Pakistan, 1985) Vol. It, p. 158. 
Abu Daoud, Salman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. V, p. 340. 
Ibn Saad, Al-Tabqat al-Kubra (Dar Sader, Beirut) Vol. II, p. 185. 
Ibn Hisham, Abu Muhammad Abdul Malik, Al-Seerah a! -Nabvia (Dar Al-Jeel, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 185. 
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describing merely the principles, have been left to the discretion of the ruler. The rulers 
are bound to legislate in the light of these principles and if they fail to make laws in 
conformity with these injunctions they shall be liable in the Hereafter. 
The discussion above suggests that human rights declared by the international 
organisations and adopted by the modem states in the 20th century are guaranteed by the 
provisions of Shari'ah from its early days. The rights guaranteed are compatible with 
many of the rights enunciated by the contemporary international human rights 
instruments. 213 These rights are granted by God, not by any parliament, and therefore 
can never be abolished or changed by any temporal authority for any reason. 
Conclusion 
Comparing the provisions of both the systems it becomes clear that Shari'ah has a 
rational approach to deal with the crimes in a society. It has laid down such rules and 
principles of criminal liability fifteen hundred years ago which, the most civilised 
nations of the world introduced to their legal systems just a century ago. Shari'ah 
emphasises that magnitude of punishment to be inflicted on the convicted must be 
proportional to his guilt. A diversity of punishments, available in Shari 'ah, for various 
offences ranging from different kinds of Hudood to Tazir seems very natural from the 
view point of the objectives of punishment. 
A structural difference between Shari'ah and the English law may be that under 
Shari'ah offences are classified on the basis of punishment, like offences of Hudood, 
Qisas and Tazir, whereas in English law the classification is based upon the harm 
caused, like offences against person and property. 214 There exist clear definitions of 
offences and their prescribed punishments in Shari 'ah. This characteristic is compatible 
with the modem criminal statutes that define offences and stipulate punishments. 
The principles of criminal liability enunciated by Shari'ah and the strategy adopted by it 
to eradicate crime from a Muslim society are comparable to any legal system of the 
world. The research refutes the suggestion of orientalists that there does not exist penal 
system of Islam nor there is a well developed concept of guilt and criminal liability. 215 
Shari'ah has precedence in adopting very effective punitive and preventive measures, 
212 Ahmad, Khurshid, Islam: Its Meaning and Message (Islamic Council of Europe, London, 1976) p. 89. 213 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 1982, op. cit. p. 5. 
214 Lippman, Mathew, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure (Praeger, London, 1988) p. 38. 215 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 187. 
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based upon sound principles, which the English legal system is in lack of. In the 
beginning there was no concept of intention or mes rea in English criminal law and this 
approach resulted in the liability of inanimate objects, animals and human beings 
without proof of any blameworthy state of mind. 216 On the other hand, in Shari 'ah the 
requirement of state of mind had been developed and settled since its early days. The 
idea that Shari'ah being primitive cannot cope with the present day needs must be 
discarded. The world today tormented by social problems, unrest, delinquency, disorder, 
anarchy, perversions, corruption, disintegration of the family as a social unit, violence, 
uncontrolled and abundant use of intoxicants, needs a legal system to relieve it of all its 
worries, and the facts suggest that the principles of Shari 'ah may provide the relief 
sought. 
The next chapter deals with the concepts of defences to criminal liability and their basis 
in both the legal systems. 
216 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law (The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1963) p. 10. 
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Chapter-5 Defences to Criminal Liability 
5.1 Introduction 
It is a general principle of criminal law that a person should not be held liable unless the 
prosecution has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that he has caused, with a specific 
state of mind, certain event forbidden by the criminal law. ' A defendant may offer 
several types of defences to the prosecution's allegations and the criminal law must 
unequivocally guarantee the protection of right of the accused or the suspect to claim 
defence. In certain cases, he may straightforwardly deny all or some of the facts alleged 
by the prosecution, like the plea of alibi. 2 There may be instances where the defendant, 
instead of denying the accusation, alleges that though he is responsible for the conduct, 
there were certain special circumstances which excuse him from liability or render his 
conduct justified. When the abnormal conditions of the person who does the act are 
such that all the elements of crime which constitute liability are not present then, of 
course, criminal liability does not arise. 3 Studying defences is very important because 
criminal liability is not exclusively based upon the nature of the act done rather it needs 
the consideration of all the circumstances leading to the commission of such an act. 4 
This chapter has been devoted to deal with the defences that may be invoked by a 
defendant when charged with any offence. The study shall be based on the questions 
like why the defences are important in criminal proceeding. How do they affect the 
liability of the offender? How the justificatory and the excusatory conduct of the 
defendant can be differentiated? Finally it shall be analysed whether Shari'ah 
recognises the concept of defences in criminal liability and whether the concept is 
compatible with modern principles of criminal justice. 
5.2 Rationale of Defences 
Is it appropriate to punish a person if he did not intend to commit a crime because either 
he lacked the capacity to know' the nature and consequences of his act or the capacity to 
conform to the law? Punishment always needs justification, since it is almost always 
something that is harmful, painful, and unpleasant to the recipient. 5 There is no 
justification for punishing someone who has not deliberately and wrongfully broken a 
1 Fletcher, George P. "Two Kinds of Legal Rules" 77 (1968) Yale LJ 880 at 883. 
2 Fitzgerald, P. J., Criminal law and Punishment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) p. 119. 
Markby, William, Sir, Elements of Law: Considered with Reference to Principles of General 
Jurisprudence (6`h ed., Oxford at the Clarendon Press London, 1905) p. 346. 
a Robinson, Paul H., "Criminal Law Defences: A systematic Analysis" 82 (1982) Columb. LR. 199 at 250. 
5 Cavadino, M. & Dignan, J., The Penal System: An Introduction (2°d ed., Sage Publications, 1997) p. 32. 
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law and thereby exercised a freedom to which he was not entitled. 6 On the basis of this 
principle execution of punishment would be justified only by showing that it serves the 
aims of rehabilitation, deterrence or retribution. 7 
Criminal law enunciates the general principles of criminal liability and everyone is 
subject to these principles except those who have been exempted by the law itself. 8 
Criminal liability depends upon the presence or absence of certain excusing or justifying 
conditions. 9 It means, though proving that the accused brought about the actus reus of 
an offence with the required mens rea is necessary for the criminal liability, yet not a 
sufficient condition for conviction. It may be concluded that a crime is made up of three 
elements, actus reus, mens rea, and the absence of a valid defence. 1° An accused shall 
be liable only where the prosecution has successfully proved that his actus reus was 
accompanied by the relevant mens rea and he is not entitled to any defence. ' 1 
All legal systems show their respect for the principle that no one should be punished if 
he could not have done otherwise, either due to his incapacity or absence of a fair 
opportunity to act otherwise. 12 An unlawful act accompanied by a vicious will is 
necessary to constitute a crime. 13 It is nothing else but a determination of one's choice 
to do or to abstain from a particular action. All the pleas and excuses that can be taken 
to protect the accused from punishment may be reduced to a single consideration, the 
want or defect of will. An involuntary act, where the will does not concur with it, cannot 
induce criminal liability; rather a choice to do or avoid an act is the only criterion that 
renders human actions praiseworthy or culpable. 14 It might be said that all the offences 
presuppose a voluntary choice to do evil or good, and where there is no such choice 
there is no appropriate ground for criminality. In order to determine the culpability or 
innocence of an accused the court shall take into account three things, the act, the will, 
and the capacity to form that will. 
`' Ibid. p. 53. 
7 Fletcher, George P., 1968, op. cit. p. 888. 
8 Blackstone, Commentaries on the law of England (15t1i ed., A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol., IV, p. 20. 
9 Mousourakis, George, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses (Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998) p. 5. 
Wells, Celia, "Swatting the Subjectivist Bug" [ 1982] Crim. LR. 209 at 210. 
10 Lanham, David, "Larsonneur Revisited" [ 1976] Crim. LR. 276. 
William Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory (Longman, London, New York, 1998) p. 206 
Williams, Glanville, "Criminal Law: Statutory Exceptions to Liability and Burden of Proof' 26 (1976) 
NLJ. 1032 at 1033. 
12 Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) p. 153. 
13 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol., IV, p. 21. 
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It is the duty of the prosecution to prove every essential element of crime. In order to 
prove that it was the result of the voluntary conduct of the offender, it can be presumed 
that every man has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for his conduct. Is The 
defence is entitled to displace this presumption by suitable evidence which may lead to 
the contrary, but it is not the duty of the defence to establish its innocence. It is 
sufficient for the accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, and he will be 
entitled to the benefit of the doubt. 16 If the defence has reasonably established that the 
case falls under anyone of the exceptions, the accused shall not be criminally liable or 
his liability shall be mitigated. 17 
5.3 Why are Defences Needed? 
A person should only be held criminally liable when he has the capacity to understand 
the nature of his act and its consequences along with the capacity to control them. It is 
the irrefutable presumption of law that a minor under the age of ten years is incapable of 
committing any offence. 18 There are certain other conditions that, if present, prevent the 
execution of punishment on the accused. These conditions operate to deny the 
defendant's capacity to conform to the rules of criminal law and to prove that he is 
unable to make a rational choice as to how he would like to act. In the absence of such 
capacity and rational choice, punishment is not only unfair but also unjust. It is as 
inappropriate as to make animals the subject of criminal prosecution. Moreover, the 
objects of criminal law cannot be achieved by inflicting punishment in such 
circumstances. 
As another example of defence to a criminal charge we can take into account the 
instance of defence of self-defence. The state must provide general protection to all its 
subjects, but it cannot guarantee protection at the very moment when an individual is 
subject to a sudden attack and he requires the protection of law. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to allow an individual who is attacked or threatened with a serious physical 
assault to repel that assault, to preserve his basic right. 
141bid. p. 20. 
S Per Lord Denning in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland [ 196113 All E. R. 523 at 532 16 Woolmington v. D. P. P [1935] AC. 462 at 481. 
"Greenawalt, Kent, "Distinguishing Justification from Excuses" 49 (1986) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 89 at 89. 
18 Children and Young Persons Act 1963, Section 16 (1). It was eight years under section 50 of Children 
and Young Persons Act, 1933. 
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Logic requires that we must differentiate, between the liability of a person who 
deliberately and intentionally violated the rule of law, knowing the evil consequences of 
his conduct, and of a person who driven by necessity, neither craving nor transgressing, 
finds himself in such a condition where he has no other choice but to do the act under 
consideration. To treat equally one who has caused harm intentionally and the other 
who has done it without deliberation is to ignore a morally significant distinction 
between them. 19 For example, if a fire broke out in a jail, the prisoners, without any 
intention to break the jail, escape from the jail to save their lives. 20 They ought not to be 
held criminally liable because their act can be justified under the circumstances. Only 
those offenders who violate the command of law voluntarily, and without any good 
reason are liable to punishment. 
Reason also demands that we must draw a broad line of distinction between the persons 
who deliberately cause harm and those causing unavoidably and accidentally. A person 
has not committed a crime if he could not have restrained himself or if it is unreasonable 
to expect him to behave otherwise than he did. Intentional and unintentional behaviour 
are so different in moral quality and in the reaction which they cause in the victim and 
in the society that all the systems of civilized criminal laws are bound to take account of 
this distinction while determining the liability of the offenders. 21 Edmund Plowden 
suggested that if the law is broken without intention to break it, under the circumstances 
beyond the control of the offender, he should not be held liable. 22 
No right thinking person in society would expect a mentally handicapped, retarded, 
deranged, or insane, immature, sleep-walking or acting in self-defence, to suffer 
punishment for any act or omission. Such persons and their states of mind when they 
did a prohibited act are not blameworthy. Hence our need for defences to deal with such 
situations where the evil consequences flow from the unintentional, uncontrolled, 
justified or excused conduct of the accused. 
5.4 Defence Defined 
All civilized societies admit that there are certain conditions under which an accused 
may have violated the words of law, but yet not the law itself. Generally a defence may 
19 Fletcher, George P., 1968, op. cit. p. 890. 
20 Bacon, Francis, Sir, Elements of Law of England (J. More Esq., London, 1636) p. 25. 
21 Smith, J. C., "Intention in Criminal Law" 27 (1974) CLP 93 at 93. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963) p. 7. 
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be termed as evidence offered by the accused to defeat criminal charge against him or it 
is any set of identifiable conditions or circumstances which may prevent a conviction 
for an offence. 23 Such conditions, if existing, exempt the accused from punishment 
prescribed by the law. A defence may be taken as a fact, which defeats the case of the 
prosecution altogether, hence leading to the acquittal of the defendant, or diminishes his 
liability even in the presence of all the elements of a crime. 24 For any particular fact to 
be a defence it has to have some potential to defend the accused against allegations 
made by the prosecution. 25 
English criminal law recognized a difference between deliberate intention and accident 
or mistake of the offender at the time of commission of the act and later on certain 
incapacities like infancy, insanity, coercion and self-defence became the grounds of 
exculpation. 26 This is because the moral standards of a society require exemption of 
some offenders from criminal liability under certain circumstances. It is a peculiar 
feature of criminal law that it is concerned not only with the punishments but also with 
highlighting and reinforcing societal values and moral basis for exemption from 
criminal liability. 27 
Nowadays, a number of such conditions, termed as defences, are recognized by criminal 
law that may prevent a conviction for an offence, like immaturity, insanity, coercion, 
self-defence, necessity and mistake. These conditions may be pleaded during a trial for 
a crime; there are certain other conditions that may even bar the trial or prosecution of 
the defendant for the crime committed, like diplomatic, judicial, legislative and 
executive immunities. 28 
5.5 Kinds of Defences 
Defences to criminal liability may be either general or special. General defences may be 
raised for all crimes whereas, special defences have been provided for certain specific 
offences and cannot be applied to the others e. g. provocation is a defence to the offence 
of murder only. 29 Paul Robinson has divided defences into five kinds i. e. failure of 
22 Plowden, Edmund, Reports of Edmund Plowden. (Catharine Lintot, & Samuel Richardson, 1761) p. 19. 
23 Robinson, Paul H., 1982, op. cit. p. 203. 
24 Dressler, Joshua, Understanding Criminal Law (Mathew Bender/IRWIN, U. S. A., 1995) p. 182. 
25 Dennis, 1. H., Criminal Law and Justice (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987) p. 82. 
26 Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law (2"a ed., Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1960) p. 79. 
27 Mousourakis, George, 1998, op. cit. p. 13. 
28 Robinson, Paul H., Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing Co. St Paul, Minn., 1984) Vol. 1, p. 55. 
29 Fitzpatrick, B. & Reed, A., "Provocation: A Controlled Response" 12 (2000) Transnational Lawyer 393. 
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proof defences; where prosecution failed to prove all the required elements of a crime to 
the required standard, offences modification defences; the defences that are embodied in 
the definitions of specific crimes, non-exculpatory or public policy defences, like time 
bar and diplomatic immunity, which do not deal with the question of culpability of the 
offender but there are certain other reasons for not convicting him, excuse defences; 
where due to some lack of comprehension, capacity or opportunity the defendant failed 
to conform to the law, and justification defences; where some harm has been caused by 
the defendant but in order to protect a more general social interest. 30 
If we carefully analyse the nature of failure of proof defences, offence modification 
defences, and non-exculpatory defences it shall be evident that all of them belong to 
excuse defences. By putting forward any of these defences the defendant claims that he 
is not morally blameworthy; lack of moral guilt is the basic unifying feature of all these 
defences. 31 For example, intoxication and insanity are termed as failure of proof 
defences, because the accused due to intoxication or abnormal mental condition was not 
in a position to form criminal intent, so the basic element of all the crimes i. e. mens rea 
is missing. Both the defences are also termed as excuse defences because the mental 
condition excuses the defendant of his criminal liability. It is also admitted that failure 
of proof defence often overlaps with offence modifications and general defences. 32 
Similarly, one defence may have multiple characteristics and hence can be classified 
under more than one category. There is no need to discuss these kinds of defences, 
rather the general defences of justification and excuse shall be given due importance to 
clarify the idea of defences in criminal law. All these defences can be broadly classified 
into two kinds: 33 
a. Justification defences. 
b. Excuse defences. 
Hart, H. L. A., Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment in Feinberg, Joel, Gross, Hyman, 
Philosophy of Law (ed) (Wadsworth, publishing, 1991) p. 662. 30 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 70. 
31 Brett, Peter, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1963) p. 145. 
32 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 72 
33 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (81h ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) p. 193. 
Jefferson, Michael, Criminal Law (3`d ed., Pitman Publishing, London, 1997) p. 209. 
Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., Criminal Law: Text & Materials (3`d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1994) p. 272. 
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5.5.1 Justification Defences 
A defence is justified whenever it denies the objective wrongfulness of the act. 34 
Normally, those who raise justification defence contend that though their conduct fulfils 
material requirements of an offence yet it is socially approved and perhaps even 
desirable. 35 When the protection of a legitimate interest, from an imminent danger, is 
possible only by sacrificing another interest, approval by the society of the sacrifice of 
the interest of substantial lesser value gives rise to justification. 36 
Criminal law sets minimum standards of acceptable conduct for its subjects, instead of 
promoting ideal behaviour. 37 Justification should not require morally best conduct from 
them; instead justified conduct is a conduct that is lawful by appropriate standard. 38 
Where a defence operates as a justification the wrongfulness of the accused's conduct is 
negated as his conduct is considered to have been the appropriate course of action in the 
circumstances in which he found himself. 39 It is important that where any person raises 
a justification defence, he admits himself that he is accused of something but he was 
justified in doing that act. 
5.5.1.1 Nature of Justification Defences 
Justification defences are not an alteration of the statutory definition of the harm sought 
to be prevented or punished as an offence. 40 A justification defence can be pleaded only, 
where some form of conduct meets the external requirements of an offence. 41 The harm 
caused remains a legally recognised harm to be avoided whenever possible; however 
this harm is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or further greater 
social interest. 42 The defence will not be justified if there is an alternative reasonable 
means for avoiding the threatened harm even if the harm avoided is the greater 
interest. 43 When a conduct is declared as justified, implicitly it means that the principle 
of justifying such conduct will promote social utility. 44 To be justified, the conduct of 
the defendant must satisfy two conditions: 
34 Ibid. p. 273. 
35 Williams, Glanville, "The Theory of Excuses" [ 1982] Crim. LR. 732 at 735. 36 Gur-Arye, Miriam, "Should the Criminal Law Distinguish between Necessity as a Justification and 
Necessity as an Excuse? " 102 [1986] LQR 71 at 71. 
37 Schopp, Robert F., Justification Defences & Just Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 4. 38 Funk, T. Markus, "Justifying Justifications" (1999) 19 OJLS 631 at 633. 39 Schopp, Robert F., 1998, op. cit. p. 3. 
40 Robinson, Paul H., 1982, op. cit. p. 213. 
41 Mousourakis, George, 1998, op. cit. p. 8. 
42 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 83. 
43 Fletcher, George P., Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co, Boston, Toronto, 1978) p. 755. 44 Alldridge, Peter, "The Coherence of Defence" [1983] Crim. L. R. 665 at 666. 
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a. The conduct must be necessary to protect or further the interest at stake, and 
b. It must cause only proportional or reasonable harm responding to the threat. 
The defendant's conduct is justified when it is determined that he had an affirmative 
right to protect a socially recognized interest threatened by the assailant. 45 Private 
defence, discharge of public duty, consent, executing judgements of the courts, lesser 
evil and superior's orders are some of the instances that can be pleaded as justification 
defences. 46 In each of these cases there is some harm caused by the defendant but there 
is also a countervailing reason for his conduct. 47 
5.5.2 Excuse Defences 
Like justification defences, excuses are usually general in their nature and hence 
applicable to all the offences. 48 A defence is an excuse when a wrongful, unjustified act 
has been committed but because of the excusing circumstances, the wrong doer is not to 
be blamed for it. 49 Unlike justification, excuse does not affect the unlawfulness of the 
act; rather it removes the personal blameworthiness of the accused. 50 Excuses admit that 
the conduct is wrong and unlawful but the defendant is excused because the conditions 
of liability are not fulfilled. 51 The harm caused is not outweighed by any greater societal 
interest furthered. The society will continue to denounce and seek to prevent such 
conduct even under objective conditions identical to the case under consideration. 52 The 
defendant's excuse for causing the harm does not relate to the nature of act, rather to the 
excusing condition and the peculiar characteristics of the accused. 53 
5.5.2.1 Characteristics of Excuse Defences 
An excuse defence must have two characteristics. 54 Firstly, a disability or the abnormal 
condition of the offender at the time of commission of the offence, like insanity, 
immaturity, duress, mistake or intoxication. 55 It may be long term or even permanent 
such as sub-normality or temporary such as intoxication, automatism or hypnotism. Its 
causes may be internal, as insanity or external as duress. The disability distinguishes the 
defendant from other people and reduces the instances in which given condition will 
'5 Clarkson, C. M. V., Understanding Criminal Law (2°a ed., Fontana Press, 1995) p. 73. 
46 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 769. 
4' Dennis, 1. H., 1987, op. cit. p. 77. 
48 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 91. 
49 Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., 1994, op. cit. p. 277. 
Moore, M., Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 482. 
50 Eser, Albin, "Justification and Excuse" 24 [1976] AJCL 621 at 635. 
S1 Robinson, Paul. H., 1982, op. cit. p. 221. 
52 Clarkson, C. M. V., 1995, op. cit. p. 74. 
53 /bid. 
54 Robinson, Paul. H., 1982, op. cit. p. 221. 
55 Clarkson, C. M. V., 1995, op. cit. p. 85; Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 209 
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excuse. 56 However, it should be kept in mind that all excuse defences do not always 
have disability element, like mistake is an excuse defence but without a disability. 
Secondly, excusing condition i. e. effect of disability to create a condition that renders 
the defendant blameless for his conduct. Having the recognized disability at the time of 
the commission of the offence will not alone qualify for an excuse, for it is not the 
disability which exculpates the defendant; rather excusing condition resulted from 
disability. For example, a defendant is not excused because he is insane or intoxicated, 
but because the effect of these instances is to create a condition that renders the 
defendant. blameless for his conduct constituting the offence. There were no reasons in 
favour of his doing what he did but because of some lack of comprehension, capacity or 
opportunity he failed to conform to the law and his conduct, though wrong, is not 
blameworthy. 57 In this way an excuse destroys the blame and bars the conviction 
because the voluntary act requirement necessary for the offences is not satisfied. An 
excuse is a denial of an essential element of crime like mens rea, knowledge or will. It 
suggests that a defence would be termed as excuse when it amounts to a denial of the 
proscribed state of mind or negligence or it affirms that the defendant was not fully free 
and responsible so as to be fairly held accountable. 
5.5.2.2 Nature of Excuse Defences 
Where a defence operates as an excuse, the culpability of the accused is negated and he 
is excused from the normal consequences of conviction and punishment. It is the nature 
of excuse that the accused's conduct is out of his control or a result of his defective 
perception or knowledge. 58 A person may be blamed for behaving in a certain way 
where either he was aware of his behaviour or he ought to have been aware. 59 Offenders 
suffering from a mental disorder or immaturity are not capable of knowing right from 
wrong. They cannot be blamed for being insane or immature; hence it is not reasonable 
to punish them. 60 The importance of the excuse defences is derived from the 
fundamental principle that for criminal responsibility there must be moral culpability 
which would not exist where the excusing conditions are present. 
56 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, Vol., I, p. 98. 
57 Dennis, 1. H., 1987, op. cit. p. 77. 
58 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 160. 59 Brett, Peter, 1963, op. cit. p. 147. 
60 Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H 
. M., 1994, op. cit. p. 277. 
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Excuses are the circumstances where it is useless to punish the offender. Generally, the 
exemption of the offenders is justified on the ground that they cannot bring themselves 
within the scope of exemption and hence not in a position to exploit it. 61 Moreover, the 
exemption will not harm the society by reducing the efficacy of the law's threats for 
others. The provisions, specifically related to the liability of an intoxicated person, are 
debatable and will be discussed while dealing with the defence of intoxication. 
5.6 Justification and Excuse Defences Distinguished 
Justification and excuse are two distinct traditional defences providing a defence when 
all the elements of an offence have been proved. However, it is said that in the modern 
legal system such distinction is of no legal importance and in both the cases it shall be 
considered whether some required element in the definition of crime was lacking. 
62 
They are erroneous and misleading when applied as notions of substantive penal 
policy 63 and the distinction between them involves no legal consequences. 
64 The 
statements simply refer to the fact that so far as the criminal liability of a particular 
defendant is concerned, it made no difference whether he was justified in what he did or 
excused. 65 Though both of them render crimes into non-crimes yet for fundamentally 
different reasons, and criminal liability of the accused is excluded on different 
grounds. 66 Even those who termed them erroneous admit that the distinction is pertinent 
and useful in procedure and may be convenient to be employed in substantive law. 
67 
Conceptually, justification and excuse serve quite different functions. The distinction 
between them is important because it serves to point out some of the most interesting 
and difficult issues, which arise from the conceptual framework of criminal law doctrine. 
Historically such distinction was recognised by English law, in the cases of justified 
homicide the defendant was completely acquitted, whereas if the offender was excused, 
he was acquitted but had to forfeit his possession to the crown. The law of forfeiture 
was abolished in 1828 and since then the distinction has lost its importance. 
68 
61 Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970) p. 42. 
62 Ibid. p. 13. 
63 Hall, Jerome, 1960, op. cit. p. 233. 
64 Stephen, J. Fitzjames, Sir, A History of the Criminal Law of England (Macmillan, 1883) Vol. III, p. 11. 
65 Hall, Jerome, "Comment on Justification and Excuse" 24 [1976] AJCL 638. 
Lacey, N., & Wells, C., Criminal Law Text & Materials (2°`' ed., Butterworths, London, 1998) p. 50. 
66 Excuse defences focus on culpability of an accused while justification defences focus on justification of 
the act itself. 
67 Hall, Jerome, 1960, op. cit. p. 233. 
68 For detail see 10.4. 
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The circumstances leading to an excuse may be altogether different from those of 
justification. 69 Excuse is an expression for one who has been caught in a maelstrom of 
circumstances, whereas a plea of justification is based upon the law's preference for one 
course of action rather than the other. 70 Excuse prevents the satisfaction of basic 
elements of a crime, whereas justification though admits the presence of the basic 
elements yet denies the liability on independent grounds. 71 Excuses are based on 
compassionate grounds, for anyone in the defendant's shoes might have done likewise. 
Hence the insanity and immaturity defences depend on the feeling of compassion and 
not on consideration of deterrence. 72 Allowing a defence of excuse is not to approve the 
conduct of the accused but only to declare that it does not merit condemnation and 
punishment. 
The behaviour of society may be different towards the victims of excused and justified 
actions. It should feel sympathy for the victim of excused but not for the justified 
actions. " The distinction is also important for the moral judgement of the conduct of the 
offender. 74 A minor who deliberately kills someone is excused but no one would say he 
is justified. 75 A defendant of an excused action has a moral claim for forgiveness from 
the victim but a justified defendant would seem to have no need for forgiveness. 7G When 
the question of justification is clearly distinguishable from excuse, defence of 
justification has a natural priority over excuse because, if the harm caused is justified, 
there remains nothing to be excused . 
77It is pertinent to mention that the concepts of 
justification and excuse are not immutable; these concepts, unavoidably, keep on 
changing in a society with the change in social- order and values. The details to follow 
will reveal the importance of the distinction; however the law commission of England 
and Wales has not adopted the proposal to include the distinction in the codification of 
criminal law. 78 Both these kinds of defences can be distinguished on certain grounds like: 
69 Allen, Michael J., Cases & Materials on Criminal Law (8th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001) p. 284. 7° Ibid. 
71 Greenawalt, Kent, 1986, op. cit. p. 89 
72 Williams, Glanville, 1982, op. cit. p. 733. 73 Horowitz, Donald L. "Justification and Excuse in the Programme of the Criminal Law" 49 (1986) Law 
and Contemporary Problems 109 at 122. 
74 Greenawalt, Kent, "The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse" 84 (1984) Columb LR 1897at 1898. 75 Smith, J. C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (10th ed., Butterworths, 2002) p. 36. 76 Horowitz, Donald L. "Justification and Excuse" 49 Law and Contemporary Problems (1986)109 at 122. 77 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 105. 
78 The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law, Law Com. No. 143,1985 (HMSO, London, 
1985) Para. 13.1, p. 114. 
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1. Justification involves the claim that the action of the defendant was not wrong 
but was an acceptable or even the right thing to do. 79 On the other hand, excuse 
involves the claim that although the action of the defendant was wrong, but no 
blame attaches to him because of some excusing condition. 80 
When an action is justified, any prima facie wrongfulness is eliminated by the 
other good attributes of the action; on the other hand when an action is excused it 
is still wrongful but the accused cannot be held responsible, for he is not 
culpable. As law does not punish people for committing harmless acts, it does 
not punish them for blamelessly causing harm because one who is not 
blameworthy ought not to receive the stigma of conviction. Thus an excuse 
operates as a shield to protect the accused from conviction and punishment. 
2. The distinction is important to third parties aiding or abetting the accused. 81 If an 
act is justified, a third party may assist the principal accused in accomplishing it, 
whereas in an excused act a third party will generally not be privileged to 
assist. 82 If the principal offender is acquitted by reason of justification, there is 
no offence to aid or abet but if the principal offender is acquitted by reason of 
excuse, the abettor shall be liable. 83 The Principle has been affirmed in a number 
of cases. 84 It can be summarized that generally, justified acts may be aided and 
not prevented, whereas excused acts may be prevented but not aided. 
3. A plea of justification, such as self-defence, goes to the aclus reus in the sense 
that it renders the conduct of the accused lawful. 85 For instance, everyone has a 
right to defend, so anything done in legitimate, genuine and reasonable self- 
defence does not constitute a crime. Excuses on the other hand, go to the mens 
rea. 8b The defendant is either incapable of forming intention, like a minor or 
79 Clarkson, C. M. V., 1995, op. cit. p. 73. 
80 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 209. 
81 Moor, M., 1997, op. cit. p. 482. 
Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 210. 
Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., 1994, op. cit. p. 280. 
Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 33, p. 194. 
George Fletcher P., 1978, op. cit. p. 760. 
82 Clarkson, C. M. V., 1995, op. cit. p. 73. 
83 Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (6`h ed., Oxford University press, 2001) p. 169. 
84 R. v. Bourne (1952)36 Cr. App. R. 125; DPP. vK&B[ 1971 ]1 Cr. App. R. 36; R. v. Cogan[1975] 2 
All ER 1059; R. v. Millward (1994) 158 J. P. 1091; DPP v. K&C [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 36. 
as Clarkson, C. M. V., 1995, op. cit. p. 73. 
86 Lacey, N., & Wells. C., 1998, op. cit. p. 50. 
Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 760. 
Robinson, Paul. H., 1982, op. cit. p. 246. 
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insane, or to understand the rationale of his conduct because of a reasonable 
mistake. 87 It means justification arises out of the nature of the accused's 
situation, whereas excuse arises out of the accused's personal characteristics. 88 
4. Justification defences are complete defences to any criminal charge because one 
cannot be partially justified in committing a crime; therefore, if one kills in the 
legitimate exercise of one's right of private defence one should be acquitted and 
not convicted of manslaughter. 89 However, in an excuse defence generally one 
may be excused from culpability for some offences but not for others, for 
example, provocation reduces the liability of murder to manslaughter but does 
not result in complete exemption from criminal liability. 90 
5. The benefit of a justification defence outweighs the harm or evil caused by the 
offence committed and renders the conduct acceptable; whereas an excuse 
defence represents a legal conclusion that the conduct is wrong, undesirable, but 
criminal liability is inappropriate. 91 In certain jurisdictions, if the defence was 
regarded as excusatory, a person harmed would have a strong claim for 
compensation, in contrast to a justification where the victim's claim for 
compensation would be significantly weaker. 92 
6. A justification defence entitles others to act similarly in the like circumstances 
because they too will be justified. Whereas, an excuse defence cannot be 
generalised in this way but it is said to be a matter of individual justice to a 
particular actor. 93 It does not allow or encourage other people to behave 
similarly in the similar situation. It shows that while deciding whether the 
conduct of the offender is justified or excused generally we take into account the 
consequences of that conduct. If the consequences of the conduct are beneficial 
for the society the conduct is justified while in case of adverse effect, though the 
accused is acquitted, it is termed as excused. 
87 Hall, Jerome, 1960, op. cit. p. 232. 
88 Greenawalt, K., 1984, op. cit. p. 1899. 
89 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 211. 
90 Clarkson, C. M. V., 1995, op. cit. p. 73. 
91 Robinson, Paul. H., 1982, op. cit. p. 203. 
Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 760 and also at Columb. L. R 82 (1982) 199 at 229. 
92 Mousourakis, George, 1998, op. cit. p. 14. 
Horowitz, Donald L., 1986, op. cit. p. 122. 
93 Moor, M., 1997, op. cit. p. 482. 
Johnson, Conrad D., Moral Legislation: A Legal Political Model for Indirect Consequenlialist 
Reasoning (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1991) p. 95. 
Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., 1994, op. cit. pp. 280-81. 
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7. An excusable conduct may lawfully be resisted by the victim but he has no right 
to resist if it is justified. 94 For example, right of self-defence is available against 
the acts of a minor or insane, but there is no such right against a person 
executing arrest in the exercise of his lawful power in discharge of his duty. 95 it 
is because the unlawful aggression of the assailant violates the legal order, 
which is maintained in public interest allowing resistance by the victim. 96 
8. Another distinction may be that the accused has a justification defence only 
when he is aware of the facts, which give rise to the justification, 97 whereas in an 
excuse defence the accused is relieved of criminal liability even though he did 
not know the facts giving rise to the excuse. 
There is an opinion in English criminal law that the circumstances giving rise to excuse 
do not excuse unless the defendant is aware of them. Whereas, in a justification defence 
he is relieved of criminal liability even though he did not know the facts which give rise 
to justification. 98 This view is incorrect in the light of section 28 (3) of Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which makes an arrest lawful only if the arrestee is 
informed of the grounds of arrest; this is not possible unless the person making an arrest 
knows or at least suspects the existence of valid grounds for arrest. 99 
This particular point can be better understood by taking into account the case of R. v. 
Dadson, 100 a police constable was charged for shooting at a person carrying stolen wood. 
Under the law it was permissible for a police officer to shoot an escaping felon. At the 
trial the constable sought to raise justification that he was shooting to arrest an escaping 
felon. Stealing wood was only a felony where the thief had two previous convictions of 
the same offence. In fact, the victim had several such convictions and was a felon but 
the constable did not know this. The court held the constable liable for causing grievous 
bodily harm with intention, as he was not justified in shooting because the victim 
committed no felony known to him at the time when he fired. 
94 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 760. 
Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 210. 
Smith, J. C., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1989) p. 19. 
95 R. v. Fennell [ 1971 ]1 QB. 428. 
96 Gur-Arye, Miriam, 1986, op. cit. p. 82. 
97 Schopp, Robert F., 1998, op. cit. p. 1. 
9" Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. F. N. 74, p. 35. 
Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 211. 
99 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 33, p. 27. 
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The same rule was reaffirmed in the case of Chapman v. D. P. P, 101 pointing out that if a 
police constable is unaware of circumstances justifying an arrest, he cannot make a 
lawful arrest, as he will not be able to comply with the rule which requires that he is 
bound to inform the suspect of the grounds for arrest. Thus, if the arrest is unlawful any 
force used to affect it is likewise unlawful. An accused will be justified in inflicting 
grievous bodily harm or even death, but only if he is aware of the circumstances when 
he does the otherwise prohibited act. It might also be argued that providing a 
justification defence to a defendant, who is unaware of justifying circumstances, would 
be a wasteful gesture. These defences are meant to encourage and induce conduct that 
creates a net benefit and a justification here would not serve to encourage similarly 
situated persons to act in a justified manner in future. Such persons are, after all, 
unaware of the need for justification defence. '°2 
5.6 Defences to Criminal Liability & Shari'ah 
5.6.1 Introduction 
Like all other secular laws, Shari 'ah does recognise certain conditions that extinguish or 
mitigate the liability of the offender. The offenders are responsible only for what they 
do of their free will; they should not be called to account for the acts done 
unintentionally or under duress. An act that would ordinarily constitute a punishable 
offence can be justified or excused under one of the several accepted conditions. It is the 
right of an accused to submit evidence to establish his defence. 
Beside excuse and justification, Shari 'ah classifies defences as pre-existing the 
commission of crimes, like immaturity, insanity, coercion, necessity, self-defence, 
mistake and the defences that originate after the commission of the offence, like waiver 
and compounding in the cases of Qisas and repentance of the offender before arrest, in 
cases of highway robbery. The basic condition for the application of law to the action of 
a person is his legal capacity or competency. No provision of Shari 'ah shall be 
applicable to the actions of one who has either no legal capacity or has a defective one. 
Here is the brief description of legal capacity in Shari 'ah. 
5.6.2 Legal Capacity in Shari'ah 
Shari 'ah has a more developed concept of legal capacity as compared to the other legal 
systems. Taking into account its importance, Muslim jurists have discussed it in detail 
in separate chapters under the title of Ahliyah. By legal capacity or Ahliyah is meant the 
100 R. v. Dadson (1850) 4 Cox. CC 358. (1850) 2 Den.; 169 ER 407. 
101 Chapman v. Director of Public Prosecution (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 190. 
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fitness of a person for the application of law to his actions. 103 In the parlance of 
Shari'ah legal capacity represents the competence of a person for certain rights and 
obligations. It is the quality which makes an individual proper subject of the legal 
command. 104 A person who is devoid of reason and faculty of understanding cannot be 
addressed because one who cannot understand the command cannot obey or comply 
with it. A person will possess full legal responsibility only if he has attained the age of 
majority and is of sound mind. The capacity of a man for legal obligations is realised by 
the intelligence possessed by him, since the intelligence is the basis of understanding. A 
person cannot be competent for understanding without intelligence, like animals and 
inmate objects. It suggests that intelligence proceeds capacity for legal obligations. 
5.6.3 Kinds of Legal Capacity 
As mentioned earlier, legal capacity of a man is realised by the intelligence possessed 
by him. The intelligence undergoes changes from his embryonic stage till his death. 
Legal capacity is vested in every man by virtue of his dignity as a human being and it 
has been divided into two major kinds i. e. Receptive and Active capacity. 105 
5.6.3.1 Receptive Capacity or Capacity for Acquisition 
It is the fitness of a person for the rights to which he is entitled and obligations to which 
he is subject as prescribed by Shari 'ah. 106 Receptive capacity is ability of every 
individual, competent or otherwise, to receive rights from other individuals and society. 
A foetus in the womb of its mother, a minor, an insane, and all other persons possess 
legal receptive capacity by virtue of their dignity as human beings and it is inherited and 
inseparable. 107 Receptive capacity is either deficient or complete. 108 The capacity of a 
foetus in the womb, before birth, is deficient in the sense that it can receive only certain 
rights such as inheritance, parentage, and bequest, but cannot bear any obligation 
towards others, 109 for there is no question of their performance by the foetus. 110 
Shari'ah doctrine entitles an embryo to those rights only which require no 
102 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 15. 
103 Al-Bazdavi, Ali bin Muhammad, Usul Al-Bazdavi (Moor M. Karkhana Kutub, Karachi, 1966) p. 324. 
Amir Badshah, M. Amin, Taysir al-Tahrir (Mataba Mustafa al-Babi, Cairo, 1350 A. H) Vol. II, p. 249. 
Al-Bukhari, Abdul Aziz, Kashaf al-Asrar (Sadaf Publishers, Karachi, Pakistan) Vol. IV, p. 237. 
104 Al-Zarqa, Mustafa Ahmad, Al-Fiqh al-Islamifi Thawbihi al-Jadid (Maktab Jamiah Damascus, 
Damascus, 1963) Vol. 11, p. 739. 
105 Al-Bazdavi, Ali bin Muhammad, 1966, op. cit. p. 296. 
Badran, Abu Al-Ainain, Usul al-Figh al-Islami (Moassasa Shabab al-Jamah, Alexendria, 1984) p. 317. 
Al-Barri, Zakeriya, Usul al-Figh al-Islami (Dar al-Nadha al-Arabia, Cairo, 1979) p. 293. 
106 Al-Taftazani, Al-Talwi/i ala al-Tawdih (Dar al-Ahd al-Jadid Lil Tabah, Cairo, 1957). Vol. 11, p. 161. 
Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 124. 
107 Khallaf, Abdul Wahab, IN Usul al-Figh (8`h ed., Dar Al-Ilm, Kuwait) p. 137 
108 Amir Badshah, M. Amin, 1350 A. H., op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 253. 
109 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 124. 
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acceptance. " The receptive legal capacity is complete at the moment the child is born 
alive from its mother's womb and survives during his whole life; he possesses rights 
and bears obligations also. 112 
After his birth an individual passes through three stages of life. The first stage is prior to 
discretion where he cannot differentiate between good and bad, right and wrong. This 
stage starts from birth and continues till he attains age of seven years. 113 At this stage 
the child is totally lacking active legal capacity. Since he is not endowed with intellect, 
no legal consequences accrue from his words or acts. 114 It is the irrefutable presumption 
of law that at this stage a minor is incapable of committing any offence. However, he is 
entitled for all the rights and liable to only those obligations that can be discharged by 
his guardian on his behalf, like compensation for damages caused to other's property. "" 
5.6.3.2 Active Legal Capacity or Capacity for Execution 
This kind of capacity begins when a child attains the age of seven years. 116 This is the 
second stage of human life after his birth. The period between seven years and puberty 
is termed as the age of discretion. 117 He possesses an immature and defective 
understanding resulting into a deficient, incomplete, and partial legal capacity. At this 
stage he is capable of concluding only those transactions, even without the permission 
of his guardian, that are beneficial to him such as accepting gifts and charity. 118 
However, if the transaction in question is totally disadvantageous, such as giving gift or 
making a will or pronouncing a divorce, it is void despite the guardian's approval. ' 19 As 
far as transactions which partake in both benefit and loss, these are valid but only with 
the approval of the guardian. 120 A minor is not liable for Hudood and Qisas penalties at 
10 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Theories of Islamic Law (I. I. I. T. & I. R. I., Islamabad, 1994) p. 79 
111 Hassan, H. Hamid, An Introduction to the Study of Islamic law (Shari'ah Academy, Islamabad, 1997)p. 349. 
112 Badran, Abu Al-Ainain, 1984, op. cit. p. 319. 
Al-Barri, Zakeriya, 1979, op. cit. p. 293. 
Al-Zokhali, Wahba, Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (1" ed., Dar Al-Fiker, Damascus, 1986) Vol. 1, p. 165. 
Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, 1994, op. cit. p. 76. 
113 Hassan, Ahmad, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (IS` ed., I. R. I. Islamabad, Pakistan, 1993) p. 303. 
114 Al-Barri, Zakeriya, 1979, op. cit. p. 294. 
115 AI-Zokhali, Wahba, Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (IS1 ed., Dar Al-Fiker, Damascus, 1986) Vol. 1, p. 166. 
Badran, Abu Al-Ainain, 1984, op. cit. p. 319. 
116 Hassan, Ahmad, 1993, op. cit. p. 303. 
117 Ibid. p. 302. 
118 Ibid. p. 306. 
119 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. p. 355. 
120 Al-Barri, Zakeriya, 1979, op. cit. p. 294. 
AI-Zokhali, Wahba, 1986, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 167. 
Badran, Abu Al-Ainain, 1984, op. cit. p. 321. 
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this stage; however a suitable Tazir punishment can be inflicted on him; 121 depending 
upon the standard of maturity and understanding attained by him. It is the rebutable 
presumption of fact whether he has attained sufficient maturity to understand the nature 
and consequences of his conduct. 
The third stage is puberty, where the physical signs of maturity become visible, both in 
male and female. Active legal capacity completes upon attaining this stage and is 
presumed to exist unless contrary is proved. Only a person who rationally knows right 
and wrong and understands the nature and consequences of his conduct has this kind of 
capacity. 122 Active legal capacity renders an individual liable to fulfil his duties and 
discharge obligations. ' 23 If it is proved that the intellect of a person did not become 
mature by his coming of age, he will not have the active legal capacity. 124 Since the 
intelligence and discernment are hidden qualities which are not readily apparent to the 
senses of human being, Shari'ah has linked personal liability with the attainment of 
puberty, which is a regular, sensible and an obvious phenomenon that can be established 
by factual evidence. '25 
Shari'ah, generally, does not determine majority by age of the person rather it 
emphasises to determine it by signs of puberty. The signs of puberty in male are 
ejaculation, capacity to impregnate, growth of hair on face and pubic area, whereas in 
female menstruation, physical changes in the body and pregnancy are considered to be 
major signs. ' 26 In the absence of such signs the puberty shall be determined by age that 
is 18 years for male and 17 for female. 127 In another opinion it is 19 years for male. 128 
However, no male shall be presumed to attain puberty before 12 and female before 9 
years. 129 
121 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, 1994, op. cit. p. 79 
122 Al-Zokhali, Wahba, 1986, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 168. 
Badran, Abu Al-Ainain, 1984, op. cit. p. 322. 
123 Al-Barri, Zakeriya, 1979, op. cit. p. 294. 
124 Hassan, H. Hamid, 1997, op. cit. pp. 352-53. 
125 Karnali, M. Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamic Text Society, Cambridge, 1991) p. 351. 
126 Al-Trablisi, Ala ud din Abi al-Hassan Ali bin Khalil, Moin al-Hukkam (2nd ed., Maktab Mustafa al- 
Babi al-Halbi, Egypt, 1973) p. 315. 
Ibn Nujaym, Al-BeherAl-Raiq (Al-Maktaba al-Majidia, Quetta, Pakistan). Vol. VIII, pp. 84-85. 
127 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. VIII, p. 85. 
128 Al-Trablisi, Ala ud din Abi al-Hassan Ali bin Khalil, 1973, op. cit. p. 315. 
129 Ibid p. 315. 
Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. VIII, p. 85. 
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A deep observation of the principle reveals that it is the intellectual power of the 
individual rather than age which determine his legal capacity. That is why an insane 
adult is not held responsible for his criminal conduct. By having complete active legal 
capacity a subject becomes competent to discharge his legal obligations and liable for 
their omission. As the presence of well developed intellect is the basic criterion to 
determine the legal capacity of a subject, hence an undeveloped intellect, in the case of 
a minor and a defective one in the case of an insane, provides defence in cases of 
delinquent behaviour. There are certain circumstances that destroy or impair the legal 
capacity of a man. There is an opinion in English criminal law admitting that "the age at 
which a person becomes competent to commit a crime must necessarily be fixed in an 
arbitrary manner. What constitutes maturity is a question of degree, and age at which it 
is reached differs from person to person and country to country. "130 Taking into account 
the person of the offender puberty is the most appropriate means to determine maturity. 
5.6.4 Causes Affecting Legal Capacity of a Person 
There are causes, which either totally extinguish the capacity or result in deficient legal 
capacity. Muslim jurists have divided such causes into two kinds; natural and acquired 
causes. 131 
5.6.4.1 Natural Causes 
The causes, affecting legal capacity, and beyond the control of the subjects are called 
natural causes. They result from an act of God and the subject cannot avoid them. 
Examples are minority, insanity, idiocy, forgetfulness, sleep, fainting, and illness. 132 
5.6.4.2 Acquired Causes 
These are caused by the man himself and on his choice he can avoid them. These causes 
include intoxication, mistake, coercion, and ignorance, 133 the effect of minority on legal 
capacity has already been discussed. Out of the remaining, some of the important causes 
and their effect on capacity, criminal liability, of subject are discussed below. 
5.6.5 Natural and Acquired Causes: How do they affect Legal Capacity? 
As discussed earlier, in Shari'ah, criminal liability of an offender entirely depends upon 
volition and discretion. Any act done by mistake or without deliberate intention does not 
give rise to criminal liability. In the Holy Qur'an it has been ordained, "And there is no 
130 Stephen, J. F, Sir, A History of the Criminal Law of England (B. Franklin, N. York, 1973) Vol. 11, p. 97. 131 AI-Bazdavi, All bin Muhammad, 1966, op. cit. p. 329. 
Amir Badshah, M. Amin, 1350 A. H., op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 258. 
AI-Bukhari, Abdul Aziz, op. cit. F. N. 102. Vol. IV, p. 263. 
132 Ibid. 
Hassan, Ahmad, 1993, op. cit. p. 309. 
Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, 1994, op. cit. pp. 91&97. 133 Ibid. 
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sin for you in mistakes that you make unintentionally, but what your hearts purpose 
(that will be a sin for you). "134 The verse states that the accountability of a person rests 
upon the commission of acts which are intended by him. There is a tradition of the Holy 
Prophet negating the criminal liability of a person who does an act by mistake, 
forgetfulness or under coercion. 135 The similar provisions can be found in the 
contemporary secular laws either negating or mitigating the liability arising out of 
mistake and duress. 
Another tradition states, "Liability has been lifted from three persons, a minor, unless he 
attains puberty, an insane, unless he recovers, and a sleeping person unless he 
awakes. " 136 These three conditions are universally accepted as valid defences to a 
criminal charge. The only point of difference is the age of a minor, which may be 
different in different jurisdictions. The tradition proves that no act can be called a crime 
if at the time of the commission the accused was suffering from mental derangement or 
a morbid impulse of really irresistible type that caused the loss of the mental or 
emotional equilibrium. 
Criminal liability is based upon the deliberate intention and rational understanding of 
the criminal act as well as its consequences. A prohibited act done under dire necessity 
is exempted from criminal liability. It has been commanded in the Holy Qur'an, 
"Whosoever is driven by necessity, neither craving nor transgressing, it is no sin for 
him. " 137 There is a legal maxim in Shari'ah which states that necessity renders 
prohibited permissible. 138 If the act was done under dire necessity without an intention 
to transgress the doer shall not be liable. The maxim is governed by another principle 
that the person should not go beyond the limits of necessity. 139 If he exceeds the limits 
he shall be liable to the extent he exceeded. 
134 Al-Qur'an 33: 5 
135 lbn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, Sunan ibn Majah, (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. 1, p. 659. 
136 Ibid. p. 658. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, Al-Ja, neh al Saih (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 32. 
Al-Zokhali, Wahba, 198 6, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 163. 
137 Al-Qur'an 2: 173 
138 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Na=air (Idara Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi). Vol. I, p. 86. 
AI-Suyuti, A1-Ashbah Wa Al-Na=air (Dar al Kutub al Ilmia, Beirut, 1979) p. 84. 139 Ibid. 
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The Hanfrte consider unreasonable delay in prosecution of Hudood offences as a 
defence to the criminal charge. 140 The provision is analogous to the limitation laws in 
secular jurisdictions which bar the conviction of the offender after a specific period of 
time because delayed prosecutions are less useful and these types of defences have been 
named as non-exculpatory defences. 141 The study suggests that Shari 'ah acknowledges 
all the defences available to the accused under modern statutes. If there is any doubt 
regarding the intention of the offender or there exist any legitimate condition that 
renders the offender incapable of forming intention required for the offence, the 
offender's liability shall be either extinguished or mitigated. 
5.6.6 Some Defences not Acknowledged by other Legal Systems 
Shari'ah provides certain defences which are not offered by the secular laws. Blood 
relations may be considered as a defence to a number of charges. Like, if a father has 
killed his son he shall not be liable for Qisas, according to the majority opinion of the 
Muslim jurists. 142 The principle is based upon the tradition of the Holy Prophet which 
states, "A father should not be executed in Qisas for the death of his son. "143 This view 
is based upon the fact that the father is the cause for the existence of the son; logically it 
is not reasonable that the son should be a cause for the non-existence of his father. '44 
Another argument may be that the natural love and affection between a father and son 
eradicate the possibility that the father has intended death of his son. 145 Where death 
was not intended the killing was not liable to Qisas. However, Malkite opined that 
where it was proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the father actually intended death 
of his son he shall be liable to Qisas, like the cases of cruel and brutish killing or 
slaughtering. 146 The exception also extends to the grandfather and mother of the victim. 
Likewise, Hadd punishment for theft 147 and false accusation of unlawful sexual 
140 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 27. 
lbn Abdeen, Muhammad Ameen, Hashia /bn Abdeen (Dar Al Fiker, Beirut). Vol. IV, p. 37. 
Al-Sarakhsi, AI-Mabsut (Idara Al-Qur'an Wal Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi) Vol. IX, p. 69. 
141 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol., 1, p. 102. 
142 Al-Jassas, Abi Bakar Ahmad bin All Al-Razi, Ahkam Al-Qur'an (Dar al-Mushaf, Cairo) Vol. 1, p. 178 
Al-Kasani, Al-Badai wa Al-Sanai (H. M. Saeed Co. Karachi, Pakistan, 1979) Vol. VII, p. 235. 
Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin Ali, AI-Mohazzib (Matbah Isa Al-Babi Al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. 11, p. 174. 
lbn Qadama, AI-Mughni (Maktaba Al-Mustafa Albabi al Halbi, Egypt) Vol. VII, p. 667. 
141 Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 18. 
144 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VII, p. 666. 
Al-Khatib, Al-/gnah (Dar Al-Marfa Litabbah wa Al-Nasher, Beirut, 1979). Vol. II, p. 155. 
145 Al-Toori, Takmila Al-Beher Al-Raiq (Maktaba Majidia, Quetta) Vol. VIII, p. 296. 
146 Al-Qartabi, Al-Jamah Li Ahkam-al-Qur'an (Dar Al-Kutab-al-Arabia, Cairo) Vol. Ii, p. 250. 
Malik Bin Ans, Al-Mudawana Al-Kubra (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 484. 
147 AI-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 68. 
Al-Dasooqi, Hashiat Al Dasooqi (Dar al Ahya Al-Kutab al-Arabia, Egypt) Vol. IV, p. 337. 
lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 275. 
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intercourse 149 shall not be implemented upon the father. The above opinions regarding 
the Hadd punishment for theft are based upon the saying of the Holy Prophet, "You and 
your property are for your father. " 149 Whereas, the opinion in the case of false 
accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse is based upon the analogy of punishment of 
Qisas; the father is not liable to Qisas being the right of man, the Hadd of false 
accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse is not implemented on him. 
Matrimonial relations also provide a defence to the charge of theft against either of the 
spouses. It is because the property of husband and wife is considered to be their 
common property. A saying of the Holy Prophet reveals that if the wife living in the 
matrimonial arrangements takes the property of her husband, without his consent or 
knowledge, she shall not be liable for theft. 150 A similar provision existed there in 
English law that a wife shall not be liable for theft by stealing her husband's goods 
because a husband and wife were considered as one person in law. 151 Repentance, 
before arrest, in cases of highway robbery, and waiver of the victim of the theft, to 
prosecute the offender, before an application for prosecution are some more instances 
that have not been provided by other legal systems. Similarly, pardon and amicable 
settlement between the parties, in offences of murder and bodily injuries is allowed. 
There are certain other conditions that provide an effective shield against any criminal 
charge. For example, Shari'ah demands a very high standard of proof for each element 
of the offence for the infliction of Hadd punishment. Four male witnesses are required 
to prove the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse liable to Hadd. These witnesses 
must have observed the act of penetration themselves. 152 The condition shows that it is 
almost impossible to prove the offence by evidence. In addition, there are certain 
conditions in the person of witnesses to be met before deciding the admissibility of their 
deposition. 153 The proof of the offence of Hudood has been made difficult as compared 
14' Al-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. p. 92 
149 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 769. 
'SO Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, Saih al-Bukhari (Cagri Yayinlari, Turky, 1981) Vol. VI, p. 193. (It 
is narrated that wife of Abu Sufyan came to the Holy Prophet and made a complaint about the 
stinginess of her husband that, despite his affluence, he did not give adequate maintenance to meet the 
needs of herself and her child and she stole from his property. The Holy Prophet permitted her to take 
that much which was sufficient to meet her appropriate requirements. ) 
'51 Russell, W. O. Sir, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours (Butterworth, London, 1819) Vol. 1, p. 26. 
152 lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 199. 
Al-Rammali, Nihayat a! Muhtaj (Al-Maktaba al Islamia) Vol. VII, p. 430. 
153 Al-Trablisi, Ala ud din Abi al-Hassan Ali bin Khalil, 1973, op. cit. p. 243. 
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to the other matters. High demands are made of the witnesses as regards their number, 
qualification, and contents of their statements. '54 
Except the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse two male Muslim witnesses of high 
repute must testify to all the particulars of an offence. The witnesses must not be the 
near relatives of the victim nor must be the foe of the accused and their testimony must 
not conflict. 155 A voluntary confession made by the offender may be retracted at any 
time. The court will provide every opportunity of retraction to the offender. It is even 
recommended that the judge should suggest to the offender the possibility of 
retraction. 
156 A retraction of the confession voids the probative value of the proof 
required for the infliction of Hadd 
5.6.7 Effect of these Defences on Criminal Liability 
It should be noted here that most of the conditions mentioned above have a mitigating 
impact on the criminal liability of the offender157 For example, the primary punishment 
for murder is Qisas; whereas, if the death was caused by mistake, either mistake of act 
or mistake of fact, the primary punishment shall be blood money (Diyat), similarly, a 
homicide committed by a minor or insane shall be treated alike. This seems to be a point 
where the criminal and tortious liability coincide. Here, though the offender is not liable 
criminally, yet to pay reasonable compensation to the family of the victim from his 
property will not harm him. It appears that in many cases of excuse the society may 
exercise its right to protect itself from further harmful but excused conduct of the 
offender by imposing civil liability. This may be helpful in controlling counterfeited 
claims for defences based upon certain kinds of disabilities. 
A particular feature of Shari'ah is that it does not emphasise the infliction of 
punishments, especially the Hudood. The most important means of restricting Hadd 
punishment are their peculiar definitions, standard of proof and the role of doubt, which 
means and includes here the resemblance of an unlawful act done to another lawful one 
and, therefore, the possibility of its being done under the belief of its being lawful. 158 
For instance, intercourse in a voidable marriage, which the husband might have 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, pp. 198-200 
isa lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 199. 
Al-Rammali, op. cit. F. N. 151. Vol. VII, p. 430. 
iss lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. Vlll, p. 196. 
156 Ibid. 212. 
157 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, Al-Tashrih al-Jinai al-Islami (Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. I, p. 404. 
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considered valid; or during the waiting period (iddat) following the definite dissolution 
of marriage, which the husband might have thought similar to the waiting period after a 
revocable repudiation are the instances that provide a shield against criminal liability. 159 
Similarly, if there is a difference of opinion among the Muslim jurists, regarding the 
permissibility or otherwise of an act, that also leads to a doubt sufficient to prevent the 
infliction of Hadd punishment. 160 
The instance of restricting the implementation of Hadd punishment for theft shall make 
it clear how the infliction of these punishments has been restricted to the rare instances. 
It is not every theft that could incur the punishment of amputation; Muslim jurists have 
set up very rigid rules defining the particular kind of theft liable to amputation. Failure 
to meet any of these rules may lead to a doubt sufficient to prevent the execution of 
Hadd. Beside adulthood, sanity, competency, and intention to take away the property of 
others'61 there are number of other requirements to be fulfilled. For example, the 
commission of theft from public treasury shall not be liable to Hadd because it is the 
theft from common property and the offender may have thought of his share therein. '62 
Applying the same principle of doubt of common property a theft by a son from the 
property of his father, a father from the property of his son, a beneficiary from the trust 
property, and a wife from the property of her husband shall not be liable to Hadd. 163 
Another essential element of theft liable to Hadd is that the property must be in 
protective custody or place of safe-keeping (Hirz) at the time of theft. 164 The Hirz may 
be either by virtue of place or person, like where the property was kept in a safe place or 
a guard was appointed over it. 165 If the property stolen was not in Hirz, the offender 
shall not be liable for the Hadd notwithstanding its value. Generally Shari'ah maintains 
a rule that things subject matter of theft were taken from their place of ordinary 
safekeeping; like goods from a shop, personal possession from a house, jewellery from 
15' Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 176. 
159 Al-Sarakhsi, op. cit. F. N. 139. pp. 88-89. 
160 Mehdi, Al-Syyed Sadiq, Al-Agoobat al-Shari'ah (Al-zahra Lil I'lam al-Arabi, Cairo, 1987) p. 54. 
161 Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin All, Al-Mohazzib (Dar-Al-Shamia, Beirut, 1996) Vol. V, p. 418. 
162 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 55. 
Ibn Qadama, Al-Mughni (151 ed., Dar-Al-Hadith, Cairo, 1996) Vol. X1, p. 386. 
Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin All, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 160. Vol. V, p. 436. 
163 lbn Qadama, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 161. Vol. XII, pp. 382-87. 
Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin Ali, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 160. Vol. V, p. 438. 
1G° lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 248. 
AI-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin All, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 160. Vol. V, p. 422. 
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a safe, and an animal from a fold, a horse from a stable. 166 A theft committed by a guest 
in the house of his host shall not be liable to Hadd punishment because the permission 
of the host to enter the Hirz removed an element of theft i. e. plundering the sanctity of 
the private property. 167 A theft committed by a servant from the house of his master is 
covered under the same principle. 168 A reason for this may be that there has been some 
degree of negligence on the part of the employer or the owner to employ or allow such 
an untrustworthy person into Hirz. 
Prescribed amount of stolen property (Nisab) 169 is another essential condition to impose 
Hadd for theft. If value of the stolen property, in one attempt, is less than Nisab the 
offender shall not be liable for Hadd. 170 If two thieves break into a house and take the 
property jointly, the stolen property will be equally divided between them and neither of 
them will be punished with amputation if the respective share of each is less than the 
required minimum of Nisab. 171 
Items available in abundance, in wild state, and having no owner, like wood and hay, 
un-harvested fruit, objects normally not subject to ownership, like fish and birds, 
perishable substances, like meat, eggs and food stuff, religious icons and texts, property 
deemed to be of no value in Shari 'ah, like wine and musical instruments used for idle 
amusement, things subject to common ownership like water and salt, in all these cases 
the offender shall not be liable to Hadd. 172 Surreptitious taking of property is another 
essential element; taking property openly by force may be treated as robbery, 
punishable by Tazir. 173 Similarly, other offences against property such as,. criminal 
breach of trust or criminal misappropriation of property are liable to Tazir only. 174 
165 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 50. 
166 lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 249. 
167 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 50. 
Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin Ali, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 160. Vol. V, p. 433. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 254. 
168 lbn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 57. 
169 Nisab is the minimum value of stolen goods for implementation of Hadd punishment. Unless the value 
of stolen goods equals or exceeds this minimum value, the Hadd punishment shall not be applied. (In 
Pakistan under Hudood Ordinance 1979, the amount has been fixed as 4.457 gms of gold or property of 
equivalent value)AI-Sherazi, Ibrahim Bin Ali, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 160. Vol. V, p. 420 
170 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 141. Vol. VIII, p. 242. 
11 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 53. 
72 Ibid. & Ibn Qadama, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 161. Vol. XII, p. 380. 
Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 180. 
173 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 179. 
174 Lippman, Matthew, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure (Praeger, New York, 1988) p. 46. 
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Shari'ah emphasises avoiding infliction of Hudood to the maximum. A saying of the 
Holy Prophet states, "Avoid infliction of Hudood upon Muslims to the maximum extent, 
verily it is better for the judge to commit a mistake in acquittal rather than in punishing 
the accused. " 175 The tradition enunciates the golden principle of criminal laws of all the 
civilised societies, that if there is any doubt in the mind of the judge regarding the 
criminality of the accused, its benefit must go to the accused. The English criminal law 
admits the rule that it is better to acquit five guilty men before conviction of an 
innocent. 176 As already mentioned that the principle of doubt also includes the doubt in 
the mind of the offender as to permissibility or otherwise of the act, its scope is wider 
than the scope of doubt in man-made laws. The conditions, mentioned above for the 
offence of theft, in all their manifestations prove the implementation of the saying of the 
Holy Prophet that the Hadd punishment should be avoided if at all possible, and strong 
tendency in Shari'ah to restrict the applicability of Hadd punishments to the maximum. 
Though the punishments in Shari 'ah are severe and exemplary yet the tough conditions 
of proof and presence of all the elements required in the crime itself place a limit on the 
instances of their infliction. Any reasonable doubt will lead to the suspension of Hadd 
and thereby a secondary punishment shall be applicable. Such conditions provide the 
accused with various shields against any unjust or arbitrary conviction, minimise the 
possibility of infliction of severe punishments and on the other hand ensure an efficient 
prosecution and conviction of the guilty. Hence, a fair balance between the interests of 
the accused and the society is achieved. "' 
Conclusion 
It has been suggested that Shari'ah punishments are inflicted as a last resort. Shari'ah 
seeks to prevent the commission of crimes by means of internal control of a firm belief 
in the Day of Judgement and the life hereafter along with certain external preventive 
measures; both these means give rise to an effective barrier against crimes. 178 In 
addition, severe punishments are provided for a wrongdoer who does not take into 
account the preventive measures and is not restricted by the fear of God. These 
punishments provide an effective general deterrence for all those having criminal 
intentions and tendencies. 
Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 125. Vol. V, p. 50. 
"S Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 33. 
17G Fletcher, George P., 1968, op. cit. p. 881. 
177 Lippman, Matthew, 1988, op. cit. p. 63. 
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The concept of liability is based upon the capacity of the offender; rational and reliable 
means of determining legal capacity have been provided in Shari'ah. There is a well 
developed concept of defences available to an offender and a number of additional 
conditions, not recognised by English law, also exist that mitigate or extinguish the 
liability. An accused has been provided with various safeguards to minimise the 
possibility of unjust or arbitrary conviction. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution 
and any doubt is to be resolved in favour of the accused. All the mitigating and 
extenuating elements have been given due importance. The study discards the view of 
the orientalists that Shari'ah does not recognise defences and mitigating conditions in 
criminal proceedings. ' 79 
The next chapter will focus on intoxication, its prevalence in English society and its 
effects on human beings. 
18 Ibid. p. 86. 
179 Schacht, Joseph, 1964, op. cit. p. 187. 
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Part-II 
Chapter 6 Intoxication and English Society 
6.1 Introduction 
Alcohol is the oldest and the most widely used intoxicant in human history., Man has 
been familiar to its use from very early period of recorded history. 2 Over-indulgence of 
men in alcoholic beverages and the resulting criminal behaviour have existed from time 
immemorial. Centuries of experience prove that a great deal of crime is committed by 
intoxicated persons. 3 
Determination of criminal liability of an intoxicated offender and rationale of defence of 
intoxication is one of the major aims of this part. In order to understand this, it is 
necessary to have knowledge of intoxication and its effects on human beings. This 
. chapter will 
deal with a number of questions; inter alia, the meaning of intoxication, 
differentiation in English law between intoxication by alcohol vis-a-vis drugs, possible 
harmful effects of intoxication on the individual and society and seriousness of the 
problem of intoxication among the young. The chapter will also examine the steps taken 
by various English governments to control consumption of alcohol and resulting harm. 
It will also inquire the fundamental question as if there is any relationship between 
intoxication and crime. The answers to these questions would be provided in the light of 
the opinions of men of profession and the reports published by the Home Office. The 
chapter will also demonstrate the reactive nature of English criminal law. 
6.2 Intoxication Defined 
Intoxication may be defined as a condition, where by use of intoxicants a person loses 
normal use of his physical or mental faculties. It renders him incapable of acting in a 
manner an ordinary prudent man, in full possession of his faculties using reasonable 
care, would act under similar conditions. 4 The condition is attributed to use of some 
substance, such as alcohol or drugs, which leads to impairment of the person's 
awareness, understanding or control. 5 Intoxication has also been linked with temporary 
insanity that lasts till the person remains under the influence of the intoxicant. 
6 However, 
New Report of a Social Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Alcohol: Our Favourite Drug 
(Tavistock Publication Ltd., London, 1986) p. 11. 
2 Hastings, James, Selbie, John A. & Gray, Louis H., Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (T &T Clark, 
Edinburgh, 1908) Vol. 1. p. 299. 
3 McCord, David, "The English and American History of Voluntary Intoxication" (1990) 11 JILL 372 
Black, Henry Campbell, Black's Law Dictionary (6` cd., West Publishing Co., 1990) p. 822. 
5 Law Commission Report, Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law 
Com. No. 229,1995) Para 1.1, p. 1 
6 Burrows, Ronald, Words &Phrases Judicially Defined (Butterworths, London, 1996) Vol. 111, p. 146. 
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logically the linkage is not reasonable because intoxication is self-induced condition for 
which an intoxicated person can be blamed whereas insanity is by the act of God and an 
insane person cannot be blamed for it. 7 
6.3 Is there any Difference between Alcohol and Drugs Consumption in 
English Law? 
Intoxication may be caused by consumption of alcohol, drugs or any other substance or 
by the combination of these. Though alcohol is generally distinguished from drugs yet 
scientifically it is a drug. 8 Being a chemical substance it possesses all the characteristics 
of a drug to effect human mind and bodily systems. 
9 In English law, use of alcohol is 
permissible in contrast to the drugs but so far as the general principles of liability of the 
intoxicated offender are concerned, there is no difference between the two. 
10 This 
principle is really very strange because as a matter of law there is an enormous 
difference between alcohol and other drugs. Although the law regulates, where, when, 
by whom, and to whom alcohol ' may be sold, yet generally its sale, possession or 
consumption is no offence. 11 On the other hand it is unlawful to import, export, 
manufacture, sell, possess or distribute dangerous drugs, their extracts and all other 
derivatives. 12 
If both, intoxication by alcohol and dangerous drugs, were to be dealt similarly it makes 
no sense, at all, for all the legislation on the issue to control misuse of drugs. A person 
intoxicated by lawful means (alcohol) and the other who has committed an offence in 
bringing about that condition (use of dangerous drugs) cannot be logically treated on the 
same grounds. This view also contradicts the recognised principle in all jurisdictions 
that no one should be allowed to privilege one crime by another. 13 It will be quite 
reasonable to deal with intoxication by drugs differently from one by alcohol. 
' Jefferson, Michael, Criminal Law (3rd ed., Pitman Publishing London, 1997) p. 255. 
8 Williams, Glanville, Textbook of Criminal Law (2"`' cd., Stevens & Sons, London, 1983) p. 464. 
9 Royal Commission on Licensing (England & Wales) Cmd. 3988 (HMSO, London, 1932) Para. 67. 
Rasool G. Hussein (ed) Substance Use and Misuse: Nature, Context and Clinical Interventions 
(Blackwell Science Ltd., London, 1998) p. 13. 
10 Section 6 (6) of Public Order Act 1986 provides: "In subsection (5) Intoxication means any intoxication 
whether caused by drink, drugs or other means or by a combination of means. " 
11 Licensing Act 1872. 
12 Dangerous Drugs Act 1920. 
13 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (15t1i ed. A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. IV, p. 25. 
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6.4 Use of Alcohol and the English Society 
Consumption of alcoholic beverages has a long history in the British Isles. 
'4 Its use was 
'considered not only a crime, rather a national master curse in England and Wales up to 
the first quarter of the 19t1i century and all the miseries of the peoples and the nation 
were ascribed to it. IS Now the situation is different, concepts regarding its use have been 
changed and, like other Western societies, alcohol has been incorporated in to the fabric 
of everyday life of the British people. 16 It is an integral part of the most joyous and the 
most distressing of human occasions. 17 In addition, it also has an essential role in many 
religious ceremonies. 18 Alcohol has a multiple role in Western societies; it is a stimulant, 
a celebrant, an anaesthetic, a medicine, a tranquilliser, a food, a fuel, a social lubricant 
and a status and religious symbol. 19 Research shows that its consumption, in UK, is now 
nearly double what it was fifty years ago. 20 
If we take into account age groups using alcohol, its consumption is more common 
among the young. Children are born into a world where alcohol is seen as both a 
pleasure and danger. 21 Studies show that young drinkers usually have parents who 
drink. 22 They look upon their parents and elders as role models, count the cost for the 
future the least, and for most young people the feeling of belonging to the adult world 
and experiencing the pleasurable effects of alcohol far outweighs concerns for health. 
23 
They see glamorous advertisements, specifically designed to attract the young, 
24 
conveying a positive message. 25 All these factors increase the temptation for use of 
alcohol among teenagers. 
14 Alcohol and the Public Health: A Study by a Working Party of the Faculty of Public Health Medicine 
of the Royal Colleges of Physicians on the Prevention of Harm Related to the use of Alcohol and other 
Drugs (Macmillan, London, 1991)p. I 1 
15 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, History of England in the 19x' Century (Longman, Green, 1913) Vol. 11, p. 97. 
16 Alcohol and the Young , Report of a 
Joint Working Party of the Royal Colleges of Physicians and the 
British Paediatric Association, (The Royal College of Physicians, 1995) p. 23. 
Hartz, Catherine, Alcohol and Health (The Medical Council on Alcoholism, London, 1990) p. 5. 
17 Alcohol and the Young, 1995, op. cit. p. 1. 
18 Saunders, W. M., "Alcohol Use in Britain: How Much is Too Much" 43 (1984) Health Edu. J. 66. 
'9 Ibid; Anderson, Peter, & Wallace, Paul, Alcohol Problems (Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 1 
20 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 2. 
21 Alcohol and the Young, 1995, op. cit. p. 1. 
22 British Medical Association, Young People and Alcohol (British Medical Association, 1986) p. 13. 
23 Alcohol and the Young, 1995, op. cit. p. 1. 
24 Royal Commission on Licensing (England & Wales) Cmd. 3988,1932, op. cit. Para. 732. 
25 American Academy of Paediatrics, Alcohol Advertising: Fiction vs. Fact 
(http: //www. aap. ori, -/advocacy) 
2002. 
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Surveys show that, by the age of 15 and 16,98% of teenagers have tasted alcohol and 
from adults less than 5% are abstainers. 26 At 13 years of age 80% boys and 73% of girls 
have tasted alcohol. By 15 years 91% of boys and 90% of girls have consumed it. The 
average consumption of 13 and 15 year old boys is 8 and 15 units respectively27 while 
the average consumption of girls in the same age group is 6 and 9 units per week. 28 This 
shows that males drink more than females and younger drink more than adults. 29 A 
survey shows that among teenagers (11-15 years old) 6% boys and 5% girls are 
believed to be drinking beyond recommended limits30 and same is the case with 27% 
men and 12% women. 31 The increasing trend of using alcohol and drugs among the 
young has resulted in 'a remarkable increase in rate of crimes in society. More than one 
third of house hold burglaries, theft and property crime are attributed to the young 
addicted to alcohol and drugs. 32 . 
6.5 Effects of Intoxication on Human Conduct 
Alcohol consumption has no uniform behavioural effects. 33 They vary from person to 
person and are also dependent upon the quantity, quality and element of alcohol 
concentration of the intoxicated substance consumed. 34 Individual consumers vary 
greatly in the manners they behave after intoxication. Some become sleepy and 
exhausted, others become joyous and cheery, still others become quarrelsome and 
aggressive. 35 In English society, release aggressiveness, inclinations to sexual demands, 
dominant behaviour, unruly and noisy conduct, petty thefts and criminal damages are all 
seen as part of drunkenness. 36 At this stage, it seems appropriate to take into account the 
opinions of some expert jurists and psychiatrists, regarding the effects of intoxication on 
human conduct, as they experienced and observed them. The knowledge of such effects 
is important to understand the principal social and legal issues involved in the problem. 
26 I lartz, Catherine, 1990, op. cit. p. 5. 
27 (One unit =one half pint of beer, or one pub measure of spirit, or a one standard glass of table wine= 10 
millilitres of pure alcohol). 
28 Hartz, Catherine, 1990, op. cit. p. 30. 
29 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. pp. 18-19. 
30 Alcohol and the Young, 1995, op. cit. p. 30. {(The current recommended safe limit for adults is 21 units 
per week for men and 14 units for women) Whent, Hilary & Sayeres, Mary, Health Update: Alcohol 
(Health Education Authority, 1997) p. 7) 
3' National Statistics, Statistics on Alcohol: England: 1978 Onwards (http: //www. statistics. goy. uk) 
Statistical Bulletin 2001/13 July 2001. 
Pirmohamed, M., Brown C. "The Burden of Alcohol Misuse on an Inner City General Hospital" 93 
(2000) QJM 291. 
32 Law Com. No. 229,1995, op. cit. Para 1.2, p. 1 
33 Weiner, N. Alen, & Wolfgang, Marvin E., Pathways to Criminal Violence (Sage Publications, 1989) p. 50. 
34 Royal Commission on Licensing (England &Wales) Cmd. 3988,1932, op. cit. Para. 65. 
35 Brett, Peter, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1963) p. 195. 
36 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 34. 
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6.5.1 Jurist's View 
It is well known that intoxicants weaken the restraint, which normally governs a 
person's conduct; an intoxicated person tends to say or do things that he would never 
say or do when sober. 37 He can develop a double personality, the sober self is forgotten 
when he is intoxicated and his intoxicated self is forgotten when sober though some 
time partly and not completely. 38 In fact, intoxication causes a number of conditions like 
aggressiveness, loosing inhibition and self-control, physical reaction and co-ordination, 
impairing reasoning and ability to foresee consequences, awareness and judgement, 
altered perception which may lead to inadvertence, oversight, and automatism providing 
opportunities for offensive conduct that would not otherwise occur. 39 
It can be said that consumption of alcohol leads to uncivilised behaviour because of the 
malfunctioning of brain, the control unit of the body. Intoxicated person is incapable of 
knowing the nature of his conduct and the consequences that might follow such conduct. 
He has altered perceptions leading to inadvertence or mistake. Most probably his 
conduct will be harmful and offensive. 
6.5.2 Psychiatrist's View 
In human history, alcohol has never been considered useful for man. In the early history 
of civilised man it was considered a poison, in the 16`h and the 17th century all the social 
problems were attributed to it and in the present century it is believed to stimulate 
obsession, depression, intense fear, epilepsy, a state of unconsciousness, morbid 
impulsiveness and mental deterioration . 
40 It is, therefore, clear that alcohol stimulates 
negatively and is essentially a narcotic. 4'Alcohol loosens all the higher inhibitory 
factors, allows the repressed instinctive ones to come into play so that man becomes 
primitive in his out look and habits. 42 The drunk loses self-control and self-direction, his 
37 Smith, J. C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (8`4 ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) p. 225. 
38 Devon, James, The Criminal and the Community (John Lane the Bodley Head, London, 1912) p. 53. 
39 Gough, Stephen, "Intoxication and Criminal Liability: The Law Commission's Proposed Reforms" 112 
(1996) LQR 335 at p. 338.. 
Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (14`h ed., Butterworths, London, 1998) p. 603. 
Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 464. 
Allen, Michael J., Textbook on criminal Law (4`h ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., 1997) p. 138. 
Smith, J. C., 1999, op. cit. p. 144. 
Murphy, Daniel, Alcohol and Crime (Home Office Research Bulletin No. 15,1983) p. 8. 
Ashworth, A. J., "Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability" 91 (1975) LQR. 102 at 113. 
40 0' Connor, William A., Psychiatry, a Short Treatise (Joh Wright & Son, Bristol, 1948) p. 281. 
4' Reason, Will, Drink and the Community (Student Christian Movement, London, 1922) p. 31. 
42 Henderson, D. K., Psychopathic States (W. W. Norton & Co., INC. New York, Reprint, 1947) p. 60. 
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ideas are confused, the reasoning power disturbed, he sinks into a heavy sleep from 
which he cannot be roused; in short there are all symptoms of narcotic poisoning. 43 
Alcoholism causes not only massive scale mental and physical diseases, it also has a 
humiliating effect on the social niveau of the intoxicated due to spending of undue 
proportion of their income on drunkenness. 44 Drinking brings misery and degradation 
on many either through their own indulgence or that of those on whom they depend. If it 
does not cause poverty, it often leads to its aggravation. 45 Excessive drinking may 
reduce social competence making it difficult to maintain employment, family life and 
increasing the risk of drifting into crime. Alternatively, a life of crime and participation 
in a criminal subculture may encourage excessive drinking. 46 Alcoholism represents 
both the escape of weak, unstable and ambitious men from predictable defeat and their 
result against the demand of society. 47 
The opinions suggest that an intoxicated person takes himself, or tries to take, out of the 
domain of the community feeling, evades logic, reason and the feeling for truth, strives 
for a goal different from the usual and realistic one. The use of alcohol brings about a 
deviation from the accepted standard of normal behaviour; it is the cause for certain 
physical, mental and, probably financial, problems. Self-respect becomes impaired, 
selfishness, neglecting family, loosening self-control, want of truthfulness, loss of 
memory, irritability, lowering of mental tone and moral deterioration become 
characteristics of personality. 48 The ill effects of alcohol are not limited to the drunkard 
only but he entails mental disease on his children also. 49 Various effects of alcohol on 
human behaviour have been mentioned above but it should be remembered that all these 
phenomena vary according to the quantity of intoxicant consumed, its strength, the time 
occupied in consumption and the resisting power of the person consuming. 50 
43 Russell, A. G., Drinking and Disease (S. W. Partridge & Co., London, 1868) p. 10. 
Hastings, James, Selbie, John A. & Gray, Louis H., 1908, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 300. 
44 Mayer, G. W., Slater, E., & Roth, M., Clinical Psychiatry (Cassell & Co., London, 1960) p. 343. 
45 Devon, James, 1912, op. cit. p. 52. 
46 Murphy, Daniel, 1983, op. cit. p. 8. 
47 Adler, Alfred, The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology (Translated by, P. Radin. ) (Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, Reprint, 1946) pp. 55-56. 
48 Ibid. p. 300. 
49 Russell, A. G., 1868, op. cit. p. 5. 
50 Hastings, James, Selbie, John A. & Gray, Louis H., 1908, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 300. 
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6.6 Alcohol and Human Health 
The study of alcohol's effects on human health is very important because it is the state's 
duty to protect health of its subjects and for this purpose to fix the approved standards 
for production and sale of edibles. A failure in this regard may result into deterioration 
of health of its subjects. The Food Safety Act 1990 declares that it is an offence to 
render any food injurious to health with intent to sell it for human consumption. Both, 
the person who rendered the food injurious and one who sells, are criminally liable. 
51 If 
it is proved that alcohol is injurious to human health then logically it is not reasonable to 
allow its production and sale. 
Alcohol consumption is associated with a variety of physical disorders and a number of 
diseases are caused by its constant use. The list of diseases which can be caused by 
alcohol is long and cover virtually every medical speciality including cancer and 
stroke. 52 Alcohol when taken into the system, and repeated from time to time, has a 
tendency to produce particular forms of disease in nervous system, alimentary canal, 
liver, kidney and disorder of nutrition. 
53 Use of strong spirits produces frequently 
extravasations of blood, and inflammation of the lining membrane of the stomach, 
laying the foundation of future disease. 54 Heavy alcohol consumption sometimes brings 
adolescence. 55 The story does not end here, alcohol can and does affect fertility and 
increases the risk of spontaneous abortion. It can harm the foetus, which is most liable 
to be damaged in the very early stages of pregnancy. 
56 It may increase the likelihood of 
engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse and sexual relations with a large number of 
partners affecting immune system and, therefore, augments the risk of AIDS. 
57 Alcohol 
use causes cirrhosis, cancer of mouth, oesophagus, pharynx, larynx and breast cancer in 
women. 58 
51 The Food Safety Act 1990, Sec. 7 & 8. 
52 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 24. 
53 Russell, A. G., 1868, op. cit. p. 8. 
5' Ibid. p. 9. 
55 Alcohol and the Young, 1995, op. cit. p. 1. 
Royal Commission on Licensing (England & Wales) Cmd. 3988,1932, op. cit. Para. 69. 
56 Alcohol and the Young, 1995, op. cit. p. 2. 
57 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 33 {Surveys show that 20% men and 16% women admit 
to have unprotected sex after being drunk. (Alcohol Concern, Alcohol and Teenage pregnancy 
(http: //www. alcoholconcern. org. uk) 2002. ) 
58 Thun, Michael J., Peto, R., "Alcohol Consumption & Mortality among Middle-aged & Elderly U. S. 
Adults" The New England Journal of Medicine (1997)337(24)(http: //content. neim. ore/ciyi)2002. p. 1705 
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Heavy drinkers have long been recognised to have an increased risk of dying 
prematurely. 59 The main causes of increased mortality among the intoxicated are suicide, 
accidents, and alcohol related diseases. 60 It has been noted that a large number of those 
attending casualty departments with accidental injuries were drunk . 
61 Alcohol can kill 
and among adults can cause very significant ill health and unhappiness, sometime 
destroying careers and wrecking family life. 62 In UK, use of alcohol causes over 40,000 
deaths per annum from over consumption; it is second to tobacco use as the cause of 
premature deaths. 63 The fact is established by abundance of evidence direct and indirect 
and instantaneous effects. There are a number of cases in which, after an excessive dose 
of a mixture containing a high percentage of alcohol, men have died. 64 
The study suggests that alcohol causes from stimulant effects up to intoxication, coma, 
and death, it has every immediate variety of effects upon the brain, up to confirmed 
insanity showing that it acts as a poison which destroys protoplasm. 65 It is estimated that 
15 to 20 percent insanity is caused through drink and this percentage has shown an 
increasing trend. 66 Men of relevant professions have established that it is a major cause 
of all the physical and mental diseases. However, some medical research suggests that a 
moderate consumption of alcohol reduces the risk of heart disease in people 40 or older 
and lowers the risk of diabetes. 67 On the other hand a slightly immoderate drinking may 
markedly increases the risk of heart disease. 68 Moderate alcohol consumption may also 
help in stress reduction, diminution in risk of coronary artery disease, increases appetite 
especially in the elderly69 but the scale of moderate drinking must be customized by 
taking into account age, gender and medical history of the drinker. 70 Despite of this it 
(The same source reveals that mortality from breast cancer is 30% higher among women reporting at 
least one drink daily than among non drinkers. ) 
59 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 27. 
60 Ibid. 
Ibid. p. 34. (It has been estimated that in 2002,6% of road accidents involved illegal alcohol level 
resulting in a total of 20,140 deaths. (Department of Health, Statistics on Alcohol: England, 2003 
(http: //wivw. statistics. eov. uk) 2004) 
62 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. pp. 68-69. 
63 Cooper, David B. (Editor) Alcohol Use (Radcliff Medical Press, Abingdon, 2000) p. 217. 
64 Russell, A. G., 1868, op. cit. p. 5. 
65 Hastings, James, Selbie, John A. & Gray, Louis H., 1908, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 299. 
Russell, A. G., 1868, op. cit. p. 12. 
66 Hastings, James, Selbie, John A. & Gray, Louis H., 1908, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 301. 
67 Reaping alcohol's Benefits, Avoiding harms (http: //www. msnb. msn. com) 2004. 
68 Ibid. 
69 But I heard Drinking was good for my Health! 
(littp: //Nvww. ined. unc. edu/alcohol/education/benefits. html) 2004. 
70 Reaping alcohol's Benefits, Avoiding harms, op. cit. F. N. 67. 
149 
Iniosicaliun ill L. m ancl. S'kori'uh 
can be said that moderate drinking may have some benefits but it also carries increased 
health risks . 
71 The uncertainty in determining moderate drinking has led the Academy 
of Medical Sciences to urge the government that it should take unpopular decisions to 
reduce alcohol consumption. 72 Another research suggests that even moderate alcohol 
consumption has no positive effect on health73 and hence people who do not drink 
should not start for health reasons. 
6.7 Intoxication and Criminal Tendency 
Jurists and psychiatrists have observed that intoxication is a major cause for 
commission of crimes in a society. Intoxicants distort judgement, reduce an actor's 
ability to control his aggressive feelings, and anti social impulses. 74 Crime rate in a 
society rise and fall with the general level of alcohol consumption75 and it is universally 
accepted that there is a close link between excessive drinking and breach of law. 76 Many 
people who commit crimes have taken drugs, whether dangerous ones or ones not 
classified in law as dangerous, e. g. alcohol. 77 A study of crime in a seaside resort 
showed that a very high percentage of those arrested for any criminal offence had been 
drinking prior to committing the offence. 78 Many of these offences would not have been 
committed if the offender had not been intoxicated. 79 A proof of direct relationship of 
alcohol consumption with crime is that during World War I the totality of alcohol 
80 related crime declined with the downturn in alcohol consumption. 
Intoxication is an important factor leading towards homicide or serious injury to 
others. 8' A study of murder in West Scotland found that 50% male and 30% female 
murderers were intoxicated at the time they committed the crime, as were 52% of male 
71 But I heard Drinking was good for my Health! op. cit. F. N. 69. 
72 The Academy of Medical Sciences, Calling the Time (www. acniedsci. ac. uk) 2004. 
73 Carole L Hart, Smith, D. J., "Alcohol Consumption and Mortality from all causes, coronary heart 
disease, and stroke: result from a prospective cohort study of Scottish men with 21 years of follow up" 
BMJ 318 (1999) p. 1725. 
74 Dressler, Joshua, Understanding Criminal Law (West Publishing Co., ST. Paul, Minn., 1994)p. 293 
75 Hartz, Catherine, 1990, op. cit. p. 5. 
75 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 67. 
Nash Parker, Robert & Cartmill, Randis, "Alcohol and Homicide in the United States 1934-1995-Or 
one Reason Why U. S. Rate of Violence May be Going Down" 88 (1988) JCL. 1369. 
76 Hastings, James, Selbie, John A. & Gray, Louis H., 1908, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 301. 
Plant, Martin, Alcohol: Minimising the Harm (Free Association Books, London, N. York, 1997) p. 5. 
77 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 252. 
Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (3`d ed., Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 218. 
78 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 43. 
'9 Smith, J. C., 1999, op. cit. p. 144. 
80 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 67. 
81 Per Lord Birkenhead, L. C. in D. P. P. v. Beard [1920] All ER. 21 at 24. 
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and 32% of female victim. 82 Alcohol is often consumed not only by the offenders but 
the victims as well prior to the offence being committed. 83 A survey of 588 murder 
cases showed that alcohol was present in, the victim, the offender, or both, in 64% of 
the offences, and in 34% of 646 rape cases that drastically increased to 72% within ten 
years. 84 Another study suggested that alcohol was present in 63% of 130 homicide 
victims. 85 It shows that those who drink have disproportional high risk of being victim 
of a crime. 86 Intoxication can be a trigger that releases impulses already established in 
the situation among the offenders and victims. 87 It is often asserted that the composition 
of alcohol is linked to crimes in general and to violent offences in particular. 88 A report 
of Home Office confirms that 40% of violent crimes; 78% of assaults and 88% of 
criminal damages cases are committed while the offender is under the influence of 
alcohol. 89 In many cases intoxication assists the professional criminals; for the 
intoxicated man is an easy prey to them than a sober one. 90 
How the intoxication has led the society to the crimes? It is evident from another report. 
In 1984 just over 154,000 offences of personal violence were recorded by the police, of 
which some 112,000 were offences of wounding or assault, 25,000 were offences of 
robbery and 15,000 were sexual assault. A further 800 recorded offences were homicide 
or attempted murder and another 800 were threats or conspiracy to murder. The 
remaining category of significant size was 200 offences of causing death by reckless 
driving. These 154,000 offences represent just under 5% of all notifiable offences 
recorded by police in 1984.91 It has been further assessed that crime of personal 
violence recorded by the police rose by 72% between 1974 and 1984, an increase 
similar to that for all recorded crime 69%. 92 In 1987, out of 251 cases of group violence 
82 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 43. 
83 Home Office, Tackling Alcohol Related Crime: Building a Safe, Just and Tolerant Society 
(http: /hvww. homeoffice. eov. uk/ocrg/aapO700. htm) p. 1. 
83 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 68. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Weiner, Neil Alan, & Wolfgang, Marvin E., 1989, op. cit. p. 51. 
6 Walmsley, Roy, Personal Violence (Home Office Research Study No. 89,1986) p. 37. 
7 Lindqvist, Per, "Criminal Homicide in Northern Sweden 1970-1981: Alcohol Intoxication, Alcohol 
abuse and Mental Disorder" 8 (1986) Int. J. Law and Psychiatry. 19 at p. 34. 
8 Murphy, Daniel, 1983, op. cit. p. 8. 
89 Deehan, Ann, Alcohol and Crime: Taking Stock (http: //www. homeoffice. gov. uk/rds/prgpdfs) 2003. 
90 Devon, James, 1912, op. cit. p. 61. 
91 Walmsley, Roy, 1986, op. cit. p. 3. 
92 Ibid. (Alcohol consumption and resulting violence is constantly showing increasing tends. There were 
271,5000 incidents of violent crime recorded by police in England and Wales during Oct-Dec. 2003 
(The Independent, 30 April 2004, p. 10)). 
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90% were found to be alcohol related. It has been officially acknowledged that alcohol 
is root cause of majority of crimes in the society. 93 Police officers are aware of the part 
drink plays in sex offences, child abuse, road accidents, damage and violence at public 
and private places. 94 To what extent intoxication is involved in the crimes of violence 
and public order the courts are also conscious of the fact. At the last but not the least is 
given the opinion of House of Lords as expressed in D. P. P. v. Majewski. 95 It states that 
the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the major cause of crimes in the society to 
which misuse of drugs has added more severity. 96 The evidence suggests that the link 
between alcohol and crime cannot be denied and many violent offenders commit 
offences after consuming alcohol. 97 The reports mentioned above either from the 
independent organisations or the official agencies reflect the severity of the problem 
faced by society. 
6.8 A Brief History of Legislation to Control Intoxication in English 
Criminal Law 
Traces of legislation to control import of liquor, its sale, consumption and resulting 
intoxication can be found as far back as the 14`h century. 98 Though there are 
innumerable Acts dealing with the subject matter; we will deal only with some 
important ones. Up to the end of the 15th century there was neither any restriction on the 
number of alehouses and taverns in any area nor on the sale and consumption of 
alcohol. 99 In the middle of the 16th century drunkenness became a major cause of 
violence and disorder in society. The alehouses were centres of such violence; people 
caused trouble after becoming drunk at the premises. In order to check the situation it 
was considered that by restricting the opportunities to purchase and consume, the 
misuse of alcohol could be diminished. 100 
6.8.1 Legislation in the 16th and the 17th Centuries 
In 1552, justices of peace were authorised to control sale and use of alcoholic beverages 
and subsequent violence by taking guarantee from the sellers that their premises would 
not be used for unlawful games; they would maintain good order within the premises to 
93 The Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Consultation Paper No. 127,1993) Para 1.10. 
94 Payne G, Sergeant. "Why drugs must be made legal" Police Review, 28`h Feb. 1992 p. 388 at 389. 
95 D. P. P. v. Majewski [1976] 2 All ER 142; [1977] AC. 443. 
9G lbid at p. 146 and at p. 4 69. 
97 Walmsley, Roy, 1986, op. cit. p. 16. 
9B In 1318 an Act was passed to forbid the public officers to deal in the business of wine, 1318 (12 Edw- 
2) c. 6 and later on a number of Acts to deals with the general matters pertaining to it, like, 1368 (42 
Edw-3) c. 8; 1369 (43 Edw-3) c. 2; 1369 (43 Edw-3) c. 3; 1380 (4 Ric-2) c. 1.1444 (23 Hen. -6) c. 17; 
1562 (5 El. ) c. 5, s. 11. 
"" Royal Commission on Licensing (England &Wales) Cmd. 3988,1932, op. cit. Appendix 2, Para 9. 
"'0 Edwards, Griffith, Alcoholism: New Knowledge and New Responses (Croom Helm, London, 1977) p. 78. 
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avoid trouble and violence. 101 This step may be considered as the foundation of all the 
legislation concerning the control on sale and consumption of liquor. 102 In 1553, it was 
enacted that there will be only two alehouses in a particular town or borough. 103 In 1604 
an Act specifically reminded the owners of the inns, alehouses, and victual houses that 
these places are meant for travellers and not for entertainment of lewd and idle people to 
spend their money and time in drinking there. '°4 It was declared an offence to allow any 
person, other than travellers, to remain drinking at such places. In 1606, distillers were 
prohibited from selling wine to unlicensed retailers. 105 All these administrative steps 
and preventive measures remained ineffective and ultimately a bold step was taken 
declaring drunkenness a crime punishable by imprisonment in stocks or a fine. 106 
In 1609107 and 1623108 certain penalties were prescribed for the ale housekeepers, if 
found guilty of the breach of conditions for keeping such houses. However, with the 
change of the monarch, the policy was changed and a soft attitude towards sale and use 
of alcohol was adopted. In 1625, inn-keepers, alehouse-keepers or victuallers were 
exempted fröm punishment, if they had allowed someone to drink alcohol in their 
premises. 109 Two years later, sale of wine without a licence was made punishable with a 
fine of 20 shillings or whipping, whereas any subsequent conviction for the same 
offence was made liable to imprisonment. ' 10 One of the measures taken to control the 
consumption of liquor was the imposition of excise duty in 1643.111 
Despite increase in prices of wine 112 and change in the procedure of issuing licences, 113 
the consumption of liquor continued to rise. In 1688,12,400,000 barrels of alcohol were 
101 1552 (6 Edw-6) c. 25 
102 Royal Commission on Licensing (England & Wales) Cmd., 3988,1932, op. cit. Appendix 2, Para. 13. 
103 1553 (7 Edw-6) c. 5 
104 1604 (2 Jac-1) c. 9. 
105 1606 (4 Jac-1) c. 4. 
106 Act for Repressing the Odious and Loathsome Sin of Drunkenness 1606. Section I of the Act states, 
"Where the loathsome and the odious sin of drunkenness is of late grown into common use within this 
realm, being the root and foundation of many other enormous sins, as bloodshed, stabbing, murder, 
swearing, fornication, adultery and such like, to the great dishonour of God and of our nation, the 
overthrow of many good arts and manual trades, the disability of diver workmen and the general 
impoverishing of many good subjects, abusively wasting the good creature of God. " 
107 1609 (7 Jac-1) c. 4. 
108 1623 (21 Jac-1) c. 7., s. 3., 
109 1625 (1 Cha-1) c. 4. 
11° 1627 (3 Cha-1) c. 3. 
111 Williams, G. Prys, Drinks in the Great Britain 1900 to 1979 (Edsall, London, 1980) p. 2. 
112 1670 (30 Cha-2) c. 5. 
113 1670 (30 Cha-2) c. 6. 
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brewed for a population of little over 5,000,000.114 In the same year, a further duty of 
six shillings a barrel was imposed, exclusive of the excise duty already payable. ' 15 To 
discourage excessive drinking and to preserve the state and church from these vices 116 
once again additional duties were imposed upon liquors in 1692117 and 1694.18 The 
heavy taxes proved effective to some extent and the production sank to 11,350,000 
barrels in 1695, yet almost one third of the arable land of the kingdom was devoted to 
barley, used to brew alcohol. ' 19 An important factor in diminishing alcohol use in the 
last years of the 17`h century was introduction and wide spread use of coffee in 
England. 120 
6.8.2 Legislation in the 18th Century 
All the legislative attempts to end immoderate selling and drinking practices met with 
strong opposition from vested interests and victims alike. 121 It has been suggested that 
by the 1720s gin was being sold in streets of London and Bristol by hawkers at a penny 
a pint. 122 In 1722, production of malt for brewing beer attained the extraordinary figure 
of 33,000,000 bushels, 123 indicating consumption of a whole barrel of beer, in a year, 
for every member of population. 124 The passion of gin drinking affecting the majority of 
population rapidly spread in the society. 125 The situation became so bad that in 1725 it 
was estimated that in London, excluding the city and the Surrey side of river, there were 
over 6,000 places where gin was openly sold. In some areas every fifth house retailed it 
and in addition it could be obtained from anywhere. 126 The situation was so bad that 
cheap gin were given to the workpeople instead of their wages. 127 It is said that half of 
the population of the town was selling wine to the other half. 128 
114 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 100. 
115 1688 (1 Will. & Mar. ) c. 24. 
116 Cobbett, William, Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England (Longman, Hurst, Orme, & Browne, 
London, 1811) Vol. 11, p. 533. 
117 1692 (4 Will. & Mar. ) c. 3. 
118 1694 (6 &7 Will. & Mar. ) c. 20. 
119 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 100. 
120 Ibid. pp. 98-99. 
121 Ibid. p. 100. 
122 New Report of a Social Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1986, op. cit. p. 21. 
123 A British unit of measure equal to 8 Imperial gallons. (Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus). 
124 Sidney &Webb, Beatrice, The History of Liquor Licensing (Frank Cass & Co., London, 1963) p. 21. 
125 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole., 1913, op. cit. Vol. Il, p. 101. 
126 Turberville, A. S. (Editor) Johnson's England: An Account of the Life and Manners of his Age 
(Clarendon Press Oxford, 1933) Vol. 1, p. 3 12. 
127 Sidney &Webb, Beatrice, The History of Liquor Licensing (Special Edition, London, 1903) p. 22. 
128 /bid. 
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In 1726, the Royal College of Physicians submitted an appeal to the Parliament, 
drawing its attention to the fatal effects of liquor upon great number of both the sexes, 
rendering them diseased, degraded in behaviour, unfit for business, poor and a burden to 
themselves, to ban the use of such liquors. 129 However, instead of prohibition, the 
government thought it appropriate to discourage the sale and consumption by 
prescribing heavy licence fee. 130 In 1729, a licence costing £20 per year on distillers and 
retailers, and a further duty of 5 shillings per gallon on cheap spirits was imposed; the 
hawking on the streets was prohibited to protect the interests of the licensee. 131 The Act 
met with much opposition from the traders and growers of the wheat132 and after four 
years, in 1733,133 they obtained its repeal because it had discouraged the sale and 
affected their business. '34 
The fatal passion for drink reached to such an extent that the average production of 
British spirits which, was only 527,000 gallons in 1684, and 2,000,000 in 1714, had 
risen in 1727 to 3,601,000 and in 1735 to 5,394,000 gallons. 135 The major problems of 
society, like poverty and crimes, were attributed to alcohol use. 136 In 1736, Parliament 
intended to regulate the supply and consumption of alcohol more strictly. 137 A new Act 
was passed which aimed at practical prohibition by raising the licence fee to £50 and the 
rate of tax to 20 shillings a gallon. ' 38 The preamble of the Act admitted that drinking of 
liquor had become very common, especially among the people of lower classes and its 
excessive use had greatly destroyed their health, corrupted their morals, and rendered 
them unfit for useful labour. 139 The Act rendered illegal to deliver spirits to workpeople 
in part payment of their wages and forbade its hawking in the streets. It was 
apprehended that a complete prohibition might give rise to great dissatisfaction of the 
population, perhaps leading to serious civil disturbance. 140 One might suggest that the 
ruling class was hesitant to completely ban alcohol for the sake of their own interests. 
129 New Report of a Social Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1986, op. cit. p. 21. 
130 Sidney & Webb, Beatrice, 1903, op. cit. p. 25. 
131 1729 (2 Geo. 2) c. 17. 
132 Royal Commission on Licensing (England &Wales) Cmd. 3988,1932, op. cit. Appendix 2, Para. 25. 
133 1733 (6 Geo. 2) c. 17. 
134 Turberville, A. S., 1933, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 313. 
'35 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 101. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Turberville, A. S., 1933, op. cit. p. 313. 
138 1736 (9 Geo. 2) c. 17. 
139 Preamble of the Ibid. 
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However, the duties were regarded as excessive and only a few licenses were taken out, 
but an underground retail trade. soon sprang up, which was very popular and profitable, 
duty free spirits remained available cheaply which led to failure of effective 
enforcement of the law. 141 Such a majority transgressed the law that it could not be 
executed. 142 Drinking became a part of the lives of the people in such a way that they 
were not willing to leave it or to accept any restriction on their freedom. In a short time 
the people won over the legislators, and finally they were allowed to continue drinking 
without further legal interference. 143 
Use of alcohol was considered to be the principal cause of poverty and pauperism in 
society. 144 What was earned by the workers went to the beer houses and as a result they 
were gone from poor to pauper. 145 The situation has not been changed even in this 
modern era. 146 In 1742, more than 7,000,000 gallons were distilled, showing a steady 
increase in the consumption. 147 According to another authority volume of liquor distilled 
was not less than 7,160,000 gallons as against 4,947,000 in 1734.148 The picture of the 
society of this era sketched before House of Lords in 1743 is terrible. 149 Another 
140 Ibid. Vol. IX, p. 1039. 
141 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 102. 
142 Sidney &Webb, Beatrice, 1903, op. cit. p. 25. 
143 Turberville, A. S., 1933, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 313. 
144 Booth, Charles, Pauperism a Picture and the Endowment of old age (Macmillan, 1892) p. 11. 
145 Marshal, Dorothy, Eighteenth Century England (Longman, London, 1962) p. 35. 
146 English people spend more on alcohol than they do on other necessities of life. (The Royal College of 
Physicians, A Great and Growing Evil (Tavistock, London, 1987) p. 7; Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. 
p. 66). More than 7% of consumer expenditure goes on alcoholic drink, the amount that is supposed to 
be spent on better health, clothing and food of the consumer. (Crooks, Edmund, Alcohol Consumption 
and Taxation (The Institute of Fiscal Studies, London, 1989) p. 7}. In 19892, British people consumed 
1350 million gallons of beer equivalent to 30 million pints a day, 35 million proof gallons of spirits 
and 106 million gallons of wine. This costs Britain £ 33 million a day. (Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. 
cit. p. 66}. Reports show that, in 1987, population of England and Wales spent £ 17 billion on alcohol 
equivalent to £370 for every adult in Britain. (Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 2). 
Expenditure on misuse of drugs further aggravates the situation. A report of the Home Office shows 
that the average weekly expenditure, among all arrestees who had consumed at least one illegal drug 
in the last 12 months was £129 approaching the highest of £192, whereas the arrestees using both 
heroin and cocaine reported the highest levels of expenditure amounting to £308 per week. (Bennett, 
Trevor, Drug and Crime (Home Office Study No. 205,2000) p. vii. ) 
147 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 102. 
148 Sidney & Webb, Beatrice, 1963, op. cit. F. N. 117, p. 3 1. 
149 It was stated that, " If one million of gallons out of the seven distilled be employed in good uses, the 
remaining six, at a '/2 pint each, will make 96 millions drunk at once, and one tenth part of it, 
9,600,000. And if each drunkenness loses the labour of one day at a shilling, it is £480,000 lost. Six 
million of gallons will give 10 gallons a year, which is near a quartern a day, to 600,000 persons. If 
one in thirty of these are killed, it is 20,000 persons a year: if one in thirty more disabled it is 20,000 
more: if one in six is a woman, and one in twenty of these with child, there will probably be 5,000 
children destroyed thus: if one in twenty of them has the care of young children and gives them this 
liquor, here will be 5,000 more destroyed. "{Cobbett, William, 1812, op. cit. Vol. XII, p. 1368}In some 
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attempt was made in 1743 to suppress the clandestine trade150 and at the same time to 
increase the public revenue by lowering the duty. 151 This may be seen as an effort to 
check the evil rather than to prohibit it. It is claimed that the Act of 1736 was repealed 
to protect the home distillery and discourage import. 152 However, the actual reason was 
that the government by 1743 needed more revenue and it did not wish to dispense with 
any existing source. 153 Alcoholic drinks provided an easy and plentiful source of 
revenue. 154 Reduction of the duties is also attributed to the fact that the government was 
keen to take care of people whose livelihoods depended upon the alcohol trade. 155 The 
duty of 20 shillings was reduced to a few pence a gallon and the licence to retail was 
reduced from £50 to £1.156 The act was calculated for raising money and nothing else. 157 
Under the new Act it was proposed to issue 50,000 licences to retail liquor158 and an 
unlicensed retailer was liable to a fine of £10.159 
It was admitted openly that "If this evil cannot be prevented, avail yourselves of the 
money arising from it. " 160 This suggests that raising money was preferred over the 
health and prosperity of the nation. The government received revenue both from excise 
duty and licensing but at the cost of enormous increase in the consumption of alcohol. It 
was very common to see poor, mad, drunk committing outrages in the streets of London 
or deadly asleep at the doors of empty alehouses throughout the day. ' 61 
By another Act, a licensee was not allowed to carry on the trade of distiller, grocer or 
chandler or to keep a brandy shop and he had to dwell in the same house. 162 This Act 
had good effects, but it hit the distillers hard, 163 and they obtained an amending Act 
other authorities consumption in 1743 has been estimated to 20,000,000 as against 11,000,000 gallons 
in 1734. (Williams, G. Prys, 1980, op. cit. p. 5) 
150 1743 (16 Geo-2) c. 8. 
151 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 102. 
152 Cobbett, William, 1812, op. cit. Vol. XII, p. 1379. 
153 Sidney & Webb, Beatrice, 1963, op. cit. F. N. 117, p. 33. 
154Ibid p. 35. 
1s5 Cobbett, William, 1811, op. cit. Vol. IX, p. 1038. 
156 Sidney & Webb, Beatrice, 1963, op. cit. F. N. 117, p. 33. 
157 Cobbett, William, 1811, op. cit. Vol. Xll, p. 1368. 
158 Ibid Vol. XII, p. 1440. 
159 1743 (16 Gco-2) c. 39. 
160 Cobbett, William, 1811, op. cit. Vol. XII, p. 1369. 
161 Sidney & Webb, Beatrice, 1963, op, cit. F. N. 117, p. 32. 
162 1744 (17 Geo-2) c. 17. 
163 Turberville A. S., 1933, op. cit. p. 313. 
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allowing the London distillers to sell by retail on payment of £5 for a licence. 
164 Despite 
the fact that there were 17,000 licensed shops, in 1749 more than 4,000 persons were 
convicted of selling without licence. 165 The widespread use of liquor affected the health 
of people badly. 166 Brewing of alcohol reached such a scale that in 1750,7000 out of 
12000 quarters of wheat sold weekly in London were converted into spirits. 
' 67 In this 
period annual consumption of spirits rose approximately from 500,000 gallons in 1684 
to 11 million gallons in 175 1.168 The annual consumption in London was said to have 
reached 64 litters per capita. 169 
Alcohol consumption reached to such a high level that many counties requested the 
Parliament to ban the excessive drinking, which caused a great decay of piety, and 
virtue amongst the common people, and tended to the destruction of the commerce and 
industry of the Kingdom. 170 As a result of these requests, an Act, strengthening the 
provisions of the Act of 1743, was passed that slightly increased the duties on liquors 
and prohibited the distillers, grocers and keepers of jails and workhouse keepers to retail 
spirits. 171 The Act was followed by the rapid decline in consumption of alcohol. 
172 In 
1753, certain additional conditions were imposed on public houses and licensees, it was 
suggested that no licence would be granted to any person for retail sale of liquor except 
on the fulfilment of these conditions. 173 The restrictive legislation and coercive 
measures led to the reduction in consumption of alcohol under two million gallons by 
1758 but soon it increased again. 174 The sale of alcoholic beverages was so common 
that despite an un-repealed order of 1585, which ordained only 100 common alehouses 
for London, there were about 2000 such houses selling alcohol . 
175 
6.8.3 The Industrial Revolution and After 
In the 19t1i century consumption of alcohol began to rise again, particularly in the 
rapidly developing industrial towns, attributed partly to the country's growing 
prosperity and partly to the deprived conditions in which industrial workers were forced 
164 1747 (21 Geo-2) c. 39. 
165 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. Il, p. 103. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Sidney &Webb, Beatrice, 1963, op. cit. F. N. 117, p. 43. 
168 Lecky, W. E. Hartpole, 1913, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 103. 
169 Crooks, Edmund, Alcohol Consumption and Taxation (The Institute of Fiscal Studies, London, 1989) p. 14 
170 Turberville, A. S., 1933, op. cit. p. 313. 
171 
1751 (24 Geo-2) c. 40. . 172 New Report of a Social Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1986, op. cit. p. 21. 
173 1753 (26 Geo-2) c. 13. 
174 Office of the Health Economics, Alcohol Abuse (Office of the Heath Economics, London, 1970) p. 6 
175 Sidney &Webb, Beatrice, 1963, op. cit. F. N. 117, p. 44. 
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to live. 176 This increased alcohol use trend resulted into many social problems, -like 
neglect of children, wife beating, debt, loss of trade and accidents. 
177 From 1824 to 
1869 a number of Acts regulated the policy for issuing licences for brewing and 
retailing liquors, adjusting licence fee, duties and taxes on their sale and regulating the 
hours of sale. 178 Despite such restrictions, sale and consumption of beer and spirits rose 
steadily. 179 In 1872, The Licensing Act was passed that governed the activities of selling, 
drinking alcohol and drunken behaviour. Under this Act, retail of liquor without a 
licence was prohibited; to be drunk in any highway or public place was declared to be 
an offence; and similarly sale of liquor to any person under the age of sixteen years of 
age was prohibited. 
Excessive drunkenness caused numerous social and health problems. Awareness of 
these problems, and failure to control drunkenness, led the government to consider the 
rehabilitation of drunk. In 1879, the Habitual Drunkard's Act was passed to facilitate 
the control and cure of habitual drunk. Alcohol consumption was boosted further in 
1880 by Gladstone's free mash tun system, which allowed brewers to use carbohydrate 
sources other than malt and so to lower the price of liquors. 
180 The era of heavy use of 
alcohol is characterised by its cheapness and easy availability. 
181 Towards the end of the 
l9`h century, consumption had risen to nearly 11 litres of pure alcohol a year for every 
man, woman and child, and over 40% of all Exchequer funds were derived from the 
excise duty on alcoholic beverages. 
182 
The 20th century witnessed a turn in the governmental policy towards alcohol 
consumption. The Licensing Act 1902 allowed the apprehension of any person found 
drunk in any highway or other public place, who appeared to be incapable of taking care 
of himself or had charge of a child under the age of seven years. In 1910, all the 
legislation on the subject was consolidated and certain conditions were imposed on 
persons and premises relating to the issue of licences for sale of liquor. Sale of liquor 
176 Ibid. p. 21. 
177 Alcohol and the Public Health, 1991, op. cit. p. 14. 
178 1824 (5 geo. -4) c. 54; 1825 (6 Geo-4) c. 94; 1828 (9 Geo-4, c. 61, s. 
35; 1828 (9. Geo-4) c. 61, s. 14; 1828 (9. 
Geo-4) c. 68; 1830 (11. Geo-4) c. 48; 1830 (11. Geo-4 &I Gul-4) c. 51; 1830 (11. Geo-4 &I Gul. -4) c. 64; 
1840 (3 &4 Vic. ) c. 61; 1860 (23 Vic. ) c. 118; Wine and Beer Houses Act 1869. 
179 New Report of a Social Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1986, op. cit. p. 21. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 67. 
182 Ibid. 
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was prohibited on Sunday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day. 
183 However, the situation 
did not seem to improve. In 1911, there were 115,362 licensed places for the sale of 
intoxicating liquor in England and Wales, while the total population was a little over 
36,000,000.18`1 The figure suggests that, on average, one sale point was available for 
every 312 persons or 208 adults; in the same year 21.5 million gallons of spirits were 
consumed besides wine and beer. 185. 
6.8.4 Impact of World War-I on Consumption of Alcohol 
Due to the First World War, the first quarter of the 20t1i century observed a sharp decline 
in drinking trend which can be attributed to the imposition of heavy taxes, stricter 
licensing regulations, reduction of alcohol content and the death of a substantial number 
of the country's youth. 186 Between 1916 and 1918, beer and alcohol consumption fell by 
50%, a figure which persisted until the mid 1930s. 187 The trend of declination in alcohol 
consumption also resulted in reducing the alcohol related offences from 60/10,000 
population in 1912 to 10/10,000 population in 1932.188 In 1950's, once again, the trend 
of drinking started rising at a steady rate until it reached to the current levels. 
189 
In 1953, entrance of any person under the age of 14 years in the bar of licensed premises 
during the permitted hours and sale of liquor to under the age of 18 years was declared 
prohibited. 190 The Act reflected a desire to take serious steps to discourage use of 
intoxicants among the young, but the statistics, given in 6.4, shows that all these steps 
failed to have any impact at all on the consumption of liquor in the society in general 
and among the young in particular. In 1985, taking into account the disturbance caused 
by intoxicated spectators, possession and use of intoxicating liquor at sporting events 
was declared prohibited. 191 The Licensing Act 1988, increased the permitted hours for 
the sale of liquors and trading hours on Sunday and Christmas Day were fixed. 
192 
The sequence of legislation spread over a period of almost 700 years, sought to regulate 
the use of alcohol in England and Wales has addressed the way in which alcohol may be 
183 Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910. 
184 Reason, Will, 1922, op. cit. p. 9. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Crooks, Edmund, 1989, op. cit. p. 15. 
187 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 67. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Licensing Act 1953. 
191 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc. ) Act 1985. 
192 Licensing (Sunday Hours) Act 1995. 
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sold or supplied; who can sell; where; when; and to whom it may be sold. 
193 Despite of 
all this legislation, and other attempts to control the use of intoxicants, their use is 
gradually increasing. 
6.9 The Efforts of the Home Office to Control Intoxication 
The major problem in eyes of the government is not the consumption of alcohol rather 
the growing trend of violence as a result of intoxication. A Home Office action plan 
aims to reduce the problems arising from under-age drinking, to reduce public 
drunkenness, and to prevent alcohol related violence. Under the Licensing (Young 
Persons) Bill, presently under progress in Parliament, if passed, it will become an 
offence for any person working in licensed premises in a capacity which gave him 
authority to prevent a sale, to permit knowingly a sale to an under 18 by any other 
person (previously this offence was restricted to the licensee). It would also become an 
offence for an adult to purchase alcohol on behalf of a person under 18. The Bill also 
demands wide use of the provisions of section 1(1) of the Confiscation of Alcohol 
(Young Persons) Act 1997, allowing police to confiscate alcohol from under-age 
drinkers at any public place. 194 
In order to reduce public drunkenness the action plan suggests allowing the licensees 
and managers of the pubs and clubs to refuse admission to known troublemakers and 
sale of alcohol to those who are already intoxicated. They shall also be liable for the 
design and management of their premises to avoid factors, like overcrowding, poor bar 
layout, a permissive environment which, research has suggested, contribute to alcohol- 
related aggression. The plan also proposes to give extra new powers to police to close 
premises which have become the focus of violent and disorderly behaviour. 195 The plan 
emphasises the widespread use of toughened plastic drinking glasses in pubs and bars, 
and refusal to sell beer in glass bottles in order to avoid their use as weapons of 
violence. 196 
The plan indicates the underlying will of the authority to regulate use of alcohol more 
strictly. The major obstacle in this step is the public opinion that would never accept 
193 Lacey, N., Wells, C., Reconstructing Criminal Law (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1990) p. 189. 
193 Home Office, Tackling Alcohol Related Crime: Disorder and Nuisance, Action plan. pp. 2-3 
(http: //www. homeoffice. l, yov. uk/pcr * aap0700. him) 2002. 
19S Ibid. p. 4. 
196 Ibid. p. 6. 
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any law restraining use of alcohol. 197 Another reason may be that alcohol is the chosen, 
familiar intoxicant and perhaps also because many people's livelihoods and important 
economic interests are involved. So its ill-effects, the damage it inflicts on individuals, 
on families and on the fabric of society are ignored. 198 
6.9.1 Are these Proposals Workable? 
All these proposals, as thought by the Home Office, may lead to control the three major 
problems as pointed out, under-age drinking, public drunkenness, and alcohol related 
violence. But the rationale of the proposals is quite obvious. As far as the sale to a 
person under 18 years is concerned, the action plan has presented nothing new. It has 
already been declared an offence under the provisions of the Licensing Act 1953 and the 
efficacy of the law can be observed by taking into account the statistics issued by the 
Home Office regarding the use of intoxicants among teenagers. 
Though the action plan proposes a new offence of buying alcohol on behalf of an under- 
18 but this will lead to another problem of proof that the accused has bought for such a 
person. Confiscation of alcohol from young people in public places may lead to further 
public violence and perhaps it is the main reason for not implementing the law on the 
point. 199 Refusing admission to troublemakers and not selling alcohol to those who are 
already intoxicated will not necessarily serve the desired purpose but may in fact 
augment the problem. Allowing consumption of alcohol and controlling trouble are 
inconsistent because one who drinks becomes intoxicated and hence troublemaker. 
Moreover, there is no standard available to bar staff to assess whether their customer is 
already intoxicated. Is this not a matter of common sense that to allow the consumption 
of alcohol and to control violence is like to set free a savage dog and to tie the stones 
and ensure the safety of the people? 
If it is supposed for a while that excessive drinking, in hotels and bars, may be checked 
by this way but how to control the sale of alcohol at off licence premises? In my opinion 
the only plausible solution that may operate in the circumstances is to issue drink cards 
to all drinkers specifying the quantity the card holder is authorised to purchase a day. 
The seller should be made bound to make entries of the quantity of alcohol sold to him. 
The sale and purchase of liquor without this card be declared as an offence. 
197 New Report of a Social Committee of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1986, op. cit. p. 18. 
ins Ibid. (For the details of economic benefits of alcohol see 9.7.2.1). 
199 Ibid. p. 23. 
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The prohibition impulse has never died though it emerges in different forms at different 
times. A report reveals that 70% people agree that UK would be a healthier, peaceful 
and better place if alcohol use was reduced. 200 The opinion may further be promoted if 
the non-governmental organisations and official authorities, sincerely, join together to 
eradicate consumption of alcohol from society, by boosting public alcohol education 
and preventive measures. It should be made known. to the masses that alcohol is in no 
way necessary to physical and mental well being. Its food value is negligible and its 
excessive amount may act as a poison. 201 Its use leads to a greater likelihood of physical 
and social mischief. 202 Taking into account the opinions of right thinking members of 
the society, alcohol must no longer be treated as a stimulant, but as a narcotic. 203 
It is the just need of the time to prohibit use of alcohol, because "Drink has drained 
more blood, hung more crepe, sold more houses, plunged more people in to bankruptcy, 
armed more villains, slain more children, snapped more wedding rings, defiled more 
innocence, blinded more eyes, twisted more limbs, dethroned more reason, wrecked 
more manhood, dishonoured more womanhood, broken more hearts, blasted more lives, 
driven more to suicide, and dug more graves than any other poisoned scourge that ever 
swept its death dealing waves across the world. "204 Though the prevailing conditions do 
not allow the government to prohibit the use of alcohol, yet strictly regulated use will be 
an effective step towards the right goal. 
Conclusion 
Alcohol consumption is associated with a variety of physical disorders and diseases. Its 
harmful effects on individual and society have been highlighted by governmental and 
private organisations. 205 One of the statements most frequently made is that the great 
majority of crime is due to drink. In a more cultured way we may say that most persons 
were under the influence of drink at the time they committed a crime. 206 Despite some 
efforts from private and public organisations, alcohol use is showing an increasing trend. 
A recent report states that two fifth of men and one fifth of women drink above the 
zoo Alcohol Concern, Public Ready for Action on Alcohol: New Report (www. alcoholconcern. org. uk) 2002. 
201 Medical Research Council, Alcohol: Its Action on the Human Organism (2°a ed., HMSO, London, 
1924) pp. 2-10. 
202 Wilson, George B., Alcohol and the Nation (Nicholson & Watson Ltd., London, 1940) p. 307. 
203 Royal Commission on Licensing (England & Wales) Cmd. 3988,1932, op. cit. Para. 81. 
204 Alcohol Abuse, Alcohol Problems and Solution Site (http: /hvww2. potsdani. edu) 2002. 
205 Pirmohamed, M., Brown, C. "The Burden of Alcohol Misuse on an inner-City general Hospital" 93 
(2000) QJ Med. 292. 
206 Devon, James, 1912, op. cit. p. 52. 
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recommended daily level of alcohol. 207 Similarly, average weekly consumption of 
alcohol in the young has doubled from1990-2000, from 5.3 units to 10.4 units. 
208 
Social reforms that would strike at the root causes of heavy drinking and violence 
cannot reasonably be anticipated in foreseeable future. General health education in 
respect of alcohol abuse has its place but likewise cannot be expected to make 
significant inroads into the problem. 209 As a consequence it is suggested that such 
measures in some ways are half-hearted and insufficient, and do not address the root 
cause of the problem. The truth of the proposition can be proved by the contents of a 
letter alleged to be written by the Home secretary to the Prime minister showing his 
concerns about binge drinking and alcohol fuelled crime that risks spiralling out of 
control . 
210 The harmful consequences suffered by the individual and society required 
that more effective and rational steps, to control alcohol use, should be taken. 
Accordingly the adoption of effective strategies to control alcohol and its adverse 
consequences should receive high priority. 
To determine the criminal liability of an intoxicated accused, intoxication has been 
divided into two kinds; involuntary and voluntary intoxication. The following chapter 
shall deal with the criminal liability of an involuntarily intoxicated offender. 
207 Department of Health, Statistics on Alcohol: England, 1978 Onvtards(http: //www. dli. gov. uk ) 2001. 
208 Department of Health, Press Release 2001/0582. (http: //www. dh. aov. uk). 
209 Walmsley, Roy, 1986, op. cit. p. 18. 
210 (http: //news. bbc. co. uk) 14 March 2004. 
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Chapter-7 Involuntary Intoxication and Criminal Liability 
7.1 Introduction 
Voluntary and involuntary intoxication are to be distinguished, for the latter condition is 
less blameworthy as compared to the former. In this chapter we shall ascertain the 
conditions under which intoxication may be designated as involuntary and how this 
condition affects the liability of an accused? The principles applied by the English 
courts in the cases of involuntary intoxication shall be discussed along with the 
possibility of counterfeiting the defence. Before dealing with the questions it seems 
appropriate to know how the concept of criminal liability of the intoxicated offender 
developed in English criminal law. 
7.2 Development in the Concept of Liability of an Intoxicated Offender 
in English Criminal Law 
As discussed in chapter-1, criminal liability of an offender depends upon his intention 
and volition. Now the question arises if an offender commits an offence in state of 
intoxication, incapable of forming intention, is he liable for the offence committed or he 
is entitled for the defence? The answer to this question differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Generally speaking, in English law, intoxication is not, and never has been 
a defence. ' It is never a defence for defendant to say, however convincingly, he would 
not have behaved as he did but for the drink. 2 Indeed, the fact that a defendant was 
intoxicated at the time he committed a crime has classically been rejected as a defence. 
According to Hale, a perfect but temporary insanity caused by the intoxicant shall offer 
no defence to a defendant. 3 In the 19`h century Stephen J. stated that, "no body must 
suppose and I hope no one will be led for one moment to suppose that drunkenness is 
any kind of excuse for crime. i4 The opinions were based upon the principle that a man 
who voluntary destroys his will power and awareness shall be no better situated in 
regard to criminal acts than a sober man. s 
In the modem times the defence of intoxication has caused courts, lawyers and the 
drafters of criminal codes much distress. 6 The basic reason for this distress is that the 
defence seems to bring the principle of culpability into conflict with the principle of 
prevention of crime. It is the fundamental principle of criminal liability that a person 
1 Austin, John, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5`h ed., John Murray, London, 1885) Vol. 1, p. 496. 
2 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8`h ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) p. 225. 
3 Hale, Mathew, Sir, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (T. Pyne, P. Uriel, London, 1778) Ch. IV, p. 32. 
4 As per Stephen J. in R. v. Davis (1881) 14 Cox. C. C. 563 at 564. 
5 D. P. P. v. Beard [1920] All. ER. 21 at 24. 
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should only be convicted for his voluntary and intentional criminal conduct. 7 If he is too 
intoxicated to have the required mental element for an offence, the principle of 
culpability implies that he should not be convicted. Yet violent criminal behaviour 
while drunk creates much social harm and insecurity, which the law seeks to prevent. 8 
The Common law settled the principle that though the intoxicated offender committed 
the offence in a state having neither understanding nor memory yet his liability rests 
upon the condition occasioned by himself what he could avoid. 9 
7.2.1 Intoxication Aggravates the Offence 
Initially, in English law, the principle of culpability of an intoxicated offender was very 
simple. Intoxication was not regarded as a defence; rather it was an aggravation of the 
offence. ' 0 The early ecclesiastical law approved the doctrine of aggravation' 1 and the 
classic distinguished authorities broadly asserted that voluntary drunkenness must be 
considered an aggravation rather than a defence. 12 The principle was confirmed in R. v. 
Feogossa, 13 the first reported case dealing with the liability of an intoxicated offender, 14 
and Beverley's case. 15 The reason behind this concept was that the offender has 
voluntarily brought about a condition which is wrong both morally and legally so it was 
not acceptable as a defence to a crime of which it was the predisposing cause. 16 This 
concept is in line with the general legal principle that no one should be allowed to take 
advantage of the crime he committed, in this case the crime of being intoxicated. 
7.2.2 How does it aggravate? 
Aggravation of an offence ' means to inflict a more severe punishment than in the 
ordinary case. Now the question arises, how does intoxication aggravate the guilt of the 
offender and we know that a court cannot sentence the offender beyond the maximum 
6 Gough, Stephen, "Intoxication and Criminal Liability: The Law Commission's Proposed Reforms" 112 
(1996) LQR 335 at 335. 
7 Law Commission Report, Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law 
Com. No. 229,1995) Para. 1.15. 
8 Bayles, Michael D, Principles of Laiv: A Normative Analysis (D. Reided Publishing, 1987) p. 324. 
R. v. Feogossa (1551) 1 Plowden I at 19; 75 ER I at 31. 
10 Holdsworth, W. S., History of English Law (Mathew & Co. Ltd., London, 1932) p. 442. 
11 McCord, David, "The English & American History of Voluntary Intoxication" 11(1990)JHL 372 at 373. 
Singh, R. U., "History of the Defence of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law" 49 (1933) LQR. 528 at 528. 
12 Blackstone, Commentaries (15''' ed., A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. IV, p. 25. 
Russell, W. O., A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanour (J. Butterworth, London, 1819) Vol. 1, p. 1 1. 
Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics ofAristotle (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892) Vol. 1, 
Book III, Ch. 5, p. 272. 
13 R. v. Feogossa (1551) 1 Plowden 1 at 19; 75 ER I at 31. 
14 Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 530. 
McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 374. 
15 Beverley's case (1603) 4 Co. Rep. 123 at 125; 76 ER 1118 at 1123. 
16 Turner, J. W. Cecil, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (19th ed., Cambridge University Press, 1966) p. 62. 
Fitzgerald, P. J., Criminal Law and Punishment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) pp. 143-44. 
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punishment provided for the offence he has committed whether intoxicated or sober? 
'7 
The question may be answered by taking into account the decision of the court in R. v. 
Feogossa. '8 The court held that the offender is liable for double punishment, one for 
intoxication and the other for the offence committed by him. Moreover, there are certain 
offences created by statutes in which liability of the intoxicated offender has been 
aggravated, 19 and there are many other statutory provisions under which intoxication is 
itself part of the offence created. 20 
Under certain circumstances intoxication makes the crime more serious than it 
otherwise would have been. 21 For example, under section 6(1) of Road Traffic Act 1960, 
it is an indictable offence to drive when unfit through drink or drugs. Under section 4(6) 
a constable may arrest a person without warrant if he has reasonable cause to suspect 
that the person is unfit to drive through drink or drugs. In addition, in societies, like 
Britain, where intoxication itself is not an offence and hence not liable to punishment, 
the court may disregard any mitigating factor which is to be taken into account had the 
offender been sober and sentence the intoxicated offender the maximum provided under 
the law to deter such offenders and by way of aggravating their guilt. Even those who 
deny the concept of aggravating22 admit that intoxication of the offender might led the 
judge to inflict a heavier sentence than he otherwise would have inflicted. 23 
In the second phase of development of the concept, the idea that intoxication can 
aggravate the offence lost its place. The offender was treated like a sober man and his 
intoxicated condition could not provide him any defence. 24 The opinions of a number of 
distinguished English writers published in the 17`h and the 18`1' century discarded the 
concept of aggravation. According to Bacon, 25 Hale, 26 and Hawkins27 drunkenness does 
17 Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 531. 
'8 R. v. Feogossa (1551)1 Plowden 1; 75 ER 1. 
19 Stewart, S. W., A Modern View of the Criminal Law (Pergamon Press, London, 1969) p. 117. 
For example, an offence under section 2(l) of Licensing Act 1902, being in charge of a child under the 
age of seven years or of a fire arm whilst under the influence of drink and a number of such instances 
have been mentioned under Section 12 of Licensing Act 1872. 
20 Turner, J. W. Cecil, 1966, op. cit. p. 65. 
21 Jefferson, Michael, Criminal Law (31 ed., Pitman Publishing, London, 1997) p. 253. 
22 Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 531. 
23 Ibid p. 532. 
24 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 373. 
25 Bacon, Francis, Sir, Elements of Law of England (J. Moore, London, 1636) p. 25. 
26 Hale, Mathew, Sir, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (E. & R. Nutt, London, 1736) Vol. 1, p. 32. 
27 Hawkins, W., Hawkins's Pleas of the crown (E. and R. Nutt, London, 1728) vol. 1, Ch. 1, s. 6. 
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deprive men of reason and puts them into perfect but temporary insanity during which 
they may commit crimes, but such a person shall have no privilege by his voluntary 
contracted madness and he shall have the same judgement as if he were in his right 
senses. However, it was recognised that involuntary intoxication or permanent insanity 
caused by habitual drinking could be taken as an excuse. 28 
The late 18th century seems to be era of conflict between two views; whether 
intoxication aggravates culpability or it does not affect it. 9 The latter survived in this 
conflict and the former died out. In R. v. Henry Crisp30 Channell J. said that the court 
does not view with favour the imposition of a sentence on an intoxicated offender 
severer than is usually passed for the given offence. This statement buried the concept 
that intoxication can aggravate the liability and at the same time a new view that 
intoxication can excuse the culpability emerged and a new struggle started. 31 
7.2.3 From Aggravation to Defence 
The plea of intoxication as a common law defence to a crime is a comparatively recent 
one. Until early in the 19i1' century the common law rule was that intoxication is never a 
defence, 32 but thereafter as a result of judicial decisions it has been allowed as a 
defence in certain cases. 33 This view can be supported by the evidence that there was no 
lenient provision regarding liability of intoxicated offender in English criminal law. 34 
The recognition of intoxication as a defence developed slowly over a number of 
centuries. Hale appears to be the first to qualify the general principle that intoxication 
could not excuse the offender. 35 He exempted, from the general principle, involuntary 
intoxication and permanent insanity caused even by the voluntary consumption of 
intoxicants. 36 
7.2.4 Defence of Intoxication in the 19`h century 
The early 19th century witnessed a gradual relaxation in the severity of common law 
principle to refuse intoxication as a defence to a criminal charge. 37 R. v. Grindley seems 
28 Hale, Mathew, Sir, 1736, op. cit. F. N. 26, Vol. 1, p. 32. 
29 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 373. 
30 R. v. Henry Crisp (1912) 7 Cr. App. R. 173. 
31 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 373. 
32 Per Lord Birkenhead in DPP v. Beard [1920] AC 479 at 495. 
33 Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 528. 
Per Lord Birkenhead in D. P. P. v. Beard [1920] All. ER 21 (Rep). 
34 Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 530 
35 /bid at p. 534. 
36 Hale, Mathew, Sir, 1736; op. cit. F. N. 26, Vol. 1, p. 32. 
37 Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 536. 
Per Lord Birkenhead L. C. in D. P. P. v. Beard (1920) AC 479 at 495. 
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to be the first reported judicial decision in which intoxication was put forward as a 
defence. 38 Holroyd J. held, evidence that the offender was intoxicated at the time of 
commission of the offence is an appropriate fact to be taken into consideration. 39 Being 
concerned about the mental condition of the intoxicated offender and his incapacity to 
form an intention, the courts adopted a lenient and favourable view towards his criminal 
liability. The present day principle of an intoxicated offender is based upon the same 
grounds. 40 In the second quarter of the 19`h century the English courts were of the 
opinion that intoxication could provide a defence to a criminal charge only where it 
4 resulted into permanent insanity of the accused .1 
In the same period a new turn in the policy of English courts, while dealing with the 
cases of intoxicated offenders, may be witnessed. In Marshall's case, Park J. directed 
the jury that they might take into account the defendant's intoxication when considering 
whether he acted under a bona fide apprehension that his person or property was about 
to be attacked. 42 The direction shows that intoxication. may have some relevance to the 
intention of the accused, even if limited to the cases of self-defence. 43 In Pearson's case, 
Park J. held that though the voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crimes, however it 
may be taken into account to explain the intention of the accused in case of violence 
committed on sudden provocation. 44 
The cases mentioned above imply that the courts have indirectly taken intoxication 
leading to mitigation of punishment. The danger hidden in the principle was realised by 
the courts very soon. The principle was overruled by Park J., in R. v. Carroll. He said 
that intoxication could not be taken into account while determining the intention of the 
offender. Criticising the decision of R. v. Grindley he remarked that "there would be no 
safety to human life if it were to be considered as law. "45 Comparison of the cases of 
Marshal and Carroll reveals that Park J treated both the cases inconsistently. It suggests 
38 Per Lord Birkenhead L. C. in D. P. P. v. Beard (1920) AC 479 at 495. 
39 Referred to in R. v. Carroll (1835) 7C&P 145; 173 ER 64. Cited by Singh, R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 537. 
40 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 376. 
41 Per Ilolroyd J in Burrow's Case (1823) 1 Lewin 75; 168 ER 965 and Rennie's Case (1825) 1 Lewin 76; 
168 ER 965. Also Per Lord Birkenhead L. C. in D. P. P. v. Beard (1920) AC 479 at 496. 
42 Marshall's Case (1830)1 Lewin 76; 168 ER 965. 
43 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E. "The Intoxicated Offender: A Problem of Responsibility" 44 
(1966) Can. Bar. Rev. 563 at 576. 
44 Pearson's Case (1835) 2 Lewin 145: 168 ER 108. 
45 R. v. Carroll (1835) 7 C&P. 145; 173 ER. 64. 
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that there was no fixed law on the point and judges were groping for a fair and firm 
principle to deal with the problem of the intoxicated offender. 
46 
In 1837, it was held that drunkenness is no excuse for any crime but it may be 
considered towards the fact that the passion of an intoxicated person was more easily 
excitable than that of a sober person. 
47 There are a number of other cases dealing with 
intoxication, intention of the offender in such state and his criminal liability. Among 
these cases are R. v. Meakin, 48 R. v. Cruse, 49 and R. v. Monkhouse 
50 where intoxication 
was considered an important factor to determine the capacity to form intention. The jury 
was directed that though intoxication did not constitute a defence, they must consider 
whether the defendant was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the required 
intention. In R. v. Meakin, Anderson B. directed the jury that if the defendant used a 
deadly weapon in the commission of homicide the fact that he was intoxicated has no 
effect on his intention. 51 It seems that the law during this period was uncertain as it is 
impossible to reconcile the directions. 52 
In the middle of the 19tß' century, English courts started considering intoxication a 
substantial element affecting the intention of the accused. In R v. Moor, 
53 the defendant 
was charged for attempting to commit suicide. She jumped into a well, and was rescued. 
Jervis, C. J. directed the jury that if the defendant was so drunk as not to know what she 
was doing, how could she have intended to destroy herself. It shows that in this period 
only gross intoxication which rendered the accused incapable of forming an intention or 
acting voluntarily was admissible as a defence. 
54 
In R. v. Davis, 55 admitting that intoxication is no excuse to crimes, it was held that 
intoxication amounting to temporary insanity could be treated as defence to a crime. 
This particular view stood in contrast to the cases of Burrows, 
56 and Rennie, 57 where 
46 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 576. 
47 Per Baron Park, R. v. John Thomas (1837) 7 C&P 817 at 818; 173 ER 356 at 358. 
48 R. v. Meakin (1836) 7 C&P 297; 173 ER 131. 
49 R. v. Cruse (1838)8 C&P 541; 173 ER 610. 
50 R. v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 Cox. CC 55. 
51 R. v. Meakin (1836) 7 C&P 297; 173 ER 131. 
52 Beck, Stanley M., "The Intoxicated Offender" 44 (1966) Can. Bar. Rev. 563 at 575. 
53 R. v. Moor (1852) 3 Car. &K 319; 175 ER 571. 
54 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 577. 
55 Per Stephen J. in R. v. Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563. 
56 Burrow's Case (1823) 1 Lewin 75; 168 ER 965. 
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intoxication was recognised as a defence only where it caused permanent insanity. It 
appears that there was no fixed governing principle concerning voluntary intoxication 
and resulting criminal liability and the policy on the point remained in a state of flux. In 
R. v. Stopford 58 the rule was further relaxed and merely incapacity to form intention, in 
intoxicated state, was declared sufficient for defence. In R. v. Doherty it was held that 
although drunkenness cannot be taken as an excuse for a crime, yet when the intention 
of the offender is one of constituent elements of the crime, the fact that he was drunk 
may be taken into account while considering whether he formed intention necessary to 
constitute the crime. 59 This particular decision is related to the concept of dividing 
offences into basic and specific intent. This distinction and its impact on the criminal 
liability of the offender shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
7.2.5 Defence of intoxication in the 20th century 
The first important case, in the 20th century dealing with intoxication and criminal 
liability is R. v. Mead, 60 where the accused, in intoxicated condition, caused death of 
the victim. The trial court found him guilty of murder; the Court of Appeal upheld the 
verdict by declaring that every person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of 
his act provided that such presumption can be rebutted by proving that the accused was 
so intoxicated that he was incapable of knowing the nature and consequences of his 
act. 61 This was a much broader principle than that which was laid down by Stephen J. in 
R. v. Doherty because its application is more general and not restricted to the offences 
only where the intention is an essential element of the crime committed. The case 
remained a leading authority until 1920 when the House of Lords decided D. P. P. v. 
Beard. 62 The major development in the concept of liability of an intoxicated offender in 
the 20th century is the division of offences into the offences of specific/basic intent, with 
intoxication being allowed to negate specific intent but not the basic. 
It has been observed that in the early 19`h century judicial decisions have relaxed the 
rule gradually and adopted a more sympathetic attitude towards intoxicated offenders. 63 
Initially voluntary intoxication was considered as no excuse to a crime then it was taken 
as an excuse only in the cases where it resulted into permanent insanity. The third step 
57 Rennie's Case (1825) 1 Lewin 76; 168 ER 965. 
58 Per Brett J. in R. v. Stopford (1870) 11 Cox. C. C. 643. 
59 Per Stephen J. R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox. CC 306. 
60 R. v. Mead [ 190911 KB 895. 
61 Ibid. at p. 899. 
62 D. P. P. v. Beard [1920] All. ER. (Rep. ) 21 
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admits it as a defence in the cases of temporary insanity and finally the intoxication 
rendering the accused incapable of forming specific intention was declared as a defence 
to criminal charges. 
The basic reason for such relaxation and allowing intoxication as a defence against 
criminal liability in the view of Sayre is the change of the moral values of English 
society. 64 The laws of a society are mirror of the moral standards prevailing in a society 
at a specific time. When getting drunk was considered morally blameworthy, the 
absence of intention caused by intoxication was not allowed as a defence to a criminal 
charge. The bifurcation of legal principles from moral delinquency has led the law to 
recognise intoxication as a possible defence. Criminality has lost its strong flavour of 
moral delinquency and intoxication has been allowed as an indirect and limited defence 
to the offences of specific intent. The theory of change of moral standard is supported 
by some other writers as well. 65 
By contrast, R. U. Singh does not agree with this theory. He stated that early English law 
was indifferent to the defence of intoxication because the theory of criminal liability 
was then too crude and underdeveloped to admit this exception. Later on this defence 
was not allowed because of the danger to society involved in it. Refinement in the 
theory and modifications in the law as to insanity, in the 19th century were responsible 
for the changes in the rigid old rule. 66 The earlier policy of excluding evidence of 
voluntary intoxication gave way to the logic of doctrine of mens rea, which demands 
admission of any evidence tending to show that the required knowledge, belief or 
intention was absent. The result of this approach is that a completely intoxicated person 
should be acquitted of any crime requiring mens rea. 67 Comparison of both the views 
concludes that the view of Sayre is more realistic because there is no further 
development in the basic principles of the criminal liability i. e. criminal liability 
requires a physical act accompanied by the state of mind of the accused. It is the change 
in the moral standards which has rendered intoxication an innocent act and allowed the 
accused to take its benefit. 68 
63 DPP v. Beard [ 1920] AC 479 at 485. 
64 Sayre, Francis Bowes, "Mens Rea" 45 (1931-32) Harv. LR. 974 at p. 1013. 
65 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 378. 
66 Singh. R. U., 1933, op. cit. p. 537. 
67 Ashworth A. J., "Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability" 91 (1975) LQR. 102 at 113. 
68 Keiter, M., "Just say no Excuse; The Rise and Fall of Intoxication Defence" 87 (1997) JCL 482 at 484. 
172 
Intosic: tlimi in f": nýlisli km . 1nll: SkRf1'tfll 
The courts began to admit the evidence of intoxication relevant to ascertain the mental 
element for criminal liability. Whatever the reason for the absence of this knowledge or 
belief, the law was not concerned with it. These changes in the criminal liability of an 
intoxicated offender reflect the major cultural trends and social values of the society. 69 
At present voluntary intoxication, which negates mens rea, can provide a defence to the 
crimes of specific intent only and if it was involuntary it can provide a defence to all the 
crimes. 70 The view that intoxication does not affect culpability, and that it can decrease 
culpability struggled for supremacy for quite a long time. 71 The ultimate compromise 
between these two views was provided by Majewski72 that intoxication could decrease 
culpability by negating specific intent but it could not affect culpability when the crime 
required only a basic intent. 
7.3 What is meant by involuntary intoxication? 
Intoxication may be termed involuntary where the accused consumed intoxicating 
substance, or it was administered to him without his intention, knowledge or against his 
will. 73 It may be said that two situations result into involuntary intoxication. Firstly, if a 
person consumes alcohol or drugs, and is unaware of their nature, the consumption is 
involuntary in the sense that it is not a conscious decision on his part to use intoxicant. 74 
Secondly, where he becomes intoxicated through taking drugs in accordance with 
medical prescription . 
75 Intoxication resulting from an overdose or use of drugs 
inconsistent to the directions of the physician may be treated as voluntary. 76 A person 
requiring medical treatment with a certain drug has little choice but to follow the 
doctor's prescription. Another situation may be treated as involuntary intoxication 
where the accused took a non-dangerous drug, provided he was not reckless in taking 
it. 77 
The classic case of involuntary intoxication may be where intoxication is brought by a 
third party, as where the accused was forced to consume intoxicant, or he was deceived 
69 
Ibid. 70 Smith, J. C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (10th ed., Butterworths, 2002) pp. 241-42. 
71 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 373. 
72 R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 
73 Law Com. No. 229,1995, op. cit. Para 1.31. 
Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (4'h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) p. 183. 
74 Mewtte, Alan W. & Manning, Morris, Criminal Law (2ni1 ed., Butterworths, Toronto, 1985) p. 203. 
75 Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. p. 240. 
Turner, J. W. Cecil, 1966, op. cit. p. 62 
Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (6`h ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., 2001) p. 162. 
77 Card, Richard, Card, Cross, and Jones Criminal Law (15'h ed., Butterworths, 2001) p. 619 & 634. 
77 Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (4'h ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., 1997) p. 146. 
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by his friends or enemies. 78 What prevents the intoxication from being voluntary in the 
cases of fraud is not the tricking of the other person but the innocent mistake of fact by 
one made drunk. 79 However, if the accused has the knowledge of likelihood that his 
drink might be spiked by his friends and is negligent in not taking steps to ensure that it 
did not contain alcohol or drugs the intoxication should not be treated as involuntary. 80 
Involuntary intoxication includes all instances in which, as a result of a genuine mistake 
as to the nature or character of the liquor or drug, it resulted from taking something not 
known to be capable of producing such a result. 81 However, it should be remembered 
that a person who knows that he is taking intoxicant is not entitled to claim that the 
resulting intoxication is involuntary merely because he does not know the precise nature 
or strength of the intoxicant. 82 Simply, intoxication will be involuntary if the accused 
cannot be held liable for it. 
7.4 Involuntary Intoxication as a Defence to Criminal Liability 
Intoxication is one of the excuse defences that operates as a denial of existence of an 
element of a crime such as intent or voluntary conduct. 83 The defence of involuntary 
intoxication is analogous to insanity; however the defendant has to establish that the use 
of intoxicant created a state of mind where he was unable to control his physical 
movements and to use his intellect or to form necessary mens rea. 84 Involuntary 
intoxication which merely impairs the defendant inhibitions cannot provide a defence to 
85 a criminal charge. 
Peter Seago stated that, "involuntary intoxication could be raised as a defence to any 
crime of basic or specific intent, as evidence that the accused did not, in fact, form the 
necessary mens rea of the offence. "86 It can only be considered as a 'defence if it negates 
the intent and to ascertain that fact the evidence of the nature of the intoxication is to be 
taken into account. In D. P. P. v. Beard, 87 the court held that "The evidence of 
drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent 
78 Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (10 ed., Butterworths, London, 1998) p. 618. 
Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 252. 
79 Perkins, R. M. & Boyce, R. N., Criminal Law (3`d ed., The Foundation Press, N. York, 1982) p. 1002. 
80 Mewtte, Alan W. & Manning, Morris, 1985, op. cit. p. 203. 
81 Perkins, R. M. & Boyce, R. N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1002. 
12 R. v. Allen [1988] Crim. LR. 698. 
83 Mewtte, Alan W. & Manning, Morris, 1985, op. cit. p. 193. 
84 Moore, Michael, Placing Blame (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 485. 
85 Spencer, J. R., "Involuntary Intoxication as a Defence" 53 [1994] CLJ6 at 6. 
86 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. pp. 183-84. 
97 D. P. P. v. Beard [ 1920] AC. 479 
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essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with other facts 
proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intention. "88 However, the 
condition, even if negates mens rea, is not a defence to the crimes of negligence and 
strict liability. 89 
It is claimed that merely loss of inhibition caused by involuntary intoxication does not 
constitute a defence though it may be a matter for mitigation of punishment imposed 90 
However, it is important to note that involuntary intoxication cannot be considered a 
mitigating factor in general, because in certain cases it is binding on the court to 
sentence the offender the mandatory punishment. For example, homicide committed 
under excused circumstances may be treated as manslaughter instead of murder but the 
punishment of manslaughter on conviction (where the offender had already been 
convicted of a serious offence) is mandatory life imprisonment, the court has no 
jurisdiction to mitigate it. 91 If the court sentences him with mandatory life imprisonment, 
his intoxication has not been taken into account even for an offence of specific intent. 
This discards the Majewski rule as laid down by the House of Lords. On the other hand, 
if the court takes into account his intoxication and resulting mental condition, to 
ascertain his liability, it will be contrary to the express statutory provision. 
Normally, involuntary intoxication could not provide a defence if it has not rendered the 
accused incapable of forming intent required for the offence. 92 However, English courts 
are inclined to consider his actual intention at the time of commission of the offence. In 
R. v. Sheehan, 93 it was held that in cases where drunkenness and its possible effects 
upon the defendant's mens rea is an issue, the jury should not be asked to decide 
whether a defendant through drunkenness was incapable of forming a specific intention; 
they should be warned that a drunken intention is nevertheless an intention and subject 
to that, having regard to all the evidence, they should be asked whether they are 
satisfied that the defendant, at the material time, in fact had the requisite intent. 94 It has 
also been suggested that a drunken offender has intention similar to a sober man, 
88 Ibid. at pp. 501-502. 
89 Wilson, William, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory (Longman, London, 1998) p. 253. 
90 Spencer, J. R., 1994, op. cit. p. 6. 
91 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, Section 2. 
92 Robinson, Paul H., Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing Co., 1984) Vol. 11, p. 341. 
93 R. v. Sheehan [1975] 1 WLR. 739. 94 
Ibid at p. 744. 
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intoxication has only removed his inhibitions and freed his repressed desires and 
intentions thus his intention while drunk is real intention. 95 His inhibited and self- 
controlled desires are converted into actions. It would not be a defence to a criminal 
charge if the defendant had the necessary intent when the offence was committed, even 
though the intent arose out of circumstances for which he was not to be blamed. 96 
There may, however, be cases in which defendant's intoxication give rise to doubts as 
to whether he possessed the mental element of the offence charged. These cases are 
dealt with in different ways according to the offence involved. Some time, the 
defendant's intoxicated state is taken into account, with the other circumstances, in 
determining whether he had the relevant state of mind; but in other crimes the 
defendant's mental state, and hence his liability, are determined as though he had not 
been intoxicated. 97 
7.5 Use of Non-Dangerous Drugs and Criminal Liability 
How does self-induced intoxication by reason of taking a soporific or sedative drug that 
generally is not likely to cause unpredictability or aggressiveness affect the liability of 
the offender? This particular question has been discussed in R. v. Hardie; 98 `D' took a 
number of Valium tablets to calm himself when the woman with whom he had been 
living in a flat told him to leave the flat. The woman to whom the tablets belong told 
him that he could take as many as he liked, as it would do him no harm. `D' later 
returned to the flat in an intoxicated state apparently caused by the tablets he had taken 
and set the flat on fire. 
He was charged with criminal damage with intent to endanger life under section 1(2) 
and 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act, 1971. In his defence he pleaded that he did not 
have necessary mens rea due to intoxication arising from taking Valium. The defence 
was that Valium was taken for the purpose of calming the nerves only, it was an old 
stock and that the appellant was told it would do him no harm. Neither was it known 
generally nor to the accused that taking of Valium in the quantity taken would render a 
'S Comments, "Intoxication as a Criminal Law Defence" 55 (1955) Columb. L. Rev. 1210 at 1211. 
96 R. v. Kingston [1994] Crim. LR. 846. 
" The Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Consultation Paper No. 127,1993) Para. 2.2. 
9" R. v. Hardie [1985]1 WLR. 64. 
176 
intuxicatiuu in l; nhlish Lam and. SÜnri'ah 
person aggressive or incapable of appreciating risk to others or have the side effects 
such that its self administration would itself have element of recklessness. 99 
The trial court convicted the offender for the offences but the Court of Appeal quashed 
the conviction and held that "it is true that Valium is a drug and it was taken 
deliberately and not taken on medical prescription, but the drug is in our view, wholly 
different in kind from drugs which are liable to cause unpredictability or 
aggressiveness. " The decision suggests that where the accused was drunk, or was under 
any other excusing condition without his fault, he shall not be held criminally liable 
even recklessly. The decision may be criticised on a number of grounds: 
Firstly, it is a case where the accused has taken a drug without a doctor's prescription 
relying on the statement of the woman. An offender should be held voluntarily 
intoxicated where he has taken the drug without a doctor's prescription or exceeded the 
prescribed dosage. Section 6 (5) of Public Order Act, 1986 provides a defence only 
where intoxication was caused solely by taking drugs in the course of medical treatment. 
The phrase `in course of medical treatment' clearly shows that a medical practitioner 
must have prescribed the medicine and it was taken following his directions. Where the 
accused has recklessly ignored or violated the doctor's instruction, as if he exceeds the 
prescribed dosage or thereafter taken alcohol or some other drug contrary to medical 
advice, his intoxication will be voluntary. 100 In R. v. Majewski, Lord Elwyn-Jones L. C. 
opined that deliberately taking drugs without medical prescription or wilful 
consumption of alcohol cannot excuse the offender from criminal liability, even if at the 
time of the act under question he was intoxicated. 101 
Secondly, there is no specific criterion to divide drugs into dangerous and others 
because drugs may have different effects on the conduct of different human beings, if 
taken without medical prescription. Moreover, drugs can be dangerous even if used on 
prescription to cure a disease. 102 The line between sedative and aggressive drugs is not 
necessarily a clear-cut one. Indeed Valium, held to be non dangerous, causes aggressive 
9' Ibid. at pp. 69-70. 
10° Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 78. p. 619. 
101 R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC 443 at 474 
102 Bayer, R. & Oppenheimer, G. M., (eds) Confronting Drug Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1993)p. 79. 
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behaviour in some people. 103 In addition, it is strange that the determination whether a 
drug is dangerous or not is left to the discretion of a judge, without the benefit of advice 
of the specialists in this field, the pharmacists. 104 It is becoming more and more 
complicated to differentiate between dangerous and non dangerous drugs. In a case in 
Edinburgh a woman killed her five years old daughter with a claw hammer after an 
overdose of paracetamol, 105 The only plausible solution is that the jury should have 
been left to consider whether the defendant was reckless in taking the drug. 106 
Another case on the same point of law, recklessness, has been decided in a different 
way. Elliott v. C (a minor), 107 is a case, where the respondent, a school girl of 14 years 
of age, not sleeping the whole night, entered a garden shed, found white spirit, poured it 
on to carpet of the shed and ignited it. She was charged under section 1(1) of Criminal 
Damage Act 1971. The trial magistrate found her not guilty on the grounds of her age, 
immature understanding, lack of experience of dealing with inflammable spirit and the 
fact that she must have been tired and exhausted at that time. The Court of Appeal held 
her liable for criminal damage on the basis of her recklessness. The House of Lords also 
refused a petition for leave to appeal. 108 The court did not take into account the 
defendant's age and personal characteristics in determining the obviousness of risk. The 
decision has created an anomaly, Hardie could have been held liable for his reckless 
behaviour if the court had taken into account the principle laid down in the Elliott case 
and applied the provisions of the relevant section of the Criminal Damage Act, 109 
because recklessness has the same meaning through out the section. 110 
However, we must now note the significant decision of the House of Lords in R. v G, III 
a case of similar nature where two boys aged 11 and 12 respectively went camping 
without their parent's permission. In the middle of night they entered the back yard of a 
shop, set fire to some news papers and threw them under a large plastic dustbin and left 
103 Law Com. No. 229,1995, op. cit. Para 1.38. 
104 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 256. 
105 (http: //news. hhc. uk) 16 October, 2003. 
106 R. v. Hardie (1985) 80 Cr. App. R. 157. 
107 Elliotl v. C (a minor) [1983] 2 All. ER. 1005. 
108 [1983] 1 {VLR. 951. 
109 Section 1(1) of the Act states that any person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any 
property with an intention to destroy or damage or being reckless as to whether any such property 
would be destroyed or damaged, intending by such destruction to endanger the life of another, shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
110 Per Lord Diplock in R. v. Ca/dwell [ 198111 All. ER. 961 at 964. 
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without putting out the fire. They did not realise the risk that the fire would spread. The 
fire spread and the shop was burnt causing £1 million worth of damage. The boys were 
charged under section 1(1) and 1(3) of Criminal Damage Act 1971. They were 
convicted on trial and their appeals to the Court of Appeal were dismissed on the 
principle of Caldwell and Elliott that where there was an obvious risk of damage, it was 
immaterial that the defendant themselves had not foreseen the risk. The question 
whether there was an obvious risk of property being destroyed or damaged was to be 
determined by reference to a reasonable person and not by reference to person endowed 
with the defendant's characteristics. Allowing their appeal the House of Lords overruled 
the principle laid down in the above mentioned cases and held that foresight of 
consequences is a necessary ingredient of recklessness in the context of section 1 of the 
Act. 112 In order to convict the offender under the section it must be proved that he acted 
recklessly where he was aware of the risk and it was unreasonable to take that risk. If 
the defendant due to his age and personal characteristics genuinely did not foresee the 
risk involved, he could not be held liable under the section. The case adopted a 
subjective approach instead of objective one and now it is necessary to look at the 
matter in the light of how it would have appeared to the defendant. The subjective 
approach may cause certain problems particularly in cases of voluntary intoxication 
where the defendant is deprived of ability to foresee the risks involved in his conduct. 
However, the problem can be solved by applying the Majewski approach that voluntary 
intoxication is generally no defence to crimes of basic intent. 113 (as to which, see 
Chapter-8 below). 
7.6 Capacity to form Intent in Intoxicated Condition and Criminal 
Liability. 
In criminal proceedings, if it is proved that the necessary intent was present when the 
offence was committed, a defendant does not have open to him a defence of involuntary 
intoxication. The principle has been set in R. v. Kingston, 114 the defendant raised the 
defence of involuntary intoxication but there was no suggestion that he lacked mens rea 
for the offence in question. The trial judge directed the jury that if they thought that the 
accused had the necessary mens rea, then they should convict, since an intoxicated 
intent was still an intent. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on the ground that 
111 R. vG [2004] 1 AC 1034. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Per Lord Elwyn- Jones L. C. in R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC 443 at p. 471. 
114 R. v. Kingston [1994] 3 All. ER. 353. 
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he had formed an intention to indecent assault after being involuntarily intoxicated 
which he would not have formed had he been sober. 115 
The decision of the Court of Appeal led to the conclusion that the accused would have a 
defence even if he knew what he was doing, and understood the circumstances making 
it an offence provided that he would not have behaved in such a way had he been sober. 
This particular decision is contrary to the established principle of mens rea and the rule 
laid down in R. v. Sheehan. 116 Where the defendant is capable of forming intention to 
commit a crime, it is not reasonable to presume that he has not formed; rather more 
reasonable is to presume that he has formed the required intention. 
The ruling of the Court of Appeal that intent to commit an indecent assault is not 
criminal if formed in circumstances of loss of self control induced by a spiked drink was 
criticised on a large scale. 117 The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal's 
decision reaffirming the rule that involuntary intoxication would amount to defence 
only if it negates mens rea. 118 The decision retains the principle that in the presence of 
mens rea the defendant shall be convicted of an offence notwithstanding that it was 
brought about by the surreptitious administration to him of drink or drug. 
It can be summed up that involuntary intoxication could only affect criminal liability if 
it either gave rise to temporary insanity or rendered the accused incapable of having 
necessary mens rea. 119 Where intoxicating substance merely reduces or eliminates 
inhibitions, courts are unanimous in holding that no defence is created. This rule has 
been criticised in that punishing a man for doing while drunk what he would not have 
done while sober is in effect punishing him for getting drunk. 120 In the defence of the 
rule, however, it can be argued that intoxicated person usually causes harm that can be 
reduced effectively by punishing him for causing it and it is not punishing him for 
getting drunk. 121 Further, one who releases a furious dog on a helpless person is 
responsible not because he controlled the animal's actions in causing harm but because 
115 Ibid. p. 377. 
116 R. v. Sheehan [1975] 1 WLR 739. 
117 For Example See: Spencer, J. R., "Involuntary Intoxication as a Defence" 54 [1995] CLJ. 12 and 
Sullivan, G. R. "Involuntary Intoxication and Beyond" [1994] Crim . 
LR. 272. 
118 [1994] 3 WLR. 519. 
110 Perkins, R. M. & Boyce, R. N., 1982, op. cit. p. 999. 
120 Loewy, Arnold H., Criminal Law (West Publishing Co. ST. Paul, Minn., 1975) p. 240. 
121 Cross, Rupert, "Blackstone v. Bentham" (1976) 92 LQR. 516. at 526. 
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he voluntarily forfeited his control over the dog. 122 The liability of an intoxicated 
offender can be supported on the same ground. 
7.7 Is it Possible to Counterfeit the Defence of Involuntary intoxication? 
The defence of involuntary intoxication is an easy defence, which would be open to 
abuse. 123 Because burden of introducing a defence for consideration is comparable to a 
`burden of pleading' in a civil trial; it means simply that if a party wants to raise an 
issue it must say so. The party bearing the burden of pleading on a matter is a party who 
will benefit from raising the issue. In context of criminal law defences, that party is 
generally the defendant. 12' The burden of pleading is not exactly a burden and certainly 
not a true burden of proof. There is no significant quantum of evidence that the 
defendant must produce to discharge the burden. Any evidence, even a bare claim will 
be sufficient to raise the issue of defence. '25 
The burden of proving requisite intention is always on the prosecution notwithstanding 
the fact that the defence is using evidence of intoxication to establish a lack of intent. 126 
It is not for the defence to prove the innocence of the accused rather the creation of a 
reasonable doubt either by the evidence of the prosecution or the defence as to his guilt 
will be sufficient for the acquittal. 127 So in this particular case it will be the duty of the 
prosecution to prove the capacity of the accused to form intention and not the defence to 
prove his incapacity. 
The idea that the defence of intoxication is an easy defence to be counterfeited and 
variation of intoxication's effects on human behaviour is not a new one, earlier jurists 
were well aware of it. Blackstone apprehended this possibility and emphasised that the 
law should not take it into account while determining the criminal liability of the 
offender. He said, "but the law of England, considering how easy it is to counterfeit this 
excuse and how weak an excuse it is, (though real) will not suffer any man thus to 
privilege one crime by another. " 128 Hale stated that to prove the guilt of the intoxicated 
is a matter of great difficulty, partly because the condition can easily be fabricated and 
partly from the variety of its degrees, whereof some are sufficient, and some are 
insufficient to excuse the offender. 129 
122 Keiter, M., 1997, op. cit. p. 499. 
123 Spencer, J. R., 1994, op. cit. p. 9. 
124 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. Il, p. 12. 
125 Ibid. p. 13. 
126 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 597. 
127 Per Lord Sankey L. C. in Woolmington v. D. P. P. [1935] AC 462 at 481. 
128 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 25. 
129 Hale, Mathew, Sir, 1778, op. cit. F. N. 3, Ch. IV, pp. 32-33. 
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The effects of intoxicants differ from person to person; a person may counterfeit the 
condition of intoxication even if he were sober at the time of commission of the offence. 
A regular user of alcohol my develop a high tolerance for alcohol and while never 
appearing grossly intoxicated may use excessive amount of alcohol., 30 Moreover, the 
liability of the defendant is just to introduce the defence of intoxication, the burden of 
rebutting the defence lies on the prosecution, which is comparatively a difficult task. 131 
It is very easy for the defendant to assert that his drink has been spiked and it is a hard 
task for the prosecution to disprove it; and unless disproved it would usually lead to an 
acquittal, because court could never be certain beyond reasonable doubt that even 
without involuntary intoxication the defendant would still have acted as he did. 132 J. R. 
Spencer mentioning the example of such abuse in the cases of prosecution of drunk 
drivers who use the tale of spiked drink in their defence says that up to now it has been 
put forward as a special reason for not disqualifying the drivers on conviction and even 
in this limited context the higher courts have found it necessary to hedge it about with 
limitations to prevent abuse. 133 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded that involuntary intoxication per se should not constitute a defence 
where the defendant remains able to control his action and appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct. This is the rule that has been approved by `Halsbury's Laws of England' 
that involuntary intoxication is a defence, even in the crimes of basic intent, provided 
that it negatives inens rea if it does not, it cannot be a defence. 134 However, it should be 
kept in mind that the defence of intoxication should not be allowed to be misused by the 
offenders due to the probability of its easiness to be counterfeited. The only problem 
while dealing with an intoxicated offender is to ascertain whether intoxication was 
involuntary. 
The next chapter will deal with a more complicated form of intoxication defence in 
English criminal law i. e. defence of voluntary intoxication. 
130 Saunders, W. M., "Alcohol Use in Britain: How Much is Too Much? "43 (1984) Health Edu. J. 66 at 68. 
131 R. v. Stripp (1969) 69 Cr. App. R. 318. 
132 Spencer, J. R., "Involuntary Intoxication as Defence" 54 [1995] CLJ 12. 
133 Spencer, J. R., 1994, op. cit. p. 6. 
134 l-Iailsham, Lord of St. Marylebone, Halsbury's Laws of England. (4°i ed., Butterworths, London, 1990) 
Vol. 1 1(1) Para 29, p. 35. 
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CHAPTER 8 Voluntary Intoxication and Criminal Liability 
8.1 Introduction 
The focus of inquiry into criminal liability of an offender is ordinarily his state of mind 
at the time of commission of an offence. ' Intoxication poses problems because it can 
result in an inability of the accused to form required state of mind and hence allowing 
him to escape punishment for an act otherwise a crime. Requirement for the mental 
element of the act leans in favour of an intoxicated offender, whereas balance of 
practical and utilitarian concerns is tilted towards protection of society from such harm. 
The criminal law has to reconcile the two competing demands of the social protection 
and justice to the accused. 2 This chapter presents a fundamental analysis of key 
concepts of English legal doctrine in this area. It will be examined how English law 
entertains the complex situation where intoxication was brought about by the offender 
willingly. It will also be ascertained whether the rules applied in such cases are 
consistent, logical, reasonable and uniform. 
8.2 Voluntary Intoxication Defined 
Voluntary intoxication is caused by any substance which the defendant knows, or ought 
to know, have tendency to cause intoxication and which he knowingly consumed or 
allowed to be introduced into his body regardless of the fact that whilst taking it he was 
ignorant of its precise strength. 3 Voluntary intoxication is not limited to those instances 
in which intoxication was desired or intended but includes all the instances where a 
person can be blamed for it; 4 even though the effect of the amount of intoxicant taken is 
much greater than would have been expected by him. 5 Intoxication will be presumed to 
be voluntary unless some special circumstances are proved to render it involuntary. 6 
8.3 Voluntary Intoxication as a Defence to Criminal Liability 
The modern maxim "voluntary intoxication is no defence" is so universally accepted as 
not to require the citation of cases. 7 This legal rule reflects the belief that morally a 
drunken offender is at least as bad as, if not worse than, a sober one and thus should be 
treated as harshly or more so. 8 In contemporary English law where the existence of 
1 Colvin, Eric, "A Theory of the Intoxication Defence" 59 (1981) Can. Bar. Rev. 750 at 753. 
2 Wells, Celia, "Swatting the Subjective Bug" [ 1982] Crim. LR. 209 at 211. 
3 R. v. Allen [1988] Crim. LR. 698. 
4 Perkins, Rollin M. & Boyce, Ronald N., Criminal Law (3`d ed., The Foundation Press, 1982) p. 1001. 
5 Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (14`h ed., Butterworths, London, 1998) p. 604. 
6 Perkins, Rollin M. & Boyce, Ronald N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1001. 
7 Fingarette, Herbert & Hasse, Ann Fingarette, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility 
(University of California Press, 1979) p. 77. 
Perkins, Rollin M. & Boyce, Ronald N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1005. 
8 McCord, David, "The English and American History of Voluntary Drunkenness to Negate Mens rea" 
I1(1990) JLH. 372 at 375. 
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specific intent is necessary to constitute an offence, voluntary intoxication may be taken 
into account while determining that intent. It will provide no defence to criminal acts 
unless it negates the existence of specific intent. Similarly, it will be no defence in crime 
of basic intent and Dutch courage cases. 10 
8.3.1 Classical View of English Courts 
There are number of cases, as discussed in 7.2.4, of the 19`h century suggesting that 
voluntary intoxication was not a defence to any type of criminal charge. The decisions 
are based upon the principle that the law should not disregard an accused's culpability 
in causing the condition he offers as a defence. 11 As the defendant is liable for his own 
intoxication so he should not be permitted to benefit from it. 12 Even in the last quarter of 
the 20`1i century the courts retained the principle. Lord Salmon, in Majewski, stated that 
a man, who by voluntary intoxication gets himself into an aggressive state, cannot claim 
immunity from the provisions of criminal law on the ground of intoxication. 13 The 
accused might have known before he got drunk, that he was likely when drunk to 
commit acts inconsistent with the law. 14 It implies that as a matter of principle English 
courts reject voluntary intoxication as a defence. 
8.3.2 Why should Voluntary Intoxication not be a Defence? 
Where the defendant's intoxication is voluntary it is unjust that he should escape 
punishment for the harm he has caused. 15 Allowing the offender benefit of voluntary 
intoxication is to ignore the critical fact that he may have culpably caused his own 
intoxication for the commission of the offence. 16 It is potentially dangerous that he 
should avoid the control imposed by criminal law and would be unreasonable to leave 
the citizens legally unprotected from unprovoked violence resulting from voluntary 
intoxication. 17 It is admitted that voluntary intoxication should not be considered as a 
"18 defence because it is "wholly inconsistent with the concept of reasonable man. 
9 Perkins, Rollin M. & Boyce, Ronald N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1008. 
10 Intending to commit a crime and subsequently voluntarily consumption of intoxicating substance, to 
acquire courage, for commission of the intended crime is called Dutch courage (Per Lord Denning in 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland v. Gallagher [ 1961 ] All. ER. 299 at 314. 
Robinson, Paul H., Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing Co., 1984) Vol. 1, p. 295. 
12 Parker, Graham, "Criminal Law-Mens rea-General Principles-Intoxication as a Defence" 55 (1977) 
Can. Bar. Rev. 691 at 699. 
Tuckman, Alan J., "Involuntary Intoxication and Criminal Liability" Psychiatry & the Law, July- 
August 2001, p. 2. 
13 R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at 482 
14 Austin, John, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5th ed., John Murray, London, 1885) Vol. I, p. 496. 
Is The Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (The Law Commission Consultation Paper 
No. 127,1993) Para. 1.3 p. 2. 
16 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 295. 
1' Per Lord Simon., R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at 476. 
18 Per Lord Taylor CJ in R. v. Morhall [ 1993] 4 All. ER 888 at 893. 
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Society is entitled to punish those who of their own free will render themselves so 
intoxicated as to pose a threat to other members of the community. 19 Many members of 
society would find it abhorrent that a person who has caused the actus reus of a crime 
should escape liability because he has got himself into such a state that he did not know 
what he was doing. 20 The act of voluntary intoxication is itself judged irresponsible and 
the consequences must be paid for. 21 Moreover, the threat of punishment may cause a 
person either to abstain or to moderate his intake of intoxicants and to self control. 22 
8.3.3 Logic behind the Principle 
Alcohol use is so intimately woven into the fabric of English society that it is very 
difficult to determine what is and what is not alcohol related. 23 If the intoxicated 
offenders were to be exempted from criminal liability then there is no need to establish 
a criminal judicial system. 24 Intoxication does not afford any defence to a criminal 
charge because its dangerous effects on human behaviour are commonly known. 25 The 
general principle of English law is that subject to very limited exceptions self-induced 
drunkenness is no defence to a criminal charge. 26 However, the statement can be 
justified only if we take into account certain categories of crimes, as far as the number 
of crimes is concerned these are too numerous to constitute "very limited" exceptions. 27 
8.3.4 Exceptions to the General Principle 
There are two situations where voluntary intoxication may serve to acquit an accused . 
28 
Firstly, where alcohol reduces him to a condition in which he is wholly unable to judge 
his actions; if excessive drinking causes actual insanity, such as delirium tremens, then 
19 Per Sopinke J., Daviault v. R (1975) 118 DLR (4`h) 469 at 471 
20 Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (4`h ed., Sweet & Maxwell London, 1994) p. 172. 
21 Beck, Stanley, M., & Parker, Graham E. "The Intoxicated Offender: A Problem of Responsibility" 44 
(1966) Can. Bar Rev. 563 at 573. 
22 Williams, Glanville, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1983) p. 466. 
23 Alcohol and the Public Health: A Study by a Working Party of the Faculty of Public Health Medicine 
of the Royal Colleges of Physicians on the Prevention of Harm Related to the use of Alcohol and other 
Drugs (Macmillan, London, 1991) p. 23. 
24 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox. C. C. 306 at 308. 
25 Atkinson, Charles Milner (Translated from French to English) Bentham's Theory of Legislation: 
Principles of the Penal Code (Oxford University Press, 1914) Vol. 11, p. 35. 
26 As per Lord Denning in Attorney General of Northern Ireland v. Gallagher [ 1963] AC 349 at 380. 
Mclean, Ian & Morrish, Peter, Harris's Criminal Law (22"" ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) p. 94. 
27 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 596. 
28 Per Lord Denning in Attorney General for N. Ireland v. Gallagher (1961) 45 Cr. App. R. 316 at pp. 342-43. 
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M' Naghten29 rule will be applied in exactly the same way as insanity raises from any 
other cause. 30 
Secondly, where insanity is shown not to exist, intoxication can be a defence only if it 
destroys specific intention or renders the accused incapable of forming such intention. 31 
This exception is controversial, there are certain authorities mentioning that it is not the 
incapacity of the defendant to form specific intention rather actual absence of intention 
at the time of commission of the offence affords him a defence. R. v. Garlick 32 clearly 
proves that when intoxication is raised as a defence to a crime of specific intent, the 
question in issue is not the defendant's capacity to form the necessary intent but simply 
whether he did form such intent. 33 As intoxication would seem to negate the necessary 
element of an offence, requisite intent, the prosecution shall be liable to prove it. 
It is important to emphasise that intoxication itself does not negative mens rea and 
hence does not affect criminal liability. Stephen J. in R. v. Doherty34 held that, "A 
drunken man may form an intention to kill another, or to do grievous bodily harm to 
him, or he may not; but if he did form that intention, although a drunken intention, he is 
just as much guilty of murder as if he had been sober. "35 The statement suggests that a 
drunken intention is as dangerous and wicked as a sober one. 36 
Another exception may be added to these two that where any statute expressly provides 
that a particular belief shall be a defence to the offence charged; the accused is entitled 
to take the benefit of his voluntary intoxication if he committed the offence with this 
29 M' Naghten rule can simply be stated as that an insane person is guilty of the offence committed, unless 
the disease was so severe that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. Robertson, Geoffrey, Freedom. The 
Individual and the Law (Penguin Books, London, 1993) p. 434. 
30 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8°i ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) p. 235. 
Lord Hailsham of ST. Marylebone, Halsbury's Law of England (4`h ed., Butterworths, London, 1991) 
Vol. 11 (1) Para. 30, p. 35 
31 Stewart, S. W. A Modern View of the Criminal Law (Pergamon Press, Oxford, London, 1969) p. 121. 
Fitzgerald, P. J, Criminal Law and Punishment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) p. 144. 
R. D. Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) p. 150. 
32 R. v. Garlick [1981] Crim. L. R. 178; (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 291. 
33 Elliott, D. W. & Allen, Michael J., Elliott & Wood's Casebook on Criminal Law (6`h ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1993) p. 255. 
34 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox. C. C. 306. 
35 Ibid. at p. 308. 
36 Perkins, Rollin M. & Boyce, Ronald N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1012. 
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belief. 37 For example, the Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 5(2) provides that a 
person has a defence or a lawful excuse as per section 1(1) to a charge of criminal 
damages if he believed that he had the consent of the person entitled to give consent and 
section 5 (3) provides that "it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not if it is 
honestly held. " The exception was applied in. laggard's case. 38 
8.3.5 Is the Quantity of Intoxicant Consumed Related to the Defence of 
Intoxication? 
In order to establish the defence of intoxication it is not sufficient to prove that the 
accused had been drinking heavily, for the effect of alcohol varies significantly from 
person to person. 39 There is no standard concerning what level of alcohol consumption 
causes intoxication sufficient for legal purposes. 40 Many people reach a level which 
may be regarded by others as intoxication, nevertheless they are still fully aware of what 
they are doing; alcohol has simply made them more aggressive or less inhibited. 41 
This fact has been proved in R. v. Tandy, 42 the appellant's blood at the time of the 
offence in question contained approximately 300 to 400 mgs of alcohol per 100 ml of 
blood, a lethal intake for a normal person. Nevertheless, evidence showed that her 
movements were co-ordinated, her speech was all right and she displayed no clinical 
evidence of intoxication. It can be argued that the criterion fixed by some experts that an 
intoxicated state is readily observable through slurred speech, impaired and abnormal 
co-ordination, relaxation of inhibition and rowdiness43 is not reliable under certain 
circumstances. Intoxication may show that an accused has no intention of committing 
the offence under question yet he may have sufficient control of his senses to be able to 
contemplate it and so to be guilty. 44 
8.3.6 Degree of Voluntary Intoxication that may Provide Defence 
As mentioned above that in certain cases voluntary intoxication may provide a defence 
to a criminal charge. Now the question arises whether an ordinary state of intoxication 
will suffice or there should be a certain level or degree of it? Voluntary intoxication at 
37 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 604. 
38 Jaggard v. Dickson [ 1981 ] QB 527; [ 1980] 3 All ER 716. 
39 Jefferson, Michael, Criminal Law (3`a ed. Pitman Publishing, London, 1997) p. 253. 
Mitchell, Chester N, `The Intoxicated Offender: Refuting the Legal and Medical Myths 1I (1988) Int. 
J. Law and Psychiatry 77 at 86. 
4° Simester, A P. & Sullivan, G R., Criminal Law: Theory & Doctrine (Hart Publishing, 2000) p. 555. 
41 Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) p. 195. 
42 R. v. Tandy (1988) 87 Cr. App. Rep. 45. 
43 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 342-43. 
Anderson, Peter, The British Medical Association Guide to Alcohol and Accidents (B. M. A., 1989) p. 11. 44 Turner, J. W. Cecil, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (19°i ed., University Press, Cambridge, 1966) p. 64. 
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best affords a defence only if it creates mental confusion excluding the possibility of 
forming specific intent; 45 simple removal of inhibitions cannot be relevant. 46 The 
capacity to form intention leads to presumption of its existence and the accused will be 
criminally liable even if he did not have the intention at the material time. 47 It may 
amount to a defence only where the state of intoxication is akin to insanity or reaches 
blind intoxication. The proposition has been confirmed not only by English criminal law 
but also by certain other common law jurisdictions. 
In Stubbs's case O'Conner L. J. held that defence of intoxication requires that 
drunkenness be very extreme before it shall be allowed to influence the prosecution's 
case. 48 In New Zealand, in Kamipeli, 49 the trial judge directed the jury that for the 
negation of intention necessary to constitute an offence the degree of intoxication must 
be very marked, the accused must be so drunk that he could be described as blind 
drunk. 50 In a Canadian case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that only drunkenness 
of the extreme degree, approaching the boundaries of insanity, or akin to automatism, is 
relevant in criminal proceeding. 5 
The above opinions suggest that intoxication can be considered as a defence only where 
it is extreme and approaches the boundaries of insanity, rendering the accused incapable 
of forming requisite inens rea. 52 But still a question remains unanswered that how in 
such a blind condition of intoxication can the drunkard control his body movements to 
commit the offences without being able to form intention? The answer is simple that 
since the degree of intoxication which would render the accused incapable of forming 
the requisite intent is unlikely to be short of unconsciousness, if the jury were directed 
in such a way intoxication could hardly be a defence. 53An offender having a slightly 
less degree of intoxication might be capable of forming intent to commit a crime. 54 
Though it cannot be decided with certainty as to how much a person can be affected by 
an intoxicant and still be capable of forming an intoxicated intent yet he must be 
45 Perkins, Rollin M. & Boyce, Ronald N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1013. 
4' Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, 1999, op. cit. p. 192. 
47 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 605. 
48 Stubbs (1989) Cr. App. R. 53. 
49 Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610. 
50 Ibid. at p. 612. 
51 Daviault v. R (1975) 118 DLR (0) 469 at 479. 
52 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 774. 
53 Note, "Intoxication as a Criminal Defence"55 (1955) Colum. L. Rew. 1210 at p. 1214. 
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sufficiently intoxicated as to be lacking full mental capacities rendering it questionable 
whether he would be physically capable of performing the criminal act. 
8.3.7 Nature of Voluntary Intoxication Defence in English Criminal Law 
There is, perhaps, no other legal issue except defence of voluntary intoxication, on 
which courts have so widely differed or so often changed their views. 55 Voluntary 
intoxication and the manner in which it affects criminal liability of an accused have 
continued to be the subject of extensive criticism. The reason for this criticism is closely 
related to the fact that the law on the point is based upon policy considerations, 56 
contradictory to the basic principles underlying criminal liability, with the result that the 
law has developed in a haphazard and unsatisfactory manner. 57 
The policy as described by Lord Salmon states that it would shock the public and would 
rightly bring the law into contempt, if the drunkard were allowed to go free; moreover, 
it would certainly increase one of the really serious dangers facing society today. 58 The 
public will be annoyed at the proposition that a person could escape criminal liability on 
the basis of his drunkenness. 59 In addition, one of the main functions of the criminal law 
is to exercise a general deterrent so as to protect major social interests. Any legal system 
that allows intoxication to negative mens rea would lead offenders down an easy route 
to exemption from the punishment they deserve. Indeed, the more intoxicated they 
become, the less likely they'would be to be held criminally liable for any harm caused 
in that condition. 60 This may be the reason that current public opinion is probably 
moving even more towards the condemnation of intoxication as a defence. 61 
The rationale for this is quite straight forward; the consumption of alcohol lessens 
inhibition and self control, frequently causing ill-considered and stupid behaviour. The 
issue presents the choice of whether the magnitude of an offence should be measured 
from the objective viewpoint of the community or the subjective perspective of the 
Sd Perkins, R. M. & Boyce, Ronald N., 1982, op. cit. p. 1001. 
55 Keiter, Mitchell, "Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of Intoxication Defence" 87 [1977] JCL 482 
at 482. 
56 1lorder, J., "Sobering up? The Law Commission on Criminal Intoxication" 58 (1995) MLR 534 at 535. 
S' Mackay, R. D., 1995, op. cit. p. 148. 
" R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at 484 and Per Lord Edmund-Davies at 495. 
59 The Law Commission Report, Legislating the Criminal Code (Law Com. No. 229,1995) Para 5.23. 
60 Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (3`d ed., Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 221. 
61 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 174. 
Keiter, Mitchell, 1977, op. cit. p. 482. 
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offender. 62 From objective view point, the maintenance of public security, peace and 
order, demands that an intoxicated person should be held strictly liable for all his acts, 
whereas subjectively it is unjust to blame a person for an offence which due to his 
intoxication he was incapable of intending. 63 
No one would appreciate that the breach of criminal law should result in acquittal. 
Merely the fact that the defendant acted in an intoxicated condition, in a way he would 
not have acted had he been sober does not assist him at all provided that the necessary 
intent was there. A drunken intent is nevertheless intent. 64 There seems little doubt that 
the vast majority of drunken offenders fall within this category and do in fact have the 
required mens rea at the time of commission of the offence. 65 There are, however, rare 
cases in which the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea due to intoxication. 66 
8.3.7 Intoxication and Abnormality of Mind under Section 2(1) of the Homicide 
Act 1957 
Normal human beings frequently drink to excess and when drunk do not suffer from 
abnormality of mind, within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. The 
section provides that a person shall not be convicted of murder if suffering from such 
abnormality of mind induced due to inherent causes or by disease or injury which 
substantially impairs mental responsibility for his acts or omissions. It suggests that the 
section does not recognise intoxication as a disease of mind or abnormality. The view 
has further been strengthened by the opinion of the Law Commission which expressly 
excluded intoxication from mental abnormality. 67 Abnormality of mind within section 2 
(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 is so obvious that a reasonable man would term it 
abnormal. 68 A transitory malfunctioning of mind caused by some external factor, such 
as alcohol or a blow to the head or failure to take food to neutralise the effect of insulin, 
is not a disease of mind . 
69 However, a permanent damage to brain caused by drink 
would be a disease of mind within the section70 and similarly such an abnormality so as 
to impair mental responsibility of the offender. 71 
62 Notes, "Constructive Murder- Drunkenness in Relation to Mens Rea" 34 (1920-21) Har. L. Rev. 78 at 80. 
63 Keiter, Mitchell, 1977, op. cit. p. 488. 
64 R. v. Sheehan [1975] 2 AII. ER. 960. 
GS Mackay, R. D., 1995, op. cit. pp. 148-49. 
66 Mitchell, Chester N., 1988, op. cit. p. 79. 
6' The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com. No. 177,1977) Clause 56. 68 Per Lord Parker C. J., in R. v. Byrne [ 1960] 2 QB 396 at 403. 69Rv. Bailey[ 1983] 2 All ER 503; R v. Quick [ 1973] QB 9 10. 70 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (10°i ed., Butterworths, LexisNexis, 2002) p. 249. 71Rv. Spriggs [1958] 1 QB 270; [1958] 2 WLR 162; [1958] 1 All. ER 300. 
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Considering this statutory provision in R. v. Fenton, 72 the trial judge ruled that the effect 
of alcohol consumed by the defendant was to be ignored since it did not amount to 
abnormality of mind due to inherent cause. Accordingly he directed the jury that they 
must convict of murder if satisfied that the combined effect of the factors other than 
alcohol was substantially insufficient to impair the mental responsibility of the 
defendant. The Court of Appeal upheld the direction. 73 The same principle was 
maintained in R. v. Gittens. 74 However, in R. v. Turnbu11,75 the issue left for the jury was 
whether intoxication or the abnormality of mind was the main factor in killing. In this 
case Court of Appeal also held that the jury had been correctly directed. 76 This is an 
entirely different direction to that by trial judge in R. v. Fenton, but strangely enough, 
the Court of Appeal went on to hold that the defendant must show that his abnormality 
of mind substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts notwithstanding the 
effect of alcohol, which is the direction that was given in Fenton's case. 
These authorities suggest that abnormality of mind caused by intoxication is immaterial 
and not a relevant evidence to be considered by the jury under section 8 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967. The decisions of the cases and the interpretation of the relevant 
provision of section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 by the courts seems contrary to the 
law as confirmed by the House of Lords in R. v. Majewski77 which states that the 
intoxication may be considered altogether with all other evidence in deciding whether 
an accused possessed the mens rea of an offence of specific intent. 78 
It can be concluded that taking intoxication as defence is a problematic issue for 
exculpation of the offenders or mitigation of their punishment. Intoxication per se will 
not substantially impair responsibility within the terms of section 2(1) of Homicide Act 
1957, however broadly its terms are interpreted. Nonetheless the courts have recognised 
that alcoholism is a disease which falls within the section. 79 
72 R. v. Fenton (1975) 61 Cr. App. R. 261. 
" Ibid. p. 263 
74 R. v. Gittens (1984) 79 Cr. App. R. 272. 
75 R. v. Turnbull (1977) 65 Cr. App. R. 242. 
'G Ibid. p. 243. 
77 R. v. Majewski [1976] 2 AII. ER. 142. 
78 Boland, Fay, "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" 60 (1996) JCL. 100. 
79 Sullivan, G. R., "Intoxicants and Diminished Responsibility" [1994] Crim. LR. 156 at 156. 
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8.3.9 Voluntary Intoxication and Insanity 
Many serious crimes are committed under the influence of intoxication. Although in this 
particular condition mental illness is not involved, nevertheless the defendant may wish 
to claim that because of his voluntary ingestion of drug or alcohol, he experienced some 
thing like temporary insanity. 80 Could he raise the defence of insanity? Is this claim 
admissible? Logically, it might be argued that the intoxication defence should, like 
insanity, preclude criminal liability. The accused in the acute intoxication condition may 
have lost power of self-control, his ability to make judgments may be impaired and he 
may be incapable of foreseeing the consequences of his acts, yet both the situations are 
quite distinct and cannot be treated alike. 
Intoxication itself is not regarded as disease affecting mind: but disease caused by it, so 
far as it affects the mind. 81 If the accused's voluntary intoxication does not amount to 
insanity but only reduces his capacity to resist temptation, it will be no defence. 82 The 
distinction between temporary insanity and mere intoxication is still upheld by the 
academic authorities on criminal law. 83 Logically it is quite reasonable to distinguish 
between a mad and a bad man. Though sometime it is opined that the distinction 
between the two is far from clear-cut, 84 yet the opinion can be discarded on the ground 
that if we take into account the cause and not the effect both the conditions can easily be 
distinguished. 85 
It is not reasonable to annex disturbance of mind caused due to voluntary intoxication 
with insanity. A person who is insane will be acquitted because he is not responsible for 
his condition and hence not liable for the acts done in that condition in contrast to a 
voluntary intoxicated person. 86 Treating voluntary intoxication differently from insanity 
may also be justified on the basis that conviction and punishment may deter the 
R0 Dressler, Joshua, Understanding Criminal Law (2'' ed., Matthew Bender, USA, 1995) pp. 203-204. 
Stephen, J. F., Sir, A Digest of the Criminal Law (9th ed., Sweet & Maxwell London, 1950) Article. 8, p. 7. 
Per Stephen J., in R. v. Davis (1881) 14 Cox. C. C. 563 at 564. 
82 Crispin, W. L., Stephen's Commentaries on the Law of England (2151 ed., Butterworths, 1950) Vol. IV, p. 19. 
83 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 235. 
84 Ibid. 
as It is worth mentioning here that initially common law rejected the defence of temporary insanity caused 
by voluntary intoxication. See Hale, Sir Mathew, Pleas of the Crown (London, 1778) Ch. IV., p. 32. 
The same view has been confirmed by the judges of the 19th and the 20th century as Per Holroyd J in 
William Rannie's Case (1825) 1 Lewin 76,168 ER 965 and Per Lawton L. J. in R. v. Quick [1973] 1 
QB 910 at 922. C. L. R. C. also admitted that voluntary intoxication short of insanity is no defence even 
if it negates the mental element of the crime. C. L. R. C. Offences Against the Person, 14'h Report, 1980 
(Cmnd. 7844) Para. 257, p. 111. 
86 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 466. 
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offender, in future from becoming intoxicated and re-offending. 87 Moreover, it may be 
argued that insanity is not a defence to the crimes of specific intent only; rather it 
affords a valid defence to the crimes of basic intent as well. 88 Whereas, voluntary 
intoxication is no defence to the crime of basic intent unless it results into legal insanity 
of a more than transitory nature. 89 In this case it will be a defence of insanity and not 
intoxication. It can further be said that alcohol and other drugs being external causes 
only in very rare cases will lead to insanity. 90 However, continuous use of intoxicants, 
after a period of time, so debilitate the mind that the mental faculties of the person are 
destroyed and in this condition the appropriate defence is insanity and not intoxication. 
Insanity can be distinguished from intoxication on another ground that a person who 
successfully sets up a defence of insanity is not released; he goes to a psychiatric 
hospital for as long as he is thought to be a danger to the public. 91 On the other hand, an 
alcoholic or drug addict who is convicted of crime need not to be punished, the court 
may put him on probation for treatment. 92 The comparison suggests that it is not 
reasonable to link intoxication with insanity. 
8.3.10 Voluntary Intoxication and Duress 
Defence of duress is one of the excuse defences; it arises where the accused commits 
the aclus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea but under a threat of harm to him 
or to another person. 93 In English law there is almost consensus of opinion that the 
defence of duress is not available to an accused who voluntarily and with knowledge as 
to its nature joined a criminal gang, knowing that members of the gang might bring 
pressure on him to commit offences. 94 The view has been confirmed by the Court of 
Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (4`h ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., 1997) p. 138. 
88 Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (15`h ed., Butterworths, London, 2001) p. 631. 
89 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 181. 
90 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 255. 
91 Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. F. N. 70, p. 217. 
92 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 466. 
Fingarette, Herbert, & Hasse, Ann Fingarette, 1979, op. cit. p. 5. 
93 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 632. 
94 R. v. Shepherd (1988) 86 Cr. App. R. 47; [1987] Crim. LR. 686. 
Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 637. 
Reed, Allan, & Seago Peter, 1999, op. cit. pp. 223-24. 
Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 248. 
Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 219. 
Simester, AP. & Sullivan, GR., 2000, op. cit. F. N. 40, p. 592. 
Elliott, Catherine & Quinn, Frances, Criminal Law (4`h ed., Longman, London, 2002) p. 294. 
Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 200. 
Scanlan, G. & Ryan, C., An Introduction to Criminal Law (Financial Training Publications, 1985) p. 184. 
193 
in[Ulicatl(HI in English Law and. Shari'u! i 
Appeal in the Sharp 95 and Fitzpatrick 96 cases. The principle is universally recognised 
and embodied in the criminal laws of almost all the civilised nations of the world like 
Canada, 97 New Zealand, 98 U. S. A., 99 Australia, 100 Pakistan, 101 and India. 102 The logic 
behind the principle is that the accused voluntarily exposes and submits himself to 
illegal duress to which he was subjected; he cannot claim it as an excuse either in 
respect of the crimes he commits against his will or in respect of his continued but 
unwilling association with the gang. 
8.3.10.1 Similarity between the two Situations 
How does this condition resemble voluntary intoxication? The question can simply be 
answered that physiological and psychological effects of intoxicants are generally 
known even to moderate drinkers. 103 In cases of voluntary intoxication the accused 
knows the tendencies of intoxicant and its effects, he knows that intoxicants can cause 
disinhibitions and he may lose control of his body and mind which may lead to an 
offensive conduct that would not otherwise occur. He should not be entitled to any 
exemption from criminal liability, like the case of joining a gang of criminals. That is 
the most appropriate and logical principle to bring uniformity in the realm of criminal 
liability. As already mentioned English law of intoxication is based upon policy rather 
than principle, 104 such contradictions and inconsistencies are not unusual. 
8.3.11 Voluntary Intoxication and Mistake 
Apart from intoxication, a defendant's mistaken belief as to fact may operate to prevent 
a conviction105 provided that the mistake causes a condition of lack of mens rea or 
affords a legally recognised excuse. 106 A genuine even unreasonable mistake will 
exempt the defendant if it negates the definitional element of the offence or generate a 
belief that elements of a valid defence are present. 107 It would not be justified to punish 
an accused when owing to a genuine mistake of fact he acts without any criminal 
intention or believes that he is acting lawfully. 108 
95 R. v. Sharp [1987] 1QB 853; [1987] 3 All ER 103. 
96 R. v. Fitzpatrick [1977] NILR 20. 
97 Canadian Criminal Code, s. 17. 
98 New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, s. 24. 
99 The New York Penal Code 1967, s 35.35. 
100 The Tasmanian Criminal Code, s. 20. 
101 Pakistan Penal Code 1861, s. 94. 
102 Indian Penal Code 1861, s. 94. 
103 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 607. 
10' Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (6' ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., 2001) p. 153. 
l°s The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993 op. cit. Para. 2.24. 
106 Simester, A P., & Sullivan G R., 2000, op. cit. F. N. 40, p. 543. 1071bid p. 560; J. C. Smith, 2002, op. cit. F. N. 70, p. 237. 1 °R 13eckford v. The Queen [ 1988] 1 AC 130 at p. 142; R. v. Fennell [ 1971 ]1 QB 428 at 431. 
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Intoxicated mistake falls under the ordinary rules of mistake; intoxication is merely a 
circumstantial evidence to prove it. 109 There is no logical distinction between a mistake 
resulting from voluntary intoxication and the mistake that do not. 110 A man may commit 
a mistake whether he is drunk or sober. ' 11 Should a person who, because he is drunk, 
under a mistaken belief does certain criminal acts be allowed to use that mistake as a 
defence against a criminal charge? Does the English criminal law treat both the 
mistakes under the same principles? To answer the questions we will take into account 
some decided cases. 
In Jaggard v. Dickson, 112 the defendant, in voluntary intoxicated condition, caused 
damage to the property of another which she mistakenly believed to be her friend's. She 
was charged under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 but relied on the 
defence afforded by section 5(2) (a) and (3) of the same Act which provides a defence 
to a charge of criminal damages if the defendant believes that the owner of the property 
would have consented to such damages. The Court of Appeal held that since the 
defendant had honestly believed that she would have had permission to cause the 
damage, she had a defence to the charge albeit her belief was founded on self-induced 
intoxication. 
This decision creates very abnormal results and it is very hard to follow the statutory 
interpretation adopted by the court. The decision implies that a person who because of 
his intoxication does not intend to damage property, or mistakenly believes it to be his 
own, will be guilty. 113 However, if he damages another's property believing that it 
belongs to a third party consenting to the damage, he is not guilty. 114 May it not leave 
the public unprotected against alcoholics and junkies who are social danger? Suppose a 
man sets fire to a building, and in his defence he says that he was intoxicated and 
believed that he had been allowed by the owner to burn it down. Assuming that he is 
believed, or not disbelieved, would he still has a concrete defence? A court will 
109 Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. F. N. 70, p. 241. 
R. v. Gamlen (1858) 1F&F 90; 175 ER 639. 
110 Milgate, H. P., "Intoxication, Mistake and the Public Interest" [1987] CLI381 at 382. 111 Keiter, Mitchell, 1997, op. cit. p. 498. 
112 Jaggard v. Dickson [ 1981 ] QB 527; [ 1980] 3 All ER. 716. 
113 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. pp. 178-79. 
114 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 265. 
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obviously wish very strongly to convict on such facts but no distinction can be found 
between this hypothetical and the facts in Jaggard case. 115 
In R. v. 0' Grady, 116 Lord Lane C. J. held that a mistaken belief in the existence of 
right of self-defence, caused by voluntary intoxication, is no defence. 117 The decision 
introduced a further anomaly into the intoxication law that is already rife with difficulty. 
For example, if an intoxicated offender commits homicide; he will be charged with 
murder, a crime of specific intent. Applying Majewski rule, if the jury are in any doubt 
as to his mens rea; he will be convicted of manslaughter only. However, in the same 
condition if he mistakenly believed that he was acting in self-defence, O'Grady rule 
does not allow him to rely on the defence and he will be convicted of murder., 18 It 
suggests that intoxication was relevant to intent but not to self-defence. ' 19 It is hard to 
justify such a distinction or to keep the issue of mistake and intent apart since they are 
merely different ways of looking at the same issue. 120 The distinction leads to the result 
that a mistaken belief of a sober man in existence of the circumstances of right of self- 
defence will provide a defence while a similar mistake in drunken state will not. 121 
The case suggests that if a defendant mistakenly acts in self-defence and is drunk, the 
mistake will be ignored even if it is not attributable to drunkenness, and perhaps even if 
it is a perfectly reasonable mistake. This is surely absurd. If a person makes the kind of 
mistake that he would have made when sober, i. e. a reasonable mistake, he should be 
entitled to a defence even if he is intoxicated because in such circumstances the 
intoxication is irrelevant. 122 Lord Lane's judgement in this case is unsupportable in 
terms of principle rather it was a policy decision. He considered that where an innocent 
15 Williams, Glanville, "Two Nocturnal Blunders" 140 (1990) NLJ 1564 at 1565. 
The proposition that an intoxicated mistake of fact entitles an accused to be treated as if his belief 
were true appears strange for two reasons. Firstly, the courts have been manifestly reluctant to allow 
intoxication to operate as defence. Secondly, the courts have often insisted that mistakes must be 
reasonable if they are to excuse (See, Ashworth, A. J., "Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability" (1975) 
91 LQR. 102 at 119 and Rose (1884) 15 Cox. C. C. 540; Chisham [1963] 47 Cr. App. R. 130). Whereas 
intoxicated mistake could be unreasonable. (Simester, A P., & Sullivan G R., 2000, op. cit. F. N. 40, 
p. 560). Since, a fortiori, an intoxicated mistake cannot be reasonable it would seem that a mistake as 
to matter of excuse cannot excuse. 
116 R. v. O'Grady [ 19871 QB 995; [ 1987] 3 WLR 321. 
117 Per Lord Lane R v. O'Grady [ 1987] 3 WLR 321 at 326. 
118 Ibid. p. 384. 
119 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 265. 
120 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 178. 
121 Milgate, H. P., 1987, op. cit. p. 382. 
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victim has been killed because of a drunken mistake, it is not acceptable that the 
defendant should leave the court without blame. In fact, a defendant would not leave the 
court without a conviction as he could be convicted of an offence of basic intent. 123 This 
judgement is contradictory to his own judgement in Williams's 124 case that was 
confirmed by Privy Council in Beckford. 125 O'Grady creates an exception to the 
principle, confirmed in the two cases mentioned above that a mistake of fact, however 
unreasonable is relevant to the jury's consideration of self-defence. 126 
The Law Commission rejected the dictum in O'Grady's case by saying that conviction 
for murder would not be justifiable if the accused thought, for whatever reason, that he 
was acting in self-defence and who would have been acting reasonably if he had been 
sober. 127 The C. L. R. C. also held that there should be no difference between the evidence 
of voluntary intoxication adduced in relation to a defence and to negate the intent. 128 
Now we take into account the effect of mistake in the offence of rape. Section 1(1) of 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 states that a man commits rape if he has 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent knowing or being 
reckless that she does not consent. It means that if the defendant mistakenly believes in 
the consent of the woman, he is not guilty of rape, because lack of belief in her consent 
is an ingredient of crime. 129 As the offence of rape requires intent to have sexual 
intercourse without the woman's consent, therefore, intoxication can negative such 
intent. 130 Let us see, how English law deals with the situation. 
The rule that a defendant cannot be convicted of rape if he believed, albeit mistakenly, 
that the woman consented, even though he has no reasonable grounds for that belief was 
upheld in R. v. Morgan131 However, in R. v. Woods132 where the appellant with three 
122 Clarkson, C. M. V., & Keating, H. M., Criminal Law: Text & Material (3d ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1994) p. 403. 
123 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. F. N. 87, p. 143. 
124 Williams (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276. 
125 Beckford v. Queen [1987] 3 WLR 611. 
126 Milgate, I I. P., 1987, op. cit. p. 382. 
127 Law Com. No. 177,1977, op. cit. Para 8.42. 
128 C. L. R. C., 141h Report. Cmnd. 7844,1980, op. cit. Para. 277. 129 Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., 1994, op. cit. p. 403. 
Notes, "Intoxication as a Criminal Law Defence" 55 [1955] Columb. L. R. 1210 at 1214. 130 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 595. 131 R. v. Morgan [1975] 2 All. ER 347; [1976] AC 182; [1975] 2 WLR 913. (Contrary to the Morgan 
approach, The Sexual Offences Bill introduced into the House of Lords in 2003 indicates the biggest 
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other young men was charged with the rape of a young girl. The jury were directed that 
the appellant's self induced intoxication afford him no defence to the allegation that he 
was reckless as to whether the girl consented to sexual intercourse. An interesting point 
is that in Jaggard v. Dickson the court held that the accused is not guilty of criminal 
damage if he believed in consent; however a drunken accused is guilty of rape if he 
believed mistakenly in the woman's consent, 133 although in both the cases the offences 
are of basic intent. 
In R. v. Fotheringham, 134 the accused made a drunken mistake with respect to identity 
of the woman with whom he was having sexual intercourse. The jury were directed that 
they had to ask themselves whether there were reasonable grounds for the accused to 
believe that he was having sexual intercourse with his wife. The accused was convicted 
of rape. This decision may be criticised; on one view of Majewski, drunkenness supplies 
recklessness. In this case, however, the accused did not make a mistake as to reckless 
element, consent, but as to an clement defined solely in terms of intent. The accused did 
not intend to have unlawful sexual intercourse rather he intended to have it with his wife. 
His mistake was as to the identity of the woman and drunkenness explains why it was 
made. Rape is a crime of basic intent as to consent, but is a crime of specific intent in 
relation to the victim not being his wife. 135 It is unlikely that courts will hold that the 
answer to the question whether rape is a specific or basic intent crime depends on with 
regard to which element of the offence the accused has made a mistake136 It could also 
be argued that although a drunken rapist is culpable but he is not as culpable as a 
deliberate rapist hence his crime should not be treated as rape rather some lesser offence 
such as negligent sexual invasion. 137 The offence would differ from rape to the same 
extent as manslaughter from murder. Moreover, if there ought to be a distinction 
overhaul of this area of the criminal law. Clause 76 of the Bill sets up a rebuttable presumption that 
the complainant did not consent to penetration in certain circumstances. The Explanatory Notes to the 
Bill indicate the intention is to require the defendant to adduce positive evidence of his own. A further 
presumption is that the defendant is to be taken not to have believed that the complainant consented 
unless he proves that he did believe it. The Explanatory Notes envisage a legal burden of proof on the 
defendant on the balance of probabilities. (http: //www. publications. parliament. uk2004. 
132 R. v. Woods (Walter) (1982) 74 Crim. App. R. 312. 
"' Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 266. 
134 R. v. Fotheringham (1989) 88 Crim. App. R. 206. 
135 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 263. 
1361bid. 
137 Wells, Celia, 1982, op. cit. p. 213. 
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between the negligent and the reckless, why not a similar distinction between the 
reckless and the intentional? 138 
It suggests that in English law, there was no uniform and consistent rule to deal with the 
situation. In certain cases, defence of voluntary intoxication has been successfully 
pleaded on the basis that it has led to mistake as to essential element of the offence, 
139 
whereas in others it has been totally rejected, highlighting the arbitrariness and 
complexity of the principles of criminal liability of an intoxicated offender. An attempt 
has been made in 2003 to remove the ambiguity by defining the offence of rape newly 
and fixing a criterion for determining the reasonable belief of the accused in the consent 
of the victim. Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 states that a person shall be 
convicted of rape if he penetrates, with his penis, the vagina, anus or mouth of the non 
consenting victim and does not have a reasonable belief that the victim consents. 
Section 1(2) describing the criteria to determine the reasonable belief of the accused 
states that all the circumstances, including any steps taken by the accused to ascertain 
the consent of the victim shall be taken into account. It shows that the legislature is 
willing to use objective standards in determining the liability of the offenders in sexual 
offences by introducing a test of absence or presence of reasonable belief to replace the 
previous recklessness requirement. 140 It may be pointed out here that this approach is 
notably different from the judicial decision in R. v. G. 
141 where the House of Lords 
preferred a subjective approach in the offences of damage to property and overruled the 
principle laid down in Caldwell. 142 
8.3.12 Crimes of Specific and Basic Intent 
As mentioned earlier voluntary intoxication is no defence to a criminal charge. However, 
in the 19t' century English and American judges attempted to introduce an element of 
flexibility into the law to allow partial exculpation of intoxicated offender. ' 43 The search 
for such a doctrine resulted in what has become known as the specific intent exception. 
Although the exception was supposedly based on classical principles of criminal law, in 
fact, the judges constructed a novel but inappropriate doctrine in an effort to handle the 
138 Ibid at p. 214. 
139 Orchard, Gerald, "Surviving without Majewski: A view from down under" [1993] Crim. LR. 426. 
140 "Arson: Mens rea- Recklessness whether Property Destroyed or Damaged" Crim. LR. 369 at p. 372. 
141 R. v. G [2004] 1 AC 1034. 
142 R. v. Caldwell [19811 l Al 1. ER. 961. 
143 Fingarette, H. Herbert & Hasse, Ann Fingarette, 1979, op. cit. p. 77. 
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problem of liability of an intoxicated offender. 144 The practical application of this 
principle seemed easy enough at first glance but it has led to many complicated issues. 
8.3.12.1 Origin of Specific/Basic Intent Distinction 
The distinction between offences of specific/basic intent has become a persistent 
headache for criminal lawyers, especially over the last two or three decades. 145 The 
terminology of specific intent is traceable to the second quarter of the 19th century. 
Patterson J. in R. v. Cruse14b stated that intoxication can defeat the positive intention 
required for murder. 147 While in R. v. Monkhouse, 148 Coleridge J. held that drunkenness 
would not lead to an acquittal unless, inter alia, it deprived the defendant of the power 
of forming specific intention. 149 Later on the statement of Stephen J. in R. v Doherty 150 
is considered to be the basis for the technical concept of specific intent. 151 Most 
importantly, Lord Birkenhead L. C., in the first quarter of the 201h century, referred to 
specific intent. 152 His statement contains a number of conflicting propositions. He used 
the term specific intent in the first part of his opinion153 whereas intent simpiliciter in 
the second part. 154 Seemingly both the terms were used interchangeably. 155 He did not 
explain what he meant by specific intent rather it can be said confidently that he had 
nothing very special in his mind but unfortunately he did not cross the word out of his 
speech before delivering it. 156 This indicates that he may not have meant to distinguish 
between specific/basic intent rather he simply referred to the offences where intent is an 
important element of an offence. 157 He just mentioned that the criminal law requires that 
the mens to be rea as to each element of actus reus of every crime. '58 
144 Ibid. 
145 Gough, Stephen, "Surviving without Majewski? " [2000] Crim. LR. 719 at 719. 
Gough, Stephen, "Intoxication and Criminal Liability: The Law Commission's Proposed Reforms" 
112 (1996) LQR 335 at 342. 
146 R. v. Cruse & Mary his wife (1838) 8 C. & P. 541; 173 ER. 610. 
147 8 C. & P. at p. 545; 173 ER 612. 
148 R. v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 Cox. C. C. 55. 
149 Ibid. at p. 56. 
150 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox. C. C. 306. 
151 Fingarette, H. Herbert & Hasse, Ann Fingarette, 1979, op. cit. p. 77. 
152 R. v. Beard (1920) A C. 479. 
153Ibid. at p. 499. 
154 Ibid. p. 504. 
155 Gough, Stephen, 1996, op. cit. p. 343. 
156. Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 471. 
157 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 765. 
158 R. v. Beard (1920) A C. 479 at 504. 
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The adjective specific means no more than the presence of appropriate mens rea for the 
guilt and conviction of the offender. 159 Specific intent makes no legal sense other than a 
legal fiction providing partial defence to an intoxicated offender. 160 The cases gave no 
indication that a specific intent was different from an ordinary intent. Similarly, other 
intoxication cases of the same period omit any reference to it. 161 The reason for 
occasional use of words specific or positive intent was to denote malice or a form of 
negligence that intoxication would obviously not negate. 
162 The view can be supported 
by the fact that the phrase specific intent has never been defined. ' 63 Clearly in the early 
usage of the term judges were not referring to, or attempting to formulate, a doctrine 
with independent substantive contents. Rather, they were simply using the phrase to 
refer to the intent element of the crime with which the defendant was charged. 
164 
Specific intent, indeed, seems to be a meaningless expression and it is a discredit to 
English law that it should continue to be used in determining issues as important as 
those dealt within serious criminal cases. 165 
8.3.12.2 What Might be Possible Grounds for Distinction? 
Specific/basic distinction seems to be based upon a belief that alcohol does not affect a 
person's ability to control bodily movements but may affect the ability to form intention 
regarding those movements. This distinction is artificial because the intention to 
perform a bodily movement is usually inseparable from the reason why movement was 
made. 166 Another ground for distinction and allowing the defence of intoxication in the 
offences of specific intent could be that if such a defence is allowed in the offences of 
murder and wounding with intent, the amplitude of the basic intent offences of 
manslaughter and unlawful wounding lies beneath them ensuring defendant's liability. 
The distinction has also been annexed to the punishment for the offence of murder; 
aiming to reduce murder by an intoxicated person to the less serious homicide of 
manslaughter. Had murder been a non capital crime or had it not carried a mandatory 
sentence it would probably have remained untouched by the specific intent rule. 
167 
'59 Beck, Stanley M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 578; Fingarette, Herbert & Hasse, Ann 
Fingarette, 1979, op. cit. p. 81. 
160 Parker, Graham, 1977, op. cit. p. 701. 
161 Gough, Stephen, 1996, op. cit. pp. 342-43. 
162 Ibid. p. 344. 
163 Butler Committee Report, 1975, (Cmnd. 6244) Para. 18.52, p. 235. 
164 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 380. 
165 R. v. Burns [1975] Crim. LR. 155. at p. 157. 
166 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 384. 
167 N. L. A. Barlow, "Drug Intoxication and the Principle of Capacitas Rationalis" 100 (1984) LQR 639 at 640. 
Sullivan, G. R., "Involuntary Intoxication and Beyond" [1994] Crim. LR. 272 at 273. 
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The doctrine of specific intent has become a time-honoured rule in English law; 
nonetheless, it fails to identify the essential reasons for finding that an intoxicated 
offender is less morally responsible than his sober counter part. The doctrine does not 
lead logically to the overall result that was desired, that intoxication may mitigate but 
should never completely exonerate. The specific intent exception, therefore, has 
arbitrary applications and must be learned by rote, since most have little logical 
relationship to the principles underlying the doctrine, or indeed to the facts doctrine is 
often used to cover. ' 68 
8.3.12.3 What is Meant by the Crimes of Specific and Basic Intent? 
Though defining specific intent is still problematic; crimes of specific/basic intent can 
be differentiated on certain grounds. In R. v. Morgan, 169 Lord Simon said that actus reus 
is generally composed of an act and some consequences that may be very closely or 
remotely connected with it. In the crimes of basic intent the mens rea does not extend 
beyond the act and its consequences, however remote, as defined in the actus reus. 170 
Prosecution need not prove the mens rea required for the offence, the accused can be 
convicted simply on the proof of actus reus. 171 In the crimes of specific intent 
prosecution will succeed only if it can prove intention, knowledge, foresight or belief 
contained in the definition of the offence. 172 Precisely, crimes of specific intent are 
crimes where the mens rea of the offence extends beyond the actus reus, while in 
crimes of basic intent the mens rea goes no further than extending to the elements of 
actus reus itself. 173 
Whether an offence falls in any particular kind will depend upon which type of mens 
rea prosecution seeks to prove. For example, in the offence of simple criminal damage, 
if prosecution alleges that the defendant damaged the property recklessly, the offence is 
one of basic intent. However, if it alleges that the damage was done with intent, the 
168 Fingarette, Herbert & Hasse, Ann Fingarette, 1979, op. cit. p. 78. 
169 R. v. Morgan [1975] 2 All. ER 347; [1976] AC 182; [1975] 2 WLR 913. 
170 Ibid [ 1975] 2 All. ER at p. 363; [ 1976] AC 182 at 216. 
171 Card, Richard, 2001, op. cit. F. N. 88, p. 622. 
Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 256. 
172 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. Para. 2.5. 
As per Lord Simon in D. P. P. v. Majewski [1976] 2 All. ER. 154. 
Horder, J., 1995, op. cit. p. 538. 
173 Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., 1994, op. cit. p. 393. 
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offence is one of specific intent. 174 But, whatever the prosecution may allege in any 
particular case, it is still considered to be the offence of simple criminal damage. 175 
The safest way to describe these offences is that crimes of specific intent are those 
where the defence of voluntary intoxication is permitted by the courts, whereas in the 
crimes of basic intent the courts have refused to accept the defence. 176 This distinction 
can be criticised on the ground that if the principles of justice require the admission of 
the intoxication defence for crimes such as murder, theft, etc. it is difficult to see why 
the same consideration of justice do not apply for manslaughter, rape and assault etc. 177 
Logically no distinction should be drawn between specific intent and any other kind of 
intent, and that if the evidence of intoxication tended to negative whatever kind of intent 
was necessary to prove a particular charge, then there should be an acquittal . 
178 
8.3.13 Examples of the Crimes of Basic and Specific Intent 
On the basis of distinction discussed above following offences have been designated as 
offences of specific intent: murder, wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with 
intent, theft, robbery, burglary with intent to steal, handling stolen goods, endeavouring 
to obtain money on a forged cheque, criminal damage contrary to s. l(1) or (2) of the 
Criminal Damages Act 1971 where only intention to cause damage or, in the case of 
s. 1(2) of the same Act only intention to endanger life, is alleged, indecent assault where 
proof of indecent purpose is required, an attempt to commit any offence requiring 
specific intent and possibly some forms of secondary participation in any crime. 179 The 
list could be further extended to cover a number of other offences in which intent as to 
at least one element of the offence suffice as mens rea. 
On the other hand, manslaughter, rape, maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous 
bodily harm, kidnapping and false imprisonment, assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm, assault on a constable in the execution of his duty, indecent assault where act is 
unambiguously indecent, common assault, taking a conveyance without the consent of 
the owner, criminal damages where intention or recklessness, or only recklessness, is 
174 White, Stephen, "Offences of Basic and Specific Intent" [1989] Crim. LR. 271 at 272. 
175 Ibid. 
176 D. P. P. v. Majewski [1977] AC 443 at 469. 
McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 381. 
177 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 778. 
Fingarette, Herbert & Hasse, Ann Fingarette, 1979, op. cit. p. 77. 
178 Smith, J. C., "Case and Comments: Drink and Drugs" [1975] Crim. LR. 570 at 571. 179 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 229. 
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alleged and possibly an attempt to commit an offence where recklessness is a sufficient 
element in mens rea as in attempted rape are offences of basic intent. 
180 
8.3.14 Is this Classification agreed upon? 
The classification above is not agreed upon by the English courts. In Gray v. Barr, 
181 
Lord Denning stated that in manslaughter of every kind there must be a guilty mind 
otherwise the accused must be acquitted. 
182 Similarly, in R. v. Lamb 183 it was held that 
mens rea is the essential ingredient in manslaughter. 
184 These opinions suggest that 
manslaughter is an offence of specific intent where intoxication could be relied upon to 
negate it, whereas in English law generally it is treated as an offence of basic intent. 
In the light of the classification above, all the attempted offences are crimes of specific 
intent. 185 This is true even where the completed offence is a crime of basic intent like 
the offence of rape. The situation is still confusing because in R v. Khan186 the Court of 
Appeal held that the mens rea of rape and attempted rape is the same; only difference 
between the two is the accomplishment of the offence. ' 87 It, therefore, seems that the 
crime of attempted rape is an offence of basic intent. However, the court itself admitted 
that the same principle does not apply to the other offences and their attempts. 
188 It is 
not merely a difference of opinion among English courts on the point; various American 
jurisdictions also held contradictory views regarding rape and assault crimes whether 
they are the offences of specific or basic intent. 189 It shows that though the offences 
have been divided into specific/basic yet the division is controversial. 
8.3.15 Nature of Specific and Basic Intent 
Nature of specific intent is thus a matter of great importance in order to ascertain the 
liability of the offender. What does the terms "specific" and "basic" intent mean? The 
true answer is obviously nothing. They are like things the courts are acquainted with 
when they observe them i. e. they knew when a defendant's liability could be reduced 
but they could not define. Complications started arising when judges began trying to 
define them. Attempting to define terms designed to provide maximum flexibility for 
Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 175; Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. pp. 267-68. 
181 Ibid. 
181 Gray v. Barr[ 1971] 2 QB 554. 
182 Ibid. at p. 568. 
183 R. v. Lamb [ 1967] 2 QB 981. 
184 Ibid. at p. 988. 
185 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 757. 
186 R. v. Khan [1990] 1 WLR 813. 
187 Ibid. at p. 819 
188 R. v. Khan [1990] 1 WLR 813 at 819. 
189 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 382. 
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policy consideration always proved to be problematic. 
190 A careful analysis of the 
authorities, particularly Majewski itself fails to reveal any consistent principle. 
191 
In Majetivski, the term specific intent was compared with basic intent. 
192 Lord Simon 
suggested that the distinguishing factor between the two is that "the mens rea in a crime 
of specific intent requires proof of a purposive element. "' 
93 In his view specific intent 
means the purposive element in a crime but did not define the purposive element, and 
the term is difficult to fit in with present law. 194 The prosecution must prove that the 
purpose of commission of the act extends to the intent, expressly or impliedly required 
for the commission of that act. This distinction between the two terms is not satisfactory 
because the offence of rape, declared as basic intent offence, obviously requires a 
purposive element. 195 It is difficult to imagine any case of rape where the defendant 
does not have the purpose of having sexual intercourse with a woman. 
196 Lord Elwyn- 
Jones L. C., with whom Lord Diplock and Kilbrandon concurred, adopted the view that 
specific intent is equivalent to further intent; 
197 whereas Lord Simon in the same case 
opined that further intent is only one type of specific intent. 
198 The outcome of 
Majetivski was that the House of Lords had decided that there was a distinction between 
basic/specific intent, but could not explain the difference. 199 
The courts have not stated clearly how they conceive the intent as specific. The phrase 
`with intent' in the definition of a crime normally refers to an ulterior intent but in the 
crime of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm no 
such ulterior intent is required. Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause it 
190 Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., 1994, op. cit. p. 392. 
191 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 228. 
192 Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at 473. 
193 Ibid at p. 480. 
194 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 259. 
195 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 228. 
196 Drink & Drugs: D. P. P. v. Majewski [1976] Crim. LR. 374 at p. 378. (Similarly, if we take into account 
the definition of crimes of basic intent, as given in 8.3.12.3, murder is a crime of basic intent. The 
aclus reus is killing and it is certainly not necessary to prove any mens rea going beyond that. If the 
basic intent test is applied then, intoxication negating mens rea ought not to be a defence to murder or 
to an offence under section 18 of Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Yet it is accepted on all 
hands that it is a defence to both these crimes. The law approved by the House of Lords seems totally 
inconsistent with the theoretical basis proposed. Drink &Drugs; DPP v. Majewski [1976] Crim. LR. 
374 at 377) 
197 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 612. 
198 D. P. P. v Majewski [ 1977] AC 443 at p. 478. 
199 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 260. 
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merely means intentionally causing grievous bodily harm. 
200 The Law Commission also 
admits that the Majewski approach does not apply to all offences that require subjective 
mens rea, but only to what the courts have determined to be offences of basic as 
opposed to specific intent. 201 The difference between these two types of offences, the 
policy reasons for distinction, and the basis, on which the distinction is made, are all 
obscure. 202 The distinction can also be rejected on the ground that those who would 
otherwise be liable for their criminal conduct will escape because they were drunk at the 
time the offence was committed. 203 This clearly shows that it goes contrary to the policy 
for which the distinction was drawn i. e., to make it sure that an intoxicated offender 
shall not escape the criminal liability. 
8.3.16 How to Resolve Ambiguity? 
To put an end to all this confusion and conflict, the decision is to be left on the 
discretion of courts to grant or withhold the title of specific or basic intent. It depends 
on the fact whether the evidence of voluntary intoxication is considered to be relevant to 
the question of liability for a particular offence. 
204 Even this solution does not seem to 
be workable because the courts themselves are confused in designating crimes as of 
specific intent or basic intent. In R. v. Clarkson, 
205 Megan L. J. stated that intoxication 
could negate the mens rea for aiding or abetting the crime because the offender might 
not realise that he was giving encouragement by his presence at the scene of the 
crime. 206 The dictum shows that aiding and abetting of any offence is a crime of specific 
intent. This view has been discarded by Lord Simon in D. P. P. v. Lynch 
207 when he says 
that neither aiding nor abetting a crime requires a proof of mens rea because definition 
of the crime does not itself suggest any ulterior intent. 208 Now the only appropriate 
solution that may be suggested, because of the ambiguity inherent in the terms, is to 
focus on what courts do rather than what they say. 209 
200 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 472. (For example in the offence of assault with intent to rob, 
wounding with intent to resist arrest or breaking into a house with intent to commit robbery). 
201 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. Para. 1.7. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Bernard v. The Queen [1988] 2 SCR. 833 at p. 7 of 30 (http"//www lexuni. umontral. ca/csc- 
scc/en/ruh/1988/vol2/html/1988scr2 0833. html) 2001. 
204 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 613. 
205 R. v. Clarkson [1973] 3 All. E. R. 344. 
206 Ibid. at p. 347. 
207 D. P. P. v. Lynch [1975] AC. 653. 
208 Ibid. at pp. 698-99 
209 Loewy, Arnold H., Criminal Law (West Publishing Co. ST. Paul, Minn., 1975) p. 239. 
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8.3.17 Rationale of Specific/Basic Distinction 
Different theories have been presented to justify the distinction between specific and 
basic intent. One such theory states that, the idea behind the Majewski rule is that the 
people, who get drunk and later commit offences requiring recklessness, cannot 
introduce evidence of intoxication to negative recklessness, for the very process of 
getting drunk contained sufficient element of recklessness. 
210 To argue that intoxicated 
person really are reckless because getting drunk is reckless course of conduct involves a 
manifest confusion between a general, non legal use of the term reckless and the 
technical, legal term which denotes that the defendant was aware of the risk of the result 
which actually occurred. 21 'Recklessness in getting drunk is magically linked to the 
subsequent action in a way which defies doctrinal stricture of actus reus and mens rea 
combination. 212 It is well known now that a culpable state of mind which is 
contemporaneous with prohibited conduct has the status of fundamental principle from 
which departures are not to be permitted. 
213 Arguably, House of Lords had not felt the 
need to satisfy what is perceived as the dictates of the formal requirement `actus non 
facit reum mens sit rea' it need not have explained the intoxication rule in recklessness 
terms at al1.214 
Various attempts have been made to explain why some offences are crimes of specific 
intent where as others are not, but none is satisfactory. 
215 For example, to argue that all 
these crimes require some form of further intent is unconvincing, since that is not true 
of murder. 216 Murder is an offence of basic intent; killing constitutes the actus reus and 
certainly we need not to prove any mens rea going beyond that. In R. v. Hyam, 
217 Lord 
Diplock stated that it is the uncomplicated view in English law that in crimes of murder 
no distinction is to be drawn between specific and basic intent. 
218 This view can be 
affirmed by the statement of Stephen J. in R. v. Doherty, 
219 where he said that it is 
difficult to see how a man can fire a loaded pistol at another without intending to cause 
210 Per Lord Elwyn-Jones in R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at 475. 
211 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 220. 
212 Lacey, Nicola &Wells, Celia, Reconstructing Criminal Law (2"a ed., Butterworths, 1998) p. 206. 
De Burca, Grainne, "Intoxication and Criminal Law" 141 (1991) NLJ560. 
213 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 753. 
214 Wells, Celia, "Whither Insanity ?" [1983] Crim. LR. 787 at 789. 
215 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 219. 
216 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 228. 
Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 219. 
217 R. v. Hyam [1975] AC. 55. 
218 Ibid. at p. 86. 
219 R. v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox. C. C. 306. 
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his death. It would be murder though he did not intend to kill . 
220 In R. v. Meakin 221 it 
was held that where the accused has used deadly weapon, the fact that he was drunk 
does not at all alter the nature of the case; but if the accused has intemperately used a 
non deadly weapon, at the time when he was drunk, the fact of his being drunk might be 
taken into account by the jury. It can be argued that there is nothing in the principles of 
criminal law or the concept of mens rea that support the basic/specific intent distinction. 
Indeed, all crimes are of specific intent, in the sense that the mens has to be rea. The 
issue in the cases would not be whether or not the accused was drunk but whether or not 
the mens rea required for the particular crime with which he is charged. If he has the 
mens rea he should be convicted. 222 
These decisions are in line with the principles of criminal liability and proof of intention 
of the offender. It can be said that an intoxicated person can decide to kill some body. If 
he rushes at the victim and stabs him, the jury may come to the conclusion that he 
intended to ki11.223 Indeed it is hardly possible to preserve the physical capability to 
execute such crimes, without also retaining a low degree of intelligence which is 
sufficient for the offence. 224 
As mentioned earlier basis for specific/basic intent distinction are not clear. Another 
case adds more to the confusion. In R v. Richardson & Irwin, 
225 the complainant and the 
defendants were university students. After drinking they indulged in horseplay. The 
defendants dropped the complainant from a height of about 10-12 feet and he suffered 
injuries. The prosecution case was that the defendants had acted both unlawfully and 
maliciously in the sense that they actually foresaw that dropping the complainant would 
or might cause harm and nevertheless took the risk of doing so. 
The defendants pleaded that the complainant had consented to the horseplay and that his 
fall was an accident. They were convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to 
section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Interestingly, the Court of 
Appeal allowing their appeal quashed the conviction but neither substituted conviction 
221 Ibid at p. 308. 
221 R. v. Meakin (1836) 7 Car. & P. 297; 173 ER. 131-32. 
222 Mewtte, Alan W. & Manning, Morris, Criminal Law (2nd ed., Butterworths, Toronto, 1985) p. 210. 
223 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 467. 
224 Markby, William, Sir, Elements of Law (6`h ed., Oxford at the Clarendon Press, London, 1905) p. 363. 
225 R v. Richardson & Irwin [ 1999] Crim. L. R. 494; [ 1999] 1 Cr. App. R. 392. 
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for a lesser degree of assault nor did it order a retrial. 226 It suggests that an accused 
cannot be convicted if he mistakenly believe or might have believed, due to intoxication, 
that the victim consented. The decision discards the rule laid down in Majewski that self 
induced intoxication is no defence, except to the offences requiring specific intent. 
"This rule requires modification if the decision is correct. Intoxication is a defence if it 
causes the defendant to believe that the victim is consenting, although, if he had been 
sober, he would have known that this is not so. "227 
It can be said that the specific/ basic intent distinction is far from satisfactory, as has 
been discussed, we have to wait for a judicial pronouncement before we can safely 
categorise a particular offence. 228 It can be summed up that the distinction, between the 
effects of voluntary intoxication on the crimes of specific/basic is juristically 
unjustifiable and is supported only on historical and practical grounds. 229 
8.3.18 Illogicality of the Distinction 
The distinction between specific/basic intent crimes is not logical because the mens rea 
of an offence will often, if not always, contains element of both basic and specific intent 
together. 230 For example, the offence of unlawfully and maliciously wounding with 
intent to prevent the lawful arrest of any person, contrary to the section 18 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is an offence of specific intent. 231 Suppose that 
the accused admits that he was intending to protect a lawful arrest but, due to 
intoxication, never realised that what he was doing created a risk of wounding. Here the 
element of mens rea he is denying is basic intent, and therefore the evidence of 
intoxication should be irrelevant. 232 
The distinction may lead to some irrational and illogical results like; the same criminal 
conduct may be classified as a specific intent crime at one occasion and basic intent 
crime on another. For example, rape is considered to be a crime of basic intent however, 
an assault with intent to commit rape is a crime of specific intent. By the application of 
the principle of specific/basic intent a voluntary intoxicated accused would have a 
226 Nicolson, D. & Bibbings, L., Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law (Cavendish Publishing, 2000) p. 142. 
227 Commentary on R. v. Richardson and Irwin [ 19991 Crim. LR. 494 at 496. 
228 Mackay, R. D., 1995, op. cit. p. 150. 
229 Per Lord Simon Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at 479. 
230 White, Stephen, 1989, op. cit. p. 273. 
Smith, J. C., R. v. Fortheringham [1988] Crim. LR. 846 at p. 847. 
231 White, Stephen, 1989, op. cit. p. 273. 232 Ibid. 
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defence to assault with intent to commit rape and not in the complete offence of rape 
even though his conduct and state of mind were same in both the cases. Another 
objection to the theory of distinction could be that intoxication may reduce a murder 
into manslaughter. The court in these cases takes notice of public outrage if the 
defendants were totally exculpated. However, if this was reasoning of the courts it 
would have made more sense had rape been classified as a crime of specific intent with 
indecent assault as its basic intent counter part. 233 It is difficult to envisage a man, 
however drunk, having sexual intercourse without intending to do so. 34 Specifically, 
for a male offender, it is not possible to achieve penetration without erection that cannot 
be attained without having a specific intention for sexual intercourse. 235 It can also be 
argued that though under prevailing classification "rape is a crime of basic intent, but in 
relation to the act of intercourse the prosecution must establish that the defendant 
intended to have intercourse with the woman. "236 The view can further be fortified by 
the opinion of Lord Birkenhead who considered the offence of rape as an offence of 
specific intent by saying that intoxication could be no defence to the offence of rape 
unless proved that the accused was too drunk to form the intent to commit it. 237 
Finally, their Lordships themselves admitted that the distinction between basic and 
specific intent is illogical. 238 Taking into account all the evidence, it can be said that 
neither common law nor psychology knows any such phenomenon as basic intent 
distinguishable from specific. 239 Leaving all other evidences and arguments apart, only 
the views of their Lordships are sufficient to discard the distinction because that what is 
illogical cannot be justified. It is impossible to devise a principle of criminal law that 
despite its illogicality and inconsistency provides justice and protection to the subjects, 
as much as a logical and consistent rule can. Once the principle of responsibility 
because of voluntary intoxication is abandoned for some offences, it should be 
233 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 176. 
234 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 230. 
235 (The proposition is approved by the Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Bill 2003 which retains the term 
rape for the offence which, exceptionally, can be committed only by a man who "intentionally 
penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with his penis. ") 
(http: //www. publications. parliament. uk) 2004. 
236 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 177. 
237 D. D. P v. Beard [ 1920] AC 479 at pp 504-05. 
238 Per Lord Simon in R. v. Majewski [1977] AC. 443 at 483; Lord Edmund-Davies at p. 493; Lord 
Russell at 498. 
239 McCord, David, 1990, op. cit. p. 385. 
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abandoned for all, otherwise the result is arbitrary. 240 The proposition is perfectly 
compatible with the rule that when the law requires mens rea in the sense of intention or 
recklessness, a person who lacks that mens rea, whether he was drunk or not cannot be 
convicted. 241 
The distinction may lead to another problem; the trial courts have no guidance as to how 
to treat new offences, or offences that happen so far to have escaped judicial 
consideration at appellate level. 242 The confusion over the distinction arises from the 
fact that it is merely a device, envisaged by common law, to achieve a certain result 
rather than reflecting a rational theory. 243 It permits the evidence of voluntary 
intoxication, for conviction of the offender to a crime of lesser degree, who otherwise 
would have been acquitted. It is pertinent to mention that almost all the common law 
jurisdictions, which adopted specific/basic distinction, have subsequently discarded the 
Majewski rule 244 and adopted a uniform principle to deal with the problem of 
intoxicated offender. English criminal law is out of step with other jurisdictions which 
have abolished the special rules on intoxication, 245 and is becoming isolated in the 
commonwealth in clinging to it. 246 
8.4 Crimes of Basic Intent and Defence of Intoxication 
Voluntary intoxication is no defence in the crimes of basic intent. 247 The accused would 
not be permitted to assert lack of mens rea due to intoxication. It means that 
intoxication causes no problem in relation to crimes that may be committed recklessly 
or without intention. 248 An offender who relies on voluntary intoxication as a defence to 
a crime of basic intent may be convicted notwithstanding that the prosecution has not 
proved any intention or foresight. 249 It is claimed that Section 8 of Criminal Justice Act 
240 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 756. 
241 Smith, J. C., "Case & Comments: R. v. Majewski" [1975] Crim. LR. 570 at 573. 
242 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. Para. 3.5. 
243 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 298. 
244 In Australia, in The Queen v. O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64. In New Zealand in 1975 in R v. Kamipeli 
[ 1975] 2 NZLR 610 and in Canada, the principle was discarded in 1994 in Daviault v. The Queen 
(1994) 118 DLR (4`h) 469. 
245 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 273. 
246 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 30, p. 237. 
247 As Per Lord Elwyn-Jones L. C. in DPP. v. Majewski [1976] 2 All. ER 142 at 146. 
24s The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. Para. 2.34. 
249 C. L. R. C., 14 `h Report, Cmnd. 7844,1980, op. cit. para. 257, p. 111. 
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1967 is irrelevant. 250 The section does not abrogate the rule of substantive law nor does 
the rule contravene the section. 251 
The conviction of voluntary intoxicated offender for a basic intent offence is explained 
by the courts on the ground that he was reckless as to the risk of becoming mentally 
impaired while taking the drink or drugs and recklessness is sufficient mens rea for the 
offence in question. 252 This theory can be rejected for the reason that it proceeds on the 
basis that one who takes drink or drugs is conclusively presumed to be reckless, which 
conflicts with the provisions of section 8 of the Criminal justice Act, 1967.253 The 
section requires the court or jury to take into account any evidence which may help 
them to draw such inferences as it thinks proper and reach a decision on the issue. The 
section does not say "except the evidence of intoxication" but the courts act as if these 
words were there. 254 The object of section was to prevent the trial judge from directing 
the jury that as a matter of law they must ignore certain evidence on the issue of 
intention. The section was passed to rule out artificial treatment of the notion of 
intention but that is the very thing that the judges are doing under the cover of the 
doctrine of basic intent. 255 
It is also contradictory to the general principle of criminal law requiring the prosecution 
to prove that the accused intended or foresaw would be consequences of his act. A 
defendant while intoxicated might have committed the offence mistakenly or 
accidentally but it appears that for the crimes of basic intent recklessness will be 
imputed to him and no evidence shall be admissible to rebut the imputation. 256 
Presuming an intoxicated person automatically reckless is to replace mens rea with 
strict liability. 257 
Another objection may be raised that this theory discards the rule of coincidence of 
act us reus and mens rea at the time of prohibited conduct. To convict an accused simply 
on the basis of recklessness when he took drink or drugs as to the risk involved in taking 
250 Seago, Peter, 1994, op. cit. p. 175. 
251 Per Lord Elwyn-Jones in D. P. P. v. Majewski [1977] AC. 442 at 476. 
252 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 606. 
253 /bid & Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 219. 
254 Commentary on R. v. McPherson [1973] Crim. LR. 457 at 458. 
255 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 474. 
25" Note, "Intoxication as a Criminal Defence" 55 (1955) Colum. L. Rev. 1210 at pp. 1212-13. 
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it is to base liability on a very different ground from that specified by the definition of 
the offence. 258 It is strange that the law enacted by the parliament is superseded by the 
controversial rule enunciated by the courts. The interpretation reduces the section to 
impotence. It means anything that would have been withheld from the jury's 
consideration before the section was passed can still be withheld from them because the 
judges declare it to be irrelevant. 259 
8.5 Proposed Reforms in English Law on Intoxication Defence 
With a view to assure the liability of an intoxicated offender, the Butler committee 
proposed creation of a new offence of dangerous or criminal intoxication. On conviction 
on indictment, maximum penalty suggested is one year imprisonment for a first offence, 
three years for a second or subsequent one; on summery trial maximum sentence 
suggested is six months . 
260 The new offence would be committed whenever an 
individual caused the aclus revs of an indictable offence but lacked, through 
intoxication, the required mens rea. 261 The proposal of creating the new offence is 
advantageous in the sense that the problem of distinguishing between specific/basic 
intent would disappear. The offender would not be totally acquitted as now happens 
when he is charged with a specific intent crime and there is no fall-back basic intent 
offence. 262 
The proposal means that the new offence would be one of strict liability in respect of the 
conduct of the offender. It would require the fault element of becoming voluntarily 
intoxicated. 263 Under the committee's proposal the offence would be an included 
offence; the defendant would not be charged with this special offence at first instance 
and could only be convicted of such offence after being acquitted of the principal 
offence charged. The creation of new offence of being drunk and dangerous would pay 
more respect to the logic of criminal liability than the existing English approach and 
such a special offence could empower the courts to order either treatment or punishment 
of the offender according to the circumstances. 264 
257 Parker, Graham, 1977, op. cit. p. 704. 
258 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. F. N. 5, p. 606. 
259 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 473. 
260 Butler Committee Report (Cmnd. 6244,1975) Para 18.51-18.59. 
261 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 118. 
262 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 269. 
263 Butler Committee Report (Cmnd. 6244,1975) Para 18.54 to 18.58. 
264 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 117. 
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However, the proposal can be objected upon several grounds like the punishment 
proposed by the committee is considerably less severe for serious offences such as 
homicide or rape. 265 It may encourage offenders to raise the issue of voluntary 
intoxication in their defence more frequently in the hope of being acquitted of a more 
serious offence. The special offence may later become a defence to the serious offences 
, 
because the degree of intoxication has not been specified in the proposal and even the 
slightest level of intoxication would be sufficient to attract its application. The proposal 
was rejected by the majority of C. L. R. C. in 1980, however, the minority opinion of the 
committee agreed with the proposal suggesting a major modification that the 
punishment of the proposed offence should be the same as for the principle offence. 266 
The suggestion of minority would definitely reduce the number of defendants pleading 
defence of intoxication because there would have been no significant advantage for the 
defendant in making such a plea. 
The proposal of equivalent punishment has also been approved by the New Zealand 
Criminal Law Reform Committee because a defendant who habitually consumes 
intoxicants and commits criminal acts in that condition deserves it. 267 However, creation 
of a special offence with an equivalent punishment to the principal offence seems to be 
needless, given that the accused convicted of the special offence would be liable for the 
punishment of the principal offence charged and in this case there is no justification for 
the extra time and labour involved in proving the special offence. 
8.5.1 The Law Commission's Proposals 
In 1993, the Law Commission concluded that the present law is complicated, difficult to 
explain, though it purports to apply a social policy of ensuring the liability of an 
intoxicated offender yet only does so in an unpredictable and unprincipled way; and if 
taken seriously it creates many difficulties of practical application. 268The Commission 
expressed its dissatisfaction over the prevailing law but admitted that it is based on 
public policy. Even if we accept that the policy behind the rule is to ensure the liability 
of intoxicated offenders, there is no rationale reason for protecting the public against 
some drunken offender but not against others, particularly where the distinction is not 
based upon the gravity of the offence or the availability of included offences. If the 
265 C. L. R. C., 14`h Report, Cmnd. 7844,1980, op. cit. Para. 261, p. l 13. 
266 Ibid. Para. 263. 
267 New Zealand, Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Intoxication as Defence to a Criminal 
Charge, 1984, Para. 67. 
268 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. Para. 3.24. 
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public protection require special measures, that should be accomplished through 
comprehensive legislation rather than ad hoc judicial re-casting of some offences. 269 
Taking into account the illogicality of basic/specific intent distinction and growing 
criticism on Majetivski approach, the Law Commission in its consultation paper 
recommended its abolition. 270 The Commission admitted that the present law on 
intoxication is difficult to state with any certainty271 and suggested a number of options 
to make the law on intoxication reasonable and certain. Among these options is the 
abolition of Majetivski rule without replacement or its abolition with a new offence 
(options 5 and 6). So after the abolition of Majewski rule, the prosecution shall be bound 
to prove subjective mens rea of the offender in all the cases regardless of any distinction 
between the crimes of specific/basic intent. The defendant's intoxication will merely be 
one piece of evidence to determine his intent and awareness or foresight at the time of 
commission of the offence. Option No. 6, abolition of the rule combined with a new 
offence is not a new one. The same suggestion was made by the Butler committee in 
1975. The Commission suggested that the jury should be able to take into account the 
evidence of intoxication, together with the other circumstances, in deciding whether the 
defendant acted with the requisite mental element. 272 
The abolition of the Majewski rule without any replacement will bring the law on 
intoxication in line with the provisions of section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967. If 
the intent of the accused is proved, intoxication or resulting inhibition or lack of self 
control shall not serve as a defence. The same principle is enforced in Australia, New 
Zealand and in some jurisdictions in U. S. A. `73 The first and second options of leaving 
Majewski intact, or codifying its approach were dismissed declaring them impracticable 
and undesirable in the light of criticism by the Commission itself and others. 274 
In 1995, the Law Commission retreated from all its proposals previously made and 
recommended the codification of the present law of intoxication with a few significant 
269 Bernard v. The Queen [ 1988] 2 SCR. 833 at p. 12 of 30 (http: //www. lexum. umontral. ca/csc- 
scc/en/pub/1988/vol2/html/I988scr2 0833. html) 2001. 
270 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. 
271 Ibid. Para, 3.1, p. 27. 
272 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. Para. 6.30. 
273 Ibid. Para. 5.23., p. 63. 
274 Paton, E., "Reformulating the Intoxication Rules: The Law Commission's Report" [1995] Crim. LR. 382. 
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amendments. 275 This proposal is the option No. 2 among the options suggested by the 
Law Commission in its consultation paper. 276 The grounds provided by the Commission 
for the deviation from their earlier proposals are that the abolition of the Majewski rule 
would be perceived by the public as unacceptable. 277 They declared the Majewski rule 
as prudent policy which dominated the general principles of criminal law. 278 They also 
claimed that the consultation with the majority of judges, law society and others 
asserted that the rule worked fairly and without any undue difficulty. 279 The idea of 
creation of a new offence was dropped because more trials would take place, expert 
evidence would be needed as to whether the accused was substantially impaired, more 
police time would be spent on ascertaining the extent of his intoxication and the 
prosecution would not know in advance of trial whether the proposed offence should be 
included in indictment. 280 
It appears that all the ground realities regarding the defence of intoxication have been 
changed within two years thus leading the Law Commission to abandon all its previous 
proposals. Only considering the abolition of the idea of creating a new offence will 
reveal the strength of the Law Commission's opinion. All the reasons, provided for not 
creating a new offence, seem to be merely an excuse for the sake of an excuse. Firstly, 
the accused shall be convicted of this offence where he has committed a dangerous 
offence and due to intoxication his intent could not be proved. It needs no separate trial 
for this purpose if all other elements of the crime have been proved except the intention. 
The accused shall be convicted for the proposed offence and sentenced accordingly. In 
such cases jury would be directed that they may give a verdict of not guilty of, the 
offence charged but guilty of the offence of dangerous intoxication if they find that the 
defendant did the act charged but by reason of the evidence of intoxication they are not 
sure that at the time he had the state of mind required for the offence, and they are sure 
that his intoxication was voluntary. 281 
Secondly, expert evidence is also required under the present rules. No one could be 
convicted or acquitted unless his mental capacity was proved by the expert evidence. 
275 Law Com. No. 229,1995, op. cit. Para. 5.48, p. 53. 
276 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 127,1993, op. cit. 
277 Ibid. Para. 1.27, p. 8 
278 Ibid. Para. 1.14, p. 4. 
279 Ibid. Para. 1.28, p. 8. 
280 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 277. 
281 Butler Committee Report. (Cmnd. 6244,1975) Para. 18.54. 
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Thirdly, it is the duty of the police to ascertain the extent of intoxication of the offender, 
because police is the first official agency taking his custody after commission of the 
crime. In addition, in all other cases the burden also lies on the shoulders of the police to 
prove the extent of intoxication of the accused, like breath test in the case of a drunk 
driver. Fourthly, prosecution need not know in advance whether to include the proposed 
offence in the indictment, because impliedly it is included in the original offence for 
which the accused is charged as argued earlier. 
The Law Commission accordingly recommended some new proposals for legislating on 
the issue. 282 The proposals contained in the report were extremely complex and 
awkward. 283 The legislation in furtherance of this report appears unlikely. 284 The 
provisions of draft bill 1998, `Offences Against the Person' are largely based upon the 
straight forward proposals of Law Commission Report No. 218.285 This is an attempt to 
present the common law rules on intoxication into statutory form. 286 Clause 19 (1)(a) of 
the draft bi112S7 treats a voluntary intoxicated person having been aware of any risk of 
which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated. Clause 19(1) (b) provides 
that a voluntary intoxicated person must be treated as having known or believed in any 
circumstances which he would have known had he been sober. The effect of the bill's 
provisions is that a mistaken belief cannot be relied upon to negative liability where 
awareness of risk suffices for liability. 288 The proposal imposes the liability even for 
specific intent offences on the basis of what the accused would have known had he not 
been intoxicated. 289 
The object of the corresponding provisions in the earlier drafts, and the principle 
followed by the courts in such cases, was not to attribute to the defendant a belief which 
he did not in fact hold but to prevent him from relying, by way of defence, on a belief 
which he did hold. 290 This clause is unexplained and, it seems, unhappy deviation from 
Law Com. No. 218 and the earlier proposals regarding intoxication. 291 It can be 
282 Law Com. No. 229,1995, op. cit. Para. 1.34, p. 10. 
283 Reed, Alan & Saego, Peter, 1999, op. cit. p. 204. 
284 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. F. N. 87, p. 152. 
285 Reed, Alan & Saego, Peter, 1999, op. cit. p. 204. 
286 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. F. N. 87, p. 152. 
287 Home Office, Violence: -Reforming the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (1998) Draft Bill. 
288 Paton, E, "Reformulating the Intoxication Rules: The Law Commission's Report" [1995] Crim LR. 383. 
289 Simester, A P. & Sullivan, G R., Criminal Law: Theory & Doctrine (Portland-Oregon, 2002) p. 566. 
290 Smith, J. C., "Offences against the Person: The Home Office Consultation Paper" [1998] Crim. LR. 317 
at 321. 
291 Ibid. 
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concluded that clause 19(l) (b) is unnecessary as the draft Offences Against the Person 
Bill does not deal with defences, and should be omitted. Its sole purpose in the earlier 
drafts was to deal with an intoxicated belief in facts relied on by way of defence. 292 
Conclusion 
The whole discussion can be concluded by saying that the distinction between 
specific/basic intent is artificial and two fundamental problems stem from it. Firstly, 
parliament not the courts should alter the law if it is to be done in the name of policy 
over principle. 293 This is in line with the decisions of Court of Appeal where reduction 
of murder to manslaughter was refused, in cases of use of excessive force in self- 
defence. 294 Logically, if the creation of any new rule in the cases of self-defence is left 
to the discretion of parliament, the application of the same principle requires that in the 
cases of defence of intoxication the matter should also be left to parliament. But the 
courts have evolved this makeshift solution, in furtherance of a generally agreed policy 
of social defence, rather than await legislative action. 295 
Secondly, even if it was appropriate for the courts to do so, there is no evidence that the 
artificiality of the specific intent requirement is actually required for social protection. 296 
If the bases for the policy are ambiguous there is no justification to continue it. Well 
known dangers of voluntary intoxication can be minimised by replacing the confusing 
specific/basic distinction with a simple and easily understandable rule that intoxication 
is no excuse for a criminal conduct. 297 A voluntarily intoxicated offender should be held 
liable, for he himself caused a disabling condition in which he might cause harm to the 
person or property of others. 
The policy implicit in the distinction represents a compromise between punishment of 
voluntary drunkard offenders disregarding their mental condition, and total exculpation 
suggested by the actual facts at the time the offence was committed. The persistence in 
the belief that a person who voluntarily indulges in alcohol should not escape the 
292 /bid at p. 322. 
293 Bernard v. The Queen [ 1988] 2 SCR. 833 at p. 3 of 30 (littp: //www. lexum. timontral. ca/csc- 
scc/en/pub/1988/volt/html/I988scr2 0833. html) 2001. 
294 R. v. Hussin [1963] Crim. L. R 582 ; R. v. Clegg [1995] A. C. 482. 295 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 1 17. 
2)6 Bernard v. The Queen [ 198812 SCR. 833 at p. 3 of 30 (http: //svww. Iexum. umontral. ca/csc- 
scc/en/pub/1988/vol2/html/I988scr2 0833 html) 2001. 
297 Keiter, Mitchell, 1977, op. cit. p. 511. 
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consequences has helped to reach this compromise. 298 However, this compromise is not 
satisfactory and the dissatisfaction is based on the fact that drunkenness by itself has 
never been regarded as a defence in English criminal law. 299 A comparison between the 
present law and the attitude of common law courts up to the 19`h century shows that the 
present law gives an allowance to the intoxicated offender guaranteeing him a less 
severe punishment to that which he actually deserves. 
The law on defence of intoxication is unscientific and complicated; it impeded justice, 
confuses judges and juries, promotes lengthy trials and triggers an inordinate numbers 
of appeals. 300 If public policy is the only base for the law then its mitigating role should 
be denied even if it negates mens rea. It will deter voluntary intoxication and close-off 
an easy loophole for many intoxicated offenders. 301 If justice requires admission of the 
intoxication defence for some kinds of offences, it is difficult to see why the same 
consideration does not apply for the others. 302 The intoxicated offender does not have 
two minds; one for specific and the other for basic intent. 303 
The study suggests that no single principle can explain the distinction between 
specific/basic intent and further it does not reflect a qualitative difference between states 
of mind indeed, to say the least, that terminology of specific/basic intent is unhelpful. 304 
Whatever the merit of this criticism, it is certain that the intoxication rules in English 
law are based upon fiction and illogical legal devices. 305 Public interest, protection of 
the rights of offenders and victims require that all the terms used in criminal law should 
be defined, unambiguous and used consistently and general principles of criminal 
liability should be preferred over policy. 
In the next chapter we shall take into account the principles of Shari'ah dealing with the 
problem of intoxication in an Islamic society. 
298 Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law (The Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1960) pp. 546-47. 
299 Smith, J. C., Towards a Rational Criminal Law (The Holdsworth Club of the University of 
Birmingham, 1983) p. 5. 
300 Mitchell, Chester N., 1988, op. cit. p. 77. 
301 Note, "Intoxication as a Criminal Defence" 55 (1955) Colum. L. Rev. 1210 at 1217. 
302 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 778. 
303 Beck, Stanley, M., & Parker, Graham E., 1966, op. cit. p. 581. 
304 Colvin, Eric, 1981, op. cit. p. 767. 
305 Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 221. 
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Chapter-9 Intoxication and its Defence in Shari'ah 
9.1 Introduction 
Shari'ah covers, on the individualistic level, spiritual, moral, intellectual, esthetical, and 
physical aspects of man's personality, and collectively, social, economic and political 
dimensions of society. ' Every Muslim is under an obligation to fashion his entire life in 
accordance with its injunctions and to observe at every step what is permissible and 
prohibited. 2 The reason is simple, man's life is a unit and any defect in any aspect 
affects the others also, therefore, Shari'ah regulates all the aspects of human life 
including food and drink. 
In this chapter, it is proposed to study the principles of Shari'ah in connection with 
intoxication and the strategy for its control and prohibition. The effects of intoxication 
on human beings and criminal liability of an intoxicated offender shall also find their 
place in the chapter. Analytical synthesis of English law and Shari 'ah shall be presented 
to show that Shari'ah has adopted a realistic approach to deal with the vice of 
intoxication and it is the only law that has successfully controlled use of intoxicants in 
an Islamic society. The chapter underlines the proactive characteristic of Shari'ah as 
well. 
9.2 Shari'ah's Directions Regarding Food and Drink 
The directions regarding edibles in Shari'ah have been enunciated in the Holy Qur'an 
as "0 mankind! Eat of that which is lawful and wholesome in the earth, and follow not 
the footsteps of the devil. Lo! He is an open enemy for you. "3 Enjoining the use of 
wholesome and permissible any transgression has been ascribed to Satan. The 
prohibited foods have been made known to the Muslims, the verse ordains, "You are 
forbidden to eat that which dies of itself and blood and flesh of swine and that which 
has been dedicated unto any other than Allah, and the strangled, and the dead through 
beating, and the dead through falling from a height, and that which has been killed by 
(the goring of) a horns and the devoured of wild beasts. "4 In many other verses5 the 
similar provisions have been provided and other than the things expressly prohibited 
consumption of anything is lawful. A Muslims is under an obligation to follow these 
directions in his everyday life. 
'Ansari, Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman, The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society (15` 
ed., Indus Educational Foundation, Karachi, Pakistan, 1973) Vol. 1, p. 116. 
2 Doi, Abdur Rehman, Shari'ah: The Islamic Law (Ta-ha Publishers, London, 1984) p. i. 
Al-Qur'an 2: 168 
4 Al-Qur'an 5: 3 
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9.3 Islamic Society and Intoxication 
In Arabia at the time of the Holy Prophet the only intoxicating substance known was 
alcoholic drink made from grapes, dates, wheat, barley or maize. 6 The brewing of 
alcohol from these substances was popular among pre-Islamic Arabs. 7 The intoxicating 
substance made from these materials is known as "Al-Khamr" which means a substance 
which mixes up, covers, or swamps the mind and reason. 8 Khamr is an Arabic word 
which literally means which veils, covers or conceals a thing. 9 Alcoholic beverages are 
termed as Khamr because they veil the intellect and obscure the moral sensibilities of a 
man. The definition itself describes the characteristics of intoxication and distinguishes 
it from insanity; insanity destroys the intellect and mental capacities of a person, 
whereas intoxication merely covers and conceals them. 
Shari'ah not only prohibits excessive drinking, rather a drop of wine is prohibited as 
strictly as a glass. There is a principle that if the large quantity of a drink intoxicates, a 
smaller quantity of it is prohibited. 10 The logic behind the principle is that large 
quantities usually begin with smaller ones. The first drop leads to other drops and 
consequently the intoxicated person drops his position, health, respectability, fortune, 
friends, family and all prospects of his life. It is very important to beware of the first 
drop. It is not only the use of intoxicants that has been declared unlawful rather any type 
of connection with intoxicants is prohibited. The Holy Prophet said, "God has cursed 
upon ten persons in connection with wine: the one who brews it and the one for whom it 
is brewed; the one who drinks it and the one who serves, the one who carries it and the 
one for whom it is carried, the one who buys it and the one for whom it is bought; the 
one who sells it and the one who eats its profits. "" 
S Like, Al-Qur'an 2: 172-173 
6 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, Sunan Ibn Majah (Gagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. 11, p. 1121. 
Abu Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, Sunan Abu Daoud (Gagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 78. 
AI-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, Saih al-Bukhari (Gagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. VI, p. 242. 
7 Bassher, Taha, "The Use of Drugs in Islamic World" British Journal ofAddiction 76 (1981) 233 at. 233. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1121. 
Abu Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 78. 
9 Ibn Manzur, Lissan Al-Arab (Dar Sader, Beirut, 1955) Vol. IV, p. 254. 
Ibn Faräs, Mu jam Magayis AI-Lugha (Al-Dar AI-Islamia, Ghadeer, 1990) Vol. 11, p. 215. 
Al-Johri, Al-Sihhah Taj Al-Lugha wa Sihhah Al-Arbia (Dar Al-Kutb Al-Ilmia, Beirut, 1999) Vol. 11, p. 310. 
10 Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, Al-Jameh al-Saih (Gagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 292 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1124. 
Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 82. 
Ahmed, bin Hanble, Masnad Ahmed bin Hanble (Gagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. I, p. 316. 
Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 18. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1121. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 111, p. 589. 
221 
lnu, xicalkin hi English I: aw 3ttd. Shef1'uh 
Both the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet are clear and unequivocal in 
prohibition of intoxicants. These sources provide logical and reasonable arguments why 
intoxication is such a great evil to society. It is obvious that drunkenness is viewed in 
Shari'ah as a crime of considerable seriousness and it has succeeded to greater extent 
than most religions and philosophies of the world in exterminating this evil from society. 
Despite the socio-economic differences and varying cultural traditions among Muslim 
countries of the world, the practice of Islamic doctrine is considered to be the most 
essential factor in maintaining a relatively low prevalence rate of alcohol consumption 
as compared to the other parts of world. 12 
Intoxicants are prohibited because they can damage a person psychologically, 
physically, socially and mentally. Many people know the bad effects of liquor on their 
health but they still drink. There are millions of Muslims who have read no research on 
effects of liquor on human health, many of them cannot read at all but they have never 
tasted even a drop of it in their lives. This has been the case since the emergence of 
Islam for the last fifteen centuries. 
9.4 What is meant by Intoxication in Shari'ah? 
Intoxication may be defined as dominance of a condition, caused by ingestion of some 
substance, which prevents a person acting according to the guidance of intellect without 
destroying it. 13 The definition suggests that human intelligence is neither lost nor 
diminished by intoxication though remains suspended for the time being. 
Muslim jurists have defined various conditions of an intoxicated person that may lead to 
prove his state of intoxication. According to Hanfrte and Malkite an intoxicated person 
is one who cannot distinguish between earth and sky or between a man and a woman 
and his speech and gait are not co-ordinated. 14 According to Shaflie an intoxicated 
person is one whose speech is slurred and un-coordinated and his secrets are 
disclosed. 15 Hanblite say that an intoxicated is one who does not know what he utters. 16 
Their view is in conformity with the Qura'nic concept of intoxication which states that 
12 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 238. 
13 Al-Bukhari, Abdul Aziz, Kashafal-Asrar (Hussain Hilmi, Turkey, 1307 A. H) Vol. IV, p. 1482. 
14 Jbn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah Wa AI-Nazair (Idara Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi) p. 553. 
Ibn Abdeen, Muhammad Ameen, Hashia Ibn Abdeen (Dar al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 41. 
Al-Dasooqi, Shamas ud din Muhammad Arafa, Hashiat Al-Dasooqi Ala Sharah al-Kabir (Dar al-Ahya 
Al-Kutab al-Arabia Isa al-Babi al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. IV, p. 359. 
15 Al-Sauti, Jalal ud din, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair (Dar al-Ktub AI-11mia, Beirut, 1979) p. 217. 
16 Ibn Qadama, AI-Mughni (Maktaba AI-Riaz a[-Hadisa, Riyadh) Vol. VIII, p. 192. 
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an intoxicated person does not know what he utters. 
' 7 According to another view it is 
not necessary that an intoxicated person should be incapable of distinguishing between 
man and woman or earth and sky, rather it is sufficient if he cannot distinguish between 
his own clothes or shoes if mixed with the other people. 
'8 
The conditions of an intoxicated person as described by the Muslim jurists have been 
confirmed by modern research. It is admitted that human brain starts reacting to alcohol 
with the first sip and keep on reacting until well after the last drink. Its stimulating 
effects are changed into depressant; leading to lack of self control, loss of ability to 
make good decisions, slurred speech, lost co-ordination, and uncontrolled behaviour. 
19 
These conditions leads to the conclusion that a person must be grossly intoxicated 
before he is designated so and his intoxication is to be considered by a court to 
determine his liability. This view of Shari'ah is on a par with the similar view in 
English law as discussed in 8.3.6. 
9.5 Shari'ah's View Regarding Alcohol and Drugs 
Shari'ah prohibits use of Khamr regardless of its source, kind and nature whether from 
grapes, wheat, barley, dates or any other substance . 
2() The view is based upon the saying 
of the Holy Prophet expressly enunciating that the intoxicants brewed from these 
substances are Khamr. 21 However, Ilanfite and an opinion of Malkite differ with the 
view and say that the intoxicant brewed only from grapes is to be termed as Khamr. 
22 
They argue that at the time of prohibition there were certain other intoxicating 
substances but the one brewed from grapes were termed as Khamr. 
23 The difference of 
opinion is practically of great implications because an accused shall be liable for the 
Hadd if he consumed Khamr, regardless of the fact whether he was intoxicated or not, 
whereas in the cases of substances not termed as Khamr he shall be liable for Hadd only 
when he becomes intoxicated after the consumption of the intoxicating substance. 
17 Al-Qur'an 4: 14. 
18 Al-Bahli, All bin Abbas, Al-Qawaid wal Fawaid al-Usulia (Matba al-Sunnah, Cairo, 1956) p. 38. 
Ibn Qadama, Al-Mughni (IS` ed., Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, 1996) Vol. XII, p. 450. 
19 National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, National Institute of Health, New Year, Old 
Myths, New Fatalities (http: //www. niaaa. nih. i4ov ) 2002. 
20 lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 16. Vol. VIII, p. 304. 
Al-Khatib, Shamas ud din Muhammad bin Ahmad al Sharbini, Al-Iqnahfi Hal Alfaz Abi Shi jjah (Dar 
Al-Marfa, Beirut, 1979) Vol. 11. p. 186. 
Malik Bin Ans, Al-Mudawana Al-Kobra (Dar Sader, Beirut) Vol. VI, p. 261. 
Al-Sherazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim bin All, Al-Mohazzib (Matbah Isa AI-Babi AI-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. 11, p. 286. 
21, Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 78. 
22 lbn Abdeen, Muhammad Ameen, Hashia Ibn Abdeen, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 178. 
Al-Dasooqi, Shamas ud din Muhammad Arafa, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 352. 
223 
Intosiraticut in Gnl; lish I_. iw and . Shrui'uh 
Shari 'ah takes an uncompromising stand in prohibiting intoxicants. Despite the 
difference of opinions on the use of word Khamr for a particular substance, there is 
complete unanimity on the point that use of any intoxicating substance is unlawful. The 
saying of the Holy Prophet, "All intoxicants are Khamr and all types of Khamr are 
forbidden"24 is unanimously admitted. The saying suggests that the Arabic word Al- 
Khamr signifies any substance which causes intoxication. There remains no doubt that 
any substance capable of befogging or clouding mind of man, impairing his faculties of 
thought, perception and discernment is prohibited, with whatever name we call it, for it 
produces the same public harm. 25 
Shari 'ah s approach to deal with the problems of intoxicants is more consistent as 
compared to English law. Unlike English law, it does not differentiate between drugs 
and alcohol. Logically there must not be any difference between the two from the legal 
point of view because they affect the human mind exactly the same way. The approach 
can be supported by the fact that the industrial revolution and modern scientific research 
has resulted in a huge increase of manufactured chemicals and new drugs used for 
intoxication. The recognition of the hazards of a new drug may take considerable time 
prior to proper preventive intervention and control by the governments. Shari 'ah has 
just given a simple principle that any substance, whatever its name may be, if causes 
intoxication, should be regarded as harmful and prohibited. 
9.6 Pre-Islamic Society and Alcohol 
In pre-Islamic Arab society use of wine was an integral part of their social life. 
Specifically the young were very fond of wine, woman and wars. 26 Alcohol probably 
served a much greater psychological necessity, to the pre-Islamic Arabs than to any 
other society of that time. 27 They were so fond of alcohol and drinking parties that their 
love for alcohol is reflected in the Arabic language which has nearly one hundred names 
for wine. 28 Different names described different kinds of Khamr regarding its origin, 
alcohol contents, the substance from which it was brewed, specific method of its 
23 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 241. 
24 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 1122. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 291. 
Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 83-84. 
25 Lippman, Matthew, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure (Praeger, New York, 1988) p. 48. 
26 Jawad Ali, Dr, Tarikh-al-Arab Qabl-al-Islam (Dar al-ilm Lilmalayeen, Beirut, 1970) Vol. IV, p. 665. 
27 Badri, M. B., Islam and Alcoholism (American Trust Publications, 1976) p. 1 1. 
28 Qardawi, Y. All, The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam (5'h ed., Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1995) p. 70. 
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fermentation and brewing, its effects on drinker and many other qualities. 29 Ancient 
Arabic literary work and poetry is full of praises glorifying intoxicants, excessive 
drinking and gambling. 30 Alcoholic indulgence was praised for its pleasure producing 
and overjoyed effects. It seemed that the people were worshipping the bottle rather than 
their God. The prevailing condition in English society is closely identical to that of 
Arabs before Islam. The study, how Shari'ah successfully banned the use of intoxicants 
would be helpful to form a strategy to control the present situation in English society. 
9.7 Strategy of Shari'ah in Prohibiting use of Intoxicants 
To eradicate the vice of drinking Shari 'ah has adopted the strategy of prohibiting it 
gradually. It has adopted a wise course of teaching and training that worked very 
effectively. After about fifteen centuries the successful Islamic model of alcohol 
prevention and prohibition still stands out as exceptional and indeed unique in human 
history. 31 It is because of the fact that Shari'ah is not confined only to commands, 
prohibition and their consequences, but unlike secular laws it addresses the conscience 
of the individuals as well. This moral appeal to the conscience consists of a persuasion 
of a warning, an impression to the possible benefit and harm that may follow the 
obedience of command or violation of a prohibition including a promise of reward or 
threat of punishment in the Hereafter. 32 This gives an additional strength to the 
injunctions of Shari'ah and the common man obeys the law more willingly. The 
prohibition settled gradually and prevented use of liquor in four different phases. 
9.7.1 First Phase 
The first Qura'nic verse dealing the problem of intoxication touches the question very 
lightly. It states, "And of the fruits of the date, palm, and grapes, whence ye drive strong 
drink and also good nourishment. Lo! Therein is indeed a portent for people who have 
sense. "33 The verse, indeed, differentiates between strong drink and good nourishment. 
For the people of intellect and senses the verse was enough to raise suspicion about the 
use of Khamr. This verse acted as an alerting signal and raised probing questions on the 
harmful effects of alcohol. 34 The people having good judgement and rational sense 
started raising questions regarding use of Khamr. A few of them must have reduced 
their alcoholic intake or attempted to abstain from drinking though it was still 
29 Badri, M. B., 1976, op. cit. p. 16. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 233. 
32 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (I. T. S., Cambridge, 1991) p. 139. 
33 Al-Qur'an 16: 67. 
34 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 233 
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religiously and legally not forbidden. 35 The message proved to be a ground levelling 
step which paved the way for the second phase. 
9.7.2 Second Phase 
In the second phase, replying the questions of believers raised to the Holy Prophet, the 
matter has been dealt more directly. It has been said, "They question thee about 
intoxicants and games of chance. Say: In both is great sin and (some) utility for men; 
but the sin of them is greater than their utility. "36 It could be inferred from the question 
raised that the growing community of believers were more concerned about the virtue of 
the use of alcohol. 37 The verse clearly supports the views of those whose pious character 
made them perceive the great sin in alcohol use before they were told about it. The Holy 
Qur'an acknowledges that there is some benefit in intoxicants, but warns that the 
danger of its use is greater. 
Some Muslim scholars opined that use of alcohol contains some benefits like profit of 
trading for brewers, assistance in digestion, provision of energy, increase in sexual drive, 
courage to the coward, deriving of pleasure and leading to a fair complexion. 
38 However, 
the opinion is questionable on the ground that had alcohol consumption really contained 
such benefits it would have not been prohibited by the law giver, the only proved 
benefit is the profit of trading. 39 It contains all the -characteristics contrary to those 
mentioned above. 40 It leads to the enmity between the subjects, suspension of reason, 
which leads to the violation of rights of man and Allah, like murder, unlawful sexual 
intercourse, and many other crimes; it also prevents the intoxicated to perform worship 
of Allah . 
41 There is no doubt that its harmful effects are far greater than its benefits. 
Though the verse made the believers more considerate to the sinful effects of Khamr yet 
the final decision to use or to abstain from Khamr was dependent upon the personal 
discretion. Majority of the community continued to drink; nonetheless, the injunction 
alerted the community of believers to it harmful effects and prepared the way for a more 
decisive stage of prohibition. 
35 Badri, M. B., 1976, op. cit. p. 23. 
36 A1-Qur'an 2: 219. 
37 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 235. 
38 Al-Razi, Muhammad Fakhar ud din, Tafseer AI-Fakhar al-Rani (Known as) Al-Tafseer Al-Kabir iva 
Mafatikh al-Ghaib (Dar al-Fiker Littabbah wa al-Nasher, Beirut, 1995) Vol. 111, p. 51. 
Al-Qurtabi, AI-Jamah Li-Ahkam AI-Qur'an (Mataba Dar-Al-Ktub, Cairo, 1936) Vol. 111, p. 57. 
39 AI-Razi, Muhammad Fakhar ud din, 1995, op. cit. Vol. III, (Foot note) p. 51. 
Raza, Muhammad Rashid, Tafseer Al-Minar (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. 11, p. 330. 
40 Al-Razi, Muhammad Fakhar ud din, 1995, op. cit. Vol. III (Foot note) p. 51. 
41 Al-Qurtabi, 1936, op. cit. Vol. Ill, p. 55. 
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9.7.2.1 A Comparison of Utility and Disadvantages of Intoxicants 
If the disadvantages of a thing are greater than its advantages it is collectively termed as 
injurious and wisdom demands that it should be avoided. The only benefit ascribed to 
alcohol consumption in moderate quantity is that it produces a feeling of warmth in 
stomach, in certain cases increases enjoyment and well-being, elevates mood, and helps 
digestion. 42 A comparison of its advantages and disadvantages in the context of the 
British Society will be interesting. Its production, marketing, and selling has employed 
about 775,000 people in UK. 43 Export of alcoholic beverages exceeds £1000 million per 
annum which is helpful to keep balance of international trade. 44 Annual VAT and excise 
duty raised on the sale exceeded £5,000 million, in 1983, that was equivalent to 1/3 of 
NHS annual budget. 45 In1987-88, the amount elevated to £7.5 billion46 and in 1993-94 
it reached £9.1 billion being 5.5% of the total government income. 47 Moreover, the 
export of Scottish whisky comprises 2% of the value of total UK's exports. 48 These are 
the economic benefits associated with the alcohol industry and its trade, but at what cost 
these benefits are derived can be observed by looking on the other side of the picture. 
Comparing the revenue generated by the production and sale of alcoholic beverages 
with the enormous damages caused by its use proves the truthfulness of the Qur'anic 
verse and the importance of guidance revealed fifteen centuries ago. 
The public health agencies promote policies and conditions that foster health and well- 
being of the community, whereas consumption of alcohol create conditions that foster 
disaster for the public. 9 Alcohol misuse costs Britain up to £3 billion a year in terms of 
NHS services with over 28,000 admissions in hospitals caused by alcohol dependence 
or poisoning. 50 This amount is 12% of the total expenditure by NHS on hospitals . 
51 A 
42 Hastings, James, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (T &T Clark, Edinburgh, 1908) Vol. 1, p. 299. 
Alcohol and the Public Health: A Study by a Working Party of the Faculty of Public Health Medicine 
of the Royal Colleges of Physicians on the Prevention of Harm Related to the use of Alcohol and other 
Drugs (Macmillan Education Ltd., 1991) p. 23. 
43 Saunders, W. M., "Alcohol Use in Britain: How Much is Too Much? " Health Edu. J. 43 (1984) 66 at 66. 
[According to a recent analytical report total value of the UK alcoholic drink market exceeds £30 billions 
providing approximately I million jobs across the value chain from forming through distribution to pubs, 
bars and restaurants {Strategy Unit alcohol Harm Reduction Project, Interim Analytical 
Report. (http: //w vw. strategy. aov. tik/files/pdf)}] 2004. 
44 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 66. 
4s Ibid. 
46 Crooks, Edmund, Alcohol Consumption and Taxation (Institute of Fiscal Studies, London, 1989) p. 7 
47 Whent, Hilary, Health Update: Alcohol (2"a ed., Health Education Authority, 1997) p. 30. 
4s Ibid. 
49 Editorial, "Warning: The Alcohol Industry is not Your Friend" British Journal ofAddiction 87(1992) 
1109 at 1110. 
so Alcohol Concern, Your Very Good Health? (http: //www. alcoholconcern. ore. uk) 2003. 
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survey of 2988 patients, aged between 18 and 85, of acute admission in a hospital 
revealed that 41% of the admissions were either ascribed to abuse of alcohol/drugs or it 
was a contributory factor for the admissions. 52 It is estimated that 20% of all adult 
patients admitted to hospital may be classified as harmful or hazardous drinkers. 53 
Another survey of A&E (Accident & Emergency) patients determined that 12% of 
attendance to A&E is ascribed to alcohol. 54 
In addition to the cost mentioned above another £3 billions are required a year as cost of 
sickness, absence, unemployment, pre-mature deaths, alcohol related crimes and 
accidents. 55 The financial costs to society due to alcohol misuse are calculated to be £10 
billion per annum. 56 English people spend more on alcohol than they do on all other 
necessities of life. 57 More than 7% of consumer expenditure goes on alcoholic drink, the 
amount that is supposed to be spent on better health, clothing and food. 58 In 1982, the 
British people consumed 1350 million gallons of beer equivalent to 30 million pints a 
day, 35 million proof gallons of spirits and 106 million gallons of wine. 59 This costs 
Britain £33 million each day. 60 Alcohol misuse costs British industry about £1,700 
million each year in the form of loss of approximately 8 million working days through 
alcohol-related absenteeism. 61 The statistics proves that millions upon millions pounds 
have been spent in what amounts to a futile and divisive disaster. 62 
Alcohol consumption may cause a number of social problems like, domestic violence, 
child neglect/abuse, divorce, debt, fraud and financial difficulties. 63 It is estimated that 1 
million children in UK. are currently growing up in problem drinking families, having 
51 Alcohol Concern, Alcohol's on Everyone's Lips (http: //www. alcoholconcem. orR. uk) 2003. 
52 Canning, U. P. "Substance Misuse in Acute General Medical Admissions" 92 (1999) QJM319. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Pirmohamed, M., Brown, C., "The Burden of Alcohol Misuse" 93 (2000) QJM29I. 
55 Editorial, "Warning: The Alcohol Industry" British Journal of Addiction 87 (1992) 1109 at p. 1110. 
56 Alcohol Concern, Alcohol Strategy (http: //www. alcoholconcem. orR. uk) 2003(A new report estimates 
that alcohol misuse is now costing around £ 20 bn. a year (Prime Minister Strategy Unit, Alcohol Harm 
Reduction Strategy for England (http: //www. Iniaie. L,, uardian. co. uk/svs) 2004. p. 7. 
5' The Royal College of Physicians, A Great and Growing Evil (Tavistock, London, N. York, 1987) p. 7. 
Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 66. 
58 Crooks, Edmund, 1989, op. cit. p. 7 
59 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 66. 
60 Ibid. 
`1 Lord President's Report, Action against Alcohol Misuse (HMSO, London, 1991) p. 3. 
62 A latest report estimated that alcohol misuse is now costing £ 20 bn a year including 1.2 million violent 
incidents, 360,000 cases of domestic violence, 30,000 hospital admissions for alcohol dependence 
syndrome, 22,000 premature deaths, loss of 17 m working days, 1000 suicides, more than 1m children 
affected by parental alcohol problems, increased divorce rate, 70% of all admissions to A&E at peak 
times, £95m. on specialist alcohol treatment. (Cabinet Office Prime Minister's Strategy unit, Alcohol 
Harm Reduction Strategy For England (http: //ima(e. Ruardian. co. uk/sys) 2004. p. 7. 
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higher levels of problems than children of non drinkers, alcohol misuse doubles the risk 
of divorce and separation and is a major factor in 40% of domestic violence and 25% of 
known child abuse, 20% of pupils excluded from school were suspended for alcohol 
consumption. 64 It can be imagined that alcohol is not only destroying the families but it 
may also be an element degrading educational system. 
The whole story has not yet been told. Alcohol consumption is responsible for a number 
of diseases as mentioned in 6.6. Alcohol results in over 5000 deaths a year directly 
attributed to its use. 65 In addition, it is an important factor in road accidents, drowning 
and various other circumstances leading to death. Drinking and driving is a serious and 
avoidable road safety problem, one in six people died on roads is a result of drink drive 
accidents . 
66 About 16,830 lives were claimed by alcohol in traffic accidents in 1999.67 
In 2000,21% of total deaths caused by drowning were credited to alcohol. 68 Total 
number of deaths toll between 25000 and 40000 annually where alcohol is a significant 
contributory factor. 69 In addition, 50-73% assault victim injuries, 50% of all serious 
road accidents, 50% of domestic violence against females, 47% of serious injuries, 40% 
of self poisoning are credited to alcohol's use. 70 Further, alcohol is a major factor in 60- 
70% homicides, 75% stabbing, 70% beating and 50% fights or assaults. 71 Is that not 
ridiculous that English law prevents the expected harm, caused by oneself to himself, by 
enforcing the wearing of safety helmet by motorcyclists and fastening belts by motorists 
but it does not prevent a definite harm caused by alcohol consumption? 
Alcohol misuse is a more serious problem as compared to drug abuse in UK; twice as 
many people are dependent on drink than all other drugs put together. 72 The seriousness 
of consumption of alcohol and resulted crime is reflected by the fact that there were 5.2 
63 Anderson, Peter, The BMA Guide to Alcohol and Accident (B. M. A., London, 1989) p. 8. 
64 Straight Talk, From Stigma to Solution, Winter (2001) Vol. 16, No. 1. pp. 14-15; 
Alcohol Concern, Britain Ruin? Statistics (www. alcoholconcern. org. uk) Press Release, May 11,2000. 
Report From General Practice, Alcohol: A Balanced View (Royal College of General Practitioners, 1986)p. 45. 
65 Alcohol Concern, Your Very Good Health? (www. alcoholconcern. ore. uk) 2002. 
66 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Region, Transport Statistics, 
Road Safety: Drinking and Driving (http: //www. transtat. dft. t; ov. uk/) 2002. 
67 Department of Health, Statistics on Alcohol: England, 1978 Onwards (http: //www. doh. gov. uk) 2002. 
68 Water & Leisure Safety, Water Safety Fact Sheet-June 2002 (htti): //www. rospa. co. ukl) 2002. 
69 Report From General Practice, 1986, op. cit. p. 45. 
Alcohol Concern, The State of the Nation: Britain's True Alcohol Bill (www. alcoholconcern. org. uk) 2002. 
70 Alcohol Concern, Your Very Good Health? (http: //www. alcoholconcern. org. uk) 2002. 
71 Anderson, Peter, 1989, op. cit. p. 5. 
72 Alcohol Concern, Alcohol's on Everyone's Lips (littl2: //www. alcoholconcei-n. orty. uk ) 2002. 
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million crimes recorded by police in 2000-2001,73 inclusive of 733,300 violent crimes 
showing an increase by 4.3% and increase in robberies by13%. 74 The statistics above 
leads to the conclusion that the demerits of alcohol use are undoubtedly many times 
greater than its merits. Alcohol took more out of the drunk than he took out of alcohol. 
Even if we leave all the financial losses due to alcohol misuse, merely loss of one 
human life is greater than any amount of monetary benefit. Though the costs of alcohol 
misuse, personal, social, and economic, may be difficult to quantify, yet without doubt 
they are great. 75 
These are some of demerits of alcohol consumption whereas, it is estimated that merely 
a 5% reduction in the level of alcohol misuse with in a five year term could result in a 
minimum annual saving of £542.7 million. 76 About 70% of population agree that UK 
would be a healthier and better place if alcohol consumption is reduced, 63% believe 
that binge drinking is the major problem in the society, 88% think that alcohol misuse is 
the major cause of violence. 77 It suggests that general public is well aware of the cost 
they are paying for alcohol misuse. 
Here, it is worth mentioning that prohibition of alcohol in an Islamic society is 
independent of all these merits and demerits. From Shari 'ah perspective, right and 
wrong are determined, not by reference to the nature of things, but because Allah has 
declared them as such. 78 The believers, even if there are benefits in alcohol, will not 
take them into account because it has been declared harmful by Allah, the Lord of the 
universe and the supreme authority of values. 
9.7.3 Third phase 
Muslim community was becoming more aware of alcohol's evil effects and was anxious 
to have some revealed injunction in this regard. Meanwhile it happened that one of the 
Muslims, leading the evening prayer in Madina, was too. drunk to recite the Holy 
Qur'an accurately. 79 This incident seriously demonstrated the harmful effects and sinful 
outcome of alcohol use and the appropriate psychological climate had been created for a 
73 Home Office, Statistical Bulletin Recorded Crime (Communication & Development Unit, 2001) p. 3 
74 Ibid. p. 9 
75 Lord President's Report, Action against Alcohol , Misuse (HMSO, London, 1991) p. 1. 76 Alcohol Concern, Alcohol Strategy: Executive Summary (http: //www. alcoholconcern. ore. uk) 2002. 
77 Alcohol Concern, Public Ready for Action on Alcohol (http: //www. alcoholconcern. org. uk) Press 
Release, May 21,2001. 
78 Karnali, Mohammad Hashim, 1991, op. cit. p. 245. 
79 Al-Tibri, Muhammad bin Jareer, Tafseer Tibri (Dar Ahya al-Taras, Beirut, 2001) Vol. V, p. 115. 
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more restrictive action. The incident became the cause of receiving timely declaration of 
the third phase of prohibition. 
In this phase some restriction were imposed and alcohol consumption was prohibited at 
the time of performing religious worship. The Holy Qur'an says, "0 ye who believe! 
Draw not near unto prayer when you are drunken, till you know that which ye utter. "80 
The verse admonished the believers not to come to prayers with their minds befogged 
by intoxicants. The verse describes a particular phenomenon that an intoxicated person 
does not know what he is uttering because his mental capacities have been suspended 
for the time being. This phase was very important because drunkenness was placed in a 
direct encounter with the prayer. 
Since prayer is a an obligation of every adult and sane Muslim five times a day, 
logically the verse leads to the conclusion that one should drink only such a quantity 
insufficient to intoxicate him or one should not drink at the time of prayer, so as to pray 
in the state of sobriety. If a Muslim should perform his prayer regularly and he was not 
to pray while drunk, it simply meant that he could not drink anymore. The 
psychological effects of this stage were far reaching. At every call for prayer, the 
believers were reminded to abstain from drinking. This could be viewed as a major step 
in the systematic de-sensitisation process of collective abstention, analogical to 
behaviour therapy. 8' This obviously has served as a well-suited means for strengthening 
the spiritual drive to enter into a new pattern of life. 
This phase has given birth to another factor, social pressure, to abstain from use of 
alcohol. The believers were supposed to offer congregational prayers in the mosque led 
by the Holy Prophet. It was unimaginable that someone will miss them without any 
valid excuse, like serious illness. If he missed any of his prayer his friends would visit 
him at home expecting him to be seriously ill. He would feel quite ashamed to admit 
that he missed his prayer because he was drunk. The influence of group dynamics was 
optimally utilised to induce the hardcore of chronic alcoholics to conform socially to a 
new religious life. This is the basic characteristic of an Islamic society that people do 
not keep minding their own business. They are liable to co-operate in goodness and 
Al-Qurtabi, 1936, op. cit. Vol. V, p. 200. 
R0 Al-Qur'an 4: 43. 
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discourage evil, it is their duty to prevent the evil deeds if within their power or at least 
admonish the wrongdoer. By this way the addicted were helped out by social pressure 
and friendly influence of religious brotherhood that made them believe that compliance 
82 to dictates of Shari'ah bears a much greater value than addiction to alcohol. 
The traditional wine drinking had to be given up or reduced to the minimum in order 
that people might be sober and observe the above commandment. 83 However, still the 
use of alcohol was not declared as prohibited. This was the probable reason that the 
companions of the Holy Prophet were constrained to enquire about some clear 
injunction as to the use of liquor. They asked the Holy Prophet and also prayed to the 
Almighty Allah to issue a clear and satisfactory injunction. 84 On the other hand some 
alcohol addicts were still drinking. They drink after the night prayer and were well in 
their senses till the morning to offer their dawn prayer. 85 When Muslims became 
accustomed to abstain from drinking for long hours and controlled their temptation for 
alcohol, a clear, general and unequivocal prohibition for all the times was finally 
revealed. 
9.7.4 Fourth Phase 
Over the preceding years the circumstances changed and the scene was appropriately set 
for a complete preventive and prohibitive measure. In response to their inquiry the 
following verse was revealed which not only categorically prohibits use of liquor but 
also explains the causes of prohibition. In the fourth and final phase it is said, "0 ye 
who believe! Intoxicants and games of chance and (sacrificing to) idols and divining 
arrows are only an uncleanness (Rijs) and an infamy of Devil's handiwork; shun it 
therefore and you may succeed. The devil only desires to cast among you enmity and 
hatred by means of intoxicants and games of chance and to keep you off from the 
remembrance of Allah and from (his) worship, will you then desist? "86 This is the most 
forceful command describing alcohol as the tool of devil, a means that leads to greater 
sins, creates enmity among human, therefore, believers are commanded to shun it. 
The verse reveals the social and religious harmful consequences of Khamr. Drinking 
Khamr and gambling has been linked to idol's worship and declared as filthy (Rijs) and 
81 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 236. 
82 Badri, M. B., 1976, op. cit. p. 26. 
83 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 236. 
84 Abu Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 79. 
85 Al-Zokhali, Wahba, Al-Tafseer al-Munirfi al-Ageeda (Dar AI-Fiker, Beirut, 1991) Vol. V, p. 81. 
86 A1-Qur'an 5: 90-91. 
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ascribed to the work of Satan. It refers to the major risks resulting from alcohol 
consumption. Alcohol excites enmity and hatred among the community of believers by 
making the intoxicated person indifferent to moral and religious values and 
irresponsible towards his duties. The incidents of violence as a result of alcohol use are 
very common in Western society, a live example to prove the truth of the revelation. In 
fact, the injunction is accompanied by the cause and wisdom that has been proved 
scientifically centuries after it was revealed. 
An objection may be raised that the Holy Qur'an has not declared it unlawful (Haram); 
at the most it has declared it as Rijs and the act of Satan. The objection may be rejected 
on the ground that the word Rijs is more comprehensive as compared to Haram. A 
substance that has been declared as Haram may not be Rijs. For example, the property 
obtained by theft is Haram but is not Rijs or filthy. On the other hand a Rijs substance 
shall always be Haram. 87 It is worth noting that Allah Almighty when prohibited use of 
alcohol, mentioned seven causes for the command, out of which any single cause is 
sufficient to declare it prohibited. It has been linked with the worship of idols, it is 
designated as Rijs, it is called a handiwork of Satan, it has been enjoined to be 
abandoned, success has been linked with abstaining from it, it leads to hatred and 
enmity among human beings, it prevents from remembrance of Allah and His worship. 
The verse ends with a very severe admonition to abstain; will you then desist? The 
response of the community of believers to the injunction was prompt and decisive. It 
has been narrated that when the Holy Prophet had finished the recitation of the verses 
for the first time, the listeners answered with an enthusiastic cry, "We have desisted oh 
Lord! We have desisted! " 88 The word "desist" used in Qur'anic verse for the 
prohibition of alcohol has a wider meaning than mere abstaining and it aims at 
establishing a strong avoidance reaction to association with alcohol in any form. 
The response of believers to the commandment was remarkable indeed. Some people 
were drinking wine at that time, having partly filled glasses in their hands. As soon as 
they heard the announcement "wine has indeed been prohibited, " they poured the 
remaining drink on the ground and broke the big clay. pots filled with fermented 
87 Al-Qurtabi, 1936, op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 289. 
88 Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 80. 
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drinks. 89 History records that on the day of its complete prohibition wine flowed in the 
streets of Madina like water after heavy shower. 90 There is no other such precedent in 
the history of legislation of people complying so swiftly and wholeheartedly with the 
law, especially in the case of prohibition of drinking, which was a deep rooted habit of 
the pre-Islamic Arab society, glamorised by its poets and affecting its trade. 
9.8 How was the Goal achieved? 
The time period between these four steps was logically necessary to mentally prepare 
the people to abandon use of alcohol and to overpower its withdrawal effects. The first 
verse was revealed a few months before the Holy Prophet's emigration to Madina. 
91 It 
was the time when the reformation of the false believes was at the stage of its maturity 
and the people were willing to adopt a new social and moral code of life. The second 
verse was revealed soon after the emigration, 92 while the third verse was revealed after 
almost seven years from emigration, whereas, the last and final verse was revealed two 
or three years after the third93 and it is amongst the last revelations. 
94 It took almost ten 
years to achieve the object that has ever been achieved anywhere. 
95 
People had been accustomed to drinking wine and dealing in it. It would be unbearable 
for them to prohibit its use and trade at once. Obviously there were no sedative or 
analgesic drugs available to recover from any withdrawal symptoms. 
96 There might be 
some persons acutely addicted to alcohol, who would have certainly been given honey 
as a medicine to overcome the withdrawal effects. There is a long Surah in the Holy 
Qur'an named as "The Bee. "97 The Holy Qur'an describing the characteristics of honey 
says that there is healing for mankind in it. 
98 There are a number of traditions of the 
Holy Prophet proving the fact that honey can cure many diseases. 
99 Modem science has 
Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. V, p. 254. 
89 AI-Qurtabi, 1936, op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 292. 
Al-Tibri, Muhammad bin Jareer, 2001, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 43. 
9° Badri, M. B., 1976, op. cit. p. 4. 
91 Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Qur'an (Dar Al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1980) p. 393. 
92 Raza, Muhammad Rashid, op. cit. F. N. 39. Vol. II, p. 322. 
93 Ibid. 
94 lbn Kathir, Tafseer A! -Qur'an AI-Azim (IS` ed., Dar Ahya Al-Turas Al-Arabi, 
Beirut, 1977) Vol. 11, p. 5 
93 Emigration of Muslims from Makkah to Madina took place in A. D. 622 (Encyclopaedia of Islam Vol. 1, 
p. 548). If we take the same year for the revelation of the first verse then the last verse was revealed 
around A. D. 631-32. ) 
96 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 236. 
97 Surah 16 
98 AI-Qur'an 16: 69. 
99 A1-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vo1. VII, p. 12. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV. p. 409. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1142. 
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proved that honey contains a large amount of fructose that is very effective for the 
detoxication of drunkenness. Research confirms that two doses of 125 grams of honey 
at an interval of half an hour are more suitable to overcome the problem. 
100 Beside this, 
the strong religious and emotional feelings of Muslims, motivation to change and unity 
with the other members of religious community, increasing social support and group 
interaction, a firm and unconditional faith in Almighty Allah, raised greater hopes to 
meet the challenging experience of abstaining from Khamr. 
101 
The most successful campaign that had ever been launched by man against alcohol was 
miraculously achieved. 102 The response of believers to the call was not astonishing. This 
was the result of ten years gradual religious, spiritual, ethical, and social control for the 
desire of drunkenness. It can be said without any fear of contradiction that it has not 
taken just ten years to completely eradicate the evil from Islamic society, there is a 
continuous effort of long and difficult thirteen years of Makkan period behind it, to 
reform the believes of converts to the new religion. In the beginning, pre-Islamic 
customs and traditions were not touched at all, rather the preference were given to the 
deep-rooted false beliefs like idolatry, tribalism, and values acknowledged during the 
period of ignorance. These ill beliefs were the roots of a large tree of evils, of which 
intoxication and gambling were only small branches. 
103 The Makkan period seeded the 
new belief in hearts of believers, nourished it and it was grown to a large tree of a new 
social order, where Allah Almighty is the Lord of the whole universe, faith in the Day 
of Judgement, and fear of accountability are the principles of life, that discarded all the 
beliefs of ignorance. When the Arabs abandoned idolatry and prejudices of tribalism, 
the tree of evils lost its roots and intoxication and gambling were merely like weak and 
dry branches of this tree. 
The strategy adopted by Shari 'ah in prohibiting use of alcohol confirms the fact that 
even the most effective preventive measures imposed by external authority are 
incapable of liberating a community from a social vice unless a desire for liberation 
awakened in the hearts of the people concerned. 
104 Every step, to the prohibition of 
100 Larsen, Martensen Oluf, "Detoxication of Drunkenness" British Medical Journal 2 (1954) p. 464. 
101 Bassher, Taha, 1981, op. cit. p. 236. 
102 Badri, M. B., 1976, op. cit. p. 6. 
los Ibid. p. 31. 
104 Ahmad, Khurshid, Islam: Its meaning and Message (Ambika Publications, New Delhi, 1977) p. 41. 
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alcohol, was taken whenever the spiritual and moral influence of the early step reached 
its climax. 105 The strategy of Shari 'ah, to control a social evil, points out two very 
essential elements of any permanent social change in the life pattern of a society. Firstly, 
the proposed change must be well planned and gradual rather than an abrupt. Secondly, 
there must exist a calming and peaceful psycho-social reaction to neutralise or reduce 
the tension aroused by the resistance to comply the change. 106 Men are rational beings 
and they will follow their realistic interests provided that these were made known to 
them; any change conforming to these interests will be welcomed by them and will be 
of perpetual nature. 
In conclusion it will be appropriate to mention the remarks of John Burns with regard to 
the effects of alcohol on human being individually, and on the social, economical, moral, 
physical health, and life standards of society collectively. He says that throughout the 
history of human beings, drink and drunkenness have been an active cause of social 
degradation, moral decadence and political decline. Its harmful effects were not 
restricted to a particular class rather they have affected peasant and merchant, serf and 
emperor, soldier and statesman, rich and poor. Scholars sunk beneath it, priest and 
politician, artists and craftsman have sacrificed their competency and decency, character 
and capability, to the vitiating temptation that drink offers them in its demoralising yet 
delightful charms. Through all the ages drunkenness has evoked greatest condemnation 
where it has been most widely used. Alcohol pollutes whatever it touches. It enervates 
when it does not enslave. It destroys slowly that which it does not degrade quickly. For 
the individuals it is a malignant disease, for the community it is murrain, for the nation 
it is an obstacle to all phases of progress. It lies across the path of personal reformation, 
municipal progress and state amelioration, obstructing all the forces of slow remedial 
reform and rapid changes to industrial elevation. It excites when it does not divert the 
best faculties and qualities of labour class. It irritates where it does not brutalise and 
makes for discord, conflict and bitterness, where calmness, sobriety, kindness and 
decency should prevail. It is an aid to laziness and is often an incentive to the most 
exhausting and reckless work; it is the most insidious foe to independence of character; 
105 Badri, M. B., 1976, op. cit. p. 29 
106 /bid. p. 22. 
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it undermines manhood, enervates maternity and dissipates the best element of human 
nature, as no other form of surfeit. It is the mother of want and nurse of crime. 107 
The statement above suggests that alcohol is either a single cause, or in conjunction 
with certain others, which influences much of the crime and misery, social disorder, 
poverty, lunacy, physical and moral degradation leading towards darkening the life of a 
nation. It is a major cause to waste national resources. It impoverishes the services 
maintained by the state for education and health. It perpetuates the slums and absorbs an 
immense amount of capital and enterprise but gives a smaller return in employment, 
wages than any other industry, trade or service of equal magnitude. Expenditure on 
drink is an indefensible burden on the income of the nation. Money spent on drink is 
money wasted and labour and capital required for its brewing and trade injure the nation, 
instead of bringing moral and material benefits to the people. 108 
9.9 Medicinal Use of Alcohol; Is it Allowed in Shari'ah? 
The discussion above proves that Shari 'ah has unequivocally prohibited use of alcohol 
or any other intoxicant. A question still remains unanswered, is it permissible to use 
alcohol as a medicine? The question may be answered in the light of the Sunnah. It is 
narrated that a companion asked the Holy Prophet about the use of alcohol as medicine, 
"Verily it is not a medicine but a disease" replied the Holy Prophet. 109 It has been 
confirmed by scientific research that use of alcohol may cause almost all the diseases, 
like Hepatitis, Gastritis, Gout, Pancreatitis, Cardiac arrhythmia, Trauma, Strokes, Acute 
alcohol poisoning, Impotence, Infertility, Foetal damage, Obesity, Diabetes, 
Hypertension, Brain damage, acute renal failure, Neuropathy, Myopathy, Cirrhosis, 
Cancer and many others. ' 10 It is the only disease that is sold under the licence by the 
government, advertised in the media and countless outlets available to spread it. 
Shari'ah has precedence in declaring alcohol a disease, adopting a realistic approach to 
abandon its use, centuries ago without any reliance upon such research. 
Another tradition reports "Allah has created diseases and sent them down; He also 
created their cure. Take medicines to cure them but not anything prohibited. ""' The 
107 Burns, John, Labour and Drink (Lees & Raper Memorial Trust, London, 1904) pp. 5-6. 
1°8 The Liquor (Popular Control) Bill Committee, Let the People Decide: Some Notes on Drink Problem 
(The Liquor (Popular Control) Bill Committee, London, 1928) p. 1. 
1°9 Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 206. 
Ahmed, bin Hanble, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 202. 
11° Anderson, Peter & Wallace, Paul, Alcohol Problems (Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 24. 
Report From General Practice, 1986, op. cit. p. 14 
111 Abu, Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 202. 
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Holy Prophet also narrated that Allah has not put the cure of any disease in a thing 
which He has prohibited. ' 12 The text of the sayings of the Holy Prophet proves that in 
Shari'ah it is not permissible to use alcohol even as medicine. Treatment of diseases 
with alcohol is prohibited in the same way as its use as intoxicants or the taking of any 
other prohibited substance. "3 In UK, the Royal Commission confirmed the proposition 
by saying that alcohol is neither a specific cure for any disease nor it has any 
prophylactic value, 114 on the contrary its use leads to certain disadvantages. "5 
It is not surprising that Shari'ah does not allow use of alcohol or any other prohibited 
substance as medicine. The prohibition of a thing demands avoiding and staying away 
from it, while allowing its use as medicine renders it desirable and keeping it on hand 
which is contrary to the spirit of prohibition. The logic behind prohibiting its medicinal 
use is that if alcohol were permitted as medicine when people are already inclined 
towards it, it would provide them an excuse to drink for pleasure and enjoyment, 
especially since they have the impression that alcohol is beneficial for their health, 
alleviates their complaints and cures their diseases. ' 16 
A logical reason forwarded by Ibn Qayyem, is that one condition for efficacy of 
medicine is the belief of the patient that Allah has placed the curing qualities in it. Now 
when a Muslim believes that alcohol is prohibited and Haram, it prevents him from 
believing that alcohol can be beneficial. Thus, he will not have any trust in it nor will he 
take it approvingly. ' 17 In addition, if he believes that Allah has put some blessings or 
benefits in it that will go against his faith that it is prohibited. 
Taking into account the explicit provisions of Shari'ah, Muslim jurists are of 
unanimous opinion that medicinal use of alcohol is not allowed. "8 However, there is a 
112 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 248. 
113 AI-Shoukani, Muhammad bin Ali, Neil Al-Aoutar (Dar AI-Ktub al-llmia, Beirut, 1999) Vol. VIII, p. 212. 
114 Royal Commission on Licensing (England and Wales) 1929-31, Cmd. 3988 (HMSO, 1932) Para. 79. 
115 Ibid. Para 77. 
116 Ibn Qayyem, Al-Jawziyah, Zad al-Ma'ad (Moassasa al-Risala, Beirut, 1979) Vol. IV, p. 156. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 16. Vol. VIII, p. 308. 
Al-Sarakhsi, Al-Mabsut (Matba al-Saada, Egypt, 1324H) Vol. XXIV, p. 9. 
Al-Rammali, Nihayat al-Mohtaj (2nd ed., Dar Ahya al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut, 1992) Vol. VIII, p. 14. 
Al-Dasooqi, Shamas al din Muhammad Arafa, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 353. 
AI-Jamal, AI-Shaikh Sulaiman, Hashiat al-Jamal ala Sharah al-Manhaj (Maktaba Mustafa 
Muhammad, Egypt) Vol. V, p. 158. 
Alish, Shaikh Muhammad, Sharah Manah al-Jalil (Dar al-Baz, Makkah) Vol. IV, p. 552. 
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weaker opinion in Shafite school that in the cases of dire necessity, it is permissible to 
use such quantity of alcohol that is insufficient to cause intoxication. ' 19 Nonetheless, 
this exception is not a specific one rather it comes under the general principle that 
necessity renders permissible that which is prohibited. 120 Even, in the presence of this 
exception it can be said that medicinal use of alcohol is strictly prohibited where the 
person uses it with a belief of benefiting from it. 
The injunctions to prohibit intoxicants are as effective and applicable after fifteen 
centuries as they were at the time of their revelation. These are perfect, immutable and 
admit no modifications. The object of prohibiting intoxicants was to provide all that 
which is essential for a complete, all-embracing and everlasting law to raise the standard 
of human society to the highest degree of consummation and sublimity. The steps taken 
by the modern world to suppress this evil, and predominant cause of criminality, have 
been unscientific, uncertain and, therefore, unsuccessful. Let us have a look at the 
efforts of various social organisations to tackle the problem in English society. 
9.10 Social Organizations and Alcohol Control in U. K. 
At the moment, to help the people with alcohol related problems, there are 543 agencies 
in England and Wales. 121 A number of services are being provided to such persons, like 
advice to cut down drinking, detoxification therapies programmes providing group work, 
skills training and relapse prevention work. In addition, there are 328 advice and 
counselling centres, 123 day programmes, 191 residential programmes, and more than 
100 other agencies providing a combination of alcohol treatment services free of 
charges. 122 Despite all the efforts the consumption is gradually increasing and 
admittedly from 1950 to 1980 alcohol consumption has been doubled. ' 23 This increase 
has not been noted only for UK; rather published data shows a world-wide increase in 
the average population consumption of alcohol during the past three decades. ' 24 It is not 
only the quantity of alcohol consumption doubled, rather consequent crime rate also 
doubled from 15.9/10,000 adults to 30.9/10,000 adults. 125 There can be no doubt that 
119 Group of Muslim Scholars, Al-Mousu'a al-Fighiyya (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Kuwait) Vol. V, p. 26. 
Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 14. 
120 Raza, Muhammad Rashid, op. cit. F. N. 39. Vol. VII, p. 88 
121 Alcohol Concern, The State of the Nation: Britain's True Alcohol Bill 
(http: //www. alcoholconcern. oriz. uk) 2003. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Hertz, Catherine, Alcohol and Health (The Medical Council on Alcohol, London, 1990) p. 5. 
124 McIntosh, I. D. "Population Consumption of Alcohol and Proportion Drinking" British Journal of 
Addiction 76 (1981) 267. 
125 Saunders, W. M., 1984, op. cit. p. 68. 
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the raise in the crime statistics which has occurred over the past 30 years is directly 
linked to the increased availability and consumption of alcohol. If the number of private 
organisations and agencies, their endeavours to tackle the alcohol problem, and the 
effect of all the efforts on the alcohol consumption is taken into account, it can be 
concluded that the answer to the raising tide of alcohol problems lies more with 
governments and politicians rather than with social workers. 
Despite all such efforts, no indicator shows a decrease in alcohol consumption (as we 
have discussed in 6.4). Binge drinking and alcohol fuelled crime and disorder risks 
spiralling out of control. 126 Alcohol has drunk the whole nation, rather it drinks alcohol. 
People have been completely enslaved by their habit and could not forgo the pleasure of 
self indulgence. They have drowned their private sovereignty in alcohol and surrendered 
before-their desire of intoxication. All the efforts failed to change the situation because 
of lack of any motivation behind them. A number of proposals have been made and 
experimented, throughout human history, to completely prohibit use of alcohol or at 
least to control its consumption but none can be said to have solved the problem, except 
the strategy adopted by Shari'ah. The strategy still possesses tremendous potential to 
fight the problem of alcohol in the modern world. 
While concluding it can be taken into consideration what might be achieved by a nation 
if it successfully enforces prohibition. There would be a much larger proportion of 
healthy citizens and better medical services available to a large number of people, less 
number of crimes and hence a peaceful and law abiding society, vast number of people 
relieved of the miseries which the drinking bring upon them, strong family relationships 
and better environment for future generations, in abundance supply of food grain and 
fruit otherwise used in breweries and hence sober and healthy nation, increased 
efficiency of workers that will enhance industrial production and national economy. 127 
9.11 Intoxication and Criminal Liability in Shari'ah 
Shari 'ah considers intoxicants as the root cause of all the crimes in a society. 128 Modem 
research has confirmed that use of alcohol is certainly related with the commission of 
126 Home Secretary's Letter to the Prime Minister (http: //www. bhc. co. uk) March 31,2004. 
127 Reason, Will, Drink and the Community (Student Christian Movement, London, 1922) pp. 98-99. 
126 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1119. 
Ahmcd, bin Hanble, 1981, op. cit. Vol. V, p. 238. 
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crimes. 129 Though Shari'ah has strictly prohibited use of intoxicant yet the probability 
of being intoxicated and commission of crime cannot be ruled out. Generally an 
intoxicated person shall be liable for all his acts done, for intoxicated wrong doing is not 
different from any other legally prohibited wrong. 
Shari'ah differentiates between intoxication and insanity since an accused can be 
blamed for bringing about intoxication, whereas insanity being the act of God renders 
him immune from criminal liability. 130 If the liability of an intoxicated person is taken 
into account in terms of legal capacity, intoxication, whether involuntary or voluntary, 
does not affect the capacity of acquisition, because the basis of this capacity is humanity 
and intoxication does not negate it. Thus an intoxicated person has perfect capacity of 
acquisition. On the other hand the basis of capacity of execution is perfection of 
intelligence and understanding that is suspended for the time being due to consumption 
of intoxicant. It logically requires that the legal obligations should be extinguished on 
account of intoxication. The divine communication defining rights and obligations 
should not be directed to the intoxicated, for lack of understanding the command. It is 
almost the same problem as we discussed in English law. How is this tackled by the 
Muslim Jurists? To answer the question we'll take into account the two conditions of 
intoxications and the Shari'ah's view point. 
9.11.1 Involuntary Intoxication and Criminal Liability 
Muslim jurists unanimously agreed that if intoxication was caused due to mistake, 
duress, under dire necessity, like where the accused was about to die of thirst and no 
other drink was available, 131 or the person took a prescribed medicine and he was 
intoxicated, or his intoxication was caused by any other manner which is not punishable, 
he will not be criminally liable for the acts done in this condition. 132 It shall be 
considered as if he was acting under necessity or coercion133 or he shall be treated like 
an insane. 134 It is because of this condition that he is not bound to perform any act 
129 See 6.8. 
130 Al-Bahli, Ali bin Abbas, 1956, op. cit. p. 37. ' 
131 Hassan, Ahmad, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (I5' ed., I. R. I. Islamabad, 1993) p. 341. 
132 lbn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah IVa A1-Nazair, op. cit. F. N. 14. p. 552. 
Al-Kasani, Ala al-din, Badai al-Sanai (H. M. Saeed Co. Karachi, 1979) Vol. VII, p. 134. 
Ibn Abdeen, Muhammad Ameen, Hashia Ibn Abdeen, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 45. 
Al-Khatib, Shamas ud din Muhammad bin Ahmad at Sharbini, Mughni al-Mohtaj (Dar Ahya al-Taras, 
Beirut, 1933) Vol. IV, p. 146. 
Ibn Farhoon, Tabsarat al-Hukkam (Matba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt) Vol. 11, p. 252. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. 16. Vol. VIII, p. 307. 
133 AI-Zokhali, Wahba, Usul al-Filth al-Islami (IS' ed., Dar Al-Fiker, Damascus, 1986) Vol. 1, p. 179. 
134 Al-Sherazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim, Al-Mohazzib (Dar al-Qalam, Damascus, 1996) Vol. IV, p. 278. 
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relating to the rights of Allah till it lasts; nonetheless, he shall perform these acts as 
atonement after attaining sobriety. 135 If he causes loss of someone's life or damages 
property, he shall be liable to pay damages and to compensate the victim or his heirs; 
however, corporal punishment shall not be inflicted on him because he was devoid of 
intelligence and rationale understanding without his intention or fault. 136 It implies that 
in this particular condition Muslim jurists have not taken into account the intoxication 
itself rather its cause as a decisive factor to determine the liability of the offender 
Taking into account the definition of intoxication as provided in 9.4, it can be concluded 
that involuntary intoxication could provide a defence to a criminal charge provided that 
the offender was incapable of forming an intention and controlling his physical 
movements. It appears that the provisions of English criminal law in this regard, as 
affirmed in R v. Kingston, 137 are synonymous with Shari'ah. 
9.11.2 Voluntary intoxication and criminal liability 
Voluntary intoxication may be defined as intentional use of intoxicant, knowing its 
intoxicating tendencies. I-low does this condition affect the liability of an accused? 
Muslim jurists differed while answering the question. According to Hanfite, if the 
offender was intoxicated voluntarily he shall be treated like a sober man except in three 
cases, apostasy, confession of Hudood offences, and anything said contrary to his own 
deposition already submitted. 13 8 They argue that an intoxicated person is incapable of 
using his intellect so his apostasy is not valid by way of Istehsan because injunctions of 
belief and disbelief are dependent upon the intention hidden in the mind of a person and 
his confession of the same is the evidence to prove it, but the confession of a person 
incapable of using his intellect and reason is inadmissible. Whereas, by way of analogy 
it should be a valid apostasy and he should be liable for that. The reason for validity by 
analogy is that the belief and the disbelief are based upon the confession of a person and 
for that we need not to take into account his intention because it will lead to 
unnecessary hardship. 139 
Confession of an intoxicated person has further been divided into two kinds, confession 
for Hudood pertaining to the exclusive rights of Allah, like theft, drinking wine, and 
'35 Hassan, Ahmad, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (I s` ed., I. R. 1. Islamabad, 1993) p. 340. 
13GIbid. p. 341. 
137 R. v. Kingston [1994] 3 All. ER. 353. 
138 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Na: air (Moa'ssasa Al-Halbi Linnasher wa al-Touzih, Cairo, 1968) p. 310. 
139 Al-Kasani, AI-Badai waAl-Sanai (H. M. Saeed Co. Karachi, 1979) Vol. Vll., p. 134 
Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair, op. cit. 14. p. 553 
242 
Intusicatimt in English Law and Slturi'aG 
unlawful sexual intercourse. In such cases his confession is not admissible since there is 
probability of truth or falsity of the confession leading to a doubt sufficient to avoid the 
infliction of Hadd punishment. He can retract such confession made in the state of 
intoxication. 140 However, if he confesses offence of theft, in intoxicated condition, he 
shall be liable to the value of stolen property even if he retracts after being sober. It 
suggests that the retraction shall be effective to the extent of the right of Allah but it 
leaves the right of man intact. A confession, made and retracted in intoxicated condition, 
if repeated in sobriety shall be valid both for the right of Allah and the right of man. 
141 
However, if the confession is related to the violation of exclusive right of man or where 
the right of man is dominant, like offence of wrongful accusation of unlawful sexual 
intercourse, or an offence liable to Qisas, he shall not be allowed to retract and the 
punishment shall be inflicted after he attains sobriety. It is evident that except the three 
acts mentioned above a voluntarily intoxicated person shall be liable for all his acts and 
omissions. 142 Hanfite jurists argue that voluntary intoxication in itself is a crime and as 
such cannot be a defence for any other crime. Moreover, if a drunken person is 
exempted from criminal liability, it will become a means for the commission of 
offences and evading criminal liability. 
According to Shaf to a voluntarily intoxicated offender is liable for all his offences and 
he will be treated like a sober man. 143 However, they differentiate between his 
transactions conducted and completed in the state of intoxication, into two kinds. 
According to them all his commercial transactions are invalid because the knowledge of 
the subject matter, the essential element for the validity of such transactions, is negated 
due to intoxication. But his dealings relating to the rights of man like debt, tortious 
liability and divorce, made in the state of intoxication are binding upon him by way of 
punishment. 144 
Hanblite jurists are divided into two groups on the liability of a voluntary intoxicated 
offender. 145 According to the first opinion, which is dominant in the school of thought, 
140 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Theories of Islamic Law (I. I. I. T. & I. R. I., Islamabad, 1994) p. 98. 
141 Badran, Abu AI-Ainain Badran, U. sul a/-Fiq/: al-Islami (Moassasa Shabab al-Jamah, 1984) p. 328- 
142 AI-Kasani, Al-Badai wa Al-Sanai (H. M. Saeed Co. Karachi, 1979) Vol. VII, p. 223. 
143 Al-Sherazi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim Bin Ali, Al-Mohazzib (Dar al-Qalam, Damascus, 1996) Vol. IV, p. 278. 
144 Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair (Dar al Kutub al-Ilmia, Beirut, 1979) p. 216. 
145 Ibn Qadama, A/-Mughni (Maktaba Al-Mustafa Al-babi al-l-Talbi, Egypt) Vol. VIII, p. 195. 
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an intoxicated person is liable for all the offences committed in state of intoxication and 
proved by the evidence but he shall not be liable for any offence proved by his 
confession in such a state because he does not realise what he is saying. 146 The opinion 
is supported by a number of arguments; 
Firstly, they argue by the saying of Ali, when consulted by Omar bin Al-Khattab 
regarding the liability of an intoxicated offender, he said, "an intoxicated person accuses 
others, and if he accuses with unlawful sexual intercourse, he is liable for eighty 
stripes. " 147 Ali determined the punishment of an intoxicated person on the analogy of 
accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse. The opinion proves that the intoxicated 
offender, if accuses someone of unlawful sexual intercourse, will be criminally liable 
notwithstanding his intoxication. Similarly, if the accused, while intoxicated, killed 
someone; he will liable for Qisas on the basis of above mentioned authority. 148 
The consultation mentioned above was with regard to determine the liability of a person 
who drinks alcohol or uses other intoxicants voluntarily. The Caliph felt the necessity of 
consultation because fixed punishment for intoxication has neither been prescribed in 
the Holy Qur'an nor there is the Sunnah to ascertain it. 149 Whenever the Holy Prophet 
imposed a punishment for alcohol ingestion he neither mentioned that it was imposed 
according to revelation nor did he himself fixed a definite punishment. 150 It is reported 
that the First Caliph, Abu Baker, inflicted forty lashes upon the drunkard; Omar 
followed the precedent in the beginning, but afterwards when the number of 
intoxication cases increased unprecedented, he consulted the Prophet's companions to 
develop a consensus of opinion. 151 
146 Ibid. (151 ed., Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, 1996) Vol. XII, p. 233. 
147 Malik bin Ans, Al-Muwatta, (Gagri Yayinlari, Istanbul, Turkey, 1981) Vol. II, p. 694. 
148 Ibn Qadama, Al-Maqdasi, Al-Sharah Al-Kabir (Published at the Foot margin ofA1-Mughni) 
(I5' ed., Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, 1996) Vol. XI, pp. 365-66. 
149 Ibn Qadama, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 18. Vol. XII, p. 442. 
150 El-Ewa, Mohamed S., Punishment in Islamic Law: A comparative Study (American Trust Publications, 
Plainfield, 2000) p. 45. {However, the authorities from the Sunnah prove that the Holy Prophet 
inflicted 40 lashes for drinking wine. Muslim, Saih Muslim (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981). Vol. II, 
p. 1330 and Abu Daoud, Sulaiman bin Ash'ath, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 621 }. 
151 Al-Tirmidhi, Muhammad bin Isa, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 48. 
Group of Muslim Scholars, AI-Mousu'a Al-Fiqhiyya (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Kuwait) Vol. 
XXV, p. 96 {Though there is difference of opinion whether the punishment for intoxication is proved 
by the Sunnah or the Ijma yet the majority of Muslim jurists adopted the view that it is a Hadd 
punishment amounting to 80 strips, except Shafite who say that Hadd is only 40 whereas the other 40 
are Tazir. ( Gibb, H. A. R., Encyclopedia of Islam (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1973-78) Vol. IV, p. 990)) 
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Secondly, the intoxicated person is under an obligation to perform worships and he has 
not been exempted from the liability to discharge his religious duty, it logically leads to 
the conclusion that he should be liable for his conduct. ' 52 Thirdly, the intellect of the 
intoxicated person has not been destroyed, rather concealed and diminished so he feels 
the pleasure and pains of the respective conditions, his condition resembles more 
closely to drowsiness than to sleep, thereby rendering him liable for his criminal 
conduct. 153 Fourthly, he himself has caused this condition by doing an unlawful act. 
Hence he is not entitled to its benefits. 154 Their arguments prove that according to 
predominant opinion a voluntary intoxicated person is liable for his conduct and he will 
not be entitled for any defence. According to their second opinion, an intoxicated person 
is not liable for Hadd punishment because his condition resembles insanity and this 
gives rise to a doubt sufficient to relieve him of his liability. The opinion, in the school 
of thought, is comparatively weaker and not preferred. 155 
It suggests that majority of the Muslim jurists agree that if a person commits an offence 
in the state of voluntary intoxication, he shall be liable for the punishment. 156 The 
reason being that his transactions and acts are binding upon him and his condition is 
different from an insane person. The other reason is that the principle of liability of a 
152 Ibn Qadama, 1996, op. cit. F. N. 18. Vol. X11, p. 149. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid p. 233. 
155 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 16. Vol. VIII, p. 308. 
There is another exceptional opinion of Zaherite stating that an intoxicated person is not liable for 
anything except the punishment for using intoxicant. They support their opinion by the Qura'nic verse 
"0 ye who believe! Draw not near unto prayer when you are drunken, till you know that which ye 
utter. "(Al-Qur'an 4: 43)They interpret the verse as an intoxicated person is discharged of his religious 
obligation for not knowing what he utters or does, hence logically should not be held liable for his 
conduct as well. (Ibn Hazm, All bin Ahmad bin Saeed, A-Mohallah (Dar Al-Afaq al-Jadeeda, Beirut) 
Vol. XI, p. 293). However, the interpretation is not apposite. We have already mentioned that 
according to the majority opinion an intoxicated person is not discharged of his religious obligations, 
rather liable to perform them as atonement after sobriety. Moreover, they argue that a specific 
punishment has been provided under Shari'ah for intoxication and holding him liable for his acts in 
such a state would amount to punishing him twice for the same offence, which is not reasonable. 
Though the Zaherite treat the condition of intoxication akin to insanity; however, they say that the 
insane or the intoxicated should be imprisoned, in order to incapacitate him from causing further harm, 
till he repents from intoxication or till he attains sanity by treatment. 
156 Al-Kasani, Al-Badai wa Al-Sanai (H. M. Saeed Co. Karachi, Pakistan, 1979) Vol. VIl, p. 134. 
Al-Khatib, Shamas ud din Muhammad bin Ahmad al Sharbini, 1979, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 190. 
A1-Khatib Shamas ud din Muhammad bin Ahmad al Sharbini, 1933, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 296. 
Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah ; Va Al-Nazair, op. cit. F. N. 14. p. 552. 
Ibn Qadama, Al-Mughni (Maktaba Al-Mustafa Al-babi al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. VIII, p. 195. 
AI-Qartabi, Abi Omar Yousaf bin Abdullah bin Muhammad Syed Abdul Birr, Kitab a! Kafr Fi Fiqh 
AN a! Madina (Maktaba Al-Riyadh al-Hadisa, Riyadh) Vol. 11, p. 96. 
Al-Dasooqi, Shamas ud din Muhammad Arafa, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 237. 
Hassan, Ahmad, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (151 ed., I. R. I., Islamabad, 1993) p. 342. 
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voluntarily intoxicated offender operates as a preventive measure for the commission of 
crimes; otherwise anyone intending to commit a crime may get intoxicated to avoid the 
criminal liability. Moreover, he takes a free and autonomous decision to consume 
intoxicant, knowing that it is unlawful for him to consume and normally he knows that 
it will affect his capacity of self control, appreciation and that it will cause disinhibition 
so his liability should be aggravated by punishing him for the offence of intoxication in 
addition to the offence committed in that condition. 157 Intoxication shall not affect his 
liability because it is an offence in itself and it is not reasonable that an offence should 
be treated as a mitigating factor for another offence. 158 
Analysis of the opinion reveals that though intoxication can affect a person's capacity to 
appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his conduct, to control his conduct so as to 
conform to the provisions of law, yet he is not allowed to claim this condition as a 
defence to a criminal charge. There is no bifurcation of offences into specifiicibasic 
intent. Shari'ah does not take notice of the temporary suspension of the offender's 
judgement, intelligence, discretion and understanding by a wilful transgression of its 
commands. Allowing a defence in such condition would amount to encourage 
disobedience of the commands. 
9.12 Modern Trends of International Community 
Driven by innumerable changes in social, political, medical and legal philosophies 
during the past two centuries, the courts have greatly expanded the exculpatory effects 
of intoxication. However, by the end of the last century, the pendulum began to swing 
back towards a policy of accountability for acts committed in a state of voluntary 
intoxication. 159 Taking into account the harmful effects of alcohol and resulting criminal 
behaviour, the international community has also changed its trend towards criminal 
157 Badran, Abu Al-Ainain Badran, Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (Moassasa Shabab al-Jamah, 1984) p. 328. 
Al-Dasooqi, Shamas ud din Muhammad Arafa, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 313,325,345,352. 
Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Naaair (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmia, Beirut, 1979) p. 216. 
Al-Khatib, Shamas ud din Muhammad bin Ahmad at Sharbini, 1933, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 146,155. 
Al-Rammali, Nihayat al-Mohtaj (Al-Maktaba al-Islamia) Vol. VII, p. 406. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 16. Vol. VIII, p. 304. 
Ibn Farhoon, Tabsarat al Hukkan: (Matba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt) Vol. II, p. 250. 
Ibn Nujaym, Al-Beher A! -Raiq Sharah Kanaz a! Daqaiq (Maktaba al-Majidia, Quetta) Vol. V, p. 28. 
Ibn Al-Hamam, Sharah A! -Feth Al-Qadeer (Dar Ahya al-Taras al Arabi, Beirut) Vol. V, p. 81. 
Ibn Hajar, Al-Haithmi, Tofa't Al-Mohtaj (Dar Sader, Beirut, 1315 A. H) Vol. IX, p. 169. 
Al-Shaqeti, Ahmad bin Mukhtar, Maºvahib al-Jalil (Idara Ahya al-Tarasal-Islami, Qatar, 1987) Vol. IV, 
p. 377. 
Iss Al-Shafi, Ahmad Mahmood, Usul AI-Fiqh (Moasassa al-Saqafa al-Jamhia, Alexandria, 1983) p. 212. 
'591bid at p. 482. 
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liability of intoxicated offenders. The Rome statute of International Criminal Court160 is 
a clear proof of the fact. Article 31(1)(b) dealing with grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility states that anyone intoxicated voluntarily under such circumstances where 
he knew the risk that such intoxication is likely to engage him in a criminal conduct 
shall not be excluded from criminal liability. 161 The basic idea of this principle is to 
prevent mala fide intoxication with an objective to commit an offence in a condition of 
non-responsibility and later to invoke this condition as an exculpatory ground. The 
principle that voluntary intoxication prior to the commission of a crime shall negate the 
defence of absence of mens rea is generally recognised in both continental and common 
law. 162 Though at the moment voluntary intoxication will not provide a ground for 
defence in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity only yet it is a healthy sign that 
the international community has realised that the defence is not reasonable. Complete 
abolition of defence of intoxication will further strengthen the efforts to stop not only 
drug abuse but also a number of serious crimes from the society. 
'63 
A policy of excluding evidence of an offender's voluntary intoxication comply with the 
general rule that criminal defences are not available to those offenders who are at fault 
in creating the conditions supporting their defence. 164 An offender who culpably creates 
circumstances which require him to commit the otherwise excusable offence may not 
take such circumstances in his defence. For example, if the accused was responsible to 
start a brawl he is not allowed to take the plea of self-defence against the crime that he 
committed in this condition. Similarly, a person who wilfully joins a gang of criminals 
shall be liable for any crime subsequently committed, though under coercion of the 
criminals and, likewise, a person is not allowed to claim the defence of provocation, 
who himself has caused the conditions of provocation to exist. The person who 
knowingly casts off the restraint and judgement of his sobriety does not deserve to plead 
that he would not have committed the offence if sober. Intoxication turns men into 
160 The statute was adopted on 17 July 1998, obtaining 120 votes in favour and only 7 against with 21 
abstentions. 
161 (http: //www. un. org/icc/index. htni) A/Conf. 183/9. 
162 Fletcher, George P., Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1978) p. 846. 
163 Keiter, Mitchell, "Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of Intoxication Defence" 87 (1997) JCL 482 
at 483. 
164Ibid 499. 
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beasts preying upon society and thus such inebriates are as responsible for subsequent 
harm as if they set free an actual dangerous animal upon the defenceless victims. 165 
Many cases of disability based upon the excuse of intoxication may lead to the 
recurrence of the same situation and hence re-offending of the accused. A logical 
argument can be forwarded that the society has a right to protect itself and the interests 
of its subjects at stake, from further harmful but excused conduct of the offender. Under 
the circumstances it is reasonable to insist upon punishment of the offender to control 
the self-induced disability. This can further be illustrated by an example of a madman. It 
is true that he is not blamed for his conduct and hence not liable for the offence 
committed. However, if a man is so deranged that he is likely to engage in dangerous 
conduct, it is quite reasonable to put him under some form of restraint. No one would 
deny that it is the most appropriate step to prevent harm from others. Likewise, where it 
has been established by research and we are sure that drunkenness is likely to result into 
offensive conduct, 166 it is quite logical to put certain restraints on its use. 
Conclusion 
Modern research has proved that use of intoxicants is injurious to human health and it 
weakens man's reason and intellect. Beside its bad affects on human health it leads to 
economic losses in the shape of industrial and road accidents by intoxicated workers 
and drivers respectively. It injures human health and life, damages the body and 
character, overthrows will and destroys self control. Intoxication is an offence not only 
against religion, person of the intoxicated, moral standards, decency, and society but 
also against innocent wives and children and the family of the drunk. Everyone had to 
be sober all the time for their good and good of their families and society. 167 Their 
duties towards themselves, their families and society should be made known to them. 
If statistics were collected worldwide of all the patients admitted to hospitals due to 
alcohol use and those who are suffering from mental disorder, delirium tremens, 
nervous breakdowns, cancer, AIDS, ailment of the digestive tract, liver diseases, heart 
strokes and many others to which are added the statistics of suicides, homicides, rapes 
and other crimes, bankruptcies, broken homes, neglected children, distorted relations, 
related to the consumption of alcohol, the number of such cases would be so high and 
165 Ibid. 
166 Gough, Stephen, "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" 112 (1996) LQR 335 at p. 337. 
167 Keiter, Mitchell, 1997, op. cit. p. 488. 
248 
tuu»iralinu in i: 1144ish L. mv and Sh1Jf1'11i1 
unbelievable that, in comparison to it, all efforts, campaigns and preaching against 
drinking would not be enough. The statistics will lead to a unanimous conclusion that 
mankind has not suffered any greater disaster and misfortune than that brought about by 
the use of alcohol. There is an urgent need to change public attitude regarding its use. It 
is needed that to avoid alcohol related harms the concept of alcohol use should be 
changed, alcohol should be replaced by other healthy and cheaper soft drinks and better 
alternatives to relieve stress should be available to the masses. 
Though the law cannot prevent every factor which contributes to crime nevertheless it 
can prevent many such crimes by prohibiting the use of intoxicants and punishing a 
factor common to so many crimes. Taking into account this particular point the Law 
Reform Commission for Ireland proposed that an express provision should be included 
in the statutes that self-induced intoxication should never afford a defence to a criminal 
charge. 168 
Shari'ah prohibited use of intoxicants centuries ago and adopted a strategy that can be 
followed by any society at anytime to eradicate the problem of intoxication. A 
voluntarily intoxicated person is criminally liable for his conduct so the condition may 
not be taken into account while determining his mental condition. The absence of 
defence of voluntary intoxication in Shat-iah and contemporary concept of the full 
responsibility of the accused leads to the conclusion that there is no fundamental right to 
introduce the evidence of voluntary intoxication as defence. 
The next part shall explore the principles of private defence in English law and Shari 'ah. 
168 A Law Reform Commission Report on Intoxication (Ireland) LRC 51-1995 
(http: //www. lawreform. ie/publications) 2003. 
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Part-III 
Chapter-10 Right of Private Defence in English Law 
10.1 Introduction 
The defence of one's self is quite natural, one would prefer to kill rather than be killed. 
It is no offence to defend oneself or any other from unlawful violence causing 
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm or to use force in execution 
of a duty imposed by law, provided no greater harm is inflicted than necessary. ' The 
rule of self preservation renders it fair and just for a person to save his life or bodily 
integrity even if the only way to do so is to sacrifice the assailant's life or limb. 2 The 
right is a means to an end, to save the defender's interests properly recognised by the 
law. 3 Law neither requires nor wishes people to submit passively to a bodily assault 
because this would simply be an inducement to the criminals. 4 There would be a logical 
inconsistency if the right to life has been affirmed but the permission to use reasonable 
means necessary to repel aggressive threats is refused. Self-defence may be considered 
as the oldest ground of justification for use of force in all legal systems of the world. 5 
This chapter is devoted to deal with the principles of self-defence as enunciated in 
English criminal law, need of such a defence in a society, quantum of force required to 
defend, and a rational analysis of the principles regulating the right. It will also show 
that English law on the subject is still in a developing stage. Before dealing with the 
core principles it seems appropriate to analyse whether self-defence is an appropriate 
term to be used. 
10.2 Is it Appropriate to Use Self-defence for the Defence under Question? 
An individual has a right to defend attack of an assailant by using such force as may be 
necessary. This right is not confined to the defence of his body rather extends to that of 
his family and possibly, in the cases of a felonious assault, even to that of one who 
actually needs his protection. 6 In addition, the right may be exercised to prevent a crime, 
Stephen, J. Fitzjames, Sir, A Digest of the Criminal Law (91h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1950) p. 252. 
2 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law (Macmillan, London, 1968) p. 40. 
Gur-Arye, Miriam, "Should the Criminal Law Distinguish between Necessity as Justification and 
Necessity as an Excuse? " 102 [1986] LQR 71 at 71. 
s Brett, Peter, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1963) p. 152. 
4 Ross, Alf, On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment (Stevens & Sons, London, 1975) p. 4. 
5 Eser, Albin, "Justification and Excuse" 24 [1976] AJCL 621 at 631. 
6 Warmington, L. Crispin, Stephen's Commentaries on the Law of England (21" cd., Butterworth, London, 
1950) Vol. IV, p. 38. 
250 
ltiýlht of, I'risait I)eience: flats is it dealt under the 1o legal s}steno? 
to effect or assist a lawful arrest, to prevent or terminate a breach of peace, to protect 
property from unlawful appropriation, destruction or damage. 7 
English criminal law justified a woman killing an assailant who attempted to rape her 
and likewise a husband or father while defending an assault of rape on his wife or 
daughter but not in the instances of adultery by consent. 8 However, according to 
Maitland an adulterer might be killed by the woman's husband, father, brother, or son 
without any differentiation between the consensual or non consensual act. 9 In R. v. 
Wheeler, 10 the defendant pleaded that the deceased attempted to rape his common law 
wife and he killed him in her defence. The jury was directed, inter alia, that death 
caused while reasonably defending someone is not unlawful and unless it was proved to 
have been unlawful they should not convict. Historically English law required that if an 
accused claims benefit of self-defence; he must show that the assailant was attacking 
him or any other, attempting to commit a rape, carrying stolen property or resisting a 
lawful arrest. )1 
The principle of self-defence can also be applied between parents and children, 12 
husband and wife, 13 brother and sister14 and other kin. A number of cases confirm that 
apart from any relationship between the assaulted and the rescuer, there is a general 
liberty even between strangers to take reasonable steps to prevent commission of a 
crime or to rescue the attacked. ' 5 The law allows a stranger to use reasonable force for 
the defence of any other on rational and moral grounds. 16 Both, ancient and 
contemporary authorities, support the view that the right of defence is not limited to the 
family relationship. 17 
The law permits the defence of others because the righteous resentment, kindled while 
observing the strong ill-treating the weak, is surely a noble impulse. It prompts 
The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com. No. 177,1989) Clause 44 (1). 
8 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (15`h ed., A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. IV, p. 180. 
9 Pollock, F., Sir, & Maitland, F. W., The History of English Law (2°d ed., University Press, Cambridge, 
1898) Vol. I., p. 53. 
10 R. v. Wheeler [1967] 1 WLR. 1531. 
" Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law (3`a ed., Methuen & Co, London, 1923) Vol. II, p. 44. 
12 R. v. Rose (1884) 15 Cox. C. C. 540; R. v. Harrington (1866) 10 Cox. CC. 370. 
13 R. v. Driscoll (184 1) C&M 214; 174ER477. 
14 R. v. Duffy [1967] 1 QB 63. 
15 See, Devlin v. Armstrong [1971] NI 13; Albert v. Levin [1982] AC 546 and R. v. Dujfy [1967] 1 QB 63. 
16 Williams, Glanville, Textbook of Criminal Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1983) p. 501. 
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individuals to forget their own personal risk and help those in distress. The law must be 
cautious lest it loosen the bonds that form this generous alliance between courage and 
humanity. Let it rather give all honour and reward to him who protects the interests of 
others. It deeply concerns public good that every man should look upon himself as a 
natural protector of others. 18 This indicates that self-defence is perhaps rather a narrow 
term to describe the defence since it applies to the defence of not only one's self, but 
also property and family, his friends or even a complete stranger. ' Hence, it is 
appropriate to use the term private defence as a more general expression. 20 
10.3 Need for the Right of Private Defence 
The right of private defence is common to all legal systems, though its function and 
scope may vary with the degree of maturity attained by the system in which it finds a 
place. 21 It is in the interest of general peace and good order that society should take 
upon itself the task of protecting rights of individuals and prohibit use of force by 
themselves. Although a well regulated and organised society will provide general 
protection to all its subjects, it cannot guarantee protection at the very moment when an 
individual is subjected to a sudden attack. 22 This inability of providing protection at all 
times, in all contingencies led to the recognition of the right of private defence. The use 
of force in private defence is tolerated only because state fails in its task of providing 
protection against aggression. 23 It means that the right is not merely an individualistic 
right to protect one's own interests rather it is regarded as the actualisation of legal 
interest in promotion of general peace. 24 
Right of private defence is an essential right, for the vigilance of law could never take 
the place of that watchful care which every individual takes on his own behalf. 
Aggressors would never be restrained as effectively by mere fear of laws as they are by 
fear of resistance of individuals. In certain inevitable occasions dependence upon the 
arrival of official help would be disaster and it would be extremely unjust if the remedy 
of private defence were altogether denied. Taking away this right is to encourage the 25 
17 For Ancient Authority See Tooly (1709) 11 Mod. 242 at pp. 250-51; 88 ER 1015 at 1020. 
18 Atkinson, Charles M., Bentham's Theory of Legislation (Oxford University Press, 1914) Vol. 11, p. 46. 
19 Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell London, 1999) p. 206. 
20 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 501. 
21 Ashworth, A. J., "Self-defence and the Right to Life" (1975) CLJ. 282 at 288. 
22 Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (3"d ed., Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 138. 
23 Fletcher, George P., Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. Boston, Toronto, 1978) p. 867. 
24 Eser, Albin, 1976, op. cit. p. 631. 
25 Clarkson, C. M. V. & Keating, H. M., Criminal Law: Text and Materials (3`d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 
London, 1994) p. 297. 
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mischievous to do wrong. 26 Furthermore, right of private defence is certainly a factor 
helpful to minimise the incidences of public and private violence. The right can be 
supported either on the basis of self preference or on the ground that law cannot prevent 
such a conduct by the threat of punishment. This is because a threat of death on some 
future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to make a man choose death 
now. 27 If reasonable private defence were to be criminal, it might be thought to 
undervalue the victim's life for the sake of that of an aggressor. 28 Private defence, as it 
is justly called the primary law of nature, cannot be taken away by the law of society. 29 
10.3.1 Private Defence: An Exception to Prohibition of Use of Force 
Unlike other defences private defence is related only to crimes against the person and 
property. 30 The right is an exception to the prohibition of use of physical force by one 
person against another. 31 Cases may arise in which an individual's right to life conflicts 
with his duty to abstain from violence. Legal systems generally resolve this conflict by 
permitting the individual's right to life to disregard the social duty not to use force. 
Indeed, on practical grounds the right to use force in private defence is essential if 
members of society are not to be put at the mercy of the strong and corrupt. 32 A 
plausible claim that defender's case falls within this exception requires that the use of 
force is necessary and reasonable for private defence. 33 
Private defence may justify use of violence against the assailant. However, beyond this, 
the law recognises a few if any, exceptions to the ordinary principles of liability. 34 The 
significant feature of this defence is the unilateral violation of the defendant's autonomy. 
If a person's autonomy is compromised by intrusion, then he has a right to expel the 
intruder and restore the integrity of his domain. 35 Whatever is done in lawful exercise of 
right of private defence is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and 
compulsion. 36 The following section will give gist of the defence in English law. 
26 Atkinson, Charles M., 1914, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 45. 
27 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963) p. 40. 
28 Feldman, D., Civil Liberties & Human Rights in England & {Vales (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) p. 98. 
29 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 4. 
30 Loewy, Arnold H., Criminal Law (West Publishing Co. ST. Paul, Minn. 1975) p. 64. 
31 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 282. 
Bowett, D. W., Self Defence in International Law (Manchester University Press, 1958) p. 3. 
32 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 283. 
33 Bayles, Michael D., Principles of Law: A Normative Analysis (D. Reidel Publishing, 1987) p. 334. 
34 Warmington, L. Crispin, 1950, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 26. 
35 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 867. 
36 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 130. 
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10.4 Right of Private Defence and English Law: A Historical Review 
10.4.1 No Right of Private Defence Initially 
In early English law so much importance was attached to human life that at a time it had 
no distinction between murder, homicide committed by mistake or in private defence. 37 
This was because the law took into account the destruction of human life only 
notwithstanding the cause behind that. Even in the cases of homicide by misfortune or 
in private defence a man was hanged just if he had acted feloniously. 38 There was no 
concept of inens rea and no distinction between accidental and intentional homicide. 39 
It was in 1267 when homicide caused by misfortune and murder were differentiated. 40 
However, up to the reign of Edward-I (1275-1307) homicide could be justified only if 
committed in execution of the King's writ or other instances of execution of law. 41 The 
statute of Gloucester42 regulated the procedure to be followed in the cases of homicide 
by misadventure and in private defence. Before the Statute, it had become the practice 
of the clerks in chancery to issue a writ to inquire whether a homicide for which a man 
was arrested had been committed by misfortune or in his own defence, or in any other 
non felonious manner. The statute forbade this and provided that a verdict should be 
found before the justice in Eyre or gaol-delivery. 43 The accused was not entitled to an 
acquittal by the jury. He was sent back to the prison and relied on the King's mercy for 
a pardon. Furthermore, although he obtained the pardon, he forfeited his goods for the 
crime. 44 The pardon became so frequent that parliament complained that it had 
encouraged murderers and demanded that no pardon in future should be issued without 
its consent, or the king would remedy the matter by statute. 45 
It is unbelievable for a modern lawyer that it was a rule of English law that a man who 
committed homicide either by misadventure or in the exercise of his legitimate right of 
37 Coke, Edward M., Sir, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Law of England (6`h ed., W. Rawlins, 
For T. Basset, London, 1680) p. 148. 
38 Barr, Ames James, "Law and Morals" 22 (1908-09) Harv. L. R. 97. 
39 Baker, J. H., An Introduction to English Legal History (3r1 ed., Butterworths, 1990) p. 600. 
40 1267 (52. Hen-3) c. 25. "What kind of Manslaughter shall be Adjudged Murder? " 
41 Beale, Joseph H., "Retreat from a Murderous Assault" 16 [1902-031 Har. L. R. 567 at 568. 
42 1278 (6. Edw-1) c. 9. 
43 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 568. 
44 Barr, Amcs James, 1908-09, op. cit. p. 98. 
Hawkins, Williams, Pleas of the Crown (E. & R. Nutt, London, 1728) Vol. 1, Ch. 27, s. 7, p. 72. 
Holdsworth, W. S., 1923, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 358-59. 
Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 569. 
45 Kaye, J. M., "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter" 83 (1967) LQR 365 at 378. 
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private defence was held guilty requiring the King's pardon to escape punishment, and 
even if granted would still forfeit his property. 46 However, the moral sense of 
community could not tolerate indefinitely the idea that a blameless private defence was 
criminal or that he would make compensation to his culpable assailant. 
10.4.2 Relaxation of the Rule 
The need to allow private defence was felt by the lawmakers, and under certain 
exceptional circumstances, homicide committed in private defence was declared to be 
justified. In 1532, it was enacted that a person who killed another who had tried to rob 
him in his house or on or near a highway did not incur forfeiture of his goods and shall 
be acquitted and discharged47 without formal pardon by the king. 48 Apart from these 
exceptions there is abundant authority for proposition that homicide committed by 
misadventure or in private defence was an offence which needed a Royal pardon. 49 
Pardon for killing in private defence became a matter of course and ultimately the jury 
was allowed to give a verdict of not guilty in such cases. 50 The practice of forfeiting 
goods died out and was ultimately buried in 1828 by an Act of parliament. 51 The final 
step to eliminate forfeiture was taken in 1870 whereby section 1 of Forfeiture Act 1870 
clearly put the victim of an aggravated assault in a different position and relieved him 
from the punishment of forfeiture. 
In the presence of all this evidence, it has been claimed that common law has always 
recognised the right of private defence. 52 There is no justification for such a claim. At 
the most it can be said that this right has taken a fairly long time for its recognition and 
the right of private defence was recognised by the modem rather than medieval law. 53 
The law gradually moved from a position which treated all homicides by an individual 
as unlawful to the position where it recognised that an individual may kill in the 
exercise of his right of private defence. It was realised that one who is unjustly 
threatened with death or grievous bodily harm commits no crime if he avoids that threat 
even at the cost of the life of the assailant. 54 
46 Turner, J. W. Cecil, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (19`h cd., University Press, Cambridge, 1966) p. 143. 
47 1532 (24. Hen-8) c. 5. 
48 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 571. 
49 Holdsworth, W. S., 1923, op. cit. Vol. 111, p. 313. 
Barr, Ames James, 1908-09, op. cit. p. 97 
50 Ibid. at p. 98. 
51 1828 (9. Geo-4) c. 31, s. 10. 
52 Per Lord Griffith, Beckford v. R [1988] AC. 130 at 144. 
53 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 567. 
54 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1963, op. cit. E. N. 27. p. 40. 
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10.5 Private Defence Justification or Excuse 
English criminal law recognised distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide 
since the 16th century. An excusable killing led to the murderer's goods being forfeited 
but not when the killing was justifiable. 55 However, in course of the 19th century, the 
distinction between the two lost its procedural manifestations transforming a single 
body of principles covering cases of both excusable and justifiable homicide. 56 Though 
it has been argued that since the abolition of forfeiture both kinds of homicide ceased to 
be distinguishable by their consequences to the accused. 57 Nonetheless, the distinction 
has its importance in the modern laws. Justifiable homicide may result in acquittal while 
excusable homicide will render the accused liable for manslaughter. 
10.5.1 The Criteria for Distinction 
Initially the distinction was based upon nature of the offence to be defended. Homicide 
committed while defending known felonies, like to burn house of the defender, an 
assault to rape a woman, assault by thieves on someone on a highway or the offence of 
robbery committed at someone's house, was considered to be justified. 58 However, 
death of the assailant caused by the defender during commission of a non felonious 
offence; like assault to beat someone, was only excusable. 59 Another criterion for 
distinction was the kind of necessity leading to private defence. If it was avoidable and 
the defender could escape without committing homicide, he would be guilty, otherwise 
not. 60 In fact, the notion of involuntariness in this case having no choice but to kill 
justified the conduct. 61 Justification or excuse of the defence may also be adjudged by 
the magnitude of the force used by the defendant. If he uses more force than is 
reasonably necessary to repel the attack, his conduct is not justified but may well be 
excused if it is based on a mistake as to the quantum of force needed for defence. 62 
55 Jefferson, Michael, Criminal Law (3`a ed., Pitman Publishing, London, 1997) p. 209. 
56 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 866. 
57 Turner, J. W. Ccicl, 1966, op. cit. p. 144. 
58 Hale, Mathew, Sir, A Methodical Summary of the Law Relating to the Pleas of the Crown (6th ed., 
Catherine Lintot, 1759) p. 39. 
Hawkins, Williams, 1728, op. cit. Vol. 1, Ch. 28, s. 21, p. 77. 
59 Hale, Mathew, Sir, 1759, op. cit. p. 40. 
Hale, Mathew, Sir, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Printed for T. Pyne, P. Uriel, etc, 1778) Ch. 
XLI, p. 493. 
60 Thorne, Samuel E., Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England (Published in Association with the 
Seldon Society, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1968) Vol. 11, p. 341. 
I lurnard, Naomi D., The King's Pardon for Homicide (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969) p. 70. 
61 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 856. 
62 Robinson, Paul H., Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing Co., 1984) Vol. 1, p. 110. 
The Queen v. McKay [1957] ALR 648. 
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The concept of private defence represents a justifiable response of an innocent person to 
a culpable attack; 63 therefore, he is not to be blamed for killing. 
64 Private defence, if 
raised in a criminal trial, must be disproved by the prosecution. 
65 If the prosecution fails 
to do so the accused is entitled to be acquitted because unlawfulness of the accused's 
conduct has not been proved. The same is not true of excusable homicide, the name 
itself imports some fault, some error, howsoever trivial, that the law excuses it from the 
guilt of felony, though in strictness it judges it deserving some degree of punishment. 
66 
10.5.2 Private Defence: Why is it Justified? 
In modern codification, private defence is appropriately treated, like lesser evils, as 
justification. 67 The justification is based on the fact that the interests of the victim are 
greater than those of the aggressor. His culpability in starting the fight tips the scales in 
favour of the victim. 68 The aggressor, by his culpable act of threatening the life of an 
innocent person, forfeits his own right to life. 69 The right of innocent person to life is 
morally superior to an aggressor's right. Therefore, by balancing moral interests, the 
safety of the innocent person represents the greater moral good; the aggressor's death is 
the lesser social evi1.70 
Homicide in private defence may be treated as a classic kind of justifiable homicide71 
provided that the defendant must have genuinely believed that he was being attacked, or 
in imminent danger of being attacked and his response must have been proportionate to 
the perceived threat. 72 The view best accords with security; if the state through its law 
cannot provide security, then the victim can do it himself justifiably. 
73 
10.6 Conditions for the Exercise of Right of Private Defence 
Right of private defence is available in all legal systems of the civilised societies. Now 
the question arises, are there any principles regulating the use of this right? The answer 
to this question is in affirmative. All the legal systems have regulated this right by 
63 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 334. 
64 Dressier, J., Understanding Criminal Law (Matthew Bender/IRWIN, U. S. A., 1995) p. 208. 
65 Per Lord Griffith, Beckford v. R [1988] AC. 130 at 144. 
66 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 181. 
67 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 110. 
Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, 1999, op. cit. F. N. 19. p. 206. 
68 Williams, Glanville, "The Theory of Excuses" [1982] Crim. L. R. 733 at 739. 
69 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 283. 
Dressler, J., 1995, op. cit. p. 208 
70 Dressler, J., 1995, op. cit. p. 210. 
71 Devine, Philip E., The Ethics of Homicide (Cornell University Press, London, 1978) p. 151. 
Ashworth, A. J., 1999, op. cit. p. 137. 
72 Carter, Peter & Harrison, Ruth, Offences of Violence (Waterlow Publishers, London, 1991) p. 46. 
73 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. pp. 332-33. 
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certain principles and restricted its exercise by imposing certain conditions. The accused 
will be entitled for the benefit of the defence only if these conditions are met. 
10.6.1 First Condition: Unlawful Assault on Life, Property, or Chastity 
A general condition for exercise of such right is that the conduct of the assailant must be 
unlawful. 74 Both common law and section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 impose a 
condition that the defendant must have used force to defend an unlawful assault or an 
unjustified conduct of the assailant. It is not permissible to resist a justified conduct. 75 
Similarly, clause 27(1) of the Draft Criminal Law Bill authorises exercise of private 
defence against criminal act of the assailant. 76 Though in certain conditions, like 
immaturity, insanity, and mistake of fact, the assailant may not be committing an 
offence even then the victim has a right to defend. In such cases his right of defence 
depends upon his knowledge of the circumstances of the assailant, if he is unaware of 
the condition of the assailant, he is allowed to exercise his right under section 3 of the 
Criminal Act, provided that he was acting reasonably. However, if he is aware of the 
facts then section 3 is inapplicable but still he is allowed to use reasonable force to 
defend, 77 for the act of the assailant is merely excusable that can be resisted lawfully. 78 
10.6.2 Second Condition: Reasonable Force 
In English law, private defence is an answer to a criminal charge provided that the force 
used for the purpose was, reasonably necessary. If the force used exceeds what is 
reasonably necessary in the circumstances, the justification of the defence fails and is 
eliminated from the case. 79 It means that private defence is either a complete defence or 
no defence at all. 80 The defendant can rely on the defence only if his action was 
necessary to prevent harm and he has used reasonable force. 81 One must balance the 
possible harm of being the victim of unlawful force with the punishment for using 
excessive force. 82 
74 Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2002) p. 235. 
75 Smith, J. C., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1989) p. 19. 
7' The Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code; Offences against the Person and General 
Principles, Draft Criminal Law Bill, Law Com. 218 (HMSO, London, 1993) Clause 27(1). 
77 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (I 01h ed., Butterworths, Lexis Nexis, 2002) p. 282. 
78 Smith, J. C., 1989, op. cit. p. 21. 
79 Ashworth, A. J., "Excusable Mistake of Law" [1974] Crim. L. R. 652. 
80 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Offences Against the Person (Cmnd. 7844) 14th Report 1980, 
Para. 288, Part. VII, p. 1 19. 
Elliott, Catherine & Quinn, Frances, Criminal Law (4th ed., Longman, 2002) p. 284. 
82 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 334. 
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Whether the defendant has used reasonable force in defence is a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury83applying objective test. 84 If the jury concludes that the accused 
has used excessive force and that no reasonable person, making all due allowance for 
the peril under which he was acting, could consider it justified, that use of force will be 
unlawful. 85 Account should also be taken of the purpose for which the force was used; 
force used to achieve one purpose may be reasonable, but may be unreasonable to the 
other. 86 Though the standard of reasonableness changes from case to case yet there are 
certain principles to be taken into account in all the cases of private defence. Like, mere 
words of assailant, however injurious, must not be resented by blows; it would no 
longer be private defence rather vengeance. 87 Similarly, a kick is not a justified mode of 
turning out a trespasser. 88 He must be asked to leave, and a reasonable time allowed for 
compliance, before force is used against him, for otherwise it is not clear that force is 
necessary. If the trespasser is evidently determined to use force to enter, moderate force 
may be used to expel him. 89 
10.6.2.1 Why Reasonable Force? 
The rule of reasonable force not only protects the rights of the defender rather it 
safeguards the rights of the assailant as well. When the assault is less serious, the 
criminal's right to life remains intact, he merely loses his right to physical security. In 
all cases, however, the assailant should retain the right not to be subjected to force 
which is neither necessary for the victim's defence nor for any other lawful purpose. 90 
To achieve a just and proper balance between the interests of the defender and the 
assailant, an assailant ought to be protected against excessive force and any arbitrary 
treatment. 91 Thus a legal system which supports maximum protection for every human 
life should provide that a person attacked ought if possible to avoid use of deadly force 
against his assailant. 92 This will provide maximum protection to basic right to life of the 
defender and the assailant. The approach would reflect the human rights position that 
83 Reference under s. 48 A, of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1968 (No. I of 1975) [1977] AC. 
105 at 137. 
84 Mousourakis, G., Criminal Responsibility & Partial Excuses (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1998) p. 181. 
Scanlan, G. & Ryan, C., An Introduction to Criminal Law (Financial Training Publications, 1985) p. 179. 
Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8`h ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) p. 261. 
ss Allen, Michael J., Textbook on Criminal Law (4'h ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., London, 1997) p. 188. 
86 Card, Richard, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (Butterworths, London, 1998) p. 628. 
Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 290. 
87 Atkinson, Charles M., 1914, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 45-46. 
88 Wilds (1837) 2 Lewin 214; 168 ER 1132. 
89 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 517. 
90 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 289. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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every one's right to life shall be protected unless necessary for a lawful purpose. 93 
However, deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of the 
Article if it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in 
private defence or preventing a crime. 94 The provisions would discourage use of violent 
means for private defence and prevention of crime where the alternatives are reasonably 
available. 
Though as a matter of principle it is admitted that a defender is entitled to use 
reasonable force in private defence, yet what does reasonable force mean is still 
incoherent in English law. For example, in a case of 2001, the defendant stabbed a 
burglar to death with a large carving kitchen knife. The jury took only 15 minutes to 
decide that the defendant acted in self-defence. 95 In another case of similar nature a 21 
years old drug addict burglar, was repeatedly beaten by the house owner with a metal 
baseball bat causing him a broken wrist, fractured elbow, cracked ribs and a fractured 
skull. Despite such a ruthless beating it was held that the house owner has used 
reasonable force and the burglar was sentenced to one year imprisonment. 96 In 1996, a 
businessman along with his two employees caught a burglar, tied his hands behind his 
back, kept him a captive for three hours and allegedly beaten him with a cricket bat. The 
jury took 20 minutes to acquit him of unlawful assault. 97 
The facts of the cases reveal that the force used was not reasonable however, the 
accused were acquitted. In all the cases the sympathies of the jury were allegedly with 
the defendants98 and in almost all the cases the ability of the police force to protect 
citizens has been criticised. It is for the law to achieve a just and proper balance 
between the interests of a defender and the assailant. The approach of the courts in the 
above mentioned cases is contrary to the spirit of a legal system which supports the 
maximum protection for every human life preventing use of force where non-violent 
means of defence are reasonably open. A comparison of the cases with those discussed 
in 10.11 will underline the inconsistency in English criminal law. 
93 The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2. 
94 Ibid 
95 Simon, De Buxelles, "Intruder's Killer is cleared of Murder" `The Times' Nov. 9,2001. 
96 Summar's Case, `Guardian' May 15,2000. Referred to by Watson, Michael, "Reasonable Force and 
the Defence of Property" 166 (2002) JP 659 at 659. 
97 Midgley, Carol, Businessman who tied up Burglar is clear of Assault" `The Times' June 8,1996. 
98 Juries and the Vigilante 146 (1996) NLJ 869. 
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10.6.2.2 Use of Deadly Force; When is that Allowed? 
Normally deadly force may be used only if it reasonably appears necessary to prevent 
immediate death or serious injury. 99 It should be remembered that homicide is a capital 
crime partly concerning the King whose peace is broken, and partly the individual who 
is unlawfully killed. 100 The only exception to the rule is homicide committed in exercise 
of right of private defence. 101 However, use of deadly force is unreasonable if non- 
deadly force is obviously sufficient to avert the threatened harm. 102 Similarly, no one is 
entitled to cause grievous bodily harm to another unless he himself is threatened with a 
seriously injurious attack. 103 Where the purpose can be achieved by use of lesser force 
use of deadly force is not allowed. Assume `A' attacks `B' with deadly force. `B' a 
marshal arts expert, knows he can safely disarm `A' without using deadly force. He 
would not be justified in using deadly force since it would violate the necessary 
requirement of private defence principle. 104 In determining whether the force used was 
reasonable the court will take into account all the circumstances of the case, including 
the nature and degree of force used, the seriousness of the evil to be prevented and the 
possibility of preventing it by other means. '°5 
10.6.2.3 Proportionate Force is Reasonable Force 
The discussion above suggests that the force used in private defence must be reasonable 
to justify the act of the defender. 106 How to determine the reasonableness of the force? 
There is no other choice except to measure the magnitude of defensive force in terms of 
proportionality to the force used by the assailant. 107 Right of private defence is only a 
right to defend and not to retaliate so it should not extend to inflict more harm than it is 
necessary under the circumstances for the purposes of defence. In Cook v. Beal it was 
held that the defendant cannot justify a mutilation for every assault. If `A' strikes `B', 
he cannot justify the drawing of his sword and cutting his hand. 108 Exceeding the limits 
of necessary force in defence is fatal to the accused's claim of justification. The 
proportionality rule is based on the view that there are some insults and hurts that one 
must suffer rather than use extreme force, if the choice is between suffering the hurt and 
99 Loewy, Arnold H., 1975, op. cit. p. 65. 
100 Thorne, Samuel E., 1968, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 340. 
101 R. v. Rose (1884) 15 Cox C. C. 540 
102 Perkins, R. M& Boyce, R., Criminal Law (3rd ed., The Foundation Press, N. York, 1982) p. 1113. 
103 Howard, Colin, "Two Problems in Excessive Defence" 84 (1968) LQR. 343. at 347. 
104 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. I., p. 103. 
105 I Iailsham, Lord of ST. Marylebone, Halsbury's Laws of England (Butterworths, 1990)Vol. 11(1)Para. 455. 
106 Mousourakis, G., 1998, op. cit. p. 185. 
107 Stephen, J. F., 1950, op. cit. Article 305, p. 252. 
Per Coleridge J. in R. v. Driscoll (1841) C&M 214; 174 ER 477. 
108 Cook v. Beale (1697) 1 Ld. Raym. 176; 91 ER 1014. 
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using the extreme force. 109 In cases of very trivial offences it would not be reasonable to 
use even the slightest force to prevent them. 110 The rule involves a community standard 
of reasonableness, and is left to the consideration of the jury. 111 
It means that where a capital crime is endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful 
to repel it by death of the party attempting. 112 The principle of proportionality, i. e. use 
of deadly force to prevent death seems to be very reasonable. However, if we take into 
account the abolition of capital punishment for murder in various European jurisdictions, 
there is no logic to allow someone to cause the death of his assailant even if it was to 
save his own life. It can be argued that where causing death is not allowed in the due 
course of law, it must not be allowed by a private person. ' 13 
10.6.2.4 Is it Possible to Weigh the Exact Force Needed for Private Defence? 
A man who exercises his right of private defence is usually taken by surprise. He is 
under a necessity to take prompt action to save his interests. While determining the 
quantum of reasonable force it should be kept in mind that a person defending himself 
cannot weigh to nicety the exact measure of his defensive action. Due to circumstances 
of great stress, even the reasonable man cannot be expected to judge the minimum 
degree of force required to a nicety. 114 The principle of proportionality plays a 
restrictive role in the realm of private defence, yet it does not mean that the force used 
in defence must necessarily be equal to the assault. "5 The principle requires a rough 
approximation between the gravity of the harm and the quantum of defensive force! 
16 A 
jeweller's scale should not be used to determine reasonable force. "? 
The shortcomings of excitable human nature and the necessity for prompt action should 
be taken into account and the concept of reasonable force should not be confined too 
closely. If the defender is under attack and reaches for the first object that comes to his 
hand, use of that object to inflict injury is more likely to be reasonable than if he 
109 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 506. 
Ashworth, Andrew, 1999, op. cit. p. 143. 
110 C. L. R. C., Felonies and Misdemeanours (71h Report. Cmnd. 2659, HMSO, London, 1965) Para. 23. 
111 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 506. 
112 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 180. 
113 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 870. 
114 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 262. 
115 Per Lord Oaksey in Turner v. Al. G. M. Picture Ltd [195011 All ER. 449 at 471. 
116 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 296. 
117 Per Geoffrey Lane J. in Reed v. Wastie [19721 Crim. LR. 221; Reported in `The Times' Feb. 10,1972. 
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deliberately chooses a deadly weapon when others were available. 1' 8 Private defence, 
otherwise proved, would only fail if the prosecution proves beyond doubt that what the 
accused did was not by way of defence. 119 
Right of private defence does not necessarily imply a right of attacking; instead the 
victim can have recourse to the proper tribunal. 120 He does not possess a right to punish 
his assailant because in a civilised society punishment may only be carried out by 
official agencies. 121 For an individual to take law into his own hands by inflicting 
summary punishment on the assailant is rightly regarded as a crime in itself. 
122 A 
serious assault that puts the victim in immediate danger gives rise to a legitimate right 
of private defence. However, if the assault is all over, application of any force by the 
defender may be treated as punishment, by way of revenge or as an aggression. 123 
10.6.2.5 Imminent Danger and Reasonable Force 
Use of force is not reasonable if it is not necessary to prevent a crime. 
124 For use of 
force to be necessary it is required that the danger or threat apprehended by the accused 
must be sufficiently specific, imminent and must be such that it could not be reasonably 
met without resorting to force. 125 However, the act of private defence need not to be 
spontaneous, the defender can make preparations to repel an expected attack. 126 There is 
a right at common law to use reasonable force in private defence and the right extends 
to immediately preparatory acts necessary to exercise that right. ' 27 It is required that the 
standard of reasonableness should be determined by taking into account the nature of 
crises in which the necessity to use force arises. 128 A person attacked or threatened with 
attack has to decide how to protect himself. In some cases an instant reaction and 
immediate commitment will be called for; in others there will be time for preparation. '29 
118 Carter, Peter & Harrison, Ruth, 1991, op. cit. p. 48. 
11' Palmer v. The Queen [ 19711 AC. 814 at p. 832. 
120 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 183. 
121 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 288. 
122 Ibid. 
123 R v. Shannon (1980) 71 Cr. App. R. 192 at 195. 
124 Smith, J. C., 2002, op. cit. F. N. 77. p. 279. 
125 Mousourakis, G., 1998, op. cit. p. 180. 
126 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 279. 
127 Ibid. p. 267. 
R. v. Georigiades [1989] Crim. LR. 575 (commentary on p. 575); Attorney-General 's Reference (No. 2 
of 1983) [1984] QB 456. 
128 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 262. 
129 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 294. 
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10.6.2.6 Is Private Defence Available to Future Threats? 
Is the right of private defence available only against imminent violence? Is it not 
available against a threat of violence which will occur some time in future? The 
questions may affect reasonableness of the accused's action. Allen Reed & Peter Seago 
have given an illustration to explain this situation. If `A' kidnaps `B' and he knows that 
`A' will kill him if a ransom is not paid, it should be permissible for `B' to use force 
against `A' to prevent the future killing. 130 However, the illustration is not appropriate 
and does not reflect the true sprit of the rule because kidnapping itself is an offence and 
`B' is entitled to use force to prevent it, he need not to know the intention of the 
assailant whether he will kill him in future. 
The idea can better be illustrated in the form of preparations made by the defender to 
repel an attack immediately prior to what he believes to be an imminent threat. For 
example, if the assailant threatens to kill and takes measures to execute his threat, the 
defender has a right to make preparations to repel the apprehended attack without 
breach of criminal law. 131 It implies that preparatory activities to justifiable acts of 
private defence may be permissible in certain appropriate circumstances. 132 It is good 
for both, law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself but he may 
do only what is reasonably necessary. Every thing will depend upon the particular facts 
and circumstances. 133 
Right of private defence commences as soon as the reasonable apprehension of danger 
arises. It is not necessary that the defender should wait the actual infliction of harm by 
the assailant. 134 There may be situations in which it will be justified to use reasonable 
force by way of pre-emptive action against an apprehended attack. ' 35 If the assailant 
attacked the victim but missed his attack, the defender is entitled to use force in his 
defence and to inflict injury on the assailant. ' 36 If no more force is used than is 
reasonable to repel the attack, such force is not unlawful and no crime is committed. 137 
130 Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, 1999, op. cit. F. N. 19. p. 209. 
131 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. p. 174. 
132 ibid. 
133 R. v. Shannon (1980) 71 Cr. APP. R. 192 at 195. 
134 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 293. 
Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. p. 626. 
135 R. v. Driscoll (1841) C&M 214; 174 ER. 477, Beckford v. The Queen [ 1988] 1 AC. 130 at 144. 
Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 293. 
136 R. v. Deana (1909)2 Cr. App. R. 75. 
13' R. v. Shannon (1980) 71 Cr. App. R. 192 at 195. 
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10.6.3 Third Condition: Duty to Retreat 
In English law criminal liability is founded on a subjective notion of fault that the 
offender chose to cause harm when he had both the capacity and a reasonable 
opportunity to do otherwise. ' 3' The application of the principle requires that before a 
person can avail himself of the defence of private defence, he must satisfy the jury that 
the defence was necessary, he did all he could to avoid the incident, and that it was 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm. 139 No killing can be justified, upon 
any ground, which was not necessary to secure the desired and permitted result; and it is 
not necessary to kill in private defence when a peaceful though often distasteful method 
of withdrawing to a place*of safety is available. 140 When an individual's purpose in a 
threatening situation is to prevent an injury or death, it is not necessary to inflict harm 
on the assailant if there is a safe avenue of withdrawal open. 141 
10.6.31 Duty to Retreat and Early English Law 
Early English law was very rigid and the defender was under a strict duty to retreat. 142 It 
denied the defendant's right of private defence if he used deadly force against the 
assailant, where he could have avoided it by retreat. 143 The law required that retreat 
should be a real one and not fictitious nor it be with an intention to take a better 
opportunity to attack. 144 However, it was admitted that retreat does not mean that a 
person should refrain from going where he may lawfully go because he knows he is 
likely to be attacked. 145 No duty to retreat could arise until the parties are in sight of one 
another and the threat is imminent. 146 
Another opinion suggests that a true man who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from 
an assailant who by violence or surprise maliciously seeks to take his life or to do him 
grievous bodily harm. 147 The logic behind the opinion might be that if a defender is 
obligated to retreat, he is forced to give way to the wrong. 148 In addition, a show of 
138 Hart, I-1. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) p. 102. 
139 Per Bosanquet J. in R. v. George Smith (1837) 8C&P 160 at 162; 173 ER 441 at 443. 
140 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 580. 
141 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. pp. 284-85. 
142 Dakin's Case (1828) 1 Lew. C. C. 166; 168 ER 999. 
143 Holdsworth, W. S., 1923, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 313. 
Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 570. 
144 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 184. 
145 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. pp. 176-77. 
146 R. v. Field [1972] Crim. LR. 435. 
147 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 567. 
148 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 865. 
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courage by the victim may often discourage the commission of crime against him. 149 
The conclusion of those who deny the duty to retreat is rested upon two grounds. Firstly, 
that no one can be compelled by a wrong doer to yield his rights, and secondly that no 
one should be forced by a wrong doer to make a dishonourable and cowardly retreat. 150 
The opinion can be criticised on the ground that though it is true that an honourable man 
would perhaps regret the apparent cowardice of retreat, yet after calming down it would 
be ten times more regrettable for him that he killed someone. 151 Another argument may 
be advanced that it is not the question of honour or dishonour in retreating but it 
concerns the right of one man to take life of another. If the choice is between the actor's 
honour and the aggressor's life, contemporary sentiment would obviously favour saving 
the aggressor's life. 152 However, if the retreat would not diminish the danger he may 
defend himself. 153 This approach implies a general duty to avoid use of force where 
other non violent means of private defence are reasonably available. 154 In order to 
determine what is reasonable, all the circumstances must be taken into account and a 
retreat ispo facto proves that the defendant did not want to cause unnecessary harm. 
10.6.3.2.1 Is Retreat Obligatory in all the Cases? 
Duty to retreat may differ with the nature of interest to be defended. For example, an 
officer who is endeavouring to prevent a crime or affect an arrest is not obliged to 
retreat, but may press forward against resistance. 155 His act shall be dealt under the 
normal rules of private defence except that he is clearly under no duty to retreat. 156 The 
exception can be justified on the ground that prevention of crime and arrest of offenders 
involves aggressive acts for a positive purpose, whereas private defence typically 
involves defensive acts for negative one. 157 An individual entitled for the right of 
private defence might be able to avoid violence by retreat but a police officer has a duty 
to go forward and intervene. 158 
The duty may also be determined by taking into account the nature of the attack. In 
certain circumstances, a person may act without retreating, temporising or withdrawing 
149 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 289. 
Iso Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 580. 
151 Ibid. at p. 581. 
152 Fletcher, George P., 1978, op. cit. p. 865. 
153 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 579. 
154 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 289. 
155 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 574. 
156 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 510. 
157 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 302. 
158 Ibid. 303. 
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and he should have a good defence. 159 The defendant must retreat as far as he 
conveniently can or as far as the fierceness of the assault permits him; for it may be so 
fierce as not to allow him to move a step, without obvious danger of his life, or grievous 
harm. 160 It is necessary in this condition that the defendant must know that he can 
retreat in complete safety. If the he did not know it, he would be under no duty to retreat 
rather than use deadly force. 161 There might be another reason not to require retreat even 
if the actor knows that he can retreat safely because it is very difficult for an outsider to 
judge whether the actor realised that retreat would be safe. 162 
Similarly, in case of defence of property retreat means leaving the assailant in 
possession of the booty. Defence of property is justified not only because the rightful 
possession of the owner is endangered, but also the general stability and vitality of the 
rule of private possession. 163 The object of law would not be achieved had the defender 
liable to retreat. 164 The major difference between self-defence and the defence of 
property is that the defendant needs not to retreat before the use of force in defence of 
his property for that would be giving up his property to his adversary. 165 Likewise, if a 
person is assailed in his own dwelling, he is not obliged to retreat and leave himself in 
that respect defenceless. 166 There is no place to retreat once one has been forced out of 
his own house. 167 The same rule is also maintained by certain other jurisdictions. 168 The 
rationale for the rule is that a person who has fled into the sanctuary of his own home, 
or is attacked in his own home, is considered to have his back already to the wall and 
therefore is under no further duty to retreat. However, he has the option to avoid conflict 
by temporising. 169 
The old authorities on duty to retreat should be regarded as repealed and it should now 
be simply a question whether it was reasonable in the circumstances for the accused to 
159 R. v. Bird [1985] 1 WLR. 816. 
160 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV., p. 184. 
Turner, J. W. Cecil, 1966, op. cit. p. 144. 
161 Loewy, Arnold H., 1975, op. cit. p. 67. 
162 Greenawalt, Kent, "Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses" 49 (1986) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 89 at 106. 
163 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. I, section 27, p. 84. 
164 Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 574. 
165 R v. Hussey (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 160. 
16 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 294. 
Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 579. 
167 Loewy, Arnold H., 1975, op. cit. p. 67. 
168 Under U. S laws the defender can use deadly force to defend himself in his home even if he could 
retreat with perfect safety. (Greenawalt, Kent, 1986, op. cit. p. 106) 
169 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 294. 
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stand his ground for defence. 170 Retreat does not require that the person threatened 
should run away. He must demonstrate that he is prepared to temporise and disengage 
and perhaps to make some physical withdrawal to show that he does not want to 
fight. 171 Confirming the rule, the House of Lords made it perfectly clear that an 
expression by the defendant that he did not want to fight is the best evidence that he was 
acting reasonably and in good faith in private defence. 172 This is a more reasonable 
approach, for if there was a duty to retreat a person would never be able to use pre- 
emptive force. 173 However, it should be remembered that an aggressor is not entitled to 
the defence of private defence even if he retreated after the beginning of the contest. 174 
It can be concluded that, the intentional infliction of death or bodily harm is not a crime 
when it is done in the exercise of private defence or prevention of a crime provided that 
the object for which death or harm is inflicted cannot otherwise be accomplished. 15 If 
someone is unlawfully assaulted and there is immediate and obvious apprehension of 
instant death or grievous bodily harm or the person assaulted was in his own home or in 
execution of a duty imposed upon him by law, he may defend himself on the spot and 
may kill or wound the assailant without retreating. 176 
10.7 Private Defence and Prevention of Crime 
Until 1967, all the cases of private defence were governed under the principles of 
common law. '77 In 1967, Criminal Law Act was enacted to regulate the cases of use of 
force in prevention of crime. Section 3 of the Act entitles a common man to use 
reasonable force in prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in lawful arrest of the 
offenders. The section requires the jury to ask themselves whether, in the circumstances 
the defendant believed to exist, he has used reasonable force to prevent a crime. 178 The 
170 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. pp. 263-64. 
R. v. Julien [1969] Crim. L. R. 381 (Commentary at pp. 382-83). 
171 R. v. Julien [1967] 1 WLR. 839 at 843. The same view was affirmed in R. v. Mclnnes [1971] 1 WLR 1600. 
Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 286. 
172 Per Lord Lane C. J., R. v. Bird [ 1985] I WLR. 816. 
173 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. p. 176. 
174 Hale, Mathew, Sir, 1759, op. cit. p. 42. 
Hawkins Williams, 1728, op. cit. Vol. l, Ch. 29, s. 12, p. 81 
McAllen, Ian & Morrish, Peter, Harris's Criminal Law (22"a ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) p. 439. 
Beale, Joseph H., 1902-03, op. cit. p. 575. 
The principle was affirmed in Malnik v. D. P. P [1989] Crim. L. R. 451. 
17s Stephen, J. F., 1950, op. cit. Article 304, p. 250. 
176 Ibid. Article 305, pp. 251-54. 
177 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. p. 624. 
178 Seago, Peter, Criminal Law (40i ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) p. 187. 
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circumstances relevant for the purpose of the section are only the immediate 
circumstances in which the force was used. 179 
One reason for the enactment of section 3 may be that at common law rules relating to 
use of force in prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in lawful arrest of 
offenders or persons unlawfully at large were not altogether clear and appear to have 
varied according to the situation in which the force was used. 180 Under the present law 
the use of reasonable force is applicable to all cases and the common law rules are to 
that extent superseded. 181 
10.7.1 Section 3 of Criminal Law Act and Common Law 
The relationship of section 3 with the common law principles is controversial. 182 One 
view is that it has superseded the common law where force is used to prevent the 
commission of indecent exposure or to prevent a person making off without payment, 
but not the common law defences of private defence, prevention and termination of 
breach of the peace and unlawful imprisonment or trespass. 183 The other point of view 
suggests that defence of a person, whether his own or that of another is still regulated by 
the common law, defence of property by the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and arrest and 
prevention of crime by section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.184 As the section made 
no reference to the right of private defence under common law, it, therefore, means that 
the right of private defence still exists at common law so far as it differed in effect from 
the section. However, it should be remembered that a person acting in private defence is 
usually engaged in the prevention of crime and in such a case the situation is governed 
under section 3.185 Since both these, private defence and prevention of crime, are some 
time indistinguishable and overlapping in a set of facts, it would be ridiculous to have 
two sets of criteria for the two defences. 186 It is, therefore, desired that the cases of 
private defence should be decided according to the general test of reasonableness laid 
179 Farrell v. Secretary of State for Defence [ 1980] 1 All. ER. 166 at 167. 
180 Hailsham, Lord of ST. Marylebone, 1990, op. cit. Vol. 11(1) Para. 455. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Harlow, Carol, "Self-defence: Public Right or Private Privilege" [1974] Crim. L. R. 528 at 528. 
183 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. p. 625. 
181 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 259. 
185 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 278. 
Harlow, Carol, 1974, op. cit. p. 529. 
186 Elliott, D. W., "Necessity, Duress and Self-defence" [1989] Crim. L. R. 611 at 620. 
Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 263. 
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down by section 3.187 In this sense the section has completely replaced the complex 
common law rules on the subject. 188 
The circumstances under which the force used is not in the prevention of crime, such as 
where the accused is defending an attack by a minor, insane or one in a state of 
automatism or acting under a material mistake of fact, section 3 (1) cannot be applied 
and consequently there is not a total overlap between the principles of common law and 
the statutory provision. 189 To allow the private defence in the above mentioned 
circumstance shows that law does not consider it reasonable that one should be killed by 
the mistaken belief of another, or by an unjustified and aggressive act of a mentally 
abnormal or immature person. 190 The same defence and degree of force is allowed in 
these circumstances as if the attacker were responsible and culpable for it. 191 
However, a person, who used force to repel an attack, is entitled to avail the common 
law defence of private defence and the defence provided under section 3, provided in 
both the cases the force used was reasonable in the circumstances. 192 Private defence 
covers both the common law right to defend oneself against invasion of person and 
property, and the public right to use reasonable force in prevention of crime. 193 The 
view can be supported by the refusal of the Criminal Law Revision Committee to 
provide any specific provision for the use of force in the presence of general provision 
contained in section 3 for the prevention of crime. 194 
10.7.2 Private Defence, Prevention of Crime and English Courts 
How did the English courts see both the conditions? Some decided cases can be taken 
into account to understand it. In R. v. Cameron, 195 the defendant was charged with 
wounding. The defence expressly raised was prevention of crime, yet the judge summed 
up on the basis of private defence with out any mention of section 3. The Court of 
Appeal also passed over without apparent comments that the defence as framed by the 
187 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 285. 
Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 503. 
188 Harlow, Carol, 1974, op. cit. p. 528. 
189 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 278. 
Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. p. 625. 
190 Williams, Glanville, 1983, op. cit. p. 502. 
191 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 334. 
192 Card, Richard, 1998, op. cit. p. 625. 
193 Lacy, N. & Wells, C., Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and Materials (Butterworths, 1998) p. 597. 194 C. L. R. C., Cmnd. 2659,1965, op. cit. Para. 22. 
195 R. v. Cameron [ 1973] Crim. L. R. 520. 
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defendant had never been put to the jury at all. 196 It shows that the trial court and the 
Court of Appeal regarded the substance of the two defences alike. 197 A similar approach 
was adopted in R. v. Julien, 198 Devlin v. Armstrong, 199 R. v. McInnes, 
200 and R. v. 
Cousins201 that the quantum of force for both the defences is similarly limited. 
202 The 
decisions lead to the conclusion that the right of private defence overlaps with the 
defence provided under section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967.203 
However, in 1977 Lord Diplock while differentiating between the two defences said 
that the force used in prevention of crime and in private defence is quite different and a 
person who uses excessive force in private defence is more blameworthy than one who 
uses it in prevention of crime. 204 Rejecting the views Lord Lloyd said that, "I do not 
think it possible to say that a person who uses excessive force in preventing crime is 
always, or even generally less culpable. It would not be practicable to draw a distinction 
between the two defences since they so often overlap. "205 These contradictory views 
created an ambiguity whether there is any difference between the two or not. 
The Law Commission has proposed resolving the ambiguity by consolidating the 
provisions of private defence and prevention of crime in its report. 
206 Though the 
proposed reform consolidates private defence and prevention of crime, it has restricted 
the defence of another's person or property. The defender cannot defend any other 
person or his property without his authority. 207 There seems no justification for this 
restriction because in majority of the cases the right of defence arises in emergency 
situations and it is neither possible for the victim of unlawful assault to give authority or 
consent nor for the defender to obtain the same. Had it been an unconditional defence 
under necessity, it would have been more appreciable. The 'proposals expressly 
196 Harlow, Carol, 1974, op. cit. p. 535. 
197 Ibid at p. 535. 
R. v. Cameron [ 1973] Crim. L. R. 520. (Commentary on the case). 
198 R. v. Julian [1967] 1 WLR. 839. 
199 Devlin v. Armstrong [ 1971 ] N. I. 13 
200 R. v. McInnes [1971] 1 WLR. 1600. 
201 R. v. Cousins [1982] 1 QB 526. 
202 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 278. 
203 Allen, Michael J., 1997, op. cit. p. 173. 
204 Reference under s. 48 A, of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1968 (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] 
AC 105 at 139. 
205 R. v. Clegg [ 1995] 1 AC 482 at 496. 
206 Law Com. No. 218,1993, op. cit. Clause 27. 
207 Ibid. Clause 27 (1) b &d. 
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recognise the right of an innocent person to defend against a non culpable aggressor, 
like minor, insane, or a person acting under duress or under the influence of 
intoxication. 208 In each of these cases the "attacker" is not responsible for the attack; he 
could not be convicted for it, so that in a sense the attack is non-criminal yet the person 
attacked can defend himself. 209 The recommendations if accepted and legislated 
accordingly may resolve the prevailing ambiguity in the principles of private defence. 
10.8 Mistake in Private Defence 
The Common law principle since the recognition of the right of private defence is that 
the defendant may only do what is reasonably necessary. 210 Until 1983 it was 
consistently stated that an honest but mistaken belief by the defendant as to the fact or 
nature of assault could be no answer to a criminal charge unless it was based on 
reasonable grounds . 
211 A number of cases support the proposition. 212 Though the 
statutory provision under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 does not specifically 
mention whether an objective or subjective approach to be adopted by the court to 
determine the reasonableness of the belief of the defendant, nevertheless the words in 
the section "such force as is reasonable in the circumstances" can be interpreted that the 
legislature intended to prefer an objective approach. Though the C. L. R. C. recommended 
that a person should be entitled for the defence of private defence if he uses such force 
as is reasonable in the circumstances as he believe them to be 213 yet this 
recommendation has never been implemented. 214 
In 1983 the Court of Appeal, in Williams, 215 making a landmark decision boldly rejected 
the Common law principle by stating that a defendant in a case of private defence is to 
be judged on the facts as he honestly believed them to be, whether his belief was 
reasonable or not. Thus the court preferred a subjective test instead of an objective one. 
Since then it has been followed in a number of cases. The Privy Council approved the 
principle in Beckford v. R. 216 In R. v. Scarlett 217 the Court of Appeal extended the 
208 Ibid. Clause 27 (3). 
209 Williams, Glanville, 1982, op. cit. p. 732. 
210 Watson, Michael, "Self-defence, Reasonable Force and Police" 147 (1997) NLJ 1593 at 1593. 
211 Smith, J. C., "Using Force in Self-defence and the Prevention of Crime" 47 (1994) Current Legal 
Problems 101 at 105. 
Smith, J. C., 1989, op. cit. p. 104. 
212 Rose (1884) 15 Cox. C. C. 540; Chisam (1963) Cr. App. R. 130: Palmer v. R [1971] AC 814; R. v 
Fennel [1971] 1 QB. 428. 
213 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Cmnd. 7844,1980, op. cit. Part. VII, Para. 284. 
214 Smith, J. C., 1989, op. cit. p. 106. 
2'5 Gladstone Williams [1984] 78 Cr. App. R. 276; [1987] 3 All. ER. 411; [1984] Crim. LR. 163. 
216 Beckford v. R [1987] 3 All. ER. 425. 
272 
lii2ht of Prirate Defence: How is it dealt under the Wo Ichal sy. Stenis: ' 
subjective approach to the quantum of force used in private defence. The decision has 
facilitated the use of extreme force against the assailants and now it is possible for the 
defendant to use deadly force against petty crimes. 218 At present an individual does not 
commit an offence by using force which, he believes, is reasonable in the circumstances 
as he, reasonably or unreasonably, believes them to be in the exercise of right of private 
defence. The accused is entitled to he acquitted if he mistakenly believed that he was 
justified in using force as he used. 219 However, this approach has been rejected by the 
European Court of Human Rights and in a number of cases like, McCann & Others v. 
UK 220 and Jordan v. UK, 221 declaring that the killings by the law enforcing agencies in 
UK were in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
A person who mistakenly believes that the assailant is about to attack him undergoes a 
mistake of fact, for the question of existence of circumstances of necessity is question of 
fact, whereas a mistaken belief in the quantum of force necessary to defend is a mistake 
of law, for the reasonableness of the defensive force is question of law. 
222 It means that 
an objective approach shall be applied to determine the existence of the circumstances 
of defence while a subjective one to determine the reasonableness of the force used. The 
approach can be criticised on two grounds. Firstly, determining reasonableness of the 
force resting entirely upon the beliefs of the defender would have the effect of depriving 
the assailant of legal protection of his basic human rights. 
223 Secondly, it is not logical 
to adopt two different parameters in one case, a person ought to avail the defence only 
where he reasonably apprehended the attack and used reasonable force for repulsion. 
While dealing with the cases of private defence English courts have neglected the rule 
of reasonableness. In order to save human life from unreasonable aggression, the 
conduct of the person may be declared as negligent. From criminal point of view 
negligence is not a subjective state of mind rather an objective standard of fault. The 
liability of the accused can be proved by his failure to perceive the situation and to 
217 R v. Scarlett (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 290. 
218 Watson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 1593. 
219 Reed, Alan, "Self-defence-Applying the Objective Approach to Reasonable Force" 60 (1996) 
JLC. 94 at 95. 
220 McCann & Others v. U. K. (1996) 21 E. H. R. R. 97. 
221 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom (http: //www. echr. coe. int/Eng/Judements. ht m) Application No. 
24746/94 Judgement 4 May 2001. 
222 Ashworth, A. J., 1975, op. cit. p. 304. 
223 Ibid. at p. 305. 
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behave in a reasonable manner. In the cases of negligence the offender is punished for 
his failure to see the risk, rather for intentional wrong doing. He may be held criminally 
liable if his conduct falls below the reasonable person. The accused may be mistaken 
about the nature of threat but that mistake must be based upon reasonable grounds. To 
hold the defendant belief to be the decisive factor would add a new and unacceptable 
degree of subjectivity to the test of reasonableness. 224 
10.9 Necessity and Private Defence in English law 
The doctrine of necessity is closely associated with the right of private defence. In some 
jurisdictions, like U. S. A., private defence is indiscriminately treated as a form of 
necessity and the defendant's conduct is justified on the ground that the harm he 
inflicted was necessary to preserve his legally protected and thus superior interest. 225 In 
English law the situation is different, private defence is considered as a general defence 
where as necessity in general is no defence226 or at least the extent of its prevailing is 
uncertain 227 and ambiguous. 228 This approach can be criticised on the ground that there 
are certain well established areas where necessity is considered as defence. Some 
statutes expressly prove this proposition; for example, fire-brigade, ambulance and 
police vehicles are exempted from observing the speed limits if such vehicles are being 
224 Smith, J. C., 1994, op. cit. F. N. 210. p. 109. 
225 Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law (2"d ed., Bobbs Merrills, Indianapolis, 1960) p. 435. 
226 Jefferson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 232. 
227 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 251. 
Dudley and Stephens [1884] 14 QB D. 273. {From past until recently the courts have been reluctant to 
admit the existence of a general defence of necessity per se (Reed, Alan & Seago, Peter, 1999, op. cit. 
F. N. 19. p. 205) Hale said, "If a person, being under necessity for want of victuals, or cloths, shall 
upon that account clandestinely steals another man's goods, it is a felony and a crime by the laws of 
England punishable with death. "(Hale, Mathew, Sir, 1778, op. cit. Ch. 9, p. 54) Confirming the 
proposition it is asserted that the doctrine of necessity must be carefully restricted otherwise it would 
open to many an excuse. The courts must, for the sake of law and order, and protection of the rights of 
all the citizens, take a firm stand and must refuse to admit plea of necessity to the hungry and 
homeless. (Per Lord Denning in Borough of Southwark v. Williams [1971] 2 All. ER. 175 at 179 There 
are certain other cases in which defence of necessity was denied like R. v. Willer (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 
225 and R v. Denton (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 246. However, in certain other cases, like R. v. Martin 
[1989] 1 All ER. 652 and R. v. Conway [1989] QB 290, the defence was allowed)) 
228 The uncertainty and ambiguity is highlighted by the fact that in 1974, a working paper of the Law 
Commission recommended that there should be a general defence of necessity in UK's laws. 
Codification of the Criminal Law: General Principles Defences of General Application (Working 
Paper No. 55,1974) Para. 40. However, very strangely the Law Commission rejected the proposal 
and asserted that no attempt should be made to establish the defence of necessity by legislation and 
for the avoidance of doubt, if any such defence exists in common law, it should be expressly 
abolished. The Commission while rejecting the proposal of its working party admitted that the 
defence of necessity in English law is confused and uncertain. Criminal Law: Report on Defences of 
General Application (Law Com. No. 83,1977) Part IV, Para. 4.33 and Para. 4.1. Once again 
disregarding the proposal of abolishing any general defence of necessity, in 1985, the commission 
proposed not only that the judges should continue to have power to develop and clarify the defence so 
far as it exists at common law, but also that the criminal law code should contain a specific defence of 
necessity analogous to duress. Codification of Criminal Law (Law Com. No. 143,1985) Paras 13.25 
and 13.26, Clause 46 of Draft Criminal Code. 
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used for their specified purposes and speed limits are likely to hinder the purpose. 
229 
Similarly, in order to protect property that is in immediate need of protection, it is 
permissible to destroy the property of another person. 
230 Despite the denial of the 
defence of necessity there is an overlap between private defence and necessity because 
in both the cases the defendant commits an offence in order to avoid another greater 
evil. 231 It can be suggested that many a cases of defences stems out of necessity hence 
its denial leads to anomaly apparent in English criminal law. 
10.10 Defence of Property 
The provisions related to defence of property are designed to protect possession and not 
the ownership only. When a person uses force to prevent another from dispossessing 
him of property, or in order to regain possession immediately after dispossession, he is 
acting in defence of property. 232 Similarly, he is justified in using force against a would- 
be dispossessor if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent its 
imminent and unlawful dispossession. 233 The special limitation imposed on the right of 
defence of property is that the defendant must have its possession and the assailant must 
not be legally entitled to it. 234 This does not mean that the defence of the property is 
restricted to the cases of dispossession only. It extends to the situations where the 
aggressor threatens physical harm, trespasses, commits a crime involving danger to 
premises, unlawfully carries away or commits criminal mischief, burglary, tortious 
interference or any other unjustified encroachment on the defender's property. 
235 
The word property includes all types of property whether moveable, immovable, real, 
personal, premises, property that is temporary and adopted for human residence, a 
habitation or any other tangible thing. 236 By allowing defence of property, society 
considers not only the immediate physical harms but also the societal interest in the 
maintaining a right to hold personal property. 237 
229 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Section 87. 
230 Criminal Damage Act 1971. Section 5 (2) b. 
231 Williams, Glanville, Criminal Law: The General Part (2°d ed., Stevens & Sons, 1961) p. 732. 
232 Dressler, J., 1995, op. cit. p. 235. 
233 /bid p. 236. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Robinson, Paul H., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 107. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. Vol. I, p. 84. 
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10.10.1 Reasonable Force in Defence of Property 
English criminal law justifies use of force in defence of property only if it is necessary 
for the purpose of defence. 238 In R v. Scarlett, 239 the Court of Appeal held that where an 
accused was justified in using some force and could only be guilty if the force used was 
excessive, the jury ought to be directed that he could not be guilty unless the 
prosecution proved that he had applied force intentionally or recklessly. The jury ought 
not to convict the accused unless they are satisfied that the degree of the force used was 
plainly more than was called for by the circumstances as he believed them to be, even if 
that belief was unreasonable. According to this decision, the defendant can justify the 
most extravagant action provided he believes the circumstances warranted it. 240 It is also 
contrary to an already settled rule that use of extreme force for the protection of 
property, even if necessary for that purpose, is not justifiable unless it is the only means 
or there is a direct risk to human life or safety. 241 
One thing is settled that the accused is entitled for the defence only if he has used 
reasonable force. But it is not appropriate to interpret "such force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances" in section 3 of Criminal Law Act 1967 as "such force as he believed to 
be reasonable in the circumstances, "242 because use of force cannot be justified unless it 
is both necessary and reasonable. 243 Whether the force used was necessary and 
reasonable is to be determined by the jury. In R. V. Scu11y, 244 the defendant shot dead a 
trespasser to his master's garden. Garrow, B., said that a guard is not justified in 
shooting any one who comes to it in the night unless from the conduct of the party he 
has fair ground for believing his own life in actual and immediate danger. He ought first 
to see if he could not take measures for his apprehension. If he rashly shoots the man, 
who is only a trespasser, he would be guilty of manslaughter. 
10.10.2 Defence of Property and Use of Deadly Force 
In certain circumstances the right of private defence of property may extend to cause 
death of the assailant. A struggle between the possessor and a trespasser can lead to 
violence and a threat to property may turn into a threat to human life or safety. Where 
the defender of the property reasonably believes that his own life is at stake he will be 
238 Lanham, David, "Defence of Property in the Criminal Law" [1966] Crim. L. R. 426 at 371. 
239 R. v. Scarlet! [1993] 4 All. ER. 629; (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 290; [1994] Crim. L. R. 288. 
24° Hogan, Brian, "Defence of Property" (1994) NLJ 466 at 467. 
241 R. v. Hussey (1925) 18 Cr. App. R. 160. 
2421bid. 
243 R. v. Owino [ 1995] Crim. LR. 743. Commentary at 744. 
244 R. v. Scully (1824) 1 C. & P. 319; 171 ER 1213. 
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justified in taking the life of the assailant. 245 The best exposition of the principle is the 
case of Mr. Lambert, who killed one of the two robbers who entered his home and 
attempted a robbery and for the purpose put a knife on his wife's throat. The Crown 
Prosecution Services and the judge unanimously decided not to prosecute him because 
no blame can be attached to him for what he did. 246 However, where there is a threat to 
property but no clear threat to a person's safety, though, it may be more difficult to 
assess when or if ever, use of deadly force should not be justified. It implies that stress 
should be laid on the element of personal danger while allowing use of deadly force. 
Second important element is the nature of property to be defended. A home is 
considered to be a man's castle; 247 if an assailant intends to evict him or break into it 
with intent to commit burglary or homicide the defender is entitled to use deadly 
force. 248 A man may kill a trespasser, who would forcibly dispossess him, in the same 
manner as defending his body. 249 In Hinchliffe'S 250 case, Holroyd J. stated that the 
defendant "had a right to defend her barn, and to employ such force as was reasonably 
necessary for that purpose, and she is not answerable for any unfortunate accident that 
may have happened in so doing. " 
Although the same principles of defence of persons are applicable to the defence of 
property but because of its less value than human life, deadly force is no more 
permissible to defend property than it is to defend against minor assaults. 251 It is not 
reasonable to use deadly force merely for protection of the property. 252 Killing of mere a 
trespasser cannot be excused; 253 unless it amounts to a violent felony such as robbery, 
arson or burglary and the extreme step of causing death of the trespasser was absolutely 
necessary. 254 Apart from a home, the nature and value of property and all surrounding 
245 Lanham, David, 1966, op. cit. p. 370. 
R. v. Scully (1824) 1 C. & P. 319; 171 ER 1213; R. v. Moir (1825) 7C&P 179, Referred in R. v. 
Charles Price (1835) 7C&P 178 at p. 179; 173 ER 78 at 79. 
246 Wright, Oliver, "Homeowner who killed Burglar acted Lawfully" `The Times' June 18,2002. 
247 Lanham, David, 1966, op. cit. p. 378. 
Semayne's Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91 a; 77 ER 194. 
24S Cooper's Case (1639) Cro. Car. 544; 79 ER 1069. 
249 Per Hewart L. C. J. in R. v. Hussey (1925) 18 Cr. App. R. 160. 
250 Hinchle (1823) 1 Lew. C. C. 161; 168 ER 998. 
251 Bayles, Michael D., 1987, op. cit. p. 336. 
252 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 266. 
Hailsham, Lord of ST. Marylebone, 1990, op. cit. Vol. 11(1) Para. 457, p. 351. 253 Jones v. Tresilian (1670) 1 Mod 37; 86 ER 713 
254 Warming' ton, L. Crispin, 1950, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 38. 
R. v. Sullivan (1841) Car. &M 209 at p. 211; 174 ER 475 at 476. 
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circumstances must be taken into account before determining the quantum of force 
required for the defence. 255 A threat to property may, in certain circumstances, be so 
potent to permit the use of deadly force as against physical harm. 256 Thus a person does 
not commit a crime by causing death or bodily harm while defending his property or 
property of another provided that he inflicts no more harm than he in good faith and on 
reasonable grounds believes to be necessary. 257 
10.11. Defence of Property and New Trend in English Law 
The conventional view of the common law in the defence of property is that the 
defendant should use reasonable force; however, he can use deadly force in the 
prevention of a forcible and atrocious crime like robbery, burglary or homicide258 and 
even causing death of the assailant was justified in the above mentioned crimes. 259 The 
principle, that a person can use reasonable force to defend his property, seems to be 
changing by the decisions of English courts. In Revill v. Netivberry, 260 a 76 years old 
man shot and injured a burglar who was trying to break into his garden shed at night. 
Though the defendant was acquitted of malicious wounding but the judge awarded 
damages on the basis that he had used force beyond the reasonable limits of private 
defence. The case suggests that the defenders of property ought to measure the force 
required for defence or opt between the damage to their property or conviction. 
In R. v. Tony Martin, 261 the defendant, living alone in a remotely situated farm had been 
the victim of a series of burglaries. One night he shot dead one burglar and injured the 
other who had entered his house after smashing a window. He was charged with murder, 
causing grievous bodily harm with intent and keeping firearm without a certificate. He 
was convicted for all the three counts and was sentenced accordingly. The decision of 
the court signals that those, whose houses are being burgled, are supposed to shout and 
not shoot at the burglars. 262 Owner J. said that "the case serve as a dire warning to all 
burglars who broke into the houses of other people. "263 
255 Lanham, David, 1966, op. cit. p. 373. 
256 Per Lord Simon in Lynch [1975] AC 653 at p. 686. 
257 Stephen, J. F., 1950, op. cit. Article 306, p. 254. 
258 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 179. 
Semayne 's Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91 a; 77 ER 194; 
Cooper's Case (1639) Cro. Car. 544; 79 ER 1069. 
259 1532 (24. Hen. -8) c. 5. 2`i0 Rev!!! v. Newberry[1996] 1 All ER 291; [1996] QB 567; [1996] 2 WLR 239. 
261 `The Times' April 20,2000. 
262 `The Times' April 21,2000. 
263 `The Times' April 20,2000. 
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The statement of the judge suggests contrary to the decision because it is more a 
warning to house holders that if they use force against criminals in defence of their 
property they may be convicted for serious offences. If we look upon this particular 
decision in the light of previous record of the deceased, the injured and the situation 
prevailing in the area, the decision turns to be more dreadfu1.264 The decision reflects 
that the citizens are not entitled to protect themselves even though they could not get 
police help. The case illustrates the risks taken by the defendant if he uses force for the 
defence of his property. 265 
However, the public and the politicians took a serious notice of this decision because, at 
the most, he exceeded the necessary force required for the defence of his property. 266 
"The public out-cry over Tony Martin's conviction for murder would have been 
lessened considerably had the option of a manslaughter conviction been available. 11267 
Here once again, it has been proved that the rule to substitute a conviction of 
manslaughter for murder in the cases of use of excessive force where use of some force 
was permissible is more reasonable. It has also been alleged that some jurors were 
threatened that they would be harmed if Martin was acquitted. 268 This may be a factor 
for the conviction of the accused but the statements of the trial judge and the crown 
prosecutor clearly point towards the changing trend to deal with the cases of defence of 
property. The decision of the court also shows that the test of reasonable force in 
English law is unacceptably vague and gives insufficient guidance to the defenders 
regarding their legitimate right to protect themselves and their property against intruders 
but the problem with refining the test of reasonable force is that the alternatives all look 
worse than the present law. 269 
261 The Times' April 22,2000. (It has been reported that there were 58,904 recorded crimes in Norfolk 
between February 1,1999 and January 31,2000 compared to 56,329 in the same period previous year. 
All the three men involved in the crime were habitual offenders. The deceased had already 29 
convictions, the injured had 33 convictions and their third accomplice had 52 convictions. In the 
presence of such facts chief crown prosecutor stated outside the court that "actions such as taken by 
Martin cannot be tolerated in a civilised society. When people break the law, it is for the law to punish 
them, not for the individuals to take the law into their own hands. Whether acting out of revenge or 
their own system of justice. ") The situation shows the failure of the law to provide protection to the 
law abiding citizen either due to inadequacy of punishments for the crime or inefficacy of the law 
enforcing agencies to control the incidences of crimes. 
265 Watson, Michael, "Self-Defence and the Home" 167 (2003) JP 486 at 486. 
266 Yeo, Stanley, "Killing in Defence of Property" 150 [2000] NLJ730. 
267 Ibid. at p. 743. 
268 `The Times' April 21,2000. 
269 Editorial, "What Should be done about the Law of Self-defence? "[2000] Crim. L. R 417. 
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Though the Court of Appeal substituted his conviction for murder to manslaughter yet 
this was done on a totally new plea of diminished responsibility raised by the defendant 
in appeal. 270 However, it has been reported that the injured burglar has been granted 
permission to sue for damages. 271 The case poses a very interesting question whether 
the legal heirs of the deceased burglar can also sue for damages. 
10.12 Use of Excessive Force in Private Defence 
The principle of English law is that where a person, being under no mistake of fact, uses 
force in the exercise of right of private defence, he either has a complete defence or if he 
uses excessive force, no defence. 272 It means that the defence of private defence either 
succeeds so as to result in acquittal or if it fails will result into conviction of murder. 273 
Where a plea of private defence to a charge of murder failed because the force used was 
excessive and unreasonable the homicide could not be reduced to manslaughter. 274 The 
House of Lords declared that the reduction of otherwise murder to manslaughter in the 
case of private defence is the matter for decision by the legislature and not by the House 
in its judicial capacity. 275 
In R. v. Hassin, 276 in an appeal against conviction of murder it was submitted that the 
judge should have directed the jury that if `H' exceeded the bounds of private defence, 
proper verdict was manslaughter. The Court of Appeal held that the submission was a 
novelty in present times, although the principle may have existed in the days of chance 
medley. There is no rule that a defendant who has used greater force than was necessary 
in the circumstances should be found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. 
10.12.1 Is the Idea of Reducing Murder to Manslaughter a Novelty? 
The discussion above implies that if private defence is pleaded in answer to a charge of 
murder and fails for the use of excessive force, the plea affords the defendant no 
protection at all and the conviction cannot be reduced into manslaughter. However, the 
idea of conviction for manslaughter instead of murder in the cases of excessive force is 
not novel in English criminal law. In R. v. Cook's, 277 it was held that use of excessive 
force in the defence of property, which resulted into death of the assailant was 
''0 R. v. Martin (Anthony) [2003] QB 1; [2002] 2 WLR 1; [2002] Crim. LR. 136. 
271 `The Times' June 14,2003. 
272 Palmer v. The Queen [ 19711 1 All ER 1077; [ 1971 ] AC 814. 
273 Palmer v. The Queen [ 1971 ] AC. 814 at 832. 
Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 268. 
27"'R. v. Clegg [1995] 1 AC. 482., [1995] I All. ER. 334 
275 Per Lord Lloyd in R. v. C/egg [ 1995] I AC. 482 at p. 495; [ 1995] 1 All. ER. 334 at pp. 346-47. 
276 R. v. Hassin [ 19631 Crim. LR. 582. 
277 R. v. Cook's (1639) Cro. Car. 537; 79 ER 1063. 
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manslaughter and not murder. The same rule was affirmed in R. v Whalley, 278 and R. v. 
Patience, 279 in the second quarter of the l9`h century. In R. v. Harrington '280 the court 
held that private defence is ground upon which the offence of murder might be reduced 
to manslaughter. In another case of the last quarter of the 19`h century R v. Weston '28 
1 it 
was held that use of deadly force against a serious violence or its apprehension is 
justifiable. 
In a case of the early 20th century R. v. Biggin, 282 the rule was reaffirmed and seemed to 
be remained in force up till the middle of the 20th century. In Mancini v. D. P. P, 283 the 
House of Lords held that in case where the plea of private defence was raised in defence 
on the trail of a person charged with murder it is the duty of the judge in his summoning 
up to deal adequately with any view of the evidence given which might reduce the 
crime to manslaughter. 284 
The cases cited above fairly suggest that where the accused has been justified in using 
some degree of force in private defence or to resist an unlawful execution or arrest but 
used more force than which would have served his purpose has had the effect of 
reducing the conviction to manslaughter. The principle can be supported by the 
argument that if a person responds to an assault and does no more than he believes to be 
necessary in the circumstances, it would not be justified that he should be convicted of 
murder because on an objective view the degree of force used is judged to have been 
excessive. 285 The law does not tolerate such killings by refusing to grant the accused a 
complete acquittal despite the fact that the deceased was at fault in having attacked the 
accused in the first place. However, it permits the accused to escape from liability of 
murder for a less serious offence of manslaughter. 286 Apart from these cases, however, 
the English common law has made no positive contribution to the recognition and 
development of excessive private defence. 287 The courts have refused to regard the rule 
for some inexplicable reason. The English judges appear to have played an 
278 R. v. Whalley (1835) 7C&P 245; 173 ER 108. 
279 R. v. Patience (1837)C& P 775; 173 ER 338. 
280 R. v. Harrington (1866) 10 Cox. C. C. 370. 
281 R. v. Weston (1879) 14 Cox. C. C. 346. 
282 R. v. Biggin [1918-19] All. ER. 501. 
283 Mancini v. D. P. P. [1942] AC. 1. 
28' Ibid. at p. 7 
285 The Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, Consultation Paper No. 173,2003. Para. 1.61. 
286 Yeo, Stanley, Unrestrained Killing and the Law (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998) p. 1. 
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obstructionist rather than a contributory role in the recognition of excessive private 
defence doctrine in English law. 288 
The Privy Council in Palmer's case 289 rejected the authority of all the cases mentioned 
above, concluding that they deal either with the execution of an illegal warrant or 
executing process unlawfully hence bearing no impact on the law of private defence. 290 
This might be a reason for rejecting the doctrine of excessive use of force in private 
defence . 
291 However, this approach is unsatisfactory. Apparently the objection is based 
upon the concept that the right of private defence can only be exercised against an 
assault. But the council did not mention name of the act done against the execution of 
unlawful warrant and resisting unlawful arrest. 292 As discussed earlier every one is 
allowed to exercise right of private defence against any unlawful act affecting human 
body, so the objection is illogical and of no value. 
The Privy Council was not persuaded by the Weston293 and Biggin294 being clear cases 
on private defence where the courts held that if the accused used more force than 
necessary in the exercise of his right of private defence a verdict of manslaughter would 
be justified. The cases were dealt along with the others and regrettably the Privy 
Council did not expressly stated reasons for its views and rejecting the principle. 295 The 
council also considered the Australian cases on the point296 but did not find them 
convincing and rejected them for less clear reasons. 297 These decisions are by no means 
clear and unambiguous. The cases prove that the doctrine was not an innovation rather it 
already existed in English law. This can be supported by the evidence that the penal 
code drafted for India, by English men in 1837 and implemented in 1861, contained the 
doctrine of use of excessive force in private defence in the form of an exception to the 
offence of murder, indicating the presence of the principle. 298 
287 /bid. p. 118. 
288 Yeo, Stanley, 1998, op. cit. p. 118. 
289 R. v. Palmer [ 1971 ]1 All ER 1077; [ 1971 ] AC 814. 
290 /bid at p. 1083 and 825 respectively. 
291 Smith, P., "Excessive Defence-A Rejection of Australian Initiative? " [1972] Crim. LR. 524 at 529. 
292 /bid 
293 R. v. Weston (1879) 14 Cox. CC. 346. 
294 R. v. Biggin [1918-19] All. ER. 501. 
295 Yeo, Stanley, 1998, op. cit. p. 136. 22`w 
R. v. Palmer [ 19711 AC 814 at pp. 827-833. 
297 Smith, P., 1972, op. cit. p. 530. 
298 Exception 2. Section 300,1 PC and PPC. 
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The principle that murder cannot be reduced into manslaughter, where the defendant has 
used excessive force, without a new legislation seems to be an unreasonable excuse 
counterfeited by the courts. It can be criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly, the 
courts, without requiring any legislation by the parliament, divided crimes into 
basic/specific intent in the cases where the defence of intoxication to a criminal charge 
is raised. If the law is to be altered by the parliament rather than the courts, the same 
principle would have been applied there. Similarly, the liability for unlawful wounding 
has been substituted for tortious liability on the instance of the court without having 
recourse to the new legislation. 299 
Secondly, where use of some force is justified and the defender in good faith exercising 
his right exceeded the limit allowed, there is no justification of abandoning the defence 
completely. In order to hold him liable for use of excessive force it is sufficient to 
convict him of manslaughter rather than murder. In 1993, in R. v. Scarlett, 
300 the 
prosecution charged the accused with manslaughter on the ground that he used 
excessive force in the defence of his premises. If the use of excessive force does not 
reduce murder into manslaughter, this charge was not proper and the court would have 
asked to reframe the charge. 
The jurists are also of the opinion that homicide, committed under mistake as to how 
much force is needed for private defence, is excusable and the offender is not liable for 
murder. 301 Denying this defence to the offender is the denial of a recognised defence of 
mistake of fact. One might envisage an analogy between the use of excessive force in 
private defence and mistake while exercising the right. In the latter case the accused 
believes mistakenly that he is being attacked and uses force, in private defence, which 
was not permitted at all. Whereas in the former case the accused could not make out the 
exact degree of force needed to defend and exceeds the permissible limits. 
302 It seems to 
be more reasonable and logical to give him some allowance in the circumstances. 
However, it is argued that a change in the present law. would be unnecessary and 
overcomplicated because if the defendant does no more than he instinctively believe to 
22`9 Revill v. Newberry [1996] 1 All ER 291; [1996] QB 567; [1996] 2 WLR 239. 
300 R. v. Scarlett [1993] 4 All. ER. 629. 
30' Robinson, Paul 11., 1984, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 1 10. 
302 Mousourakis, G., 1998, op. cit. p. 187. 
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be necessary his conduct would be reasonable and therefore lawful, however if he 
overreacts angrily the partial defence of provocation is available. 303 
The psychological pressure experienced by the defender when his life or limb is at stake 
should be taken into account in considering whether he should be excused for exceeding 
the limits of necessary force. Stress, fear, mistake, or a combination of these factors may 
provide a good reason for excusing the accused for employing more force than is 
actually necessary to repel an unlawful attack. 304 One can generally adjust one's 
conduct in ordinary life by taking steps to avoid harm to others, whereas a person who 
finds himself without warning in what seems to be a very dangerous situation may have 
no time to take verifying steps before defending himself. 305 In the circumstances of 
great stress, even a reasonable man cannot be expected judging to a nicety the minimum 
degree of force required for defence. 306 It seems to be quite logical that a person may, 
while exercising his right of private defence, go beyond the reasonable limits of the 
force required. If the defender is to measure the force necessarily required for his 
defence, it is an implied denial of his right of defence. The approach adopted by the 
English courts, not reducing murder to manslaughter in case of excessive force, is rather 
negative, seemingly motivated by an unwillingness to make any move away from a 
comfortable view of the defence of private defence. 307 
The principle that the use of excessive force may defeat the defence of private defence 
is also contrary to the rule laid down by the English courts that a person exercising his 
right of private defence cannot weigh to nicety the exact measure of his action and it is 
not reasonable to use jeweller's scale to measure reasonable force. 308 The opinion of the 
courts in these cases suggests that a plea of private defence may be accepted even if the 
accused used more force than was in fact necessary and in the circumstances he was 
unable to calculate correctly the amount of force actually needed. 309 
Taking into account the illogicality of the existing law, C. L. R. C. recommended that if a 
defendant kills in a situation where use of some force is reasonable in private defence or 
303 The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 173,2003, op. cit. Para. 1.62. 
304 Ibid. p. 188 
305 Williams, Glanville, "Offences and Defences" 2 (1982) S. L. 233 at p. 243. 
3°' Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 262. 
307 Smith, P., 1972, op. cit. p. 528. 
308 For example see Palmer v. The Queen [ 1971 ] AC 814 and Reed v. lVastie [ 1972] Crim. L. R. 221. 
309 Mousourakis, G., 1998, op. cit. p. 186. 
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prevention of crime but he uses excessive force, he should be liable for manslaughter 
and not murder if he honestly believed that the force used was reasonable in the 
circumstances. 310 The recommendation has duly been accepted by the Law 
Commission311 and subsequently incorporated into draft criminal code for England and 
Wales. 312 House of Lord's Select Committee313 has also recommended the abolition of 
present law and proposed that a new special defence to the offence of murder should be 
introduced and a person who kills using excessive in private defence or prevention of 
crime should be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. 
10.12.2 Advantages of the Rule: Reduction of Murder into Manslaughter 
The major advantage of such legislation is that the law would be more adequately 
equipped to deal with the situation of defence where the assailed over-reacted and the 
courts would have a much free hand in selecting the appropriate sentence for the 
convicted. 314 An objection may be raised that the introduction of this rule would 
probably result in conviction for manslaughter where a conviction for murder would 
have been proper. 315 But it is also correct to say that it would equally probable to result 
in the conviction of manslaughter of persons who would otherwise have been acquitted 
of murder. 316 On the other hand the absence of such a partial defence may result not 
only in harsh convictions but in over-sympathetic acquittals as well. 
317 It is quite 
reasonable that a man ought neither to go wholly free if he has defended himself beyond 
the necessity of the occasion and thereby killed someone, nor at the other extreme to be 
convicted of murder for an error of judgement in a difficult situation which was not 
caused by him. 318 The proposed legislation may also be justified on the ground that a 
homicide committed in lawful exercise of right of private defence is morally less 
blameworthy than in other circumstances. 319 
10.13 Proposed reforms in the law of private defence in English law 
The common law principles on private defence were complicated and unsatisfactory 
which resulted into an artificial distinction between justifiable homicide and homicide 
in private defence; a blameworthy element was purported to be attached with the later 
310 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Cmnd. 7844.1980, op. cit. Para. 288, p. 122. 
311 The Law Commission, Codification of Criminal Law (Law Com. No. 143,1985) Para 13.30. 
312 Law Com. No. 177,1989, op. cit. Clause 59. 
313 House of Lords, Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, HL. Papers, 78-1 (Parliamentary 
Papers HL, 1988-89 Vol. XII1 (HMSO, London, 1989). para. 1 18, p. 35. 
314 Smith, P., 1972, op. cit. p. 533. 
315 Ibid. p. 534. 
316 Ibid. 
317 The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 173,2003, op. cit. Para. 12.84. 
318 Howard, Colin, 1968, op. cit. p. 360. 
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instance. 320 Because of its haphazard growth the law contains some inconsistencies and 
anomalies. 321 It was desired that the common law of private defence should be replaced 
by statutory defence providing that a person may use such force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances as he believes them to be in the defence of himself or any other person. 
The defence should be confined to cases where the defendant feared an imminent attack 
and there should be no specific provision relating to retreat rule or the refusal to comply 
with an unlawful demand . 
322It was also desired that there should be a statutory 
definition of private defence, separate from section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, for 
the section does not allow exercise of private defence against someone who is not 
committing a crime like a minor, insane, under a state of automatism or mistake of 
fact. 323 
Taking into account the prevailing unsatisfactory condition, the C. L. R. C. and a Select 
Committee of the House of Lords recommended the change of existing law to 
encompass the above suggestions. 324 On the basis of these recommendations, the 
provisions of statutory law on the prevention of crime and the principles of common 
law on private defence have been consolidated and restated by the Law Commission in 
a draft criminal code. 325 Clause 44(1) states that a person does not commit an offence by 
using such force as, in the circumstances which exist or which he believes to exist, is 
immediately necessary and reasonable, to prevent a crime, to effect or assist in lawful 
arrest, to prevent or terminate a breach of peace or to exercise right of private defence. 
The proposed clause would replace existing statutory and common law principles on the 
point. The provisions mainly consolidate and restate the existing law. However, the 
major difference between the existing provisions on the subject and the Draft Criminal 
Code is that if the accused kills by using excessive force, the crime will be no longer 
murder but manslaughter. 326 
The common law and the statutory provisions undoubtedly contributed to make the law 
obscure and difficult in the administration of justice. Obscurity and mystification may in 
319 The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 173,2003, op. cit. Para. 12.84. 
320 Turner, J. W. Cecil, 1966, op. cit. p. 144. 
321 Smith, J. C., 1996, op. cit. F. N. 84. p. 259. 
322 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Cmnd. 7844,1980, op. cit. Part. IX, Para, 72, p. 137. 
323 Ibid. Part. VII., Para, 283, p. 1 19. 
324 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Cmnd. 7844,1980, op. cit. Part. VII, Para. 288; House of Lords, 
Report of the Select Committee, Papers, 78-1 (Parliamentary Papers HL, 1988-89, op. cit. Vol. XI11 
(HMSO, London, 1989). para. l 18, p. 35. 
325 Law Com. No. 177,1989, op. cit. 
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turn lead to inefficiency. The cost and length of trials may be increased because the law 
has to be extracted and clarified and there is a greater scope for appeals on misdirection 
on points of law. Moreover, if the law is not perceived by the jury to be clear and fair, 
there is a risk that they will return incorrect or perverse verdicts through 
misunderstanding or a deliberate disregard of the law. It can be concluded that the 
present law on private defence is unsatisfied, unclear, and in need of reform. 327 
Codification will remove all the ambiguities and will provide a single, clear agreed 
upon test, published under the authority of the parliament. 328 
Conclusion 
Homicide cannot be justified upon any ground unless it was essential to secure an equal 
interest of the defender. It is not permissible to commit homicide in private defence 
when the object can be achieved by any peaceful means including retreat or temporising 
the situation. However, retreat is merely one of the circumstances that should be 
considered with all others in deciding whether the defendant exceeded the reasonable 
limits. The victim of an unlawful assault is allowed to use reasonable force for private 
defence but reasonableness of the force should not be measured in jeweller's scale, 
rather application of an objective test would be more appropriate and sensible. 329 If he 
has caused death of the assailant, he should not be convicted of murder provided that 
the force was not unreasonably excessive in the circumstances. The moral culpability of 
a man who honestly believes it necessary to use lethal force in private defence is 
definitely much less than a man who commits homicide deliberately and in cold blood. 
Though the present English law on the subject is unsatisfactory, however, the proposed 
reforms suggesting reduction of murder into manslaughter where excessive force was 
applied by the defender are in conformity with the principles of justice. 
In the next chapter principles of Shari'ah regarding the right of private defence shall be 
discussed. In order to evaluate their value a comparison, where possible, with the 
corresponding principles of English law shall also be made. 
326 
Clause 55 and 59. 
327 Watson, Michael, 1997, op. cit. p. 1594. 
328 Law Com. No. 177,1989, op. cit. Para. 2.5 & 2.6 at p. 6. 
329 Smith, P., 1972, op. cit. p. 531. 
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Chapter-11 Right of Private Defence in Shari'ah 
11.1 Introduction 
The right of private defence has been recognised by the laws of all civilised societies for 
very long time. 1 Shari 'ah being stricter than secular laws in protecting interests of 
individuals recognises that under certain conditions an individual is entitled to defend 
his own interests and interests of others. Though the major aim of this chapter is to 
explore the nature of private defence in Shari'ah yet we'll see how does this right 
resemble with or differ from public defence? The criteria for using force in private 
defence shall also be ascertained. A comparison of Shari'ah's provisions on the subject 
with English law, and evolving the efficacy of both the systems will also be given due 
consideration. 
11.2 Legal Defences in Shari'ah 
Shari 'ah is more concerned with the duties of a person than his rights, by this way 
everyone gets all that for which he is entitled. It prohibits the believers to go astray and 
transgress the legally recognised rights of others. In the Holy Qur'an it has been 
enjoined, "Begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressor. ,2 To avoid aggression, 
and to show respect for rights of others, has been declared as the duty of every one. 
Every member of society is allowed to defend his rights against all kinds of unlawful 
aggression. Shari 'ah does not preach the idealistic doctrine of the other cheek; instead, 
it prefers private defence tempered with compassion. 3 It affords protection and 
guarantees that the rights of individual to life, liberty and property shall not be abridged 
without the due process of law. Violation of right to life, property and chastity has been 
expressly declared unlawful. 4 Right of private defence is an exception to the general 
principle of prevention of use of force by an individual to protect his own interests. ' It is 
an exception to another well known rule of laws of all the civilised societies that no one 
can be the judge of his own cause. 6 
11.2.1 Public and Private Defence 
In Shari'ah, defence of legally protected rights has been divided into two kinds. 7 The 
first kind, named as right of public defence is meant to defend the moral, social and 
1 Bhansi, Ahmad Fathi, Al-Masoolia-al-Jinaya (Dar AI-Sharq, Beirut, Lebanon, 1984) p. 194. 
2 Al-Qur'an 2: 190. 
' Ahmad, Khurshid, Islam: Its Meaning and Message (Islamic Council of Europe, London, 1976) p. 106. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, Sunan ibn Majah (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. 11. p. 1016. 
Al-Toori, Muhammad bin Hussain bin Ali, Takmila Al-Beher Al-Raiq Sharah Kanaz al-Daqaiq 
(Maktaba Majidia, Quetta, Pakistan)Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
Qazi Zada Afandi, Takmila Fateh Al-Qadeer (Al-Maktaba al-Rasheedia, Quetta, Pakistan) Vol. IX, p. 166. 
6 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, Al-Difah al-Shar'hifi Fiqh al-Islami (Alam al-Ktub, Cairo, 1983) p. 1 14. 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, Al-Tashrih al-jinai al-Islami (Research Publishing, Beirut, 1997) Vol. 1, p. 472. 
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legal values of an Islamic society by inviting people to do good and forbid from 
committing evil. The right is so important that it may be declared as the foundation of 
all the revealed religions. Prevention of crime and propagation of goodness in society is 
the object, all the Prophets were deputed to achieve. If its knowledge is forgotten and its 
practice is given up, the very object of prophet-hood is totally defeated; its absence from 
society will lead to degeneration and disintegration of conscience, indolence and 
dullness of mind, destitution of morality, breaking up of human relationships, 
flourishing of corruption, deterioration and diminution of civilisation, destruction of 
property, damage to human life and declination of the society. 
8 
Taking into account importance of the defence it has not been left to the discretion of 
individual either to stand for it or leave it; everyone is bound to discharge his duty to his 
capacity for the promotion of peace and stability in the society. 9A failure to discharge 
the duty has been linked with the torment of Allah. 10 However, Muslim jurists have 
imposed certain conditions for the exercise of this right. Among these conditions are, 
that there should be a conduct prohibited by Shari 'ah, defender should prevent it during 
its continuation; anything done after its completion would be treated as punishment, 
which is the exclusive right of public authorities. The prohibited conduct should have 
been adopted publicly, for the defender is not allowed to inquire into the private affairs 
of individuals and finally he should not use more force than required for prevention. 
" 
This kind of defence is equivalent to the prevention of crime in English law but it is 
more comprehensive and has a much wider scope. It provides a sound base for 
elimination of crime and promoting peace and stability. On one hand it includes 
propagation of goodness in society and on the other its provisions extend beyond the 
prevention of crime to the suppression of moral sins. It falls with in the peculiar 
characteristics of Shari 'ah that it not only protects the rights of individuals, rather it also 
emphasises safeguarding the collective moral standards and values of society. 
Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 85. 
8 Al-Ghazali, Al-Imam Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad, Ahya Uloom lid din (Maktaba Mustafa 
al-Babi al-Halbi, Egypt, 1939) Vol. II, p. 302 
9 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 493. 
10 Al-Novi, Zakariya Yahya ud din bin Sharf, Riyadh A1-Salheen (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut, 1993) Vol. 1, p. 98. 
" Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, pp. 501-5. 
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The other kind, termed as private defence, is. the right of a person to defend his body, 
property, chastity of a woman amongst his relatives or the same interests of any other 
person, against any unlawful assault, by use of reasonable force. 12 The technical word 
used by the Muslim jurists for the right of private defence is "Dafeh Al-Saa'il" or 
warding off the assailant. The word Al-Saa'il in Arabic is simultaneously used in two 
different meanings. First one stands for the aggression caused by a person, 13 in this 
sense it has been defined as an aggression on an innocent person without any 
justification. 14 The second meaning of the word denotes the assailant himself. 15 In this 
sense it stands for a transgressor without any authority or justification. 
16 It makes no 
difference whether we mean by the word AI-Saa'il the aggressor himself or the act of 
aggression, in both the situations the defender is entitled to ward off the evil. Private 
defence is not restricted only to the assault of death or bodily injury rather it extends to 
any act affecting physical integrity and freedom of a person, 17 like kidnapping, 
abduction and unlawful detention or any other offence affecting human body. In this 
regard the principles of Shari 'ah are compatible with the criminal statutes of certain 
countries. 
' 8 
11.2.2 Distinction between Public and Private Defence 
In some situations, both the defences overlap because major aim of the both is to 
prevent the violation of rights of someone, a victim while warding off an evil is 
preventing the violation of his rights. 19 Nonetheless, both of them can be distinguished 
on the ground that right of private defence is exercised to repel an unlawful assault 
against body, property, or chastity, whereas right of public defence can be exercised 
against the violations of the general commandments and prohibitions of Shari'ah. 20 It 
can be said that in the cases of public defence it is the violation of right of Allah or the 
12 Ibid. p. 473. 
Ibn Qadama, AI-Mughni (Maktaba al-Riyadh al-Haditha, AI-Riyadh) Vol. VIII, p. 332. 
Al-Rammali, Nihayat al-Mohlaj (2"a ed. Dar Ahya al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut, 1992) Vol. VII, p. 239. 
Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 158. 
13 Ibn Manzur, Lissan Al-Arab (Dar Sader, Beirut, 1955) Vol. XI, p. 387. 
Ibn Faras, Afu; jam Maqayis Al-Lugha (Al-Dar Al-Islamia, Ghadeer, 1990) Vol. 11, p. 322. 
Al-Johri, Al-Sihhah Taj Al-Lugha wa Sihhah Al-Arbia (Dar Al-Kutb Al-Ilmia, Beirut, 1999)Vol. IV, p. 572. 
14 Al-Dimyati, Ibn Arif Billah, Aana-al-Talbeen (Dar Ahya al-Taras Al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 171. 
13 Ibn Manzur, 1955, op. cit. Vol. XI, p. 387. 
Ibn Faras, Muýam Maqayis Al-Lugha (Al-Dar Al-Islamia, Ghadeer, 1990) Vol. 11, p. 322. 
Al-Johri, 1999, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 572. 
'' Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ud din, Al-Siyassa al-Shariah (Dar al-Ktub al-Arabi Egypt, 1969) p. 87. 
Al-Asmi, Abdul Rehman, Majmooh-al-Fatawa (Idarah Masah Al-Askeria, Cairo) Vol. XXVIII, p. 319. 
r Al-Shathi, Al-Umm (Dar Al-Tabahat Al-Muneeria, Bolak, Egypt, 1326 A. H) Vol. VI, p. 27. 
18 Right of Private Defence, Indian Penal Code and Pakistan Penal Code Sections 96-105. 
19 Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ud din, 1969, op. cit. p. 87. 
20 Ibid. 
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society, whereas in private defence rights of individuals are violated. Another 
distinction may be that in cases of private defence there is always an unlawful assault 
and the assailed acts under the command of Shari 'ah and the natural instinct, whereas, 
in cases of public defence a person acts only under the command of Shari 'ah. 
The distinction may further be clarified by the example of a person who defends his 
own body against an unlawful assault, he exercises his right of private defence, however 
if he prevents someone to commit suicide, it will be in the public defence because there 
is no assailant in this particular case. 
21 Similarly, in a case where a woman defends an 
assault to rape her, she is acting in private defence but if the unlawful intercourse was 
with the consent of woman, prevention of this act will fall in the purview of public 
defence. It looks that, in Shari'ah, unlike English law, there is no ambiguity regarding 
the province of right of private defence and the prevention of crime. 
11.2.3 Private Defence against Minor and Insane 
As mentioned earlier right of private defence is available against any unlawful assault 
endangering life, property, or chastity of a person. Is the same right available against the 
conduct of persons who are incapable of committing crimes? According to Hanfite, 
except Abu Yousaf, it is a requirement for exercise of right of private defence that the 
assailant must be criminally liable and the act must be an offence punishable by law. 
However, if the assailed kills a minor or insane in the exercise of right of private 
defence, he shall not be liable to Qisas rather his liability is reduced to pay Diyal. 22 The 
reason being that the acts of a minor or insane are not offences because of their 
incompetence; the assailed was acting under necessity to defend his right, he is liable to 
pay damages because necessity does not affect the civil liability. 
23 The situation is akin 
to the case where a person is attacked by an animal and in order to save his life he killed 
it; he will be liable to pay value of the animal. 24 
Abu Yousaf, amongst the Hanftte jurists, agreed with the majority opinion that though it 
is necessary that the act of the assailant should be an offence but it is not essential that 
21 Ibid. 
22 Al-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
Nizarn, Shaikh &a Group of Scholars, Fatawa Alamgiri (Matba Almajidi, Kanpur, India)Vol. IV, p. 177. 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 476. 
Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) p. 182. 
23 Al-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
Nizam, Shaikh &a Group of Scholars, op. cit. F. N. 22. Vol. IV, p. 177. 
24 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 485. 
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he himself should also be criminally liable. According to them, the act of a minor and 
insane fulfils all the requirements of an offence. However, they are exempted from 
criminal liability on account of their lack of rational understanding of the fact. 
25 By 
initiating an unlawful assault and endangering the life of an innocent man they lose the 
right of sanctity to their own life. An unlawful assault entails a duty to defend; no 
liability, civil or criminal, accrues in discharging that duty. 
26 They opined that for the 
exercise of right of private defence, there is no difference between assaults of a legally 
competent person and that of a minor or insane. 
27 In this particular situation they take 
into account the unlawful assault and the danger caused by it rather than its source. 
The fundamental difference between the opinions is that according to the opinion of 
Hanfite if the assailant was a minor or insane and the victim of the assault caused his 
death, while defending, he is liable to pay Diyat because their act was not an offence 
and neither of them was criminally liable. In this condition, the defender has not 
exercised right of private defence but he was acting under necessity, so his act is not 
justified rather excused, which entails a civil liability to pay damages. However, 
according to the opinion of majority, if a man, while exercising his right of private 
defence causes death of an animal, minor, or insane he will incur no liability at all 
neither criminal nor civil. 28 
While dealing with the right of private defence, the criminal laws of almost all the 
civilised societies separately and expressly provide that a person can exercise this right 
against a minor or insane in the same manner as against a legally competent person. Had 
there been no difference between the two situations there would have been no need to 
mention it separately. The difference has been clarified by the opinion of Hanfite that if 
25 Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, Mughni AI-Mohtaj (Maktaba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt, 1958) Vol. IV, p. 194. 
Ibn Farhoon, Tabsarat al-Hukkam (Matba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt, 1958) Vol. 11., p. 356. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 329. 
AI-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. Vlll, p. 302. 
Nizam, Shaikh &a Group of Scholars, op. cit. F. N. 22. Vol. IV, p. 177. 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 476. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Al-Shaqeti, Ahmad bin Mukhtar, Mawahib al-Jalil (Idara Ahya al-Tarasal-Islami, Qatar, 1987)Vol. Vl, p. 323. 
Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 356. 
AI-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 172. 
Al-Sherazi, Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Bin All, Al-Mohazzib (Matbah Isa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt) Vol. 11, p. 225. 
AI-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, Al-Ignah (Dar Al-Marfa Litabbah wa Al-Nasher, Beirut, 1979)Vol. 11, p. 199. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 329. 
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the defender, while exercising his right of private defence, causes death of a minor or 
insane he shall be liable to pay Diyat, whereas the same result, if achieved against a 
legally competent person shall not entail any liability. 
11.3 Provisions Related to the Right of Private Defence in Shari'ah 
The right has been bestowed by the Holy Qur'an, "And one who attacketh you, attack 
him in like manner as he attacked you. "29 The verse not only proves the existence of 
right of private defence rather it also sets its boundaries. It imposes a condition on the 
exercise of such a right that the means applied and the manners adopted for the defence 
must correspond with that of the aggression. The verse has been considered by the 
Muslim jurists as the base of private defence in all forms of unlawful assaults and 
entitles the victim to ward it off whenever he is subject to it. 30 Another verse states that, 
"the guerdon of an ill-deed is an ill the like thereof. "31 The verse implies that the force 
applied for the defence must be necessary, reasonable, and proportional to the harm 
intended by the aggressor. In any case the defender is not allowed to go beyond the 
limits of necessity. 32 His intention must be to give the assailant his due and not to 
revenge or punish him. There are a number of other verses enjoining upon the Muslims 
to co-operate in good deeds, to combat mischievous, and to suppress the evil. 
A number of traditions of the Holy Prophet, some of them have been discussed in 4.2, 
conform to the same effect. Y'ala bin Omayya reported that one of his servants was 
involved in a brawl with a man. One of them took the hand of other in his mouth and bit 
it. The latter drew his hand with force, extracting two of his teeth. The victim raised the 
matter to the Holy Prophet, who declared that the man was justified in drawing his hand, 
with force, from the mouth of the complainant. Addressing the complainant the Holy 
Prophet said, "Do you think that he should have left his hand in your mouth to be bitten 
by you like a camel. "33 The tradition proves that a man is entitled to cause injury to 
other in order to save himself from an unlawful harm. 
A saying of the Holy Prophet narrates, "Help your brother whether he is an aggressor or 
a victim. He was asked, "To help the victim is understandable but how to help the 
29 A1-Qur'an 2: 194. 
30 Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 23. 
31 AI-Qur'an 42: 40 
32 Raza, Muhammad Rashid, Tafseer Al-Minar (4`h ed., Dar Al-Minar, Egypt, 1954) Vol. II, p. 213. 
33 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, Saih al-Bukhari (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 48. 
Muslim bin Hijjaj, Saih Muslim (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981). Vol. II, p. 1300. 
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wrongdoer? " "Prevent him from committing the wrong. " He replied. 34 It suggests that 
in all the cases of private defence, the right is not restricted to one's self only but every 
one is allowed to defend others also. 35 Anyone who sees a wrong being committed 
against others is allowed to help the victim and prevent the wrong doer from causing 
harm and he will be acting in private defence. 36 Another tradition describing the 
characteristics of believers states that the believers are those who co-operate with each 
other in combating the mischievous. 37 In addition, helping the weak by physical force 
against the wrongdoer has been declared as charity. 38 These provisions might be 
particularly beneficial to the weak and the disadvantaged members of society. 
Beside the provisions in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, there is a maxim in Shari'ah 
saying "Necessity renders prohibited permissible. "39 In normal circumstance it is strictly 
prohibited to cause harm to any body but the necessity of defence permits it to defend 
one's rights. The maxim above is governed by another maxim which states that the 
necessity should be kept with in its boundaries. 40 It means, where a person is allowed to 
violate the general rules under the doctrine of necessity, he is bound to remain within 
the minimum possible limits. The combined effect of the two maxims leads to the 
conclusion that a man is allowed to exercise right of private defence and will incur no 
criminal liability provided that he does not use more force than necessary for defence. 
Though the necessity and private defence are similar as far as the call of emergency is 
concerned, yet both of them differ in the origin of the danger, in the cases of private 
defence the eminent danger arises out the unlawful acts of a human being, whereas, in 
predominant cases of necessity the danger arises out of some natural cause. 41 An 
opinion in Shari 'ah states that the base for the private defence is duress rather than 
necessity, the defender has been coerced to commit an unlawful act. 42 However, this 
point of view is questionable because under duress the accused was left without any 
34 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 98. 
35 Ibn Qadama, Al-Afughni (Maktaba Al-Mustafa Al-babi Al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. VIII, p. 332. 
36 Al-Qalubi, Hashyat al-Qalubi ala Sharah Minhaj (3rd ed., Maktaba Al-halbi, Egypt, 1956)Vol. IV, p. 207. 
Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 356. 
37 Abu Daoud, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 111, p. 452. 
3s Ahmad bin Hanbal, Afasnad Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal (Cagri Yayinlari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. V, p. 154. 
39 Ibn Nujaym, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair (Idara Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi)Vol. 1, p. 118. 
40 Ibid. p. 119. 
41 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 119. 
42 Al-Baberty, Akmal ud din Muhammad bin Mehmood, Sharh A1-Ina'yah ala AL-Hidiya (Published at the foot 
margin of Takmila Fateh Al-Qadeer) (I51 ed., Al-Matbah al-Kubra Al-Ameeria, 1418 AH) p. 269. 
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option to do except the act coerced, whereas in the cases of private defence it is a 
condition the defender should chose the most appropriate means of defence. Similarly, a 
person shall be considered under duress if there was a threat to cause grievous bodily 
harm, whereas in the cases of private defence the defender is allowed to ward off any 
evil with a reasonable force. 
In order to ensure the safety of life, chastity and property of every one Shari 'ah strictly 
prohibits the violation of protected rights. of any member of society. 43 To achieve the 
object, violation of the sanctity of right to life of an assailant is permissible. The 
assailant loses his right to sanctity of life and integrity of body by causing an unlawful 
assault and endangering the legally protected interests of others. Any member of society, 
if causes death of the assailant while defending such protected interests, shall not be 
liable for any offence provided he has not breached the limits of his necessity. 44 As 
discussed in 4.7.2 the basic aim of all the revealed religions is to protect and preserve 
five fundamental interests of man. Shari 'ah permits an individual to defend them in the 
cases where state fails or is unable to protect due to emergency. It implies that Shari 'ah 
recognised right of private defence for fifteen hundred years as compared to English 
criminal law where it finds its place in the present form only since the 19th century when 
the punishment of forfeiture, for justifiable homicide, was abolished in 1870. 
11.3.1 Defence of Body and Shari'ah 
Life is indisputably the greatest possession of a man. It is common sense that he should 
be allowed to defend this possession within reasonable limits. In Shari 'ah defence of 
body is such a sacred duty that the Holy Prophet said, "Anyone if attacked unlawfully 
and killed while defending is a martyr. "45 Preservation of life is such an important duty 
that in order to preserve his life a man is permitted to consume prohibited commodities 
in the condition of dire necessity, without incurring any criminal liability. 6 Likewise, if 
he is under an apprehension of death or serious bodily injury he is permitted to use 
reasonable means to preserve his life from unlawful assault of the offender. 
" Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 141. 
44 Al-1'oori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
Qazi Zada Afandi, op. cit. F. N. S. Vol. IX, p. 166. 
AI-Tahavi, Nashyat Al-Tahatil Ala Dur Al-Mukhtar (Al-Matabah AI-Ameeria, Boulak, Egypt, 1382 
A. II. ) Vol. IV, p. 265. 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 861. 
Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 48. 
AI-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, SunanAl-Nissai (Cagri YayinIari, Turkey, 1981) Vol. IV, p. 61. 
46 Al-Quran 2: 173. 
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Moreover, in Shari 'ah, it is unlawful for a man to commit suicide. 47lt is more logical 
that he should not allow someone else to cause his death. He is allowed to save his life 
and repel the attack by a reasonable force. This right of defence can extend to cause 
death of the assailant if survival of defender is at stake. It is interesting to mention here 
that though the English criminal law has abolished the offence of suicide however, it is 
contended that a man is not entitled to do with his body as he wants because his self 
destruction might affect well being of his family and relatives. 
48 
11.3.1.1 Defence of Body: Is it Merely a Right or an Obligation? 
As discussed above Shari 'ah recognises right of private defence like the laws of all 
civilised legal systems of the contemporary world. Muslim jurists agreed that it is 
lawful for a person to use reasonable force for private defence. However, they differ as 
to the nature of the defence, whether it is a duty that must be discharged reasonably or 
merely a right that may or may not be exercised? The question of right or duty has been 
determined by taking into account the nature of interest to be defended, whether it is life, 
chastity, or property of the defender. There 
is a difference of opinion on the question 
whether defence of a particular interest is merely a right or duty of the defender, failure 
to which may entail some liability, if not in this world in the Hereafter. 
According to Hanfite, in a preferable opinion of Shafite and Malkite, it is duty of the 
victim of deadly assault to defend his body. 
49 The opinion is supported by the verse of 
The Holy Qur'an, "And be not cast by your own hands to ruin; "50 If a person does not 
defend himself against the unlawful aggression of the assailant he casts him self to the 
ruin and hence violates the command of Allah. In another verse it has been enjoined 
upon the Muslims, "And fight them until persecution is no more. "51 It has been declared 
the duty of every believer to fight mischievous to put an end to the harassment. One 
who fails may be guilty of breach of 
duty. 
47 Al-Qur'an 2: 195. 
S8 Ormerod, David, "Consent and the Offences Against the Person: Law Commission Consultation Paper 
No. 134" [ 1994] 57 MLR 928 at pp. 938-39. 
'9 Ibn Abdeen, Ilashia Ibn Abdeen (Maktaba Majdia, Quetta, Pakistan, 1399 A. H) Vol. V, p. 351. 
Al-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
AI-Dasooqi, Shamas al din Muhammad Arafa, Hashyat Al-Dasooqi Ala Sharah al-Kabir (Dar al Ahya 
Al Kutab al Arabia Isa al-Babi al-Halbi, Egypt) Vol. IV, p. 357. 
AI-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. Vlll, p. 24. 
Alish, Shaikh M, Sharah Manah al-Jalil ala Mukhtasar Khalil (Dar al-Baz, Makkah) Vol. IV, p. 562. 
so Al-Qur'an 2: 195. 
Al-Qur'an 8: 39 
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Defence of body is such an important duty that it has been linked with martyrdom, 52 the 
status acquired by a Muslim if killed while defending his religion or his country. It is 
admitted that defence of religion and country at the time of necessity is the duty of 
everyone; likewise it is a duty to defend his body. Another tradition of the Holy Prophet 
narrates, "One who assaulted a. man with a weapon, intending to kill him, should be 
killed. "53 The tradition not only emphasises the obligatory nature of the right of defence 
of body rather it proves another important recognised principle of civilised criminal 
laws, that the victim is not liable to wait for the attack of the offender, he is allowed to 
use pre-emptive force to save his life.. 
There is a legal maxim in Shari'ah stating that repulsion of a mischief is the duty. 54 The 
act of offender is truly a mischief and the victim is under a duty to avoid it by all the 
possible means. The evidences above suggest that every man is under a duty to defend 
his body and not to allow anyone to take his life or cause injury to him. The concept of 
duty has been attached to the defence of body to show its symbolic value. Shari 'ah 
gives such an importance to human life that it urges man to protect it from any unlawful 
aggression at all costs by using all possible means within his power. 
According to preferable Hanblite opinion which concurs with an opinion of Malkite and 
Shafite, it is not a duty rather merely a legal right to defend one's body. 55 The opinion is 
supported by the saying of the Holy Prophet "Remain in your homes, and when you see 
the shining of swords cover up your faces. "56 It means, where a person is in peril of his 
life he is liable to avoid the situation rather to face it. There is another tradition to the 
same effect, "Be murdered servant of Allah and not the murderer servant. " 
57 The 
tradition prefers that man be killed rather to kill. However, the traditions have been cited 
in the wrong context. Had it been the principle there would have been no room for the 
right of private defence. The traditions are more an evidence to prohibit unlawful killing 
52 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 861. 
Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 48. 
AI-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 61. 
53 A1-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 117. 
54 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 39, Vol. 1, p. 118. 
Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah Wa Al-Nazair (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmia, Beirut, 1979) p. 83. 
55 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 329. 
56 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1309. 
Abu Daoud, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV., p. 459. 
37 Ahmad bin Hanbal, 1981, op. cit. Vol. V, pp. I 10 & 292. 
Al-Sana'ni, Subal Al-Salam (2"d ed., Maktaba Mustafa Al-babi, Egypt, 1950) Vol. IV, pp. 40-41. 
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of an innocent during mayhem and mischief rather to prevent the use of reasonable 
force in private defence. 58 They enjoin upon the Muslims not to join mischievous at the 
time of chaos and mischief. 
The opinion is also supported by the evidence that Othman (the third rightly guided 
caliph) did not defend the attack of rebels when they killed him, although he knew that 
they were determined to take his life and he possessed the power to defend and if he 
chose he could have fought them. 59 The argument can be rebutted on the ground that 
Othman himself said that he does not like bloodshed in the Holy city of the Prophet. 
The rebels wanted just to take his life and in consideration of avoiding the violation of 
sanctity of the holy city and further spread of mischief in the community, he denied to 
use force against them. 60 
Some of the Hanblite jurists differentiate between the circumstances of the exercise of 
such a right. According to them defence of body is merely a right in the mayhem and 
chaos, whereas it is a duty in normal conditions. 61 The reason for the differentiation 
might be that in the circumstances of disorder and chaos, if it is declared as a duty, it 
may lead to further worsen the situation. The defence in such a condition has been left 
at the discretion of the victim of the unlawful assault and if he refrains to exercise his 
right he shall not be considered to cast himself to ruin by himself. 
62 
The effect of the differentiation leads to a conclusion that if a person does not exercise 
his right of private defence, he will be a sinner, owing to his breach of duty, in the 
opinion of those who consider private defence as a duty. Whereas, according to second 
opinion an abstinence to exercise right of private defence does not entail any liability or 
censure. 63 However, both the opinions may be combined by declaring defence of body 
as a duty in the normal circumstances, whereas it will be only a right in the times of 
chaos and mayhem, where the defence may lead to further mischief. 
58 Al-Sana'ni, 1950, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 40-41. 
Al-Bahooti, Kasshaf al-Qannah (Maktaba Al-Nasar al-Hadisa, Riyadh) Vol. VI, p. 155. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 331. 
59 Al-Sana'ni, 1950, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 40-41. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 331. 
60 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 302. 
61 Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 155. 
A1-Fatoohi, Taqi-ud-din Muhammad, Muntahi Al-Iradat (Alam al-Kutab, Beirut) Vol. 11, p. 387. 
62 Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 356. 
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Taking into account the provisions of Shari'ah regarding protection of life, it becomes 
evident that, the first opinion, declaring defence of body as a duty is preferable. Logic 
also leads to the conclusion that private defence may be treated as a duty. If it is 
admitted that defence of body is merely a right then declaring commission of suicide as 
an offence will make no sense. The major difference between English law and Shari'ah 
is that the former declares defence of body as a right, depending upon the discretion of 
the person. If he is not willing to preserve his life no one can compel him to do so 
whereas, the latter considers it a duty, the failure to discharge entails liability. 
64 it 
suggests that Shari 'ah is a step ahead in this regard and stresses more on the protection 
and preservation of human life. 
11.3.2 Defence of Property in Shari'ah 
Shari'ah recognises sanctity of private property and belongings of individuals. Taking 
property of any other by unlawful means has been strictly prohibited. The Holy Qur'an 
enjoins, "0 you who believe! Eat up not your property among your selves unjustly 
except it be a trade by mutual consent. "65 Very severe punishments, in the case of theft 
and highway robbery, have been provided for the violation of right of possession. 
Defence of property is not restricted to the personal property; a man is liable to defend 
the property of others in the same manner as his own because he owes a duty to other 
fellow men to protect their rights. 66 To assist other people in defending their property is 
the duty of every citizen because if there was no such co-operation the wrong doer 
would have taken the property of everyone without any manifest problem. 
Under Islamic principles of social morality no one is entitled to enter the house of others 
without permission. The Holy Qur'an admonishes believers, "Enter not houses other 
than your own until you have asked permission and saluted those in them. "67 The verse 
prevents all types of unlawful trespasses into or on the property of another. The privacy 
of the person has also been protected. The Holy Prophet said, "If any one (deliberately) 
peeps in to your house and you pelt him with a stone and injure his eye, no guilt will be 
63 Al-Aamadi, Al-Ahkam Fi Usul al-Ahkam (Dar Al-Hadith, Egypt) Vol. 1, p. 138. 
64 Khallaf, HmUsul al-Fiqh (8`h ed. Dar Al-Ilm Lil Taba Wa Al-Nasher, Kuwait, 1956) p. 105. A person 
entitled for a right has an option either to exercise or relinquish it, whereas a person under a duty does 
not have such an option and if he fails to discharge his duty it will be a sin for him. (AI-Ghazali, Al- 
Mustasfa min Ilm Al-Usul (Dar al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. I, p. 76) 
65 Al-Qur'an 4: 29. 
66 Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 196. 
67 Al-Qur'an 24: 27 
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on you. " 68 The provisions guarantee the peaceful possession and uninterrupted 
enjoyment of the private property. 
Shari'ah allows defence of property against any offence affecting it or disturbing its 
peaceful possession. The defender is bound to use the most appropriate means, under 
the circumstances, and reasonable force for defence. However, if it is not possible to 
defend property without causing death of the assailant, like if the assailant resists and 
causes a danger to the life of the defender, the defender can kill him. 
69 This opinion 
mixes up both the rights i. e. defence of body and property, in this particular situation 
where the assailant offers a resistance and causes apprehension of danger to the body of 
the defender, right of defence of property merges in to the right of defence of body and 
now the defender is defending his body and not property. English criminal law, as 
discussed in 10.10.2, adopted the same view and allowed causing death of the assailant 
in defence of property where there is a direct risk to human life. However, some Muslim 
jurists do not differentiate between the defence of body, chastity of woman, and 
property, if the only way to defend the interest at stake is to cause death of the assailant; 
the assailed is allowed to cause it. 70 Nevertheless, in all the cases of defence the 
defender is liable to use non fatal means before application of deadly force. 
71 
11.3.2.1 Defence of Property: Is it a Right or a Duty? 
Like defence of body, defence of property has been considered such an important right 
that while defending it if someone is killed by the assailant he will embrace 
martyrdom. 72 However, there is a great deal of differences among the Muslim jurists on 
the question whether defence of property is merely a right or a duty? According to 
Han file and Hanblite, the victim has a right to defend his property without taking into 
account its monetary value and unlike defence of body it is not a duty. 
73 They support 
68 Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 40. 
Al-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 61. 
69 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 211. 
Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 185-86. 
70 AI-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 27. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 155. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 332. 
71 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 329. 
72 Ibn Majah, Muhammad bin Yazid, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 861. 
Al-Bukhari, Muhammad bin Ismail, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 48. 
AI-Nissai, Ahmed bin Shoaib, 1981, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 61. 
Muslim bin Hijjaj, 1981, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 1300. 
73 Ibn Abdeen, 1399 A. H., op. cit. Vol. V, p. 482. 
Ibn Nujaym, Al-Beher Al-Raiq (Al-Maktaba al Majidia, Quetta) Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 156. 
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their opinion by a logical argument that it is not permissible for a person to allow 
someone to kill him or to indulge in unlawful sexual intercourse with him. A wilful 
failure to defend body or chastity will result in the violation of command, whereas in 
the case of property the owner has an absolute right to allow someone to take it. If he 
has a right to gift it or deliver it, he can withdraw his right to defend it. If the victim 
desires to defend, he can, however an abstention to defend will not lead to breach of any 
legal duty. It is opined that avoiding defence of property to save life of the assailant is 
batter than to cause his death or injure him. 74 The opinion is a manifestation of a general 
principle that human life and safety should always take priority over property. 
According to another opinion of Hanblite jurists, the assailed is under a duty to defend 
property where he believes that his defensive acts would not lead to destruction of life 
or limbs of the offender. 75 The opinion imposes a restriction that the defender while 
using force in defence of property is allowed to use only such force that should not 
cause any serious harm to the assailant. The concept of private defence in English law is 
very near to this opinion which emphasises on measure of force in private defence to the 
nicety. However, it is obvious that a condition to use jeweller's scale to measure the 
force required for defence is an implied denial of the right. 
Shafrte dealt with the question from two different perspectives. Firstly, they take into 
account the person of the assailant. According to an opinion in the school if the assailant 
was a public servant then the defence of property does not reach the height of a duty, 
however, in the case of assault by a common man defence of property is an absolute 
duty. 76 It will be a duty to defend the property, subject of unlawful assault, provided that 
it does not lead the defender to unnecessary fatigue, undue fiscal loss, or injure the 
social status of the defender. If he can defend without the apprehension of any of the 
above, it will be a breach of duty on his part to abstain. 77 
Secondly they take into account the nature of the property to be defended. According to 
the majority opinion within the school, defence of property is a duty if it is livestock or 
any right of third party is attached to it. In all other cases the defence will be merely a 
74 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 331. 
75 Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 156. 
76 Al-Qalubi, 1956, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 206. 
77 Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 196. 
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right as is the opinion of Hanfite and Hanblite schools. 78 The opinion is based upon the 
argument that it is the obligation of the owner to save the life of animals and the 
protection of rights of third party in the capacity of a bailee, mortgagee, or trustee. The 
opinion also suggests that it is the lawful possession of the property and not merely the 
ownership that has been given legal protection. 
However, they prohibit defending property in two exceptional conditions. 79 Firstly, if 
the assailant is in dire necessity e. g. where he apprehends death due to starvation and 
intends to take the edibles of another man. The owner has no right to defend provided 
that he was not also in the same condition of necessity. The reason for the opinion might 
be preference of human life over property. Secondly, if the assailant was under duress to 
destroy the property, the owner should sacrifice his property to save the life of the 
person coerced. In this particular condition both of them, the coerced and the owner of 
the property, are allowed to proceed against the person responsible for coercion. 
Malkite have a different approach to the problem. According to them defence of 
property will be a duty if its dispossession or destruction leads to extraordinary hardship 
or apprehension of death. 80 If the victim apprehended his own death or death of any of 
his kin due to the destruction of property or any severe damage was imminent as a result 
of such destruction or taking, it is his duty to defend . 
S1 For example, if a person is 
travelling in a desert and has very scarce quantities of food and water and someone 
assaults to dispossess him of this water and food. He is under a duty to defend because 
unavailability of food and water may endanger his life. This situation of defence of 
property is akin to the defence of body because a failure to defend will lead to the death 
of the assailed and there is no difference of opinion as to obligation to defend body. 
The opinion, that the defence of property is a duty, is supported by the saying of the 
Holy Prophet "Fight for your property. " 82 The tradition confers a duty to defend 
78 Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 24. 
Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 195. 
79 Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 196. 
80 Al-Dasooqi, op. cit. F. N. 49. Vol. IV, p. 357. 
Al-Khirshi, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Ali, A1-Khirshi Ala Mukhlasar Syedi Khail 
(Dar Al-Fiker Liltabah wa Al-nasher, Beirut) Vol. VIII, p. 12. 
Al-Dasooqi, op. cit. F. N. 49. Vol. IV, p. 357. 
82 Al-Shoukani, Muhammad bin All, Neil A1-Aoutar (Dar Al-Ktub al-llmia, Beirut, 1999) Vol. V, p. 367. 
Al-Sana'ni, 1950, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 40 
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property without any reference to its value or imposing any other condition for the 
exercise of right. It also indicates that the defence is allowed against any actual or 
threatened destruction, damage, unlawful taking, dispossession or any other offence 
against property. 83 
A comparison of the opinions reveals that the general rule regarding defence of property 
is that it is absolute right of the victim of unlawful assault to defend his property, 
however this right is converted into a duty where an abstinence to defence leads to 
unnecessary hardship or endangers the life of the assailed. The victim is bound to use 
reasonable force in the defence of property and if he believes that the defence is not 
possible without causing death of the assailant, he is entitled to cause his death. 84 
11.3.3 Defence of Chastity of a Woman in Shari'ah 
There is consensus of opinion of Muslim jurists that every one is under a duty to defend 
chastity of his family or the family of any other person. 85 It can not be allowed, in any 
case, to commit fornication, adultery or other indecent sexual acts. In this case if the 
defence is not possible without causing death of the assailant, it is allowed to cause his 
death. 86 Similarly, if someone threatens to commit adultery or fornication with 
someone's wife or daughter or to satisfy unnatural lust with his son, it becomes his duty 
to defend. In this particular condition he is acting to prevent the commission of a crime 
and defending his own right. 87 
If a man finds his wife in a compromising condition with a stranger he should use 
minimum possible force, if the offender is not prevented the defender is allowed to kill 
him and he will not be criminally liable. 88 It is pertinent to mention here that the Muslim 
jurists do not justify causing death merely on the ground that the deceased was in 
83 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 21 1. 
84 lbn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, pp. 185-86. 
lbn A1-Hamam, Al-Feth Al Qadeer (Dar Ahya al-Taras al-Arabi, Beirut) Vol. IV, p. 276. 
lbn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 332. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 155. 
Al-Mahalla, Jalal ud din Muhammad bib Ahmad, Sharah Al-Mahalla Ala Minhaj Al-Talbeen 
(published at the foot margin of Hashyat al Qalubi) (Maktab Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt, 1956) 
Vol. IV, p. 206. 
Al-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 27. 
85 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 302. 
86 AI-Fatoohi, Taqi-ud-din Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. Vol. 11, p. 493. 
Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 302. 
87 Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 154. 
Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 194. 
Al-Dasooqi, op. cit. F. N. 49. Vol. IV, p. 357. 
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seclusion with a woman unless the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse was 
proved. 89 They suggest that in all the cases of defence of chastity the defender is bound 
to use the lowest possible degree of force and avoid causing death. 
90 
Shafite say that a man is under a duty to defend the chastity of a woman provided that 
he is not under an apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm at the hands of the 
offender i. e. if the offender is equipped with a deadly weapon and there are chances that 
he may cause death of the defender, it will be merely a right and not a duty to defend. It 
depends upon the choice of the defender to take the risk of his life and defend or to bear 
the situation. Logic behind the opinion is that life is preferred over the chastity. 
91 
According to them the order of preference in defending the interests would be the body 
first, then chastity and property. 92 As far as the victim of rape is concerned, it is her duty 
to defend her chastity if she can. If she kills the assailant in the course of defence she is 
not liable at all. Consent for unlawful sexual intercourse is an offence and intentionally 
not defending is the best circumstantial evidence to prove consent. 
Hanblite, differentiate between the two conditions of unlawful sexual intercourse, 
whether it was being committed with the consent of the women or without her consent. 
If it was a non consensual act and she was killed, the defender shall be liable for Qisas. 
But if she was a consenting party to the unlawful sexual intercourse the defender shall 
not be liable for any punishment. 93 
English criminal law recognised the right of a man to defend the chastity of a woman. In 
this regard, some opinions of English jurists and legal historians have been discussed in 
section 10.2 along with some decided cases. 
94 Here is some further evidence from the 
88 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 331. 
89 Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 185. 
90 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. pp. 263-64. 
91 Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 195. 
92 Ibid. p. 194. 
93 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 332. {The view that a man who, finds his wife committing 
adultery, kills one or both of them is not liable for any punishment is based upon the conduct of Omar 
(the second rightly guided caliph). One day while he was taking lunch, a man came with a blood 
stained sword and joined him. He was followed by a group of people who accused him of murder of his 
wife and their friend. Omer asked him about the claim of the persons. The man replied that he found 
them indulged in adultery and killed them. The statement of accused was not rebutted by the 
complainants. Omar confirmed the act of the person by saying "If they repeat it, do the same. "(Ibn 
Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 332)} 
9' Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law (3`d ed., Methuen & Co., London, 1923) Vol. 11, p. 44. 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (15`h ed., A. Starhan, London, 1809) Vol. IV, p. 180. 
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writings of classical Common law jurists and decided cases to prove the fact. Until 1957 
a husband could kill both adulterous wife and her lover taken in the act of adultery 
under the influence of provocation. 95 The Homicide Act adhered to the principle that a 
defendant charged with murder could be provoked either by the things done or spoken 
or both together and whether this provocation was sufficient to make a reasonable man 
to do as he did was a question to be determined by the jury. 96 Before this enactment it 
was a rule of law that words could not constitute provocation. 97 Provocation may reduce 
a murder into manslaughter and a man may be provoked by finding another man raping 
his wife. 98 In Maddy's case99 and in R. v. Pearson) 00 it was held that the act of adultery 
causes such a serious kind of provocation which reduces murder into manslaughter. In 
R v. Milltitward, 101 it was declared that it would be sufficient provocation to reduce the 
charge to manslaughter, not only if there had been adultery, but even if the 
circumstances were such that the husband reasonably inferred that adultery had just 
taken place or was about to take place. The essence of this defence was passion leading 
to the loss of self-control and this would apply if the husband's inference from what he 
saw was subsequently found to be incorrect, provided that it was reasonably drawn. 
However, it was admitted that mere suspicion of adultery by a wife is not sufficient to 
reduce killing by husband from murder to manslaughter. Likewise, a confession by one 
spouse could not constitute sufficient provocation to justify a verdict of 
manslaughter. 102 
Some other cases of the 20th century, like Davies, 103 confirm the same principle that 
where a man finds his wife in the act of adultery and kills her under the provocation he 
is only guilty of manslaughter. It was also admitted that if a father witnesses a person in 
the act of committing an unnatural offence with his son and instantly kills him it will be 
manslaughter of lowest degree. 104 In 1978, a homicide committed by a 15 years old boy 
R. v. Wheeler [1967] 1 WLR. 153 1. 
9s Bresler, Fenton, Sex and the Law (Frederick Muller, London, 1988) p. 8. 
96 Homicide Act 1957, section 3. 
97 The law Commission, Partial defences to Murder, Consultation Paper No. 173,2003, Pam. 1.33. 
98 Halsbury's Law of England (4'h ed. Butterworths, London, 1990) Vol. XI (I) Para. 438-439pp. 336-37. 
Per Viscount Simon in Holmes v. DPP [1946] 2 All ER 124 at 127. 
99 Maddy's Case, (1671) l Ventr. 158., 2 Keb 829; 86 ER 108. 
100 R. v. Pearson (1835) 2Lewin 216; 168 ER 1133. 
101 R. v. Millward (1932) 23 Cr. App. Rep. 119. 
102 Holmms v. DPP [1946] 2 All ER 124 at 127. 
103 Davies [1975] QB 691; [1975] 1 All. ER 890. 
1°4 R. v. Fisher (1837) 8 Car. & P. 182; 173 ER 452. 
Robertson, A. J., The Laws of the Kings of England (Cambridge University Press, 1925) p. 269. 
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who had been buggered by the deceased was declared to be manslaughter. 
105 The rule 
that adultery can sufficiently provoke a person can further be supported by the fact that 
if the crying of a 17 days old baby can suffice for provocation to reduce murder into 
manslaughter, 106 will it not be more reasonable to allow the same defence to a person 
who finds his spouse in adultery? 
The above shows that English law was so strict in defending the chastity of a woman 
that murder was reduced into manslaughter where, in the opinion of a husband, the 
circumstances prove that the offence of adultery had taken place or is about to take 
place, 107 and it was considered to be the highest degree of provocation. 
108 A man 
provoked by seeing his wife indulged in adultery is acting either in the prevention of 
crime or defending his protected interests. It is worth mentioning here that though the 
sexual offences under English law are governed by the Sexual Offences Acts of 1956, 
1976, and 1993 but the enactment do not deal with the offence of adultery which 
suggests that adultery is still an offence to be dealt under the principles of Common law. 
These provisions are identical to the provisions of Shari'ah on the same point. However, 
the major difference is that if the unlawful sexual intercourse was being done by the 
mutual consent of both the parties, there is no right of private defence in English law. 
109 
Whereas, consent of the parties for unlawful sexual intercourse is of no importance in 
Shari'ah and in such cases if the defender causes death of both the parties he will not be 
liable. Further the dicta of Milltivard suggest that a man will be excused of murder if in 
his opinion the act of adultery has taken place but in Shari 'ah the act shall not be 
justified unless he has witnessed the offence himself. This difference is based upon the 
fact that English criminal law consider the situation under provocation, whereas in 
Shari'ah it is dealt under the general principles of private defence. 
In English criminal law, the opinion that mutual consent of the parties for unlawful 
sexual intercourse negates the right of private defence is strange because the law admits 
that, a man, who finds his wife or even girlfriend' 10 indulged in adultery, if caused death 
I° DPP v. Camplin [1978] AC 705. 
106 R. v. Doughty (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 319. 
107 R. v. Millward (1932) 23 Cr. App. Rep. 1 19. 
108 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 192. 
109 Ibid. p. 180. 
110 Twine [ 1967] Crim. LR 710. 
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of either one or both of them shall be entitled for the defence of provocation resulting in 
his conviction of manslaughter instead of murder. Had the mutual consent of the parties 
any effect on the right of exercise of private defence, there would have been no defence 
of provocation available. The decided cases suggest that the consent of woman for 
adultery is of no significance because in all the cases it would be an aggression on the 
rights of the husband. The English law expressly treats the defence of chastity under 
provocation and defence of body under private defence, which suggests that the both are 
different kinds of defences. However, it may be argued that in such cases of provocation 
the defender is defending his legally protected rights and the condition of provocation is 
akin to the private defence and both the defences overlap. ' 11 
Now a question may arise that whether a wife can kill her husband if she finds him 
indulged in the act of adultery? In English law there is no recorded case to prove 
positively or negatively. "2 However it is asserted that the rule must apply to either 
spouse alike, contrary to the traditional Common law view of subjection of wife to her 
husband. ' 13 In Shari 'ah it can be argued that a woman is entitled to react in the same 
fashion as a husband because the command to prevent the commission of crime is 
general for both men and women. 114 
11.4 How to prove that the Accused was acting in Private Defence? 
In cases of private defence a situation may arise where the accused, without any 
evidence to prove, claims that he killed in exercise of right of private defence but the 
heirs of the murdered refused to accept his claim. The issue would be how to proceed 
the case? Generally speaking, the burden of proof lies upon the prosecution to prove the 
guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt but if the accused claims that his case 
falls under any exception, he is required to prove the existence of the circumstances 
which entitle him for the exception. ' 15 The opinion is based upon the saying of Ali 
when he was asked about a person who enters his house, finds his wife in a 
111 R. v. Porrilt [1961] 1 WLR 1372. 
112 Bresler, Fenton, 1988, op. cit. p. 9. 
11' Per Viscount Simon in Hohnes v. DPP [1946] 2 All ER 124 at 128. 
114 Al-Qur'an 9: 71-72. 
15 Al-Novi, Al-Majmooh Sharah A1-Mohazzib (Dar Al-Fiker, Beirut) Vol. IXX, p. 252. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, pp. 332-33. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. IV, pp. 129-30. 
Al-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 28. 
Al-Khirshi, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Ali, op. cit. F. N. 81. Vol. VIII, p. 1 12. 
Al-Dasooqi, op. cit. F. N. 49. Vol. IV, p. 357. 
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compromising condition with a man and killed both of them. "He is bound to prove his 
claim otherwise he is liable for murder" replied Ali. ' 16 
The opinion can be supported by the logic that there are certain circumstances so 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused that the prosecution is not required to 
give even prima facie evidence on the point. In addition, in Shari 'ah, there is a maxim 
saying that plaintiff is bound to prove his claim by evidence, whereas the defendant may 
deny the claim on oath. 117 In the absence of any admissible evidence the claim of 
plaintiff shall fail. In this particular case, claiming that he acted in private defence, he is 
liable to prove it or to face the charge of murder as proved by the prosecution. There is 
almost the same situation in case of defence of property. If the owner of a house kills 
someone in his home and claims that the deceased attacked his home, the burden of 
proof lies upon him. If he has no evidence and the deceased was not a notorious thief or 
wrongdoer, the owner of the house is liable for Qisas. However, if the deceased was a 
notorious one but the owner of the house cannot prove an assault on the part of the 
deceased he shall be liable to pay Diyat to the heirs of the deceased. "' 
Hanbalite, have adopted more strict view in this situation. They say that the claim of the 
owner of the house is not admissible without evidence regardless of the fact whether the 
deceased was notorious for theft and mischief or not. If the evidence proves that the 
deceased was equipped with a deadly weapon and he attacked the defender, his death is 
justified. However, mere proof of his entrance in the house of defender either without 
any weapon or with a non dangerous weapon does not justify his killing; he may have 
entered for certain other reason. 19 According to Malkite, if the owner of the house fails 
to prove his claim by evidence, he is liable for Qisas, provided that he was not living at 
a far off place hardly visited by common man. If he was living at such a place where it 
is not possible for him to produce witnesses, then his claim is admissible on oath . 
120 It 
means that in order to be entitled for the defence of private defence, the accused is liable 
to prove that he caused death of the assailant in the lawful exercise of his right; failure 
to prove will result into conviction of murder. 121 
116 Al-Novi, op. cit. F. N. 1 13. Vol. IXX, p. 252. 
117 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 39. Vol. 1, p. 89. 
118 Ibn Abdeen, 1399 A. H., op. cit. Vol. III, p. 221. 
119 Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 333. 
120 Al-Dasooqi, op. cit. F. N. 49. Vol. IV, p. 357. 
121 Ibn Qadama, AI-Mughni (151 ed., Dar Al-Hadith, Cairo, 1996) Vol. XI, p. 344. 
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The principles are compatible with the principles of criminal laws of civilised societies 
that the plaintiff is liable to prove his claim by evidence and a plaintiff is one whose 
claim shall fail if no evidence was introduced at all. In cases of private defence the 
accused claims that he acted in the exercise of private defence, the burden lies upon him 
to prove the claim. The English criminal law followed the same principle for centuries; 
and there is ample authority to prove the assertion. 122 It was not until 1935, that the law 
in this area was changed. House of Lords took the first step in Woolmington v. DPP 123 
by stating that once the accused had given evidence that homicide committed by him 
falls with in any exception, the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond any 
reasonable doubt that it was not. However, their Lordships recognised that the new 
principle shall not be applicable in case of defence of insanity and any statutory 
exception. 124 The approach can be criticised on the ground that no reason has been 
given by the House of Lords for the exclusion of insanity from the scope of the rule that 
burden is on the prosecution to prove the guilt. 125 At the moment there are various 
statutory provisions expressly casting burden of proof on the accused e. g. proof of 
diminished responsibility, suicide pact, lawful authority or the excuse for the possession 
of an offensive weapon and lack of knowledge or belief that a substance in possession 
of the accused was a controlled drug. '26 
Similarly, in a summary trial, if the accused relies for his defence on any exception, 
proviso, excuse or justification the burden of proving such circumstances is on him. 127 It 
means in less serious offences legal burden of proof lies on the defendant as opposed to 
more serious ones. 128 In R v. Edwards129 and R. v. Hunt130 the courts held that section 
101 of the Magistrate Courts Act 1980 restates an earlier rule of common law 
applicable to all criminal trials including indictments. Though the decisions are contrary 
to the express statutory provisions yet they are important to ensure consistency between 
122 Blackstone, 1809, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 201; Mackalley's Case (1611) 9 Co. Rep. 65b; 77 ER 828; R v. 
Smith (1837) 8 C. & P. 160; 173 ER 440; R. v. Fisher (1837) 8 Car. & P. 182; 173 ER 452; The ling v. 
Oneby (1898) 2 LD. Raym 1485; 92ER 465. 
123 Woolmington v. DPP [ 1935] AC 462. 
124 Ibid. at pp. 481-82. 
125 Dennis, 1. H., The Law of Evidence (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2002) p. 377. 
126 I lomicide Act 1957 s (2) 2 and (4) 2; Prevention of Crime Act 1953 s (1) I; Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 
s(28)2. 
127 Magistrates Courts Act 1980, s 101. 
128 Fitzpatrick, Ben, "Reverse Burden and Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Drink in Charge" (2003) 67 The Journal Of Criminal Law 193 at 195. 
129 R. v. Edwards [ 1975] QB 27. 
110 R. v. Hunt [1987] AC 352; [1986] 3 WLR 1115; [1987] 1 All ER 1. 
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two modes of trials. Lord Griffiths stated "the law would have developed on absurd 
lines if in respect of the same offence the burden of proof today differed according to 
weather the case was heard by the magistrates or on indictment"131 There is an obvious 
contradiction between the statutory provision and practice of the courts, however the 
attitude of English courts in the late 20t1i century is in conformity with the opinion of 
Muslim jurists that the proof of existence of any defence or exception is the duty of the 
accused. 
11.5 Conditions for the Exercise of Right of Private Defence. 
The discussion above proves that Shari 'ah recognises right of private defence in all its 
forms and manifestations. However, exercise of this right is subject to certain 
conditions. 132 The conditions and their description is as under: 
1. An unlawful assault by the assailant. 
2. The assault must be imminent. 
3. Impossibility of private defence by any other means. 
4. Use of reasonable force. 
11.5.1 First Condition: Unlawful Assault 
Right of private defence arises as a result of an unlawful assault. Punishment by parents, 
teachers or an act done in discharge of public duty does not amount to an unlawful 
assault and hence there is no right of private defence against such acts. These persons 
are either exercising their right to reform the child or discharging their duty under the 
law. 133 However, if they clearly go beyond their authority and cause unjustifiable harm 
they will be liable. 134 English law also recognises the same principle in respect of 
parents and teachers to use reasonable force to discipline the children. 135 
There is a directly proportional relationship between unlawful assault and right of 
private defence. 136 It is the commencement of the assault that gives birth to the right of 
private defence. There is no right to defend before apprehension of a danger and there 
will be no such right after its cessation. 137 Where the assault ends due to one reason or 
131 R v. Hunt [1987] AC 352 at 373. 
132 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 478. 
Bhansi, Ahmad Fathi, 1984, op. cit. p. 195. 
133 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 479. 
134 Al-Fatoohi, Taqi-ud-din Muhammad, MuntahiAl-Iradat (Edited and researched by Shaikh Abdul 
Ghani Abdul Khaliq, Maktab Dar Al-Urooba, 1962)Vol. 11, p. 427 
135 Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (3`d ed., Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 151. 
Ormerod, David, 1994, op. cit. p. 929. 
R. v. Smith [1985] Crim. LR. 42. 
136 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 478. 
137 Al-Shat hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 27. 
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the other the right ceases to exist, for what is permitted under necessity is valid only so 
long as the necessity lasts. Anything done after the cessation of assault shall not be 
governed under the doctrine of necessity. 13 8 The defender shall be treated under the 
normal rules of criminal liability because he was not acting in private defence rather 
punishing the assailant. ' 39 Similarly, where the object of defence can be achieved 
without having recourse to use of force there is no justification for use of force. 140 
There is an opinion that if the defender initially uses excessive force in private defence 
he may be treated as an aggressor and the assailant can lawfully exercise right of private 
defence against him. 14' The opinion is based upon an un-realistic approach; the assailant 
cannot take the place of the victim, because he is responsible to cause the circumstances 
of private defence to exist. He cannot take the defence of the victim as an aggression 
and use right of private defence against him. However, if the circumstances prove that 
the original assault was not sufficient to give rise to the right of private defence and the 
defender used a force that was totally unnecessary; reasonable force used by the initial 
assailant in his defence may be justified. 
An accused who provokes the victim and then resorts to use force in private defence is 
not entitled for defence even if the victim overreacts in his retaliation and use excessive 
force but with in reasonable limits. This can be proved by the verdict of Ali in a case 
where a women having illicit relationship with a man was married to another man. On 
the bridal night her paramour entered the room; on arrival of her husband there started a 
fight between them and the husband killed the man. The woman in turn killed her 
husband and later on pleaded private defence. Ali decided that the woman is liable for 
the murder of her husband because she was an accomplice of her paramour, hence not 
entitled for private defence. 142 The detail above suggests that private defence is 
available only against unlawful assaults and any person responsible for causing the 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 487. 
138 Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 186. (For example, if a thief made his way with the stolen 
property and after some time he comes across the victim of the theft, having no stolen property in his 
possession, if the victim of the theft attacks and kills him, he shall be liable for murder because he was 
not acting in private defence of his property. ) 
139 Al-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
140 Al-Bahooti, Mansoor bin Yousaf, Sharah Muntahi AI-Iradat (Matbah Ansar, 1947) p. 378. 
141 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 488. 
142 Ibid. p. 480. 
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circumstances of private defence to exist is not entitled to claim the benefit of the 
defence. The provisions of Shari'ah in this regard are on a par with the English law. 
11.5.2 Second Condition: The Assault must be Imminent 
A person shall not be entitled to exercise his right of private defence unless he feels an 
imminent danger of attack. Imminence of the danger can be computed by taking into 
account the time and the opportunity to have recourse to the assistance of public 
authorities. 143 If the assailant cannot execute his threat imminently, merely the threat 
will not give rise to a right to defend. For instance, if there was a river, trench or any 
other such obstacle, between the assailant and the assailed, which provides a shield for 
the assailed, the assault shall not be considered imminent. Likewise, merely an intention 
of the offender to cause an aggression or harm in future will not give rise to right of 
private defence.. 144 For example, if a person intends to assault the victim in future but 
presently he is not in a position to act upon his intention, the victim is not allowed to 
attack him and claim exercise of right of private defence because the defence was 
allowed to repel an aggression and there was no aggression at the moment. 
The concept of use of pre-emptive force in private defence, in the contemporary law, is 
not a novelty. Muslim jurists have dealt with the idea centuries ago. It is suggested that 
a defender is not bound to wait for the actual assault from the assailant rather allowed to 
use pre-emptive force in his defence if he reasonably apprehends an attack . 
145 He must 
have some grounds to believe that he will be subject to an unlawful assault, if failed to 
use pre-emptive force. 146 However, it should be kept in mind that that the right to use 
pre-emptive force shall not be available merely on suspicious grounds. '47 In order to 
believe in the existences of certain circumstances there must be certain causes which 
lead to such a belief. For example, if a person rushed at him or enters his home having a 
weapon in his hand the defender may reasonably believe the existence of circumstances 
giving rise to right of private defence. 148 An unreasonable belief that the assailant was to 
attack him will not suffice a ground for private defence. 149 
143 Abdul Tawwab, M. Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 188. 
144 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 482. 
145 Al-Bahooti, Mansoor bin Yousaf, 1947, op. cit. p. 349. 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 481. 
146 Al-Shibramisi, Abu Zia Noor ud din Ali bin All, Hashyat Al-Shibramisi Ala Sharah Al-Minhaj 
(Published with Nihayat al-Mohtaj-Maktaba Mustafa Al-babi Al-halbi, Egypt, 1967)Vol. Vlll, p. 21. 
147 Al-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 27. 
148 Ibid. 
149 ibid. 
Al-Fatoohi, Taqi-ud-Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. Vol. III, p. 228. 
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11.5.3 Third Condition: There is no Other Way to Defend 
As mentioned earlier use of force in private defence is an exception to the general 
prohibition of use of force by a private person against another. A defender is allowed to 
use the lowest possible degree of force in inevitable circumstances if other reasonable 
means for defence are not available. ' 50 If he uses force where it was not required at all, 
he will not be entitled for the defence. 151 The most important among the other 
reasonable means is retreat to avoid assault. 
11.5.3.1 Duty to Retreat and Shari'ah 
As mentioned above Shari 'ah allows private defence with the lowest possible degree of 
force. Now a question arises if the defender is in a position to defend without use of 
force, whether use of force in that condition will be justified? Muslim jurists differed in 
opinion on the question. According to majority opinion if it is possible for the defender 
to save his life by retreat, taking protection of some place or to have recourse to the 
assistance of public authorities, he is under a duty to adopt any of the ways available. 
'52 
They opined that the object of right of private defence is to save his life and not to 
punish the assailant. He is bound to use the mildest means for that end. In the presence 
of a milder means he is not entitled to use force, as he is not allowed to use more force 
than required. 
Shafite impose a condition that if the defender believes that he can successfully save his 
life by retreat it becomes his duty. However, where he is doubtful he is allowed to stay 
and face the assault. 153 According to Malkite if retreat does not cause any harm to him 
he is under a duty to retreat otherwise not. 154 Here, the harm also includes any social 
harm to the reputation of the person beside any material harm. 155 The opinion is 
compatible with the opinions in English and American laws, as discussed in 10.6.3.2, 
Ibn Abdeen, 1399 A. H., op. cit. Vol. V, p. 351. 
150 Al-Novi, op. cit. F. N. 113. Vol. IXX, p. 251. 
Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 73. Vol. Vlll, p. 302. 
Qazi Zada Afandi, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. IX, p. 167. 
Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 196. 
Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 27. 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 486. 
151 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 482. 
152 Qazi Zada Afandi, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. IX, p. 166. 
Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 357. 
Al-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 197. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, pp. 331-32. 
Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 27. 
153 Al-Qalubi, 1956, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 206-07. 
154 lbn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 357. 
155 Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 240. 
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that if it is possible for the victim of unlawful assault to retreat safely; he is bound 
otherwise not. 
Shafite dealt the problem from another viewpoint as well; they say retreat is a duty only 
where the assailant is a blameless man, where he is an apostate or an alien enemy the 
defender is not under an duty to retreat rather in such a case retreat is unlawful because 
it is permissible for him to defend and that what is permitted cannot further be 
restricted. 156 However, according to a minority opinion of Shafite and Hanblite jurists, 
the assailed is not bound to retreat rather to stand and defend because private defence is 
a right bestowed by Shari'ah and the assailed is entitled to exercise it. 
157 
The analysis of the opinion suggests that the majority opinion is the most appropriate 
because the major object of the right is to save the protected interests and not to retaliate. 
If the object can be achieved by avoiding conflict in a reasonable way, the assailed 
should be liable to avoid it. It. suggests that a responsible reaction at individual level is 
encouraged and a positive behaviour is preferred over a negative or destructive conduct. 
What will be the liability of the defender where he was under a duty to retreat, but did 
not, and caused death of assailant in private defence? Shafite have two possible answers 
for the question. According to their preferable opinion he is liable for Qisas, whereas, 
according to secondary opinion he is only liable to pay Diyat. 
158 This concept of 
liability is based upon the duty of the defender to retreat. Where the defender owes a 
duty to retreat but instead of retreating killed the assailant, he is liable to Qisas. In a 
case where there is no duty to retreat but he uses excessive force and caused death of the 
assailant his liability is reduced to manslaughter liable to the payment of Diyat. 
159 
Majority opinion of the Muslim jurists suggests that a retreat is not a condition for the 
validity of the defence of private defence rather it is the best available evidence to prove 
that the defender did not intend to use excessive force and he adopted reasonable means 
for the defence. The principle is exactly the same as in the English criminal law. If a 
156 Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 28. 
157 Al-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 28. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, pp. 331-32. 
155 AI-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 197. 
Al-Rammali, 1992, op. cit. Vol. VIII, p. 25. 
159 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 487. 
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man, confronted with a situation where he cannot save his life by taking a shelter or any 
other available peaceful means, has only a deadly weapon, uses that weapon to protect 
his life, shall not be liable for anything. 160 It has been established that Shari'ah prohibits 
inflicting of any injury on the assailant that the defender might have reasonably avoided 
by retreat or withdrawal. 
11.5.4 Fourth Condition: Use of Reasonable Force in Private Defence 
Shari'ah permits private defence in the hours of necessity. However, it imposes a 
condition that force used for the defence must be proportional to the criminal force used 
by the assailant. 161 According to Hanfrte jurists, if the victim of a deadly assault was 
capable to defend without causing death of the assailant, right of private defence does 
not extend to cause death; however, in unavoidable circumstances death will be justified 
because necessity has driven him to it. ' 62 It is a question of fact whether it was 
necessary to cause death of the assailant. For example, an unlawful assault in day light 
or in a city is different from an assault of the same nature at night or in a jungle or desert. 
The victim may be helped by others in the former condition but not in the latter, so use 
of deadly force will be permissible in the latter condition and not in the former. 
Shafite, say if defence is possible by merely shouting, the defender is not allowed to use 
physical force, where physical force suffices use of a stick is not allowed, where use of 
stick does not defend use a weapon will be permissible. If defence can be affected by 
causing merely an injury or destroying an organ of the body of the assailant, the 
defender is not allowed to cause his death, if he exceeded with the possibility of defence 
by a lower degree of force, he shall be liable for compensation. ' 63 However, the order of 
preferences mentioned above is meant for the normal conditions of defence. In the case 
of a felonious assault where the defender has no option, he is allowed to use any 
reasonable means for his defence notwithstanding the order of preferences. 
164 
According to Hanblite, in all the cases of private defence the defender is liable to use 
160 AI-Shaf'hi, Al-Umm (IS` ed., Al-Matbah Al-Ameeria Al-Kubra, Egypt, 1968) Vol. VI, p. 172. 
161 Al-Kasani, Al-Badai wa Al-Sanai (H. M. Saeed Co. Karachi, Pakistan, 1979) Vol. VII, p. 93. 
Al-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
162 Al-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 93. 
Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. F. N. 73. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
163 Al-Sherazi, Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Bin Ali, op. cit. F. N. 28. Vol. II, p. 224. 
AI-Khatib, Al-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 196. 
Al-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 29. 
164 Bhansi, Ahmad Fathi, 1984, op. cit. p. 209. 
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the most reasonable and lowest degree of force and if he causes death of the assailant in 
inevitable conditions he shall not be liable to any punishment. '65 
The opinions of the Muslim jurists can be summed tip by saying that the force used by 
the defender must be proportional to the assault. If it was possible to defend the assault 
by a lower degree of force, the defender shall be liable for his excessive acts. However, 
a jeweller's scale should not be used to determine the reasonableness of the force. The 
whole situation of the defence, personality of the defender, time and place of the 
unlawful assault should be taken into account to determine the quantum of force 
required for the defence. The opinions are compatible with the case of a Martial Arts 
expert who faces a deadly assault, yet by the exercise of his skills can disarm the 
assailant, is not allowed to use deadly force in his defence. 
166 Shari'ah does not allow 
infliction of death or bodily harm unless the defender used every reasonable means in 
his power to avoid the assault and to cause as little harm as possible to achieve the 
object. The study above suggests that in order to be entitled for the defence of private 
defence the defender is liable to prove that he used force under necessity; the force used 
was reasonable and proportionate to the threat caused by the assailant. 
The force used will be reasonable if an ordinary prudent person, having the same 
general characteristics and background as the accused, placed under the same 
circumstances, would have behaved in the similar way. It means that the circumstances 
are to be adjudged purely on objective basis. This approach will provide adequate 
protection to the public because it requires the defender to observe a minimum standard 
of reasonableness, whereas, a subjective approach fails to require the defender to 
exercise a measure of reasonableness in perception of the situation. The subjective test 
as approved by English law might give a greater weight to the perceptions of the 
accused, by allowing him to assess his own circumstances unreasonably. 
11.6 Use of Excessive Force in Private Defence and Shari'ah 
The defender is allowed to defend and not to punish the assailant. Shari'ah does not 
consider the act of the defender as punishment. 167 I-Iad it been so, there would have been 
no liability of the assailant after the victim had successfully defended nor there wound 
165 AL-Mardavi, Al-Insaf Fi Mahrafal-al-Re jeh Alin Khilaf (Dar Ahya al-Tras Al-Arabi, Beirut, 1975) 
Vol. X, p. 303. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 35. Vol. VIll, p. 330. 
166 Robinson, Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing Co., 1984) Vol. II, Section 133, p. 103. 
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have been any right to defend against the acts of minor or insane because neither of 
them is liable to punishment under any civilised law. Taking into account the opinions 
of the Muslim jurists and the evidences from the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, it can be 
concluded that the victim of an unlawful assault is bound to use only reasonable force 
for private defence. If he goes beyond the limits and uses force that exceeds the force 
required for such purpose, he shall be liable. 
168 However, it will be logical to mitigate 
his liability if there was a genuine necessity for the exercise of right of private defence 
and the defender exceeded in the use of force. In such cases a conviction of murder may 
be substituted for manslaughter. 
However, where the facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the use of force was 
absolutely excessive and unreasonable, the defender may be held liable for the offence 
committed by use of such excessive force. For example, if the assailant retreated after 
being injured by the defender, the defender followed him and injured him again or 
caused his death, he will be liable either for murder or for intentionally causing 
subsequent injury. 169 If the force used by the defender was greater to such an extent that 
it falls within the realm of wanton misconduct, it would not be deemed to be used in 
private defence. However, if the magnitude of force was greater than which would have 
been used, it would still be deemed to be reasonable under the circumstances provided 
that it meets the standards of objective test. The question of reasonableness is a question 
of fact that can be determined by relying upon common sense and experience. Certain 
other factors, like the previous conduct of the accused, relationship between the accused 
and the victim, physical strength of the accused and the victim, imminence of assault 
caused by the accused and existence of other options for defence may also be taken in to 
account. 170 The rule can be simplified that a minor assault cannot be met with a deadly 
defence, whatever the perception of the accused may be. 
167 Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 473. 
168 Ibid. at p. 487. 
169 Al-Zail'hi, Tabyeen A1-Haq'iq (Maktabah lmdadia, Multan, Pakistan) Vol. V, pp. 110-111. 
AI-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 29. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 154. 
Al-Khatib, AI-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 1V, p. 196. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. VIII, p. 330. 
170 Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 154. 
AI-Sarakhsi, A1-Mabsut (Idara AI-Qur'an Wal Uloom Al-Islamia, Karachi) Vol. IVXX, pp. 50-51. 
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Muslim jurists also opined that initially a defender is not allowed to form an intention to 
cause death or grievous bodily harm to the assailant unless he believes in good faith that 
such death or bodily harm is indispensable for defence. ' 71 It is a general principle that 
intentional deadly force can never be justified because of the sanctity of human life and 
inviolability of the body integrity to the maximum extent. However, it would be 
unjustified to require in all the circumstances that the defender would not exceed the 
limits. Where in the emergency of the situation and without any explicit misconduct on 
the part of the defender a more severe injury than necessary was caused or death of the 
assailant occurred, payment of damages would be the most appropriate remedy. 172 
The English courts have also started to admit the principle of compensation in the cases 
of private defence where the defender exceeded the limits of reasonable force. In Revill 
v. Newberry, 13 the court awarded damages and in R v. Marlin (Anthony), 174 the injured 
burglar has been allowed to sue the defender for damages. 175 However, it is very strange 
that in the case of Summers the court did not take into account the broken wrist, 
fractured elbow, cracked ribs and fractured skull of a 21 years old burglar as a result of 
use of excessive force and held that the force used in the defence was reasonable. 176 
11.6.1 When Does Right of Private Defence Extend to Cause Death 
The right of private defence extends to cause death, if it was the only means to defend 
provided that the force used by the victim of assault was proportional to the danger 
caused by the assault. Shari'ah allows causing death of the assailant as the last resort to 
defend. Muslim jurists are of unanimous opinion that the victim of unlawful assault will 
be justified in causing death of the assailant if he apprehends that death will otherwise 
be the consequence. 177 Likewise, in the cases of an assault to commit rape the victim or 
171 Al-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 93. 
Al-Aabi, Al-Azhari, Jawaher Al-Ak/il (Dar Ahya al-Ktub AI-Arabia, Egypt) Vol. II, p. 293. 
172 Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 185. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 35. Vol. VIII, p. 330. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. IV, p. 92. 
Oudah, Abdul Qadir, 1997, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 485. 
Abdul Tawwab, M., Sayed, 1983, op. cit. p. 323. 
173 Revill v. Newberry [1996] 1 All ER 291; [1996] QB 567; [1996] 2 WLR 239. 
174 R. v. Martin (Anthony) [2003] QB 1; [2002] 2 WLR I; [2002] Crim. LR. 136. 
175 `The Times' June 14,2003. 
176 Guardian' May 15,2000. Referred to by Watson, Michael, "Reasonable Force and the Defence of 
Property" (2002) 166 JP 659 at 659. 
177 AI-Kasani, 1979, op. cit. Vol. VII, p. 12. 
AI-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI., p. 28. 
Ibn Qadama, op. cit. F. N. 12. Vol. Vlll, p. 329. 
Al-Dasooqi, op. cit. F. N. 49. Vol. IV, p. 357. 
AI-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. VI, p. 92. 
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any other person defending can cause death of the assailant. 178 In the defence of 
property causing death will be lawful if the assault endangers life of the defender. '79 
Private defence is quite a wider term to defend various interests. The force required may 
vary in various circumstances taking into account the nature of assault and the interest at 
stake. As the value of interests differs in the views of the right thinking members of 
society, it seems reasonable to allow causing death of the assailant in defending certain 
interests and not the others. A careful observation of the opinion of the Muslim jurists 
reveals that they allow causing death in defence of body, chastity and in certain 
conditions of defence of property. It is worth mentioning here, that the English drafters 
of Indian Penal Code adopted the same strategy and mentioned ten conditions in which 
a defendant is entitled to cause death of the assailant while exercising right of private 
defence. Six of these situations are related to the defence of body, whereas, the rest of 
four govern the defence of property. These conditions include an assault which 
reasonably causes apprehension of death, grievous bodily harm, rape, satisfying 
unnatural lust, kidnapping or abduction with an intention to cause death, wrongful 
confinement, where the victim apprehends that he will be unable to have recourse to the 
assistance of public authorities. 180 In the realm of defence of property the conditions 
include, theft accompanied by an assault to cause grievous harm, house breaking by 
night, robbery, and mischief by fire. 181 In the conditions mentioned above, the defender, 
bound by all the principles of private defence, if causes death of the assailant will be 
justified. 
This distinction places the court and jury in a better position to understand the 
circumstances of the case, the interest at stake and to determine whether the force used 
by the victim of the assault was reasonable under the circumstances. The defendant 
knows beforehand whether his act to defend is justified. The legal provisions are made 
simple and understandable for the common-man and the courts as well. Such a simple, 
178 lbn Abdeen, 1399 A. H., op. cit. Vol. V, p. 351. 
Al-Khatib, AI-Sharbini, 1958, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 194. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. Vol. Vl, p. 92. 
Al-Fatoohi, Taqi-ud-din Muhammad, op. cit. F. N. 61. Vol. 11, p. 493. 
179 AI-Toori, op. cit. F. N. 5. Vol. VIII, p. 302. 
Al-Shaf'hi, 1326 A. H., op. cit. Vol. VI, p. 27. 
Al-Bahooti, op. cit. F. N. 58. VI, p. 92. 
Ibn Farhoon, 1958, op. cit. Vol. 11, pp. 185-86. 
180 IPC and PPC, Section 100. 
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clear and coherent enactment is preferable as its makes it easier for judges to interpret 
for the juries and for the juries to comprehend it and apply to the facts of the case. 
Conclusion 
Private defence is a legally recognised right of everyone, allowing to resist any type of 
unlawful assault. A person is acting in private defence when his purpose is to defend 
any legally protected interest or prevention of crime. The major difference between the 
English law and Shari'ah in the realm of private defence is that in English criminal law 
the accused is guilty either of murder or no offence at all. There is no intermediate way 
out. The law ignores the emergency situation confronted by the defender, imminent 
requirement for the use of force and incapability of man to measure the exact amount of 
force required under such conditions. Conviction of an accused for murder is merely 
considering the offence ignoring all the circumstances under which it was committed. 
Shari'ah takes into account all such factors and presents a more logical, reasonable, 
moderate and plausible solution. A defender allowed using some force in defending his 
interests, if used a force that was excessive under the circumstance and caused death of 
the assailant, will be liable for manslaughter and not murder. While determining the 
liability of the accused a court is bound to take notice of all the circumstances of the 
case. The study shows that English law is still in the state of flux and proposed changes 
are no more than what Shari'ah has already proclaimed centuries ago. - 
'a' Ibid. Section 103. 
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Research Findings 
The law, either English or Islamic, is not concerned with punishing persons with guilty 
minds only unless they perform some act of criminal nature. In English law acts are 
prohibited on ground of social expediency and not because their moral nature, yet the 
moral aspect cannot be completely ignored e. g. the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter, defences of minority and insanity are based upon the moral 
blameworthiness of the accused. In Shari 'ah every human action carries an ethical 
quality; religion, ethic and law comprise a unit and the subjects are bound to follow the 
guidance as a whole. Islam is not merely a religion; it is a complete code of life 
providing guidance to deal with all the problems of life, individual and social, economic 
and political, national and international, in accordance with the Divine will. ' 
The principles relating to criminal liability in both the systems are identical. Both the 
systems recognise that the conduct of the offender which is prima facie an offence will 
not lead to his conviction if he has a valid defence. The court is bound to consider 
reasonable evidence in this regard and to allow its benefit to the accused because evil of 
punishing an innocent is greater than the non-punishment of guilty. Despite the 
similarity in the principles of criminal liability both the systems differ in classification 
of offences and their punishments. 
A prominent difference between the two is that apparently there is no consistency in 
English criminal law; most of the issues are governed under policy rather than principle 
hence leading to uncertainty. For example the government is not willing to control 
alcohol use, for it is considered to be restriction on an individual's freedom of choice, 
yet wish to control binge drinking and resulting violence. The attitude would have been 
admissible had the harmful effects of intoxication were restricted to the person of 
intoxicated only. Alcohol related problems, traditionally taken as personal problems, are 
now increasingly becoming community issues. It has been proved that intoxication not 
only damages the health and life of the intoxicated, its harmful effects also extend to the 
society at large in the form of crimes, violence and overburdening the National Health 
Services etc. A considerable proportion of taxes paid by the taxpayers go to the 
treatment of intoxicated hence rendering lesser amount available for the others. It is not 
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the matter of personal freedom of a person rather it involves the whole society and it is 
the duty of a state to protect the interests of the society. If the community has to 
maintain peace and order, good health and sanity, reason and understanding, against the 
freedom of an individual, it is ridiculous to say that the choice of an individual is so 
sacred that the interests of the whole community must be sacrificed. 2 
When it is said that "the government does not wish to discourage the sensible 
consumption of alcohol, but is committed to reduce alcohol-related harm" 3 the 
authorities neglect a major element that it is the sensible consumption that might lead to 
insensible one at a secondary stage. In addition, every individual has his own gauge of 
sensible. A report suggests that about 8.4 million people are drinking more than the 
recommended limits. 4 Alcohol has been proved such a dangerous substance for the 
individual as well as for society that it should not be treated carelessly; its trade and 
consumption should be dealt under the strong hand of the state. Temptation for it should 
be reduced by providing other healthy activities to the citizen and its replacement with 
cheaper and beneficial drinks. 5 Its sale and sale facilities should be reduced to the 
smallest possible limits by increasing its price and reducing the number of premises for 
sale. 6 It is unreasonable that such an acute problem remain un-addressed. Hardly any 
sacrifice will be too great which would result in a marked diminution of this evil. 
Attractive advertisements in media play a very important role in promoting use of 
intoxicants, especially in the young. These advertisements use the power and influence 
of media to convey a positive message for alcohol by glamorising drinking and play 
directly into the needs of teenagers. 7 Alcoholic beverages are portrayed as a part of the 
good life, associated with sex, fun, success, peer acceptance, and independence! That is 
why the alcohol consumption in UK has been increasing steadily. 9 Alcohol industry 
'Ali, Shaheen Sardar, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) p. 283. 
z Reason, Will, Drink and the Community (Student Christian Movement, London, 1922) pp. 105-106. 
3 Lord President's Report, Action Against Alcohol Misuse (HMSO, London, 1991) p. 1. 
Ibid. p. 3. 
(A research suggested that in the year 2000, alcohol accounted for 78.7% of the total drink market while 
soft drinks accounted for 17.5% and hot drinks for 3.8%) UK Drink Market 2002 (http: //iust- 
drinks. com/store/products) 2004. 
e Contrary to the suggestion reports indicate a steady increase in the number of on and off-licence 
premises. Whent, Hilary, Health Update: Alcohol (2nd ed., health Education Authority, 1997) p. 31. 
American Academy of Paediatrics, Alcohol Advertising: Fiction vs. Fact (http: //www. anp. org) 2003. 
s Editorial, "Warning: The Alcohol Industry" British Journal ofAddiction 87 (1992) 1109 at p. 1 109. 
9 Pirmohamed, M., Brown C. "The Burden of Alcohol Misuse" QJAf 93 (2000) 291. 
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spent £227 millions a year to advertise its products as against a meagre amount of only 
£1 million by the government for its prevention. 10 A major step leading towards 
controlling alcohol would be ban on its advertisement. 
It should be kept in mind that prohibition, without any powerful message and a clear 
object will only drive drunkenness behind closed doors and into dark places and will not 
cure or even diminish it. The religious institutions can play a very important role in 
tackling the problem. Religious faith tenders larger and deeper forces affecting the 
image of alcohol. " Unfortunately there is no uniformity of opinion in Christianity 
regarding the consumption of alcohol Roman Catholic Church does not consider it as 
intrinsically evil, whereas Protestant and certain other religious movements brand it as 
an evil which no one should use. 12 This difference of opinion might be a major obstacle 
in developing a religious pressure against alcohol consumption and hence resulting into 
failure to up root the evil from society. 
Shari'ah recognises involuntary intoxication as a defence to a criminal charge provided 
that the defendant was incapable to form intention and to control his conduct. The same 
principle prevails in English criminal law. However, both the systems treat cases of 
voluntary intoxication quite differently. English law takes account of the abnormal 
mental condition of the offender in specific intent offences ignoring his fault in bringing 
about the condition but does not apply the same rule in the basic intent offences. The 
law relating to the defence of intoxication is still in a state of flux and no logical reason 
can be forwarded for distinction between specific and basic intent. Shari 'ah, on the 
other hand, adopted a uniform principle denying any defence in the cases where the 
accused could be blamed for his intoxication. 
English criminal law on the defence of intoxication, taking into account its 
inconsistencies, has been declared as illogical, irrational and an ass. 13 The distinction 
between specific/basic intent has been designated as illogical 14 and indefensible, 15 
10 Alcohol Concern, New Figures Show Twice as Many People are Hooked on Alcohol than on all Other 
Drugs (http: //alcoholconcern. or, (. uk) 2003. 
Plant, M. & Single, E., Alcohol: Minimising the Harm (Free Association Books, London, 1997) p. 18. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Smith, J. C., Towards a Rational Criminal Law (The Holdsworth Club of the University of 
Birmingham, 1983) p. 5. 
14 R. v. Majewski [ 1977] AC. 443 at p. 483; 493; 498. 
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silliness and absurdity, 16 meaningless and unintelligible. 17 It treats the intoxicated 
person partially sober and partially intoxicated. 18 It is more logical that voluntary 
intoxication should never be a defence neither to an offence of specific nor basic 
intent. 19 No social harm would result from abolition of the intoxication defence rather it 
may lead to prevent misuse of drugs and commission of serious crimes. 20 In addition it 
will be in line with the general principle of criminal law that a defence is not available 
to an accused who was at fault in creating the condition supporting the defence. An 
intoxication defence declares that an antisocial behaviour is tolerated if committed 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Allowing intoxication to exculpate or mitigate 
criminal liability assures the inebriates that law will shield them from severe 
punishment; they enjoy the benefits of intoxicants while the victim pays the costs. 21 
Both the legal systems recognise the right of private defence. Acts done in private 
defence are not punishable if they were necessary to resist or avert unlawful assault 
provided that such acts do not manifestly exceed what is reasonable with regard to the 
danger inherent in the assault. A person may use force upon another when and to the 
extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary for private defence. In English law, 
there were formerly technical rules about duty to retreat before using force in the 
exercise of right of private defence but now it is simply a factor to be taken into account 
in order to determine whether it was necessary to use force. 22 The view is compatible 
with corresponding principle in Shari 'ah. However, there are two major differences 
between the two systems. Firstly, Shari 'ah manifestly allows defence of chastity of a 
woman notwithstanding the fact whether unlawful sexual intercourse was being 
committed by the consent of the parties or against the will of the woman. Whereas, 
there is no express provision in English law for the cases of adultery and further 
consensual sexual relationships between the members of society whether male or female 
are no offence hence denying a right to react under prevention of crime or private 
defence. Secondly, Shari'ah while granting right of private defence also took account of 
15 Leary v. The Queen [1978] 1 SCR 29 at 44. 
ý" Parker, Graham, "Criminal Law-Mens rea-General Principles-Intoxication as a Defence" 55 [1977] 
Can. Bar. Rev. 691 at p. 702. 
17 Leary v. The Queen [ 1978] 1 SCR 29 at 42. 
18 Beck, S. & Parker, G. E., "The Intoxicated Offender" 44 [1966] Can. Bar Rev. 563 at 588. 
19 The Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Intoxication as a Defence to a Criminal Offence, 
1995 (http: //www. lawreforni. ie/etiblications) Para 5.33, p. 121. 
20 Keiter, M, "Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defence" 87 [19771 JCL 482 at 483. 
21 Ibid. p. 510 
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the circumstances under which a person exercise this right. Hence allowed reduction of 
murder into manslaughter where the defender could not exactly weigh the quantum of 
force required but does not exceed the reasonable limits. On the other hand in the 
English law refusal to reduce murder to manslaughter in the instances of excessive force 
led to injustice in certain circumstances. Further, there is no consistent rule in English 
law to determine whether the force used was excessive. The decisions of the courts in 
this area seem to create anomaly as seen in the cases of defence of property. 
The proposed reforms in English law like reduction of murder into manslaughter in the 
cases of excessive private defence are already acknowledged by Shari'ah. Similarly, the 
proposal to create a new offence of dangerous intoxication with an equal punishment of 
the offence committed will be nearer to the concept of liability of intoxicated offender 
in Shari'ah. The study reveals that the principles enunciated by Shari'ah centuries ago 
are compatible with the corresponding principles of any civilized legal system of the 
present world. 
Although, in almost all legal systems, there is some degree of inflexibility, yet they are 
not equal in this regard. The degree of flexibility in each system depends very much 
upon the nature of law maker. In man-made laws, the views of law makers are subject 
to change with the change of time and conditions hence leading to an inevitable change 
in the laws. In the religious systems like Shari'ah, on the other hand, the character of 
law maker is unchangeable so is the law revealed by Him. However, this characteristic 
does not render it absolutely inflexible. Flexibility and stiffness exist side by side, 
specifically in the realm of criminal law. Leaving aside only a few offences, men are 
allowed to legislate according to their requirements unless this legislation is in 
contradiction with the injunctions of the Our'an or the Sunnah. It can be said that 
Shari'ah is not stagnant but living and developing system capable to meet the social 
problem of the world. Its vitality and capacity to meet the exigencies of changing 
patterns of life and social conditions has been demonstrated by the principles of 
criminal liability enunciated and its rules to deal with the problem of intoxication and 
private defence. By any definition of law Shari'ah is a law; it defines offences, 
prescribes appropriate punishments for them and recognises various conditions 
affording defence to an accused. 
22 Smith, J. C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (8`h ed., Butterworths, London, 1996) pp. 263-264. 
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The study in the realm of criminal law in Shari'ah suggests its compatibility with the 
English criminal law in particular and the laws of other civilised states in general. We 
discussed the principles of criminal liability and one defence each from two major kinds 
of defences i. e. excuse and justification. The similarities and the differences of both the 
system have been highlighted Though in any case it is not possible to create a uniform 
law for the whole world like the principles of natural sciences, yet one legal system can 
benefit from the experience of the other. In this regard it can be suggested that English 
legal system trying its utmost to control alcohol use and resulting criminal behaviour 
may adopt the strategy of Shari 'ah to tackle the problem. 
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